THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS OF BĀDARĀYAṆA

WITH

THE COMMENT OF ŚAṄKARĀCHĀRYA

CHAPTER II, QUARTERS I & II

EDITED IN THE ORIGINAL SANSKRIT, WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION, NOTES, GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS, AND INDEX

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PREFACE

As in several Universities the First Quarter (Pāda) of the Second Chapter (Adhyāya) of the Brahmasūtras (popularly known as the Smṛiti-pāda) with the Bhāshya of Śaṅkarāchārya is by itself prescribed for University examinations, it was decided to issue that part alone from my Second Edition (1931) of the two Quarters of that Chapter for the convenience of students. As a consequence, the Second Quarter also, containing Śaṅkarāchārya's criticism of the other Schools of Philosophy, which is alone sometimes prescribed for study at certain examinations, will be available separately. These separate issues are in each case accompanied by my English Translation and Notes, which have already won recognition amongst the critical students of Vedānta Philosophy.

The special features of this edition are: a conveniently arranged text divided into paragraphs with subsections within the paragraph marked off by a double vertical line or *daṇḍa* and the lines of the Bhāshya numbered by threes separately for each Sūtra for the sake of facility of reference; an accurate English Translation which non-Sanskritists, it is hoped, can read and understand by itself, and which is purposely placed at the beginning (and not below the text) so as to promote intelligent and independent study of the text; and the Notes which attempt to set forth the underlying philosophical concepts, while not ignoring at the same time the genuine verbal difficulties. The Glossary of Technical Terms used in the first two Pādas of Adhyāya Second, accompanied by their English equivalents, and the General Index at the end are other useful features of this edition. For a discussion of the date of the Brahmasūtras and of Śaṅkarāchārya and their relative position and achievement in the History of Indian philosophy, a reference may be made to my *Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta Philosophy* (1929), pp. 135–176, and 207–240. The price of the work has been purposely reduced so as to place it within the reach of the student of average means, for whom no other convenient edition of this portion with Notes and Translation exists on the market.

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S. K. BELVALKAR

BRAHMASŪTRAS II. I-II

WITH

THE COMMENT OF ŚAṄKARA

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

CHAPTER SECOND

QUARTER FIRST

Topic I : Heterodox Smṛitis

(*Sūtras* 1–2)

[Page 1] In Chapter First it was demonstrated, by establishing the concensus of the Scriptural passages (on the points), that the Omniscient Overlord is the cause of the world's origin, like clay, gold, and so forth of pots, ornaments, and other articles; that of the world thus created, He is the cause of stability, as being its controller, like the magician of his magical-illusion; that of the extended world, He, finally, is the author of the reabsorption into His own self, like the earth of the four classes of beings; and that the same Lord is identical with the Soul of us all. The doctrines putting forth Pradhāna and the like as the (First) Cause were also refuted as being not borne out by the Scriptures. Now is commenced Chapter Second, which is to deal with topics such as: the refutation of the objections based on Smṛitis and on Logic against our own position [Quarter 1] ; the presence of fallacious dialectics in the Pradhāna and other theories [Quarter 2] ; and the absence of inconsistency in the creation and other theories set forth in the several Vedānta-texts [Quarters 3 and 4]. To begin with, the Author puts forth the alleged contradiction (of our theory) with certain Smṛitis, and then sets it aside :

If it be objected that our position is open to the fault of leaving no scope to certain Smṛitis, we demur, as there would otherwise result the fault of leaving no scope to certain other Smṛitis. 1

The statement that Brahman alone, the Omniscient, is the cause of the world is not admissible. Why ? Since there results

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the fault of leaving no scope to certain Smṛitis. Thus there is the Smṛiti known as the Tantra, composed by the Great Sage, and regarded authoritative by those-entitled-to-respect, and other (Smṛitis) also based upon the same, which would all have no scope (at all) in your theory. For, in these Smṛitis the non-intelligent Pradhāna is set forth as an independent cause of the world. As to the Smṛitis of Manu and others, they do have a scope inasmuch as they fulfil their anticipated purpose by prescribing various religious-duties like fire-worship (Agnihotra), which are laid down as injunctions: namely, that a specific caste is to have at a specific period its ceremony of Initiation performed according to specific ritual; that a specific course of conduct is to be followed (after the Initiation); that the Veda is to be studied in a particular mode; that the return (after completion of study) is to be accomplished in a given manner; and that a particular is the method of cohabitation with one's lawfully-wedded wife. Likewise do they prescribe different religious-duties proper to the castes or the life-periods (āśramas) and calculated to secure goals attainable by mankind. But there remains no such scope for the Smṛitis such as those of Kapila and others in regard to the exercise of some kind of an activity. For, these were composed [Page 2] with the exclusive object of teaching the right knowledge that is the means to Liberation. And if these are to have no scope in that connection also, there would result an entire purposelessness of them. Therefore, you must interpret the Vedānta-texts so as not to contradict the (teaching) of these (Smṛitis). — But how can the teaching of the Scriptures, viz., that Brahman, the Omniscient one, is the cause of this world,—after it has been once established by arguments like that [in Brahmasūtra, I. i. 5] about the "Seeing"— be again open to the attack on the ground of the fault of not leaving scope for certain Smṛitis? This attack (we reply) would be nugatory in the case of persons of independent intellect. But the generality of the people, lacking such independent intellect and so unable to ascertain the sense of the Scriptures independently, would have to depend upon Smṛitis composed by celebrated authors, and would accordingly endeavour to ascertain the sense of the Scriptures with their help; and they would have no reliance upon the interpretation put forth by us by reason of their reverence for the authors of these Smṛitis. That sages like

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Kapila and others had unobstructed intuitive knowledge is declared in Smṛitis. There is also the Vedic text [Śvetāśvatara, v. 2] —"He who, in the beginning, supports by knowledge that sage Kapila when born, and who would see him while being born." Hence it is not possible to imagine that the opinion of such persons is not conformable to truth. For they, moreover, establish their view by taking the support of reasoning also. Therefore, the objection is repeated that we must interpret the Scriptures in consonance with these Smṛitis.

This is our rejoinder. We deny (your contention), as it would lead to the fault of leaving no scope to certain other Smṛitis. If, on the ground of the fault of leaving no scope to certain Smṛitis, the view that the Lord is the cause is objected to, then in that case the other Smṛitis proclaiming the Lord as the cause would be void of any scope. We will cite these : Having introduced the Highest Brahman with the words [Mahābhārata, xii. 342. 30]—" That which is subtle and beyond knowledge, "—and having affirmed [ibid., xii. 342. 31]—" He is indeed the Inner Soul of all beings and is styled ' Knower of the Field; ' "—the text declares [ibid., xii. 342. 32]—" From Him, O Best of the Twice-born, the Unevolved, consisting of the three guṇas (aspects) sprang forth." Also in another place [ibid., xii. 347. 31]—"The Unevolved, O Brahmin, is absorbed into the Person who is free from Qualities." (And again), " Listen, accordingly, to this condensed statement : ' The ancient Nārāyaṇa is all this; he creates everything at the creation-time and again consumes it (all) at the sublation-period.' "—This is declared in Purāṇa [cp. Mahābhārata, xii. 307. 115]. And in the Bhagavadgītā [vii. 6] it is said : " I am the source as also the dissolution of the entire world." Āpastamba [Dharmasūtra, i. 8. 23. 2] likewise declares with reference to the very same Highest Soul : [Page 3] "From Him spring all bodies ; He is the root, the eternal and the unchangeable." Thus in many a place even the Smṛitis show forth the Lord as being both the constituent and the efficient cause.

That unto an opponent who has based his objection on the strength of Smṛitis I should reply on the strength of the Smṛitis themselves—for this purpose it was that the fault of leaving no scope to Smṛitis was above set forth. That the Scriptures pur-

port to declare the Lord as the cause has been already shown. Hence when there ensues a conflict between Smṛitis so that only one (set) of them can be accepted and the other rejected, those Smṛitis that conform to the Scriptures are authoritative, the others being disregarded. This is declared in the treatise on Valid-proofs [Jaimini Sūtra, i. 3. 3]—" When there is contradiction (of a Smṛiti with an existing Śruti or Scriptural text) the Smṛiti is to be disregarded ; and where no Śruti (corresponding to a Smṛiti) is preserved, an inference (of its existence is to be made)." That any one can know matters beyond the purview of the senses without (the help of) the Scriptures, it is not possible to imagine, as there is no (valid) ground for it. (If one were to assert) that it is possible for perfect-sages like Kapila, as they have an unhindered knowledge (of everything), the reply is, No: for, this perfection is contingent. For, the perfection ensues from religious practices, and these are to be had from injunctions (given by the Scriptures). Hence the meaning of an already existent (Scriptural) injunction cannot be called into question on the strength of the words of a perfect-sage, who comes into existence after (the Scriptural injunction). And even if one were to turn to these sages (for the right interpretation of Scriptures), yet, as there are many such sages, whenever there results, as before indicated, a conflict between Smṛitis, there remains no mode of reaching a decision unless one resorts to the Scriptures. And for one who (is not such a perfect-sage, and who) derives his knowledge from others, it is not proper to conceive without reason a partiality for some specific Smṛitis, since, if one were to have such a partiality for some particular text, seeing that the opinions of people are extremely divergent, there would ensue the contingency of an absence of all definiteness as to the Reality. Hence, even the mind of such a (misguided) person one should endeavour to enlist to the right path by setting forth the divergent teachings of the Smṛitis, and asking him to discriminate between them according as their doctrines follow or do not follow (the teaching of the Scriptures).

As to the Scriptural-text exhibiting the perfection of knowledge of Kapila which was cited, on the strength of that it is not possible to rely upon Kapila's view even though it be against the Scriptures : for, the text contains merely the general word "Kapila"

and we know from Smṛitis of another Kapila, Vāsudeva by name, who burnt down the sons of Sagara; and furthermore a passage can have no power (for establishing one thing) if its main topic be another thing, as it would then lack all probatory force with reference to the first thing. We also have another Scriptural-text proclaiming the greatness of Manu [Tait. Saṁ, II. ii. 10. 2] —"Whatsoever Manu has declared is medicine." And Manu has praised the oneness of the Self pervading all things with the words [xii. 91]—" One who sees the Self in all beings, and all beings in the Self makes the (true) offering to the Self, and so wins Self-empire"—and so it follows [Page 4] that he reprobates the opinion of Kapila. For, Kapila does not acknowledge the doctrine of the oneness of the Self in all, as he assumes a plurality of the Selfs. In the Mahābhārata [xii. 360. 1] also, after raising the question : " Are there, O Brahmin, many persons or only one ? "—and setting forth the opponent's view [ibid., xii. 360. 2]: " O King, there are, according to those that adopt the Sāṁkhya-Yoga view, many persons,"—the text refutes that view by the passage beginning with [ibid., xii. 360. 3]: " Just as of several persons there is only one source of origin (viz. the earth), so will I declare to you that Universal Person, excelling in qualities " ; and it goes on to establish the oneness of the Self in all [ibid., xii. 361. 4-5] by the words : " The Self within me and that within thee and the others that are encased in the different bodies : of them all He is the spectator, not to be perceived by anyone anywhere. He is all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed : the one who moves unhindered and at will amidst all the beings." There is also a Scriptural text about the oneness of the Self in all [Īśa Up., 7]—" When unto the knowing individual all the beings have become one with his own Self, what infatuation, what misery, can there be for that one who realises the oneness (of all)?" Hence it is proved that the theory of Kapila runs counter to Veda, and to the words of Manu who follows Veda, also in its view about the plurality of the Selfs, and not merely in its hypothesis of the Prakṛiti as an independent First Principle. As to the Veda of course its authoritativeness in its own subject is not contingent upon anything, any more than that of the Sun in the matter of form-and-colour ; whereas that of merely human statements is contingent upon some independent external basis (the Veda or the actual reality), and is

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further estranged (from reality) by the intervension of the speaker's memory. Hence in matters that go against the Vedas the objection that certain Smṛitis would be deprived of all scope is no objection. 1.

And for what further reason is the contention that certain Smṛitis would be deprived of every scope, not valid?—

And because there is no finding of the others. 2

Entities other than the Pradhāna, and as the evolved products of the Pradhāna, which are imagined in the (Sāṁkhya) Smṛiti, viz. the Mahat and others, are not met with either in the Veda or in ordinary experience. As to the elements and the organs, these can be asserted in the Smṛiti-text as they are well-established in the world and in the Veda; but Mahat and others to which neither experience nor the Scriptures bear testimony [Page 5], the Smṛiti can have no right to assert, any more than to assert an object cognisable by a sixth sense-organ (there being only five of them). And what appears to be a scriptural warrant for the entities in question has been explained by us as not referring to them in the Sūtra I. iv. 1, beginning with the words—"If it be urged that even the inferred entity (Pradhāna) in some texts ....etc." The point is that if the Smṛiti-statement is untrustworthy in respect of the effects, it is fit that it should not be trusted in respect of the (First) Cause taught by it. Hence also that a certain Smṛiti becomes devoid of all scope is no defect. As to the support from reasoning (sought for the Smṛiti) the Sūtrakāra will demolish it in the portion beginning with Sūtra II. i. 4—"No: by reason of the disparity-in-nature, etc." 2. Here ends the Topic (1) called Heterodox Smṛitis.

TOPIC 2 : YOGA-SMṚITI

(*Sūtra* 3)

Thereby is Yoga refuted. 3

By this refutation of the Sāṁkhya-Smṛiti even the Yoga-Smṛiti is to be understood as refuted: so he extends the application (of the same arguments). For, even in that Smṛiti are assumed, in

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contravention of the Scriptures, Pradhāna as an independent first cause as well as Mahat and others as effects, none of which are warranted by experience and by the Scriptures. If that be so, because there is the application of the same reasoning, this is already implied in the preceding. Wherefore, then, make a special analogical transference? (We reply:) There is here a special cause for doubt, inasmuch as the Yoga is laid down as the means to right knowledge in Vedic texts like [Bṛih. Up., ii. 4. 5]—"The self is to be heard, thought of, meditated upon"; while we observe in the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad [ii. 8] Yogic prescriptions with manifold details beginning with the assuming of postures etc. in passages like—"Having rendered the body with its three erect parts (the trunk, the neck and the head) even ..". And there are to be found thousands of references to the Yoga in the Veda, such as [Kaṭha, II. iii. 11]—"The steady curbing of the senses is what they call Yoga"; or [Kaṭha, II. iii. 18]—"This teaching as well as all the prescriptions about Yoga"; and so forth. In the Yogaśāstra itself with (the Sūtra)—'Now, the Yoga, the means to the perception of Reality"—Yoga is acknowledged to be a means for right knowledge. Hence inasmuch as a portion of it is acceptable, the Yoga Smṛiti would become altogether free from objection, like the Smṛiti teaching the "Ashṭakā" rites. It is this additional cause for doubt that is being removed by the analogical transference; since, although a part of it is acceptable, there is seen to be, as pointed out already, a divergence as regards another part of its teaching.

[Page 6] Although many are the Smṛitis treating of the soul and kindred matters, a special effort has been made to refute just the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga Smṛitis. For, Sāṁkhya and Yoga are well-known in the world as the means of reaching the highest end of man, are so accepted by persons-entitled-to-respect, and are armed with specific references to them in the Scriptures, viz. [Śvet.. vi. 13]—"Having known that Cause, attainable by Sāṁkhya-Yoga—the God—one is freed from all fetters." The way out is given by the consideration that it is not by Sāṁkhya-knowledge or Yoga-method independently of the Veda that the highest goal is achieved. For, Śruti itself [Śvet., iii. 8] discountenances any other means of reaching the highest goal save the Vedic teaching of the oneness of the Ātman—"Knowing Him

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alone one goes beyond Death : there exists no other path for going (beyond)." The Sāṁkhya and the Yoga followers are dualists : they do not recognise the oneness of the Ātman. And as to the Śruti-text cited [Śvet., vi. 13]—"That cause, attainable by Sāṁkhya-Yoga......" etc.,—even there one must conclude that the knowledge and the meditation implied by the words Sāṁkhya and Yoga are no other than what the Veda gives, as is clear from the context. And we quite acknowledge that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga Smṛitis, in that portion where they do not contradict (the Veda), do have a claim to authoritativeness. For instance, the Sāṁkhyas assume the non-contamination of the Purusha by declaring him to be above all qualities ; and this is also vouched for by Śruti-texts like [Bṛih., iv. 3. 16] : "This person is free from attachment." So also the followers of Yoga prescribe house-less life and so forth, and in that conform to the teaching concerning renunciatory attitude well-known to Scriptural-texts like [Jābāla, 5]—" And then the wandering-ascetic with a discoloured raiment, shaven, and rid of all possessions......".—The preceding reason should be taken to have refuted all Smṛitis founded upon reasoning (as opposed to Vedic Revelation). If these be thought to aid the perception of Reality by teaching how to reason and excogitate, let them do so. Our point is that the knowledge of the Reality proceeds merely from Upanishadic texts, as is clear from passages like [Tait. Br., III. 12. 9. 7]—" No one not knowing the Veda can have an idea of that Great One," or [Bṛih., iii. 9. 26]—" I ask unto thee that Person taught (only) in the Upanishads." 3. Here ends the Topic (2) called Yoga-Smṛiti.

TOPIC 3 : DISPARITY IN NATURE

(*Sūtras* 4–11)

No: by reason of the disparity of this (world) [from Brahman]; and its being so (we learn) from the Scripture. 4.

[Page 7] To the view that the Brahman is the efficient as well as the constituent cause of this world, the objection based upon Smṛitis has been refuted. Now is to be refuted the objection based upon reasoning. How (one might ask) can there be room for an objection based upon reasoning urged against this

Vedic view already demonstrated? For, must not the Veda be deemed absolutely valid in its teaching concerning the Brahman, as in that concerning religious-practice ?—This might have been a bar to further procedure if Brahman had been an entity cognisable only by the Scripture, and not open to the other means of knowledge, like unto religious-practice, which implies a specific course of action. But Brahman is declared to be (not the result of a process of action, but) an already accomplished entity ; and in the case of such an accomplished and existing entity, for instance the earth, there is scope for the activity of other means-of-knowledge. Hence, just as, whenever Scriptural passages contradict one another, all the other passages are so interpreted as to conform to one specific passage, even so, when there is a conflict between the Scriptural passage and another means-of-knowledge the text in question ought to be always so interpreted as to conform to the means-of-knowledge. The more so, as reasoning comes nearer direct experience inasmuch as it establishes an unseen object on the analogy of a seen object ; whereas the Scriptural passage is further removed (from experience) because it tells what it wants to tell as a mere "so it was." And Brahma-knowledge becomes admittedly a means to absolution after removing away all ignorance only when that knowledge results in a realisation in one's own experience : that being its actual, tangible fruit (distinguishable from the remote, intangible fruit of the Dharma or religious practice). Scripture itself [Bṛih., ii. 4. 5] says—"The Ātman is to be heard, to be reflected upon......", and in this, by prescribing a ratiocination in addition to mere hearing, it shows that reasoning also is to be duly resorted to. Hence, once more, we repeat our objection on the basis of reasoning : " No : by reason of the disparity of this (world) [from Brahman]."

The assertion that the sentient Brahman is the cause and constituent of the world cannot be maintained. Why ? Because this (world, the) effect is disparate-in-nature from its constituent-cause. For, this world which is alleged to be an effect of the Brahman is seen to differ in nature from Brahman, being non-sentient and impure, whereas Brahman is different in nature from the world, since the Scriptures declare it to be sentient and pure. And we nowhere observe the relation of cause and effect between things disparate in nature. For, effects like ornaments

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can never be produced from the clay, nor pots and the like produced from gold. It is out of clay alone that products possessing-clay-characteristics are produced, and out of gold alone, those possessing-gold-characteristics. So similarly, this world possessing the characteristics of pleasure-pain-infatuation can properly become the effect of a cause which is constituted of the characteristics of pleasure-pain-infatuation, and not of Brahman, which is disparate-in-nature from it. And as to this disparity of the world from the Brahman it can be inferred from the appearance of impurity and non-sentiency. For, the world certainly is impure being constituted of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, as giving rise to happiness, affliction, and dejection, and producing conditions high and low like the heaven and the hell. The world is likewise non-sentient inasmuch as it makes up the bodies and the organs, and so subserves the purposes of a sentient being. For, where there is parity-in-nature there cannot obtain [Page 8] the relation of the principal and the auxiliary. Two lamps, for instance, cannot subserve each other's purpose.—One might urge against this that, on the analogy of the master and his servant, even a sentient body and instrument can subserve the purpose of the experiencing-soul. But no. In this case of the master and the servant it is the non-sentient part of the latter that subserves the purposes of the former who is sentient. It is. that is to say, just the intelligence and other non-sentient paraphernalia of the sentient servant that subserves the purpose of the sentient master; and it is not the case that the sentient soul (of the servant) does himself become subservient or recalcitrant with reference to the master's sentient soul. The Sāṁkhyas indeed maintain that the sentient souls have a nature not liable to accretion or depletion, and are devoid of any activity. Therefore the body and the organs (and all things that serve as instruments) are non-sentient. Nor is there any ground for the belief that objects like logs-of-wood or lumps-of-clay are sentient. In fact this distinction between sentient and non-sentient objects is patent to the world. Hence it follows that because of a disparity-in-nature from Brahman, this world cannot have Brahman as the constituent-cause.

Now, if some one were to say—"On the strength of the declaration in the Scripture to the effect that this world has a sentient being as its cause—I am prepared to conclude that the whole

world is itself sentient, inasmuch as the nature of the constituent-cause is known to continue in its effect; and that the non-perception of the sentiency can be explained by postulating a peculiar modification of it. Just as, that is to say, in the case of the souls that are of admitted sentiency, we do fail to perceive their sentient character in their states of sleep, fainting, etc., even so there might be a failure to perceive the sentiency in the case of objects like the log-of-wood and the lump-of-clay; and that on the ground of this very difference between them, viz., the perceptibility and the non-perceptibility (of their sentiency) and the absence and presence of colour and other qualities, we can explain without contradiction the relation of the principal and the auxiliary between the body and the organs on the one hand and the soul on the other, even though both equally participate in sentiency, the present case being quite explicable on the analogy of flesh, soup, rice, etc., which—although all equally earth-products—subserve each other's purpose by reason of the peculiar properties inherent in each,—the same circumstance also serving as an explanation of the well-known fact of the differentiation (of the world into sentient and non-sentient classes)."—One urging these considerations may somehow or other succeed in explaining away the disparity-in-nature based upon sentiency and non-sentiency; but the disparity based upon purity and impurity he can in-no-wise remove.

Nor can he explain away the first disparity, says (the Sūtra): "Its being so follows from Scripture." The sentient nature of all things in the world, even though nowhere an object of anybody's experience, is inferred merely on the strength of the Scriptural assertion about the world having a sentient first cause, because one has an absolute faith in the Scripture. But the inference is contradicted by Scripture itself, seeing that even from Scripture one learns of its being so. By 'its being so' he implies disparity from the constituent-cause. The Vedic text [Tait. Up., ii. 6] speaks of "the intelligent and the non-intelligent," and so asserts that a portion of the world is non-sentient, and from this it follows that the world is different-in-nature from Brahman. 4.

[Page 9] But is it not a fact that in some places in the Scriptures we hear of the sentient character of the elements and sense-

organs, regarded usually as non-sentient? As for instance [Śat. Br., vi. i. 3. 2-4]—" The Earth spoke;" " the Waters spoke;" or [Chh., vi. 2. 3-4]—"That Light saw;" "those Waters saw;" and such other passages, declaring the sentiency of elements. Also concerning the sense-organs we have statements like [Bṛih., vi. 1. 7]—" Those Prāṇas (faculties) indeed, contending for self-supremacy, went to Brahman;" or like [Bṛih . i. 3. 2]—"They then said unto Speech: do thou chant for us"—where the sense-organs are referred to (as sentient). In reply he recites—

But that is a statement concerning the Superintendents, because of specification and correlation. 5.

The word 'but' dispels the doubt raised. We must not at all assume the sentient character of elements and sense-organs from Scriptural passages like—" The Earth spoke, " and so forth, since this is a statement concerning the Superintendents. There is here a statement about sentient Divinities superintending elements like the earth, and organs like the speech, and performing activities proper to sentient beings, such as speaking, conversing and so forth, and not about mere elements and the sense-organs. Wherefore? Because of specification and correlation. For, there is a specified difference consisting of sentient-nature and non-sentient-nature between the experiencing-souls on the one hand and the elements and sense-organs on the other, as already mentioned; and that will not be explicable if everything were sentient. Further in the "Dispute amongst the Faculties," the text of the Kaushītakins, with a view to remove the doubt as to mere sense-organs being intended, and to comprehend the sentient Superintendents, makes a specification by using the epithet Divinities: Thus [Kaush. Up., ii. 14]—" These Divinities, forsooth, contending for self-supremacy......"; and further on [ibid., ii. 14] —"All these Divinities, indeed having recognised the pre-eminence of the Life-Breath....". There are also taught everywhere, in correlation (with the elements, organs, and other abodes), such sentient superintending Divinities in the Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Histories, Purāṇas, etc. A Scriptural text like [Ait. Āraṇ., ii. 4. 24]—" The Fire, becoming the speech, entered the mouth "—supports the existence of a Divinity guarding over the functions of the sense-organs. Further, in the concluding part of the

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passage concerning the "Dispute of the Faculties" [Page 10] statements like [Chh., v. 1. 7]—"And then the Prāṇas went up to their father Prajāpati and said......"— where we are told of their approaching Prajāpati for ascertaining who was pre-eminent, and thereafter, on his advice, of their going out of the body one by one, and so arriving at the pre-eminence of the Life-breath by the method of concomitance and non-concomitance, and then [cp. Brih., vi. 1. 13]—of the offer of tributes unto him, —all these dealings, similar to our own, as taught (in the Scriptures) further confirm the statement concerning the Superintendents. We can also understand the 'correlation' as referring to the act of 'seeing' of the highest superintending Divinity (Brahman), as mentioned in the text [Chh., vi. 2. 3]—"That Light saw"—after the Divinity had entered into (become correlated with) the effects produced by it. 5.

Therefore there does exist a disparity-in-nature between the Brahman and the world; and by reason of this disparity the world cannot be an effect of the Brahman. To this objection he now furnishes a reply—

But we do see it. 6.

The word 'but' turns back the (opponent's) objection. The statement that this world cannot have Brahman for its cause by reason of the disparity-in-nature : this is not an absolutely valid proposition. For, we do notice in the world the production, from admittedly sentient beings like men, of hair and nails etc., which are disparate-in-nature from them, as also from admittedly non-sentient things like cow-dung, that of scorpions etc. But (you might reply) it is merely the non-sentient bodies of men etc. that are the causes of the non-sentient hair, nails, and so forth, and so likewise the non-sentient bodies of scorpions, etc. that are the effects of non-sentient things like cow-dung. We answer Even so, that one of the non-sentient effects (body of the scorpion) should have an aptitude to be the abode of a sentient being, while another (hair, nails etc.) should not : this itself does constitute the disparity. And great indeed is the divergence in nature due to the process of evolution between entities like (the bodies of) men and (their products,) the hair, nails, etc., or between things

like cow-dung and (the bodies of) the scorpions and the like, as they so much differ in colour and the rest. For, were the cause and the effect to be absolutely similar, there would be an end to the very relation of cause and effect between them. If, however, it be urged that of entities like (the bodies of) men in regard to (their products,) the hair, nails, etc., or of things like cow-dung in regard to (the bodies of) the scorpions and the like, there is at least the characteristic of "earthness" which is persistent, we reply that if that were all, then of the Brahman in regard to (its products,) the ether and so forth, there is evidently the characteristic of "existence" which is so persistent. In fact, we want you to say whether, when on the ground of a disparity-in-nature you object to the world having Brahman as its constituent-cause, you mean by the disparity-in-nature the non-inherence of the entire mass of characteristics of the (cause) Brahman in the effect, the world; or the non-inherence (in the effect) of even a single characteristic (of the cause), whatever it be; or, finally, the non-inherence of (just one specific characteristic, viz.) the sentiency. In the first alternative there would result the contingency of an annihilation of the very relation of cause and effect throughout; for, in the absence of some specific difference between them, you cannot call one thing the cause and another its effect. The second alternative remains unproven. For, there does persist in ether and other (effects of Brahman) the characteristic of existence [Page 11] which belongs to Brahman, as we have already said. For the third alternative you cannot assign an illustrative example. For, unto the follower of the Brahma-philosophy, what possible example (acceptable to him) can you urge proving that a certain object destitute of sentiency is known not to have Brahman for its cause, seeing that he holds the view that all the mass of effects has Brahman alone as its constituent-cause? The conflict of this your view with the Scriptures is quite on the surface, as we have already proved that the Scriptures purport to teach Brahman as the efficient as well as the constituent cause of the world.

Next, as to the assertion that inasmuch as Brahman is an accomplished, existential entity, there is a possibility of its being open to other means-of-knowledge, that is entirely gratuitous. For, in the absence of colour and other qualities, Brahman cannot be

an object accessible to direct-perception. Also in the absence of (known) inferential marks it is outside the range of inference and the other means-of-knowledge. It is, on the contrary, cognisable only from the Scriptures, like, for instance, religious duty. To the same effect is the passage [Kaṭha, I. ii. 2]—"It is not a knowledge to be obtained by reasoning : it can be best comprehended, My dearest, only when declared by another ;" as also another passage (Ṛigveda, x. 129. 6-7]—"Who indeed has known, and who can here declare......from whence this creation has emanated ?" These two Vedic-stanzas indicate the inscrutable nature of the Cause of the World even for those that might have attained to perfection of power and vision. A Smṛiti also declares [Mahābhārata, vi. 5. 12]—"Those objects indeed that are beyond the pale of thinking—to them one should not apply logic ;" and another [Bhagavadgītā, ii. 25]—" He is declared to be non-manifest, unthinkable, and unmodifiable," as also others like [ibid., x. 2]—" Neither the host of gods nor the great sages know of my origin : I am indeed the source of the gods and of the great sages of every sort. " And as to the view that the Scripture itself, prescribing ratiocination over and above the hearing, seems to assign a place of honour also to reasoning, not by such pretensions can there be gained a possible scope for sheer reasoning. For, it is only reasoning conformable to the Scripture that is here to be resorted to as being contributory to intuitive knowledge ; such reasoning, for instance, as—(i) because the true-nature of sleep and the true-nature of waking-life are both exclusive of each other, therefore the soul (who experiences both the states) is in reality unconnected with the attributes of any of them ; (ii) because in sound-sleep the soul rids himself of all worldly concerns and becomes of the nature of the Self who is pure existence, therefore the soul is in reality of the nature of that Self who is freed of all worldly ties and whose essence is pure existence ; or (iii) because the phenomenal-world springs from Brahman, therefore, according to the axiom that the cause and the effect are non-different from one another, the world has no existence apart from Brahman ; and so on. And in the Sūtra [II. i. 11.] beginning with " By reason of the non-stability of reasoning " he is going to exhibit [Page 12] the deceptive nature of mere ratiocination.— Then as to the person who argues on the strength of the Scriptural

assertion about a sentient cause to the world, that the whole world is itself sentient, evenhe can conceivably explain the Scriptural statement concerning the distinction between the sentient and the non-sentient, viz., [Tait. Up., ii. 6]—" The intelligent as also the non-intelligent "— by declaring (the common characteristic of sentiency) to be manifest in some objects and non-manifest in others. It is our opponent, on the other hand, who cannot explain the Scriptural assertion about the distinction. How? Because in the passage in question, viz., [Tait. Up., ii. 6]—" It transformed itself into the intelligent as also the non-intelligent" the Highest Cause is declared to transform itself and assume the form of the entire world. And just as one that is sentient cannot properly become non-sentient, because the two are disparate-in-nature, even so, one that is non-sentient cannot assume the form of the sentient. We, of course, have refuted the argument based on disparity-in-nature and hence have to assume, just in conformity with the Scripture, a sentient First Cause. **6.**

If (you urge that the effect, viz., the world) would become non-existent, we say, No: for, that is a mere negative statement (without an actual object to be negated). 7.

If the sentient and pure Brahman, void of all qualities like sound, is desired to be the cause of an effect which is contrary-in-nature to it, as being non-sentient, impure, and possessed of qualities like sound, then in that case you will have to admit that the effect had no existence prior to its origination; and that would be unacceptable to you, who hold the view of the existence of the effect (in the cause) prior to production. To this contention we reply that it is no valid objection. For, it is a mere negative-statement: It is a mere denial (of the antecedent existence of the effect), and there is no real object to which the negation is to be referred. Neither also can your negative-statement come in the way of the recognition of the existence of the effect (in the cause) prior to the production. How so? Because just as, in the present time, this effect (the world) has an existence only in and through the Cause (Brahman), even so, we can understand it to have an existence also prior to creation. For, surely, even in the present time, this effect has no existence independent and irrespective of the existence of the Cause, as is clear from statements

like [Bṛih., ii. 4. 6]—" All would forsake him who recognises anything as existing elsewhere than in the Self. " And the same kind of existence, in and through the Cause, holds good in the case of the effect even prior to the creation. But (we are asked) do you not hold the Brahman, void of qualities like sound and so forth, as the cause of the world ?—(We answer) most assuredly ; but the effect with its qualities of sound and the rest possesses no existence — as apart from its existence in and through the cause—now, any more than prior to creation; so that it will not be possible for you to urge that the effect remains altogether non-existent prior to production. · In fuller details we will expound this our position when we discuss the non-distinctness of the effect from the cause in Sūtra II. i. 14 below. 7.

Because during [the period of] re-absorption (or dissolution) there would result the contingency of its being like that : therefore, the theory is illogical. 8.

Says the objector at this stage :—If the effect that has the characteristics of grossness, divisibility-into-parts, non-sentiency, finiteness, impurity and so forth, is to be assumed to have Brahman as its cause, then at the time of the Dissolution, when the effect would be restored to the causal state and re-absorbed (into the cause) and so [Page 13] would become undistinguishable from it, the effect would, by its own characteristics, contaminate the cause, so that during re-absorption there would arise the contingency of the cause Brahman also possessing, like the effect (world), impurity and other characteristics. Hence the Upanishadic view as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world does not stand to reason.—Again, once all the distinctions have merged undistinguishably together (into Brahman), at the time of the succeeding creation there cannot necessarily result a new creation with a (similar) distinction between the experiencing souls and the objects of experience, as there is nothing to restrain (the two classes) from being mixed with each other. For this reason also the view is unreasonable.—Once again, after the experiencing-souls have become, during the Dissolution, non-distinguishable from Brahman, if we were to assume a newer creation, although the occasion for it, viz., the Karman (of the souls), no longer exists—being merged into Brahman—then there is

sure to result the contingency of the liberated souls also becoming liable to be born in that creation: which also is another defect of logic (in the Brahman theory).—Should this world, finally, be imagined, even during the state of Dissolution, to remain just distinct from the Highest Brahman, then there can be no Dissolution strictly so-called, to say nothing fo the objection that the effect can in-no-wise remain distinct from the cause. Therefore also the theory is illogical. 8.

To this we reply—

Not so: because there do exist parallel instances. 9.

There is not at all in our theory anything of illogicality. As to the defect pointed out, viz., that the effect, being re-absorbed into the cause at Dissolution, would by its own characteristics contaminate the cause, that is no defect. Why? Because there do exist parallel instances. Instances can indeed be pointed out in which an effect merging back into the cause does not by its own characteristics contaminate the cause. For example, earthen plates, etc., which are the products of clay, the constituent cause, although during the period of their separate existence (as plates etc.) they are divisible into classes such as very good (high), very bad (low), and middling, they do not yet contaminate with these their characteristics their constituent cause, the clay. Similarly different ornaments fashioned out of gold, when they, after their destruction, become re-absorbed into gold, do not by their own characteristics contaminate the gold. Likewise also, the four classes of beings which are produced out of the earth do not by their own characteristics contaminate the Earth when absorbed back into it. It is for your view of the case that no parallel instance can be cited. For, Dissolution itself would be impossible if the effect were to remain within the cause just by its own nature. It is to be noted here, however, that although there is non-distinctness in nature between the effect and the cause, it is the effect that is of the nature of the cause, and not the cause of the nature of the effect, as is clear from Scriptural statements about (word-)initiation (of creation): and this he will state later under Sūtra II. i. 14.—Furthermore, your objection covers a far less field than there is warrant for, when you urge that the effect, at the time of re-absorption, would by its characteristics contaminate

the cause. The contingency holds equally well during the time that (the world actually) endures (as the world), as we (throughout) maintain non-separateness between the effect and the cause. For, there are Scriptural texts like [Brih., ii. 4. 6]—"All this that there is, is the Ātman," or [Chh., vii. 25. 2]—"The Ātman itself is all this," or [Mundaka, II. ii. 11]—"Formerly all this was the immortal Brahman itself," or [Chh., iii. 14. 1.]—"All this verily is Brahman," [Page 14]—that declare the non-separateness in all the three times of the effect from the cause. The way out of the contingency that is available in these cases, viz., that the cause is not contaminated by the characteristics of the effect, because the effect itself as well as its characteristics are superimpositions of Nescience, that same also holds good in the condition of Dissolution.

There is also this other parallel instance: Just as a magician is not in all the three times affected by the magical-illusion which he himself spreads out, because (the illusion) is not a reality, even so is the Highest Self not affected by the world-illusion; and again, just as the one (Soul) who is seeing a dream is not affected by the illusions of the dream-vision, because that illusion does not follow him over into either the waking or the deep-sleep conditions, even so the one enduring Soul who witnesses all the three conditions without himself undergoing any change, is in no way affected by all the three states that mutually exclude one another (none of them running over into the other). That the Highest Self should appear to have these three states is itself sheer illusion, comparable to the appearance of a rope in the form of a snake and the like. On this point there is a pronouncement by the Teachers who are the knowers of the traditional teaching of the Upanishads [Gaudapāda–Kārikās, i. 16]—"When the Soul, thrown into sleep by the beginningless Illusion, wakes up from it; it is only then that he realises the non-duality wherein there is neither birth, nor sleep, nor dreaming." So then, the defect urged on the ground of the contingency that, during the state of re-absorption, the cause also, like the effect, would be affected by grossness and other qualities is no longer tenable. Next, the objection that, after the merging together of all distinctions whatsoever, there cannot be pointed out any principle to regulate the subsequent creation together

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with its distinctive classifications: that is also nugatory, and just for the reason that parallel instances exist. For, just as, in the conditions of deep-sleep or Yogic-trance and the like, even though one might attain therein to one's innate nature of freedom-from-distinctions, still inasmuch as his Nescience stands un-sublated, when he wakes out of it, there does exist for him the same old distinctive classifications: even so it could be in the present case. To this effect is the Scriptural statement [Chh., vi. 9. 2–3] —"All these creatures are absorbed into the (Brahman which is) Existence, and yet do not know that they are absorbed into It. Be they here a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, or a hog, or a worm, or a butterfly, or a gnat, or a fly: whatsoever they are that they become." Just as, although the Highest Self is beyond all distinctions, yet, during the subsistence of the world, we do observe uninterrupted, all these dealings based upon distinctions, like unto the (affairs of the) dream-world (while it endures),—the dealings being grounded upon a false knowledge—even so, during the state of re-absorption also, we would infer the existence of (a latent tendency for) making distinctions, grounded likewise upon (unsublated) false knowledge. — By the same argument can be set at rest the contingency as to the liberated souls being born again, seeing that, in their case, all false knowledge has been sublated by right knowledge.—Lastly, as to the other alternative-contingency raised towards the end, viz., 'should this world be imagined, even during the state of Dissolution, to remain just distinct from the Highest Brahman ......' that is refuted by us inasmuch as we do not at all make the assumption. Hence our Upanishadic doctrine is quite logical. 9.

And because your own view is open to the same objection. 10.

[Page 15] And in the view of our opponent also the same common deficiencies would become manifest. We explain how. As to the contention that by reason of the disparity-in-nature the world cannot have Brahman for its constituent cause, that is equally applicable if it were to have the (Sāṁkhya) Pradhāna for its constituent cause, since in this view also the world which has qualities such as sound etc. is assumed to proceed from the Pradhāna which has not those sound and the other qualities. And for that very reason, i. e., because of the assumption of the pro-

duction of a disparate effect (from the Pradhāna), there would result the same contingency of the acceptance of the doctrine of the non-existence of the effect prior to its origination. So also, in the state of Dissolution, if the effect were to be assumed to remain non-distinct from the cause, the contingency of "this becoming like that" holds equally true. So likewise when all the effects, with all their specific individualities sublated, have become, in the condition of Dissolution, non-distinguishable (from their cause, the Pradhāna), the distinctions such as—this is the material-constituent attached to this Self, this the one attached to this other : all these which, prior to the Dissolution, were restricted to each person, they cannot possibly be, in a subsequent creation, regularly and necessarily assigned (to the same persons), as there is no adequate ground for the restriction. And if we assume that such a restriction could be made even in the absence of adequate ground, then the liberated souls can be liable to bondage once more, because even in their case there is the same absence of adequate ground (which by hypothesis is no bar). And if you were to make the supposition that it is only *some* of the distinctions that would become non-distinguishable, i. e., that would be completely absorbed into the Pradhāna, and not the others, then those that do not become (so absorbed) will have to be considered as not the effects of the Pradhāna. Thus all these deficiencies are common to both the sides and should not be urged against only one of them ; and so (the sūtra) emphatically declares the deficiencies to be not deficiencies, inasmuch as they have to be necessarily admitted. 10.

And also because of the non-stability of reasoning. And should you claim to reason otherwise, even so there results the contingency of non-release. 11.

For this additional reason also one should not raise any objection on the basis of mere reasoning against a matter which can be known only from the Scriptures ; since, that is to say, all reasonings are void of traditional authority and so lacking in stability, being just spun out of the sheerest guesses of men—there being no goad to keep such guesses under check. For, we find that reasonings put forth by certain learned persons with great ado are perceived to be fallacious by others more learned than

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these, while those put forth by these again are proved to contain a fallacy by some others still, so that it is not possible to assign any stability to reasonings, because there is such a difference in the faculties of men. And if one were to follow the lead of a supposedly stable process-of-reasoning endorsed by a person of well-established eminence like Kapila or some other person, even so there results the absence of stability, inasmuch as we observe the existence of a mutual divergence of views amongst propounders-of-systems like Kapila, Kaṇāda and the rest, although they be admitted to possess a well-established pre-eminence. And if you were to say—we would reason in some other manner so as to avoid the fault of an absence of stability. For, surely, it is not possible to hold that there does not at all exist any stable (unshakeable) reasoning. To go no further, this very non-stability of reasonings is (sought to be) established by reasoning itself, inasmuch as, having observed the non-stability of a certain number of reasonings, you imagine the non-stability of other reasonings of the same class. If all reasonings were to be unstable [Page 16] there would result the contingency of an annihilation of all worldly dealings. For, we do see in ordinary life people proceeding to acquire or avert (respectively) the pleasure or the pain in the path-way that is yet to be traversed on the analogy of the path-way that has been or is being traversed. Moreover, whenever there ensues a divergence of views as to the real intention of a Scriptural text, it is reasoning, consisting in an exposition of the purport of a sentence, which enables us to refute the false (prima facie) interpretation and fix the correct one. Manu also holds the same view when he lays down [xii. 105]—"Direct perception, and inference, and the Śāstra consisting of various Scriptural texts: these three one should master thoroughly well if he is desirous of ascertaining (the nature of) purity in religious-practice;" and again [xii. 106]—"It is he who tries to harmonise the injunction about religious-practices laid down by Sages with a reasoning not going against the teaching of the Vedas and the Śāstras: he alone knows what is true religious-practice and none other." In fact the so-called absence of stability is exactly a point of honour for reasoning; for, that serves as an incentive for throwing out defective reasoning and accepting one that is free from all defects. For, surely, because our forefathers were fools, that should constitute no ground at all

why we ourselves should act like fools. Therefore the instability of reasoning is no fault-in-argument. To this the reply is: Even so there arises the contingency of an absence of release. Although in a sporadic case or two reasoning appears to be well-grounded, still in the present instance, in any count, there does arise the non-release of reasoning from the fault of instability; for, a knowledge of the actual Reality as it is, which is perfectly unfathomable and on which depends man's final emancipation, cannot be even distantly guessed except with the help of the Scriptures. For, as we have already said, this is an object not falling within the ken of direct-perception as there is an absence of colour and other qualities in it, and not within that of inference and other means-of-knowledge, owing to the absence of inferential marks etc. belonging to it. Further, all the disputants who believe in a final release do equally assume that the release is achieved by right knowledge; and this right knowledge, because referring to an existing reality, must be uniform. We declare that to be the highest truth which always endures in one and the same form; and the knowledge of this truth is known as the true knowledge in the world: e. g., the knowledge that fire is hot. This being so, it is absurd that persons should maintain a diversity of views regarding the nature of the true knowledge. Contrariwise, the divergence in views based upon reasoning—their mutual opposition (and inconsistency)—is admitted on all hands. For, what one logician puts forward, claiming that that alone is the true knowledge, that is upset by another; and what this other one establishes, that is controverted by another still: this is already well-known all through the world. How can a knowledge arrived at by reasoning, and having no fixed and uniform content, ever become true knowledge? Nor is it a fact that the propounder of the Pradhāna theory is acknowledged by all the logicians as being the most pre-eminent amongst those that know how to reason, so that it might have been possible to accept his view as being the one most true. And it is of course not possible to call together in one place and at one time all the logicians that have been, that are, and that will ever be born, so that the joint-view of them all, when referring to one and the same object and delivering itself in an identical manner, might be regarded as the true knowledge. The Veda, as contrasted with these, is eternal and is the source of the right knowledge, and it

[Page 17] can properly have a fixity of subject-matter and form-of-contents, so that it would be impossible for any logicians of the past, the present, and the future to gainsay the claim for correctness which the knowledge based upon Veda can rightfully have. Hence it follows that it is this very Upanishadic knowledge that is the true knowledge. And as the claim for being true cannot be established for any knowledge other than this, there would result (by following this other knowledge) a non-release from worldly-fetters. It thus stands established that, in conformity with the Scriptures and in conformity with reasonings consistent with the Scriptures, it is the sentient Brahman that is the efficient and the constituent cause of this world. 11. Here ends the Topic (3) called Disparity-in-Nature.

TOPIC 4 : REPROBATE THEORIES

(*Sūtra* 12)

Hereby are also explained (away) theories, reprobated by men-of-position-and-competence. 12.

Because it offered the closest analogy unto the Upanishadic theory, because it was supported by very weighty reasonings, and because, in some of its sections, it was accepted by some competent followers of the Vedic view,—for these reasons it was that the objection against the Upanishadic teachings, put forth upon the basis of reasoning and claiming to find support from the theory that recognised the Pradhāna as the cause (of the world), has been thus far answered. Now, there continues to be brought forward, by some persons of feeble intellect and on the strength even of such theories as that of the Atoms, an objection based upon (mere) reasoning against the statements in the Upanishads. To meet that he makes an analogical-transference (of the present argumentation), following the (well-known) maxim of overthrowing the main assailant only (and ignoring the minor ones). What are accepted (parigṛihyante) are called parigrahāḥ. Those that are not parigrahāḥ are styled a-parigrahāḥ. The a-parigrahāḥ of the men-of-competence-and-learning (Śishṭāḥ) are designated (in the text of the sūtra) as the "Sishṭâparigrahāḥ " or theories not accepted by the wise. By virtue

of the present argumentation in refutation of the theory that regards the Pradhāna as the cause, we have to consider as refuted, after a setting forth of their untenable nature, the theories such as those which recognise the atoms and the like as the cause (of the universe)—theories which in none of their portions have been at all countenanced by persons of authority like Manu, Vyāsa, and others. The refuting argument being identical, there remains now no further ground at all for raising any objection. For, there holds good even in their case the fact of the impenetrability by (mere) logic of the highly mysterious (cause of the universe), of the instability of reasoning, of the resulting absence of release if one were to reason in any other mode, and the contradiction with the Scriptures: these and the like are the grounds of refutation. 12. Here ends the Topic (4) styled Reprobate Theories.

TOPIC 5 : OBJECTS TURNED SUBJECTS

(*Sūtra* 13)

If it be urged that by reason of the objects (of experience) becoming one with the experiencing subjects there would result an absence of discrimination, we reply, it might happen as in ordinary life. 13.

Once again, from another view-point, but on the strength of reasoning itself, the theory that regards the Brahman as the cause is being objected to. Although we grant that Scriptures might be the sole authority in their own proper province, yet where their subject-matter falls within the range of another means-of-knowledge, it is but fair that it should conform to this other means. This holds good in the case of several ritualistic and laudatory texts. Reasoning, likewise, should be unauthoritative in matters not falling strictly within its field, e. g., in regard to what constitutes and what does not constitute correct religious-practice. Well, what are you driving at? This being conceded, it is not right that the Scripture should run counter [Page 18] to something already well-established by other means-of-knowledge. But what makes you say that anything already well-established by other means-of-knowledge is contradicted by the Scriptures? The

reply follows. This distinction between the objects of experience and the experiencing subject is well-established in the world: the subject being the sentient soul within the body and the objects, the qualities like sound and the rest. Thus Devadatta is the experiencing subject, and cooked-rice the object of experience. Now this distinction would be rendered nugatory, if the subject were to be transformed into the object, or the object transformed into the subject. And such a mutual transformation in their case would ensue by reason of their being believed to be one with Brahman, the Highest Cause. And it is not right that this well-established distinction be rendered nugatory by the Scripture. For, we must postulate the existence of a distinction between the experiencing-subject and the objects-of-experience in the past and in the future, similar to what there actually exists to-day in the present. Hence, because of the resulting contingency of an annihilation of this well-established distinction between the experiencing-subject and the objects-of-experience, the final conclusion, making Brahman the cause (of the universe), is not tenable. If some one were to start such an objection one should answer him thus: It might happen as in the ordinary life. Even in our view the distinction in question can obtain without difficulty, since we observe analogies to it in the world. To explain: although foam and wave and ripple and bubble and the rest, as being just the modifications of the ocean, are not distinct from the ocean, whose essence is water, there can yet obtain a distinctness amongst themselves as also mutual relation between them such as conjunction etc. with one another. In this instance although the foam, ripple, and the rest, as modifications of the ocean, are not distinct-in-essence from the ocean which is constituted of water, yet there does not result any confusion of the one with the other. And even while such a commingling of them into one another does not take place, yet it is not that they possess an essence distinct from that of the ocean. Just so in the present case also there need not ensue the mixing up of the one with the other in the case of the experiencing-subjects and the objects-of-experience; nor likewise need they be regarded as having an essence distinct from the Highest Brahman.—It is to be noted here that although the experiencing-subject is not a modification of the Brahman, inasmuch as the Scriptural text [Tait. Up., ii. 6]—"Having created it, He thereupon entered into

the same "—speaks of the subsequent-entrance of the unmodified Creator himself into his creation, and his becoming himself the experiencing-subject, yet once He has entered into his creation there does exist a distinction caused by specific-limitations, just as there is one in the Ether caused by limitations such as the Ether-within-a-jar and the like. Consequently, it has been stated that there can exist, on the analogy of the ocean and the ripples, the distinction between the experiencing-subject and the objects-of-experience, although they are both of them identical-in-essence with Brahman, the Highest Cause. 13. Here ends the Topic (5) entitled Objects Turned Subjects.

TOPIC 6 : WORD-INITIATED WORLD

(*Sūtras* 14–20)

There is non-distinctness (of the world) from that (i. e., Brahman), because of the statements regarding (Word-)Initiation, and the like. 14.

Assuming this ordinary distinction in the shape of the experiencing-subject and the objects-of-experience we have formulated our refutation, saying that it might happen as in ordinary life. But this distinction does not exist from the point of view of the highest truth, inasmuch as we learn of the non-distinctness of the two : the effect and the cause. The effect is the multiform expanse of the world including the Ether and the rest ; [Page 19] the cause is the Highest Brahman ; and, from the point of view of the highest truth, we learn of the non-distinctness, i. e., non-existence as apart from it, of this effect from that cause. How? Because of Scriptural statements such as (word-)initiation and the like. To begin with the statement concerning (word-)initiation, there, after promising the knowledge of *all* consequent upon the knowledge of *one*, by way of the needed illustrative example it is said [Chh., vi. 1.4]—" Just as, My dear boy, by just one lump-of-clay everything fabricated out of clay can become comprehended, the modified-form being only a word-initiation,—a mere name,—as the clay alone it having any reality." The point intended is this: When one lump of clay is comprehended in its real nature as clay, all fabrications of clay such as jar, plate, or water-

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pot, being in reality no more than the clay-in-essence, can become comprehended, inasmuch as the modified-forms are a fabrication of mere word, are a name only and are originated by word alone, as when it is said that here is a jar, a plate, a water-pot, and so on. The modified-form as such has not at all any reality of essence: it is a mere name only, an unreality; the reality belonging to it only as it is clay. The above is an illustration used for the Brahman in the Scriptural text. The statement about word-initiation occurring here leads us to consider, by an application of the illustration to the matter-in-hand, the entire mass of created-objects as having no existence apart from the Brahman. And later, after declaring that Light, Water, and Food are the effects of Brahman, the same text proceeds to assert that the effects (of this triad) of Light, Water, and Food have no real existence as apart from Light, Water, and Food, with the words beginning with [Chh., vi. 4. 1]—" Fireness has vanished from the fire (as an independent reality), the modified-form being only an initiation by words, a mere name, the true reality being just the three colours (red, white, and black—belonging respectively to Light, Water, and Food)."—The sūtra speaks of 'statements regarding (Word-)initiation and the like,' and by 'the like' are to be adduced texts declaratory of the oneness of the Ātman, like [Chh., vi. 8. 7]—"All this has 'that one' as its essence; 'that one' is reality ; 'that one' is the Self : and "That thou art"; or [Bṛih. ii., 4. 6]—" All this that there is, is this very Self "; or [Muṇḍaka, II. ii. 11]—" Brahman alone is all this"; or [Chh., vii. 25. 2]—" The Ātman alone is all this"; or [Bṛih., iv. 4. 19]—" There is nothing at all of the manifold in the world. " For, we cannot otherwise understand the possibility of the knowledge of one thing giving the knowledge of everything. Hence, just as the ether contained within a jar, within a water-pot, etc., is not distinct from the great mass of ether in its entirety, and just as the water in the mirage and the like is not distinct from the sandy-plane and so forth, seeing that the former have a form that anon appears and disappears, and so are not capable of being described in their real essence ;—even so, we have to understand this entire mass of worldly-phenemenon consisting of experiencing-subjects and objects-of-experience, as having no real existence as apart from the Brahman.

An objection : Why not regard the Brahman as possessing

more than one nature in reality ? Just as a tree has more than one branch, even so is the Brahman endowed with more than one power and activity. Accordingly, both the oneness and the manifoldness are true in reality, just as the tree has [Page 20] oneness when considered as tree, but manifoldness when considered as branches ; or just as the ocean has oneness *qua* ocean, but manifoldness as foam, ripples, etc.; or just as, again, the clay as clay is one, but as jar, plate, etc., manifold. Out of this twofold nature, the knowledge of that portion which refers to oneness would bring to pass the Scriptural declarations as to emancipation, etc., while by the portion referring to manifoldness would be accomplished the secular and the Scriptural requirements belonging to the Sphere of Works. And in this way also illustrations as to clay and the like would be harmonised.—To this we say—No. For, in the illustration [Chh., vi. 4. 1]—"As clay alone there is reality," the constituent-cause is alone emphatically declared to be the exclusive reality, the statement about Word-initiation assigning unreality to the entire mass of modified-forms. The same should hold true also of the theme for which the illustrations were adduced. For, there is a definite declaration [Chh., vi. 8. 7]—" All this has 'this one' as its essence; and that is the Real"—to the effect that the Highest Cause is alone real ; while there is the teaching [ibid., vi. 8. 7]—" That is the Self : That thou art, O Śvetaketu"—that the Self-within-the-body is one with the Brahman. This oneness with Brahman of the Self-within-the-body is self-subsistent : it is not something the truth of which has to be established by extraneous efforts. So, when this oneness-in-essence with Brahman, declared in the Scriptures, comes to be realised, it serves to annihilate the ordinarily-understood distinct-individuality of the Self-within-the-body, just as the knowledge of the rope as rope drives away the (mistaken) knowledge of it as a snake and the like. And once the individuality of the Self-within-the-body is sublated, all the ordinary dealings based upon that become nugatory—dealings for establishing which one had to assume the existence of a second distinct aspect of the Brahman as manifold. This is borne out by passages such as [Bṛih., iv. 5. 15]—"When, on the contrary, all this has become in his case just one with the Self, then what is there for him to see and what means to see it ?"—which declare the absence of all phenomenal-dealings based upon

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actions, means to actions, and fruits of actions, in the case of one who has realised the Brahman as the essence (of everything). Nor can it stand to reason to assert that this (perception of the) absence of all the phenomenal-dealings is merely contingent upon certain specific conditions; for, the statement [Chh., vi. 8. 7]—" That thou art "—does not declare the (Self's) oneness-in-essence with Brahman as bound up with any specific conditions. Further, the illustration of the thief [Chh., vi. 16] declares the bondage for one who states the untruth, and the release in the case of one who states the truth; and so vouches for the sole ultimate reality of oneness only—the manifoldness being an apparition raised up by false knowledge. For, if both were to be true, how can a creature, immersed in phenomenal-world as he is, be spoken of as a prevaricator? And the text [Brih., iv. 4. 19]—" From Death he comes by death, who sees manifoldness here "—declares as much by its deprecation of a belief in manifoldness. Nor can this view [Page 21] cogently explain how emancipation can be the result of knowledge; for, there is no scope (in this view) for any kind of false knowledge which gives rise to worldly-bondage and which is to be driven away by true knowledge. For, when both of them are true, how can it be said that the knowledge of oneness drives away the knowledge of manifoldness?

But an objector might say, if we assume absolute oneness, there being no manifoldness, the ordinary means-of-knowledge such as direct-perception would be rendered nugatory as having no scope for them, like perceptions as to the form of a human being when applied to objects like pillars (which are not human beings). So also the Scriptural prescriptions as to what should and what should not be done—depending as they do upon distinctions, would also be null and void in the absence of that (manifoldness). Likewise, too, the Scriptural teaching as to emancipation would, in the absence of that, come to nought, since it is contingent upon distinctions like that between the teacher and the taught. Besides, how can we reasonably believe in the truth of the doctrine of the oneness of the Self propounded by the Scriptural teaching about emancipation, when the Scripture itself is to be false?—To the above objection we reply that our theory is not open to the fault urged. For, prior to the realisation of the

Brahman as the only true Reality, all ordinary views-and-practices whatsoever can well be true, like the phenomena of the dream-life prior to awakening. As long as there has not taken place the realisation of the oneness of Self as the only Reality, so long nobody has, born within him, the notion as to the unreality of all the modified-forms that fall into the (three) categories of the means-of-knowledge, objects-of-knowledge, and fruit-of-knowledge. On the other hand, all creatures, under the influence of Nescience, and throwing overboard the oneness-in-essence with the Brahman which is theirs by right, conceive a notion with reference to the (various) phenomenal-forms, regarding them as of their own essence or as belonging to them, and designating them (respectively) as the 'I' or the 'mine'. Therefore, prior to the awakening of the consciousness of the Brahman as the only true Reality, all secular and Scriptural requirements can find a satisfactory warrant. Just as for the ordinary man, gone asleep and visualising in dreams objects high and low, there does exist, prior to the awakening, a knowledge which he thinks to be direct perception, and which he (for the time) even firmly believes in—there being, be it noted, no notion at the time of the fallaciousness of that 'direct-perception'—even so in the present case. — But, it might be asked, how can we possibly explain the knowledge—which is true—of the Brahman as the only Reality, when it is to result from an Upanishadic statement which falls within the sphere of the untrue? For, surely, one bitten by a rope-mistaken-as-snake never dies; nor is it possible, with the help of the water-in-the-mirage, to achieve purposes like drinking, bathing, and the like. But that is no objection; for, we do meet with effects, such as death, resulting from even suspicion of poison and the like; and in a man during the state of dream we do see the effects (quivering etc.) of snake-bite, bath, and the like. Should it be urged that even this effect is unreal, this is our reply: Although in a man during the state of dream the effects due to snake-bite, bath, and the like be false, yet there is the fruit of them in the form of the man's consciousness of what had happened, which is true, seeing that it does not disappear even in the wakeful condition. For, assuredly, no man whatsoever, when awakened from dreaming, although realising as false the effects due to snake-bite, water-baths, and the like which he saw in the dream, ever regards his experience of them

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as untrue.—Incidentally, from the fact of the persistence of this consciousness of dream-experience in the man who has seen dreams we have to understand a refutation of the theory which regards the body itself as the Self.—We have a Scriptural passage to the same effect [Chh., v. 2. 9]—" When, while some activity intended for a definite end is proceeding, one sees a woman in his dreams, in that dream-vision of his he should understand a prosperity for him"—[Page **22**] which avows for the acquisition of a prosperity which is real from a dream-vision which is unreal. In the same manner Ait. Āraṇ. [III. ii. 4. 7]—after declaring that, when certain omens capable of being experienced during waking-life have presented themselves, " one should consider that he will not live much longer," goes on to say (ibid., III. ii. 4. 15)—"Now the dreams: One sees (in the dream) a black person with black teeth; and that person kills him"—that even these varied dream-visions which are unreal presage death which is real. And that is indeed well-established, in ordinary life, with persons who are skilled in (drawing inference from) invariable concomitance and non-concomitance, viz., that such-and-such a dream-vision conduces to weal and such-and-such an one to woe. So too we observe the knowledge of the true 'A' and other (sounds) as resulting from the knowledge of the untrue symbolic lines (standing for them). —Finally, here is this ultimate (decisive) argument to prove the oneness of the Ātman: viz., there is nothing further beyond it of which an expectancy exists. While in an ordinary statement such as, 'one should make an offering,' there arises the expectancy as to 'unto whom,' 'with what,' and 'in what mode,' no such expectancy is known to arise in connection with the declaration [Chh., vi. 8. 7]—'That thou art,' or [Bṛih., i. 4. 10]—'I am Brahman,' inasmuch as it intends to convey the knowledge of the absolute oneness of the true essence of everything. It is only when some other object exists as a remainder that there might arise the expectancy; but there does not exist any other object remaining apart from and beyond the Ātman, which can give rise to the expectancy. Nor is it possible to urge that such a knowledge never does arise; for, there are Vedic texts like [Chh, vi. 16. 3]—" And then indeed he did realise," and there are also prescriptions for securing that knowledge such as hearing (the Vedic texts, Bṛih., iv. 6) and repeating them after the teacher [Bṛih., iv. 4. 22]. And it is not possible to urge

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that this knowledge is fruitless or erroneous ; for, we see the fruit of it, viz., the cessation of Nescience ; and there arises thereafter no other knowledge to negative the (earlier) knowledge (as happens in the case of an erroneous knowledge). Of course, until this absolute oneness of the Ātman is realised, all secular and Scriptural affairs which are due to a compound of truth with falsehood, remain, as we have already stated, quite undisturbed. Hence, when the absolute oneness of the Ātman is brought home by this ultimate (decisive) means-of-knowledge, all the earlier activities based upon distinction are annihilated, and there then remains no more any scope for imagining the Brahman to possess manifoldness.

Another objection : we gather, from the assigning of illustrative examples such as the lump-of-clay, that the Scriptural texts intend to set forth the Brahman as one capable of being modified : for, objects like the lump-of-clay are known in ordinary life to be capable of assuming modifications. We answer, No. For, texts like [Bṛih., iv. 4. 25]—" He, indeed, is this great unborn Ātman, the ageless, deathless, immortal and fearless Brahman"; [Page 23] or [Bṛih., iii, 9. 26]—" He is that Ātman, the Not-this, Not-that"; or [Bṛih., iii. 8. 8]—" It is neither gross nor subtle",—and others deny unto the Brahman every kind of modification and declare it to be immutable. And it surely is not possible to understand one and the same Brahman as both capable and also incapable of assuming modifications. Why may it not be possible, like standing and moving (in the case of one and the same man)? No : because we have declared the Brahman to be immutable. Unto the immutable Brahman, of course, there cannot be assigned manifoldness of nature like standing and moving. We have already said that the Brahman is immutable and eternal inasmuch as all kinds of modifications are denied of it. Nor can we imagine that, just as the realisation of the oneness of the Ātman with the Brahman is the means to salvation, even so the realisation of it as capable of assuming the modifications in the form of the world might have been intended as another independent means for some other assignable fruit ; for there is no valid proof for the supposition. The Scripture declares the fruit to follow just from the realisation of the Ātman as being one with the immutable Brahman ; for instance, the text [Bṛih., iv. 2. 4] which

begins with—" He is that Ātman, the Not-this, Not-that, " and concludes [Brih., iv. 2. 4]—" Now indeed, O Janaka, thou hast attained the Fearless One." From this it follows that in a context where the prevailing theme is the Brahman, when it has been proved that the winning of the fruit is to result just from the realisation of the Brahman as destitute of all specific attributes whatsoever, any statements therein that are met with and that have no special fruit declared in their connection—e. g., the statement as to Brahman being modified in the form of the world—are to be understood merely as subordinate means contributory to the Brahma-realisation, in accordance with the maxim—" In a context where some fruit is declared in connection with the main-theme, any statements made without specification of a special fruit connected therewith have to be regarded as subordinate (to the main-theme)"—and not as though they are cabable of yielding an independent fruit of their own. For, it is absurd to declare that from a realisation of the Brahman as susceptible of modifications there might result the fruit, viz., the Ātman's susceptibility to modifications, since the nature of emancipation has to be eternal and immutable (which it cannot be if the Ātman who is to get the emancipation were to be by nature mutable). — But, for one who holds by the theory of the oneness of the Ātman with the immutable Brahman, because for him there is absolute oneness, there would result the non-existence of a controller of the world and the objects-controlled, and so a contradiction with his own solemn-declaration as to the Lord being the cause (of the Universe). To this we say, No: For the (Lord's) omniscience turns upon the mere unfolding of the embryonic Names and Forms which go to make up the Nescience. It was on the basis of texts like [Tait. Up., i. 1]—" From that Ātman sprang forth the Ether"—that we had made the solemn-assertion [Brah. Sūtra, I. i. 2]—" From which (arise) the origination etc. of this (universe)"—intended to declare that it is from the omniscient, omnipotent Lord, whose nature is eternal, pure, unfettered, consciousness, that there result the world's origination, subsistence, and dissolution, and not from the non-sentient Pradhāna or from some other principle. That solemn-assertion of course stands: nor do we assert here anything which runs counter to it. How can you say that, when you declare in the same breath the absolute oneness of the Ātman without anything as

a second to it? Listen how we declare nothing self-contradictory: In the Scriptural texts, and in the Smṛitis (based upon them), we are told that the omniscient Lord has—as if forming a part of his nature but not really explicable either as having that nature or as not having that nature—the Name and the Form, the fabrications of Nescience and the germinal-principles of the phenomenal-world,—which are designated [Page 24] as the Illusion or as the Power or as the Nature of the omniscient Lord. The omniscient Lord is distinct from these two, as is clear from the passage [Chh., viii. 14. 1]—"It is indeed the Ether which achieves the Name and the Form: that which is beyond these two is the Brahman," as also from texts like [Chh., vi. 3. 2]—"Let me unfold the Name and the Form"; or [Tait. Āraṇ., iii.12. 7]—"The Wise One, having congregated all forms, assigns the names and keeps on calling out the same;" or [Śvet., vi. 16]—"He who makes the one seed manifold." Thus the Lord becomes the Lord only when conforming himself to the limitations of Name and Form made out by Nescience, like unto the ether as conforming to the limitations of the jar, the water-pot, and the like. And He it is who, from the point of view of ordinary life, rules over the sentient-selfs styled the individual-souls, who are as if a portion of Himself—analogous to the ether as limited by the jar—and who conform to the bodies (kārya) and the organs which are all the creations of Name and Form,—all of them the fabrications of Nescience. Thus, then, the Lord's character as Lord—His omniscience and omnipotence—is merely contingent upon His being characterised by these limitations that consist of Nescience; while from the point of view of the ultimate truth there cannot reasonably remain any scope herein for the ordinary conceptions of controlling, being controlled, omniscience and the like, when the Ātman has once attained through knowledge his real nature in which all limitations are at an end. This has been declared by texts like [Chh., vii. 24. 1]—"Wherein he neither sees anything beyond it, nor hears anything besides it, nor knows anything other than itself: that is the Plenum;" and [Bṛih., iv. 5. 15]—"When in his case everything has become his very Self, what can he perceive, and with what can he perceive?" Thus in the state of highest Reality all the Upanishads vouch for the annihilation of all phenomenal-dealings. To the like effect also the Bhagavadgītā [v. 14-15]—"The Lord

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creates, of these people, neither their function-as-an-actor, nor their activities, nor the joining of their actions with (corresponding) fruit: it is Nature that does it all (automatically). Nor does the Lord receive either the sin or the merit of anyone: the knowledge is obscured by Nescience, and as a consequence of it the creatures all go deviously"—wherein is set forth, the utter absence, in the state of highest Reality, of ordinary conceptions such as that of the controller and the objects-controlled, and so forth. From the point of view of ordinary perception, on the other hand, there are statements even in the Scriptures referring to the Lord, the Controller, etc. Thus [Bṛih., iv. 4. 22] —"He is the Lord of all, the Over-lord of all beings, the Guardian of the creatures, the embankment that steadies all these worlds so as to prevent their falling into utter confusion;" [Page 25] and likewise too the Bhagavadgītā [xviii. 61]—"The Lord is stationed, O Arjuna, in the heart-region of all creatures, causing by His Power-of-Illusion all the beings to turn round and round, as though mounted upon a wheel." The author of these Sūtras on his part declares the 'non-distinctness from It' from the point of view of highest Reality; while from the ordinary, phenomenal view-point he declares that 'it might happen as in the ordinary life,' making the Brahman equivalent to the great ocean (of the illustration), and so following the mode-of-explanation by the modification-theory—without as much as explicitly controverting the phenomenal creation—particularly as it might be of some utility in meditations on the Qualified (Brahman). **14.**

And because there is a perception (of the effect) only upon the existence (of the cause). 15.

For this reason also there is non-distinctness of the effect from the cause; because, namely, it is only consequent upon the existence of the cause that the effect is perceived, and not upon its non-existence. For example, it is only when the clay is there that a jar is observed or when the threads are there, that the cloth is observed. Such an invariable perception of one thing is never observed as being necessarily contingent upon the existence of quite another thing. A horse, for instance, being distinct from a cow, is not invariably found only where a cow exists; nor, to

take another instance, is a jar invariably found only where the pot-maker exists, since they are two distinct things although between them exists the relation of an effect and its efficient (but not the constituent) cause. But, one might object, we do observe the invariable presence of one thing consequent upon the existence of another (and a distinct) thing, as for instance, the perception of the smoke (only) upon the existence of the fire. No, we reply. For, even though the fire be extinguished, we do observe smoke, as contained in a cow-boy's pipe, for example. Our objector might possibly characterise the smoke as being in a particular condition (for instance, continuous and copious and uprising) urging that this kind of smoke does not exist where the fire is non-existent; but even so there is nothing defective in our argument. For, we are going to say that the ground of the non-distinctness between the effect and its cause is the fact that our idea of the former is (invariably) coloured (and interpenetrated) by the form of the latter. Such a relation does not exist between the fire and the smoke.

As another alternative we might read the Sūtra as—"And because of the existence of the direct-perception (of the non-distinctness of the cause and the effect)." It is not merely on the basis of the Scriptures that there is non-distinctness between the effect and the cause: there is such non-distinctness also on the strength of a direct perception of it. For there does exist a direct perception as regards the non-distinctness between the effect and the cause. Thus, in an aggregate of the threads which make up the cloth, as apart from and beyond the threads, there is not at all observed such (a new and distinct) thing as a piece-of cloth, the effect: what we do actually observe are mere threads extended lengthwise and breadthwise; and likewise (there are merely) the fibres in the threads (constituted out of them) and the smaller segments in the fibres. From such a direct perceptive cognition we can take back the chain of inference to the three colours: red, white, and black [out of which, according to Chh. vi. 4, everything is made], and then (as their still more ultimate basis) the mere wind and the mere ether; and, finally, the Brahman as the sole Absolute without a second—where, as we have said, all means-of-knowledge reach their most ultimate stay-and-support. 15.

And because of the (antecedent) existence of the subsequent (effect in the form of the cause). 16.

For this reason also, there is non-distinctness of the effect from the cause: because, prior to its origination, the Veda declares the existence of the effect, which belongs to a subsequent time, in the cause, and in the form of the cause. [Page 26] Thus [Chh., vi. 2. 1]—" All this, My boy, was undoubtedly existing in the beginning;" or [Ait. Ār., II. iv. 1. 1]— " The Ātman verily was alone all this in the beginning "—wherein there is declared a co-ordination between the effect referred to by the word ' this ' and the Cause. If a thing does not exist within another, and as being of one essence with the other, it does not arise out of that ; e.g., oil from sand-grains. Consequently, since, prior to origination, it was non-distinct, so the effect, even subsequent to production, has to be inferred to be non-distinct from the cause. Moreover, inasmuch as Brahman, the Cause, does not at all deviate from existence in all the three times, so likewise the effect, the world, does not also deviate from existence in all the three times ; and since existence as such is one only, therefore also there is non-distinctness of the effect from the cause. **16.**

If you say ' Nay ' by reason of the designation (of the Cause) as ' non-existence ', the reply is—No : because, as appears from the remainder of the statement, it is (a designation) by opposite specification (merely). 17.

One might urge : But in places the Scriptural texts do also designate the effect as non-existence prior to the origination : Thus [Chh., iii. 19. 1]—" All this was in the beginning just non-existence," or [Tait. Up., ii. 7. 1]—" Non-existence, indeed, was all this at first." From this designation of the effect as non-existence there cannot be said to be an existence of the effect prior to origination. To this we answer, No. For, this designation of the effect as non-existence is not intended to declare the utter non-existence of it prior to origination, but, as contrasted with the specification of the effect as in an evolved state of its names and forms, there is another specification of it as in an unevolved state of its names and forms ; and it is by this other specification that there is here a designation of the effect—existing as it certainly

is prior to its origination, and non-distinct as it also is from the form of its cause. How do you know this? From the remainder of the statement. A statement which is of doubtful import in the earlier part is determined in meaning by its latter part. Here, for instance, in the text [Chh., iii. 19. 1]—" All this was in the beginning just non-existence "—the very same (effect) which at the outset is referred to by the word 'non-existence,' that same is again pointed to by the word 'that' and is specified as 'existence' in [Chh., iii. 19. 1]—" That was existence. " [If 'that' had stood for mere non-existence,] as non-existence can have no relation with the prior or the posterior time, the word 'was' should not properly have been used of it. So also in [Tait. Up., ii. 7. 1]—"Non-existence indeed was all this at first," in the part of the statement to follow we have a specific mention to the effect [ibid., ii. 7. 1]—" That of itself transformed its own self," [Page 27] which means that it was not before absolutely non-existent. We conclude therefore that this designation of the effect prior to its origination is merely of the nature of an opposite specification. In ordinary life anything with a fully-evolved name and form is known as a fit object for being called existence; hence, prior to its evolution with names and forms, it can be taken in a secondary sense, and declared to be as though 'non-existence.' **17.**

And from reasoning, as well as another Scriptural passage. 18.

From reasoning also we can infer the existence of the effect prior to its origination and its non-distinctness from the cause; as also from another Scriptural-passage. We will first describe the reasoning. We observe in ordinary life milk, clay, gold, and so forth—and none but these—resorted to by people who are desirous of (producing respectively) curds, jars, ornaments, etc. Persons wanting curds do not resort to clay, nor those wanting jars, to milk. This cannot be reasonably explained if the effect were taken to be non-existent. For (should it be so), prior to the origination, everything being everywhere alike non-existent, why should curds be produced out of milk alone and not out of clay, and why should a jar be produced out of clay alone and not out of milk? If (to obviate the objection) it be supposed that, although (the effect be everywhere) equally non-existing prior to its ori-

gination, yet it is in milk alone that there exists a certain subtle (predisposing) form of the curds, and not in clay; and in clay alone that there exists a certain subtle (predisposing) form of the jar, and not in milk: then, inasmuch as the antecedent condition is characterised by this subtle (predisposing) form, there results a throwing overboard of the theory of the (antecedent) non-existence of the effect (in the cause), and the establishing of the theory of the (antecedent) existence of the effect (in the cause). If, as another alternative, one were to posit in the cause a certain potency for invariably producing certain specific effect only, this potency cannot serve as a determining principle of the effect if it were to be either distinct (from effect) or altogether of the nature of non-existence; for, its non-existence or distinctness would not be specifically restricted to (particular effects and not others). Hence, the potency has to be of one essence with the cause, and the effect has to be of one essence with the potency. — Moreover, it is necessary that between the cause and the effect, as between the substance and its qualities, we should assume an identity-of-essence, as there is no distinctness between them such as there is between a horse and a buffalo. And even with the hypothesis of the Intimate-Relation (samavāya) if there has to be assumed a relation (of some sort) between the Intimate-Relation itself on the one hand, and the intimately-related objects on the other, between this (new-relation) again and the things which it keeps in relation, a yet newer relation of some kind has to be assumed, and so on *ad infinitum*, which would lead to the contingency of non-finality. If, on the other hand, there is no assumption of such a relation, there would be the contingency of the breaking asunder (of the relation). Should you here urge that the Intimate Relation, being itself of the nature of a relation, would be related to the objects without the necessity of any intervening relation then (the quality called) Contact, being no less of the nature of a relation, ought to be related (with the objects in contact) without requiring an (intervening) Intimate Relation (as you assume). The assumption of an Intimate Relation is also purposeless because (pairs) such as the substance and its qualities are actually perceived as being identical-in-essence.—How, moreover, would the effect which is an aggregate of parts subsist—if it is to do so—upon its cause, viz., its constituent parts? Would it subsist upon (i) all the parts taken toge-

ther, or would it subsist upon (ii) each one of them singly (and by turn)? If it were to sub-ist (i, a) upon all the parts (collectively), then there would arise the contingency of the non-perception of the whole-as-such, because there cannot possibly be (in one act of perception) a perceptive-contact between the entire whole and the sense-of-perception. Thus, for illustration, (the quality of) plurality, residing as it does upon the total number of things that go to make it up, cannot be perceived by perceiving the constituent things singly. If it were to subsist (i, b) upon all the parts, but *seriatim* [one segment of the whole coming into contact with its corresponding constituent-part], then [although the difficulty of non-perception disappears, yet] there will have to be imagined to the whole (a series of) constituent parts other than those out of which it was actually produced so as to make it possible for the former series of parts to exist upon the latter series in succession. For, it is by a series of constituent-parts distinct from those of scabbard that the sword fits into its scabbard. Such a supposition would further lead to a *regressus in infinitum*, because there will have to be imagined each time, [Page 28] a new series of constituent-parts to the whole by means of which it could reside upon the series of its constituent parts first imagined (and thereafter a second new series, and so on). On the other hand (case ii), if it were to reside (wholly and completely) upon any single one of its constituents, then while the whole is performing its function in one part, it cannot perform its function in another part. For, if Devadatta be present in Srughna, he cannot on that very day be present at Pāṭaliputra also. If there be a presence simultaneously in more than one place, there will have to be more than one personality; as for instance, of Devadatta and Yajñadatta respectively residents of Srughna and Pāṭaliputra. Were you to urge that, like the genus "cow-ness" (which, although one, resides upon each single species, the cow, wholly and completely) the constituted-whole might reside wholly and completely upon each one of its constituent parts, and so no defect obtains in our view, we reply, no; because we never have that sort of perception. For, were the constituted-whole to reside like cow-ness wholly and completely on each constituent-part then, just as we perceive the "cow-ness" in each cow by direct-perception, so ought we to be able to see the whole in each part by direct-per-

ception; but such a perception never takes place as by necessity. Moreover, if the whole were to reside upon any single part fully and completely, then inasmuch as a thing gets its status by performing its function, and inasmuch as the whole (which, is to perform the function) is only one, even by the horn (which by hypothesis is equal to the whole animal) it ought to perform, say, the function of the udder, or by the chest, the function of the back. But we never notice anything of the kind.

Further, if the effect were to be non-existent before its origination, then the (process of) origination would have neither a (grammatical) subject nor any substantiality. For, origination is certainly an action, and as such necessarily requires, like the action of going and so forth, a (grammatical) subject. That we should have an action and that it should be without a (grammatical) subject is a contradiction. When we speak of a jar originating, if the origination is not to have the jar as its (grammatical) subject, we will have in that case to imagine some other (grammatical) subject for it, (say, the potsherds). And similarwise when we speak of potsherds etc. originating, we will have to imagine something-else as being the (grammatical) subject of that action. If that were true, when one says 'the jar originates' he will have to be taken to say that it is the pot-maker and other causes that are originating. In ordinary life, however, when there is a statement made about the origination of a jar one never understands that even the pot-maker and so forth are being originated: rather, these are understood to have been already originated.— If, further, one were to argue that the origination of, and the acquiring-of-a-concrete-individuality by, an effect is simply the effect's coming into [samavāya] relation with its cause, and with the (genus,) existence (respectively) you have to explain how one that has not yet obtained a substantiality can have any relation at all. A relation is possible only between two existing entities, and not between an existing and a non-existing entity, or between two non-existing entities.—Moreover, (when you speak of the non-existence of an effect prior to its origination,) since 'non-existence' is void of all characterisations, its delimitation as 'prior to origination' is inadmissible. In ordinary life it is existing entities like houses and fields that are seen to possess such delimitations, and not a non-existence.

For, surely, an attempt at delimitation like—"The barren-woman's son was the king before the coronation of Pūrṇavarman"—cannot convey any specification as to when the barren-woman's son, who is void of all reality, became or is or will become king. If ever. forsooth, the barren-woman's son were to come into existence subsequent to the operation of the causal agencies, then only would it stand to reason that the non-existing effect might step into existence subsequent to the operation of the causal agencies. We, however, hold the view that since the barren-woman's son and the non-existing effect are both of them equally non-existing entities, therefore, just as the barren-woman's son could not step into existence subsequent to the operation of the causal agencies, even so would the non-existing effect not come into existence subsequent to the operation of the causal agencies. It might be objected: if that were so, the operation of the causal agencies would be reduced to purposelessness For, just as nobody ever busies himself (when producing a jar) to induce (the clay, pot-maker and other) causes to (assume an existential form) because these are already existing entities, even so, [Page 29] if the effect were to exist prior to origination, and were to be of one essence with its cause, then nobody would exert himself to endow the effect with the form-of-existence. But people do thus exert themselves. Hence, with a view to make the operation of causal agencies purposive, we would be inclined to regard the effect as non-existing prior to its origination.—The objection is not valid, we reply, since the operation of causal agencies will have motive enough in that thereby the cause is to be made to assume the form of an effect. That this 'form of the effect' again is also of one essence with the cause, inasmuch as 'what does not already exist in the cause as of one essence with it, cannot, as we have said, be originated. Besides, owing to a mere difference in the (external) form being observed, there cannot be assumed to be an otherness in the thing's real essence. For, surely, Devadatta (seated) with his hands and legs drawn together does not pass over into another entity in essence when one observes him in (another) position with his hands and legs stretched out; for, there is the recognition of his being the very same individual. In a like manner our parents etc., even though we observe them day after day in different varying postures, do not become different in essence, inasmuch as there is the recognition

that he is my father, brother, son, etc. (as the case may be). And if one were to object that this may be right in those cases where the ultimate limit of a difference in birth has not been crossed (and the individuals do not utterly disappear from us), but not so in the other cases: we say, Nay. For even in (the ordinary case of a cause-effect relation, viz.) milk and so forth assuming the form of curds, we see the transformation taking place before our very eyes. And even where, as in the case of the seeds of a Banian tree and the like (where the transformation into sprouts etc. takes place while they are) concealed from our sight, when the seeds spring up into our view after the accretion to them of other parts similar to their own, and so assuming the form of a sprout and the like, then we are to call it their birth; and when these same parts waste away and we (ultimately) cease to see them, then we are to call it their death,—if it is the intervention of a birth and a death thus understood that is to make what was non-existence to become existence and what was existence to become non-existence, then we will have to recognise the child in the fœtus and that lying on its back (after birth) as two distinct ones. Similarly too we will have to assume a distinction (of individuality) even in the conditions of childhood, youth and oldage which would entail the contingency of giving the go to the ordinary dealings with the parents and the like.—Hereby the (Buddhistic) doctrine of Momentariness is also to be understood as refuted. —He, on the other hand, who considers the effect as non-existent prior to its origination: in his theory the operation of causal agencies will have no material on which to operate: for, as the non-existent (effect) cannot be the material, it would be like the employment of various weapons such as sword etc., for the purpose of hacking the ether to pieces. If you contend that the operation of causal agencies can have (the clay) the inherent cause as the material to work upon, we say, No: for, it would involve an unwarranted license in logic if the causal agencies operating upon one thing (the inherent cause) were to bring into existence another (and quite a distinct) thing. And if it be held that the effect is merely a subtle-form of the inner-essence of the inherent cause, we demur, because that would bring you round to the doctrine of the (antecedent) existence of the effect (in the cause). Hence it follows that it is the very (causal) substances, milk and so forth, that come to be designated as effects when they stand

forth under the form of (the effects like) curds and the like. Consequently even after a hundred years one will not be able to reach the conclusion that the effect is distinct from the cause. Accordingly, it is (Brahman), the First Cause that, right down to its most ultimate effects, assumes, like an actor, the forms of the various effects, and so comes to be the basis of all the phenomenal dealings. Thus from reasoning we arrive at the doctrine of the existence of the effect prior to its origination, and its non-distinctness from the cause.

We arrive at the very same conclusion even from another Scriptural-text. Since in the preceding Sūtra there was cited a Scriptual-text which designated the cause as 'non-existence,' it is a text different from that which is meant by 'another' Scriptural-text, and which designates it as 'existence,'—namely one like [Chh., vi. 2. 1] : "Existence alone, My dear boy, was all this in the beginning, one and without-a-second." [Page 30] And the passage [in Chh., vi. 2. 1]—" And now some declare that it was nothing but 'non-existence' in the beginning "—introduces the view as regards (the effect being) 'non-existence,' and, calling this view into question by the words (following)—" How could existence be produced out of non-existence ?"—reaches the final conclusion that—" Nothing but existence, My dear boy, was all this in the beginning." Here, inasmuch as, in the condition prior to origination, the effect which is denoted by the word 'this' is placed by the Scriptural-text in co-ordination with the cause which is denoted by the word 'existence,' there follow the (two) conclusions as to the (antecedent) existence (of the effect) and its non-distinctness (from the cause). If the effect were non-existent prior to origination and were to come into the relation of 'samavāya' while it is being subsequently produced, then it would be distinct from the cause. Under this supposition the solemn-declaration [Chh. vi. 1. 3]—" By which what has not been heard becomes something already heard...."—would be rendered nugatory. The solemn-declaration on the other hand is ratified (only) by believing in the (antecedent) existence (of the effect) and (its) non-distinctness (from the cause). **18.**

And like unto a piece-of-cloth. 19.

And just as a piece-of-cloth, when rolled up, is not clearly

perceived as to whether it be a piece-of-cloth or some other substance: but the same when spread out is, by that spreading out, clearly perceived (as when one says—) the object that was rolled up is the piece-of-cloth itself. And just as, while it was rolled up, one did have the perception of it as a piece-of cloth, but did not know it as possessing a specific length and breadth; and just as the same piece-of-cloth, while it is being spread out, is perceived as possessing a specific length and breadth, but it is not felt that it is a piece-of-cloth distinct from the one having the rolled-up form: in exactly the same manner an effect such as a piece-of-cloth is non-manifest while it subsists in the form of its causes like the threads, etc., and is rendered manifest for perception by the operation of the causal agencies like the shuttle, the loom, and the weaver. Thus the Sūtra means that the maxim of the rolled-up and the spread-out piece-of-cloth establishes the non-distinctness of the effect from the cause. 19.

And like unto the life-breaths etc. 20.

And just as we observe in the world the different life-breaths, such as the Prāṇa, Apāna, etc., abiding just in the form of their root-cause, when they are curbed in the (Yogic) process of breath-control, and so performing only the function of continuing the life, but not the other (wonted) functions such as withdrawing, expanding, and so forth; and just as, these same varieties of life-breath, when again released, perform likewise their other (wonted) functions—withdrawing, expanding, etc.—over and above that of the continuance of the life; and just as the different varieties of life-breath are not distinct from the Breath (or Prāṇa) which has these sub-varieties, seeing that all alike have the moving-air as their essence: even so, analogously, is the effect non-distinct from the cause. [Page 31] Hence, inasmuch as the entire world is an effect of Brahman and non-distinct from it, the solemn Vedic declaration, namely [Chh., vi. 1. 3]—" By which what has not been heard becomes something already heard, what has not been thought becomes something already thought, what has not been known becomes something already known........."—is fully ratified. 20. Here ends the Topic (6) styled Word-Initiated World.

TOPIC 7 : CREATOR HIGHER THAN THE SOUL

(*Sūtras* 21–23)

In consequence of the designation of the other One as this, there arises the contingency of his not-doing what is beneficial, and so forth, 21.

It is from another aspect of it that the doctrine of a sentient first cause is now being attacked. If indeed one were to postulate a sentient being to initiate the creative process, there would arise the contingency of defects such as not doing what is beneficial, and the like. Why ? Because of the designation of the other One as this. For, the Scripture designates the other One, viz., the embodied soul, as being of the essence of Brahman, since there is an awakening of the consciousness in the following form [Chh., vi. 8. 7]—" That is the Self : That thou art, O Śvetaketu !" Or (interpreting another way) the Scripture designates the other One, viz., the Brahman as being the true Self of the embodied-soul, inasmuch as in the passage [Tait. Up., ii. 6]—" Having created it, into the very same He entered " — it is the Creator Brahman in the unmodified-form that is set forth as having subsequently entered all the effects, and so become the true Self of the embodied-soul. And in the text [Chh., vi. 3. 2]—"Let me thereafter enter (the creation) with this soul—this Self—and unfold the names and the forms"—the Highest Divinity designates the soul as the Self and hence points out that the embodied soul is not other than the Brahman. Therefore, the creative-function appertaining to Brahman is (eventually) that of the embodied-soul itself. As a consequence, being as he is, a free, independent creator, he should do just what is exclusively beneficial to him and what would cause him comfort, and not what is harmful to him, such as this net-work of manifold miseries, to wit : birth, death, oldage, disease and what not. For, no one who retains his freedom would fashion a house of incarceration for himself and therein enter. Nor would he, being by nature extremely pure, conceive a relation of ownership with the altogether impure body. And even though inadvertently fashioned, he would at his will abandon whatever might cause him pain, and take up what might cause pleasure. And (above all) he would

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remember : it was by me that this wondrous globe of the universe was fashioned. Every one, in fact, after doing a thing, clearly remembers that he has done it. Further, just as the magician does, without any effort and whenever he wills it, wind up the magical-illusion spread out by himself, even so ought the embodied-soul too (be able to) withdraw this creation. But, of a fact, this embodied-soul is not able to withdraw even his own body (and limbs) without making an effort. Thus then, as we do not notice the doing of any beneficial actions etc., it follows that the creative process emanating from a sentient cause cannot stand to reason. 21.

But It is more-and-beyond, as there is an intimation of distinction. 22.

[Page 32] The word 'but' turns back the objection. That Brahman, omniscient and omnipotent, and eternal, pure, sentient and free by nature, and which is over and above and distinct from the embodied-soul : it is That which we declare to be the Creator of the world. To It the contingencies, such as not doing the beneficial etc., do not apply. For, to It there does not exist anything beneficial to be achieved or anything harmful to be averted, as it is by nature eternal and free. There does not exist in Its case anywhere any hindrance to knowledge or to power, because of Its omniscience and omnipotence. The embodied-soul on the other hand is not of this nature, and to it do apply the defects such as not doing the beneficial etc. But this soul we never declare to be the creator of the world. Whence do you get this ? On account of an intimation of distinction. Declarations like [Bṛih., ii. 4. 5]—" The Self, forsooth, My dear, is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected upon, to be meditated upon ;" or [Chh., viii. 7. 1]—"He is to be sought after, to be cognised ;" or [Chh., vi. 8. 1]—"It is then, My dear boy, that one becomes of-one-essence with Existence ;" or [Bṛih., iv. 3. 35]—" The embodied-soul, surmounted by the Omniscient Self........."—and many more of a like nature, which assert a distinction of the agent and the action and so forth, designate the Brahman as being more-and-beyond the individual soul.

But it might be urged that there is also an assertion of non-

distinction, such as [Chh., vi. 8. 6]—" That thou art "—and the like. How could contradictories like distinction and non-distinction be both true ? But that is no objection. For, in more than one place it has been established that there is a possibility of both on the analogy of the (elemental) ether and ether-in-the-jar. Further, when there has been awakened the consciousness of the non-distinction by declarations such as [Chh., vi. 8. 6]—" That thou art "—and the like which point out that non-disdinction, then there results a falling away of the individual soul's relation to the phenomenal world, and also of the idea of the Brahman as being its creator, inasmuch as that right knowledge wipes out all kinds of dealings-in-phenomena, which are (just) a pageant set afoot by false knowledge. From that point of view, where is the creation, and whence can there be defects such as not doing the beneficial etc. ? This transmigratory-world which gives rise to these notions of not doing what is beneficial etc. is an erroneous-perception based upon the failure to discriminate between (the Brahman and) the limiting-adjuncts, consisting of this whole assemblage of bodies and organs, which are the fabrications of names and forms that are themselves figured forth by Nescience : it has, as we have stated time and again, no existence from the point of view of the Highest Truth—even like the feeling of the 'I' as being the subject of birth, death, cutting, piercing, and the like (which really belong to the body only). As long, then, as the notions of distinction (and dealings based upon these) remain un-sublated, so long the intimation of distinction contained in texts of the nature of [Chh., viii. 7. 1]—"He is to be sought after, He is to be known "—testifies to the Brahman being over-and-above (the individual soul), and so dispels the contingency as to our theory being open to defects like not doing what is beneficial, etc. 22.

And, because of the analogy of stones and the like, there in no cogency in that. 23.

[Page 33] Just as in the world, in the case of stones, which all partake of the common characteristic of 'earth-ness,' there are some stones, very precious, like diamonds, lapis lazuli, etc., others of medium excellence like crystals, and others of low value, only fit to be thrown at dogs and crows, so that we notice

a manifold variety amongst them; and just as of seeds which are grounded in the same soil we notice a very large variety in their leaves, flowers, fruits, smell, sap, etc., as in a sandal or a *kimpāka*; and just as one and the same food-juice produces diversified effects like blood, etc. and like hair, down, and the rest: even so it stands to reason that one and the same Brahman should give rise to the differentiation between the individual selfs and the Highest Self, and to the manifoldness of the creation. Hence, there is no cogency in that, that is to say, there is no cogency in the defect imagined by our opponent. The word 'and' (in the sūtra) suggests a cumulation of arguments like the authoritativeness of the Scripture, the nature of the modified forms as merely due to word-initiation, and the other analogous instance of the diversity of things visible in the dreams. 23. Here ends the Topic (7) entitled Creator Higher than the Soul.

TOPIC 8 : CREATOR'S CAUSAL PARAPHERNALIA

(*Sūtras* 24–25)

If one says No, because the accumulation [of causal paraphernalia] is observed, we demur : for, it is like the milk. 24.

The statement made that the sentient Brahman, one without a second, is the cause of the world, cannot be maintained. Why? Because the accumulation [of causal paraphernalia] is observed. For, in ordinary life, we observe pot-makers, [weavers], etc., the authors of jars or pieces-of-cloth or the like, producing their respective handicrafts after having furnished themselves with materials and instruments like clay, staff, wheel, threads and suchlike accumulation of mainfold causal paraphernalia. The Brahman, however, you intend to set forth as being devoid of any assistance. If It is not going to gather together other means-of-work, how can you maintain Its character as a Creator? Consequently, Brahman is not the cause of the world. To this we reply that it is no [valid] objection; for, as in the case of the milk, this can be explained as a consequence of its peculiar innate-nature. Just as in the world we find milk or water of its own accord getting modified into curds or ice without needing for it any extraneous means, just so it might be in this case too. — But it

might be urged, even the milk and the like do require extraneous means, like heat etc., while they are becoming transformed into curds, etc.: how can you then say—'for, it is like the milk'? This is no objection. That kind of modification and that degree of modification which milk of its own accord undergoes, that same kind and degree of modification towards the form of the curds is merely accelerated by the use of heat etc. If indeed milk were not to possess of its own accord an innate proclivity for becoming curds, even the heat etc. would not by force succeed in transforming it into curds. For, surely, the wind or the ether cannot be perforce compelled to assume the form of curds by heat and the like. The presence of causal auxiliaries merely contributes to the perfection of the effect. But Brahman is already possessed of a perfection of powers : not by anything extraneous is its perfection to be brought about. There is a Scriptural text to that effect [Śvet., v. 2]—[Page 34] "There exists neither the body nor the organs to Him, and we do not see any one who is His equal or His superior; we hear of His highest and diversified power, as also, of knowledge and strength and activity, which are His by nature." Therefore we can understand, even of the one solitary Brahman, in consequence of its possessing a miraculous power, this diversified modification, as in the case of the milk. 24.

And also like [the analogous cases of] the gods etc. of ordinary experience. 25.

This may be so. In the case of non-sentient objects like the milk etc. there can well result the modification in the form of curds, without the necessity of any extraneous means, because that is an observed fact. But pot-makers etc., who are sentient beings, are observed to proceed to produce their respective handicrafts not without a full equipment of means and instruments. How then can the Brahman, sentient as it is, start the activity without any assistance? — We reply, like the [analogous cases of] gods, etc. Just as in the world we notice gods, manes, sages and such other personalities of great prowess,—sentient too as they all are,—yet, irrespective of any extraneous means and by reason of being endowed with peculiar potence, creating, alone and by the act of mere meditation, many a body and a palace and a car and the like

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of diversified make-and-pose—as can be asserted on the authority of the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, the Histories, and the Purāṇas; and just as the spider spins out webs out of itself, or the female crane conceives without semen, or the lotus-plant moves from one lake to another (adjoining) lake without requiring any extraneous means of travel: even so the sentient Brahman too can create the world out of itself and without standing in need of any extraneous means.—If against this one were to urge that analogies of the gods etc., which are adduced for the Brahman, are not quite on a par with the case sought to be explained by analogy. For, the gods etc., do have their non-sentient body which can serve as the material for fashioning miraculous objects like other bodies etc. and not their sentient souls; while in the case of the spider it is its saliva produced by eating smaller insects which, when hardened, becomes the thread of the web: and as to the female crane, she conceives upon hearing the noise of a thundering-cloud; and as concerning the lotus-plant, finally, from one lake it approaches another lake by its own non-sentient body, which is propelled by an (in-dwelling) sentience, as does the creeper the tree; and it is not a case that, being itself non-sentient, it is able to perform the movement towards another lake. Therefore, all these analogous instances do not fit in with the Brahman. To this our reply should be: that is no defect. For, what was wanted to be conveyed was just the difference of these cases with the (other) parallel instances of the pot-makers and the like. While, then, the pot-makers etc. and the gods etc. are both equally sentient, the former, before beginning an action, stand in need of extraneous means, but not the latter; in an analogous manner the sentient Brahman for its parts could also similarly [Page 35] dispense with *all* extraneous means—this was all that was intended to be conveyed by the adduced analogies of the gods and the like. The point is that it is not an invariable rule that exactly the same potence that has been observed in the case of the one should precisely tally with that of all others. 25. Here ends the Topic (8) entitled Creator's Causal Paraphernalia.

TOPIC 9 : IMPARTITE'S PART-MODIFICATION

(*Sūtras* 26–29)

The conclusion then stands established that the cause of the world is the sentient Brahman, one without a second, which, on the analogy of the milk and the like, or the gods and other instances, assumes a modification of itself, without standing in need of any other extraneous means. By way of a further probing of the ascertained conclusion of the Śāstra, he is now bringing up another objection once more—

Either a wholesale transformation, or a disturbance in the Scriptural-texts about the impartiteness. 26.

There would arise the contingency of " whole-sale transformation " that is to say, modification in-the-form-of-the-effect of the whole Brahman, because there can be no parts to it. If Brahman had been, like the earth and similar objects, constituted of parts, then it would have been possible for one of these parts to get modified, while the other part could have remained unmodified. But we learn of the Brahman as being impartite from Scriptures like [Svet., vi. 19]—" Without digital-parts, without activity, tranquil, stainless, spotless," or [Muṇḍaka, ii. 1. 2]—"The Purusha verily is divine, devoid of definite dimensions, unborn, and possessed of both the without and the within," or [Bṛih., ii. 4. 12]—" This Great-Being is endless and unfathomable and solidly constituted out of knowledge alone," or [Bṛih., iii. 9. 26]— " He is that Ātman (describable as) 'not-this,' 'not-that,'" or [Bṛih., iii. 8. 8]—" Neither gross nor subtle,"—and others which deny all specifications in its case whatsoever. So then, as there is not any possibility of a modification in one part, the contingency of a whole-sale modification having arisen, there would result an outright destruction (of the Brahman), which would also involve the futility of the instructions to seek and obtain a sight of the Brahman, seeing that the effect is to be seen by us all without any effort whatsoever, and there is no possibility of the Brahman remaining over and above the effect ; hence too the Scriptural statement about Brahman being unborn would be vitiated. And if, with a view to the removing of this defect, you

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were to assume parts to the Brahman, still the texts just adduced teaching the impartite nature of the Brahman, would become disturbed. Furthermore, if we assume parts to it, there arises the contingency of its non-eternality. In every way then this theory cannot possibly be sustained: Thus the objection. 26.

But on account of the Scripture: the Scripture being the (only) basis of it. 27.

By the word 'but' he dispels the objection. There certainly exists no flaw in our theory. To begin with, there is not the contingency of a whole-sale transformation. Why? From Scripture. Just as the Scripture declares to us the creation of the world from Brahman, [Page 36] even so there is a declaration as to the existence of the Brahman independently of its modifications, inasmuch as there is an assertion of the Cause and its modifications as being distinct from one another: namely [Chh., vi. 3. 2]—" And the Divinity reflected: 'having by means of this soul, this Self, subsequently entered these three divine entities, let me unfold the names and the forms,' " or [Chh., iii. 12. 6]—" Thus much is his greatness: greater than that is the Purusha. All the beings form a quarter of Him, His immortal three-quarters are in the heaven;" and the like. Also there are passages which speak of the heart as His abode, and passages which speak of the (individual soul's) merging back into Existence. If the entire Brahman had been used up in the process of transformation into its effect, then the specification referring to the condition of deep-sleep, namely, [Chh., vi. 8. 1]—" Then, My dear boy, he becomes merged back into Existence"—would become inapplicable inasmuch as the individual soul remains always merged into the essence of the modified Brahman (as being itself a modification of the Brahman), while (beyond the Modified Brahman) there exists no unmodified-Brahman (into which it can become merged during deep-sleep). Also there are texts placing the Brahman beyond the pales of our perceptive-organs, whereas the modifications of the Brahman (which by hypothesis exhaust the Brahman) are always within the range of the perceptive-organs. Hence there does exist an unmodified-Brahman.—Nor does this involve a disturbance of the Scriptural passages regarding impartiteness, because we assume likewise its impartiteness on the strength of

the Scriptural declarations themselves. For, Brahman has the Scriptures as the only basis and the word-testimony as the only means-of-proof, and it is not open to sense-perception. We have therefore to believe in it just as the Scripture teaches it. And the Scripture propounds both these in the case of the Brahman: its part-transformation and its impartiteness. Why, in the case of charm-beads, spells, herbs and the like, as we know them in the world, we see their mainfold potences depending upon differences in place, time and other circumstances, and giving rise to many self-contradictory effects. Now, if even these cannot be determined by mere logic, in the absence of special instruction as to what specific thing has what particular potences helped by an assignable set of auxiliaries, what particular spheres of action, leading to what particular consequences: how much the more reason there is not to expound, except with the concurrence of the Scripture, the characteristics of Brahman, the real nature of which is beyond the ken of even thought! Thus, likewise, declare those well-versed in the Purāṇas [Mbh., vi. 5. 12]—"Those objects indeed that are beyond thought : them one should not bring under the yoke of logic. That which is beyond the normal-phenomena—such is the definition of the Unthinkable." Hence it can arise only from Scripture : this understanding of the true-nature-as-it-is of things that are beyond the pale of sense-perception.

But, it might be urged, even the Scripture cannot make us acquiese in a self-contradictory statement, such as, that the Brahman is impartite, that it assumes a modification, and that the entire whole is not modified. If Brahman be at all impartite, either it ought not to be ever modified, or the entire whole ought to be modified. And to assume that in some of its aspects it gets modified, while in the others it remains [Page 37] unmodified, virtually makes it possessed of parts owing to this assumed difference in aspects. For, it is only in matters pertaining to an action that even a self-contradictory teaching like [under Jaim. Sūtra, x. 8. 6]—" He takes the Shoḍaśin-cup in the Atirātra rite : He does not take the Shoḍaśin in the Atirātra rite,"—can have the perceived contradiction therein composed by resorting to an option in practice; because an action, after all, rests upon an individual's will. But in the present case even recourse to option cannot possibly remove the contradiction, because the nature of

reality does not depend upon any man's will. Hence the view contains an ineradicable difficulty. We reply that it is not so; because we can assume the differences in the aspects (of the Brahman) as merely the fabrications of Nescience. For, surely, owing to a difference in aspects fabricated by Nescience, the thing-as-it-is cannot be rendered liable to partition. Because to a person suffering from eye-disease the moon appears as if double, the moon in reality cannot of course be double. It is through a difference in aspects consisting of names and forms which are the fabrications of Nescience—aspects, one of them developed and the other undeveloped, and both of them not susceptible of a discrimination as to whether they are or are not other than That (Brahman)—that the Brahman comes to be the basis of all phenomenal dealings involving liability to modification; whereas in its ultimate real nature It transcends all the phenomenal dealings and abides as ever unmodified (and unmodifiable), seeing that the distinction of names and forms is a fiction of the Nescience and is merely word-initiated, so that (in reality) it does not militate against the impartiteness of Brahman. Nor need we suppose that the Scriptural statement about modification primarily intends to teach the modification itself, because no fruit is made known as resulting from such a comprehension. It is, on the other hand, intended to teach the real-essence of Brahman as devoid of all phenomenality, because a fruit is declared as resulting from that comprehension. Thus a Scriptural passage [Bṛih., iv. 2. 4]—introducing the theme with—"This is that 'Not-this,' 'Not-that' Ātman"—goes on to say: "Now hast thou verily reached the Fearless, O Janaka!" Accordingly, in our theory there exists no possibility of any flaw. 27.

And besides we do have similar and manifold creations in the self also. 28.

Further, one need not here contentiously ask, how one and the same Brahman can have a multiform creation without violating its real nature, since, even in a self who is one and who is seeing a dream, a multiform creation without violating his real nature is declared to arise in the text commencing with [Bṛih., iv. 3. 10] —"There there are no (real) cars, nor yoke-animals, nor paths; and yet he creates the cars, the yoke-animals, and the paths." And in

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ordinary experience too we come across manifold creations of elephants, horses, and the like amongst the gods and amongst the magicians, etc., without thereby vitiating their real (unitary) nature. Similarly, even in the unitary Brahman—and without destroying its real nature—there can exist a multiform creation. 28.

And because the same objections can be urged against your own view. 29.

[Page 38] In our opponent's own theory also the same flaw exists. The view endorsed by the follower of the Pradhāna-theory is that the impartite, infinite Pradhāna, void of sound and other qualities, is the cause of the effect, which is divisible into parts, of limited dimensions, and possessed of sound and other qualities. Even in that view there arises the contingency of a wholesale modification of the Pradhāna which is impartite, or a vitiation of the assumption of its impartiteness. But it would be pointed out that they do not at all assume the Pradhāna to be impartite. There are the three eternal qualities of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. The Pradhāna is merely a state of equipoise of these (three qualities), and so with these very parts it is capable of division into parts. But the present defect cannot possibly be remedied by this kind of liability to partition, since Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas are each of them equally impartite. And if one of these in turn, with the other two as auxiliaries, is to be the constituent cause of a similar world of phenomena, then (by parity of reasoning) there does arise the contingency of the same objection being urged against your own view. But inasmuch as reasoning is always unstable [Brahmasūtra, II. i. 11,] if you are inclined to (flout our reasoning and) believe in the Pradhāna's being in fact capable of partition, then there presents itself the contingency of its being impermanent, etc. And if your idea were that it is the potences as inferred from the diversity of effects that are the (so-called) parts, those can be made equally available in defence of the propounder of the Brahman-theory.—In a like manner in the case of the follower of the theory of Atoms, when he assums the conjunction of one atom with another, if, as being without parts, the atom is to come into contact with another atom in its entirety, then, as there could be no further increase in the

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size, the result (of the conjunction) would be a mere atom (and not a binary). And if the atom were to come into contact at some of its parts, then that would militate against the ascription of impartiteness to the atom, so that in this theory also there arises the same contingency (as in ours); and that ought not to be therefore pressed against just one of the opposing theories only. As for the propounder of the Brahman-theory, he *has* refuted the objection directed against his own view. 29. Here ends the Topic (9) entitled Impartite's Part-Modification.

TOPIC 10: FULLY-EQUIPPED DIVINITY

(*Sūtras* 30-31)

We have said that even from the unitary Brahman there can properly arise this manifold assemblage of modification in consequence of the Brahman being endowed with manifold potences. But, it might be asked, how do we know that the Highest Brahman is joined to such manifold potences? The reply follows—

[The Divinity is] endowed with everything, because it is thus declared. 30.

We have to assume that the Highest Divinity is equipped with all powers. Why? Because it is thus declared. For, the Scripture declares the joining of the Highest Divinity with all powers: for instance [Chh., iii. 14. 4]—"Possessed of all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes; encompassing all this, the unspeaking, the unconcerned;" or [Chh., viii. 7. 1]—"He of truthful desires and truthful purposes;" or [Muṇḍaka, I. i. 9]—"He who knows all and realises everything;" [Page 39] or [Bṛih., iii. 8. 9]—"It is at the behest of this, the Immutable One, O Gārgī, that the sun and the moon stand sustained;" and others of like import. 30.

If you say Nay, by reason of the absence of organs (of perception and action), the explanation has been already given. 31.

This might be. But the Scripture declares the Highest Divinity as being devoid of all organs, as for instance [Bṛih., iii. 8. 8]—"Without the eye and without the ear, and without speech and

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without mind;" and the like. How can such a Divinity, albeit endowed with all powers, be able to proceed to activity? For, even the gods and others although sentient and endowed with all powers, we learn, are able to proceed to various activities only because they are equipped with a spiritual body and spiritual organs. Moreover, when there has been a denial of all characterisation to the Divinity in the text [Bṛih., iii. 9 26]—"Not-this, not-that," how can the Divinity be coupled with all potences?—What was to be said in answer to the above has been already stated before. This Brahman is altogether unfathomable, and penetrable only to the Scripture, but impervious to reasoning. Besides, we cannot lay down the rule that what potence was seen in the case of one, in the same manner it should exist in the case of another also. That the Brahman, in whose case all specifications have been denied, can yet be joined to ommipotence has been already explained by us by setting forth the distinction of aspects as imagined by Nescience. The Scriptural text likewise [Śvet., iii. 19]—"Without hands and feet, and yet swift and able to grasp: He the eyeless sees, He the earless hears"—declares, in the case of the Brahman—albeit destitute of all organs—the possession of all kinds of potences. **31.** Here ends the Topic (10) entitled Fully-Equipped Divinity,

TOPIC 11: FINAL END OF CREATION

(*Sūtras* 32–33)

The theory of a sentient First Cause is, from another point of view, again called into question—

No: because of purposiveness (of all activities). 32.

That the sentient Highest Soul should have created this globe of the Universe does not stand to reason. Why? Because of the purposiveness of (all) activities. For, in this world, we never observe any sentient person—where he proceeds to act after previous deliberation—commencing any activity, however slight be the effort involved in it, if it does not subserve some purpose of his own: much less an activity involving such a very heavy exertion. And there is the Scriptural text [Bṛih., ii. 4. 5] confirming this concensus of commonsense—[Page 40] "Not indeed, My dear,

does all this become dear unto one in the interest of all this, but rather does all this become dear in the interest of one's own Self." And there is involved a very heavy exertion in this activity, viz. that of creating this globe of the Universe with all its array of details high and low. If now all this (mighty) activity of the sentient Highest Soul is to be assumed to minister to his own (specific) ends, then the absolutely self-sufficient nature of the Highest Self, as endorsed by the Scriptures, would be vitiated. If, on the other hand, there be no purposiveness (in the activity), there would result an absence of the activity itself. And in case you were to say that, just as we at times observe even a sentient person, in a frenzied state, performing, by reason of his intellective apparatus being out of gear, activities that aim at no benefit to himself, even so might the Highest Self be taken to have gone about the action, then, in that case, the omniscience of the Highest Self, as attested by the Scriptures, would be overthrown. Hence, that a sentient being should have been the author of the creation is a theory that does not hold together. 32.

But, as in ordinary life, it might be mere sport. 33.

The word 'but' negatives the objection. Just as in the world, in the case of one who has all his desires fully satisfied—say of a king or of a royal minister—we do observe, in the way of playings and recreations, various activities of the nature of mere sport and not in anywise aimed at any other extraneous purpose; and just as (movements like) up-breathings and out-breathings etc. take place by very nature and without aiming at any extraneous purpose: even so in the case of the Lord also there can take place, by His very nature, an activity of the nature of mere sport and without aiming at any other purpose. For, of course, there cannot be imagined to exist in the case of the Lord any other purpose, whether we view at it logically or in the light of the Scriptures. Nor can you gainsay what is only the (intrinsic) nature of any one. And although the creation of this entire globe of the Universe might appear to us as a very heavy exertion, yet to the Highest Lord it is but sheer sport; for, He has immeasurable powers. And although indeed, in ordinary life, even in the sports there can be attributed some slight purpose, still, in the present case, not even such a purpose can possibly be posited, because of

the Scriptural declaration of His self-sufficiency. Nor can there result a cessation of the activity, or a frenzied activity, because the Scriptures avow both the creation and the omniscience. Nor finally, should this fact be forgotten that the Scriptural account of creation—as it comes within the sphere of the phenomenal-dealings in names and forms, which are but the figurations of Nescience—is not to be understood from the point of view of the highest truth, but is to be taken as having been aimed at setting forth the Brahman as the real essence of everything. 33. Here ends the Topic (11) entitled Final End of Creation.

TOPIC 12 : INEQUALITY AND CRUELTY

(*Sūtras* 34-36)

Once again is brought up an objection against the Lord being the cause of the origination etc. of the world, with the object of strengthening the view solemnly averred, following herein the maxim of infixing a peg [by shaking it and the soil at its root]—

There is no inequality, nor cruelty, because of (the Lord's) showing due-consideration : so, in fact, it declares. 34.

[Page 41] The Lord cannot reasonably be the cause of the world. Why? Because there arises the contingency of His inequality and cruelty. For, He makes some—e.g., the gods etc.,—experience greatest happiness; others—e. g., the beasts and the like—He makes suffer the greatest miseries; while others still—e. g., men etc.—He allows to experience (both these) in moderation. That the Lord should have created the world with such an unequal dispensation argues in His case the presence, as in that of an ordinary mortal, of love and hatred; and so there arises the contingency of a flat contradiction of the Lord's nature of passionlessness as determined by Revealed-texts and compilations-of-authority. Then again, there arises the contingency of an ascription to Him—because He brings about visitations of sorrows and encompasses the destruction (at Dissolution) of the entire creation—of compassionlessness and of extreme cruelty, for which even the most wicked conceive a loathing. Therefore, owing to this contingency of inequality and cruelty, the Lord

cannot be the cause. To this contingency we make the reply that the Lord does not stand open to the charges of inequality and cruelty. Why? Because of a showing of [due] consideration. If indeed the Lord were to create this creation, with its (patent) inequalities, entirely irrespective of any consideration, then there could arise these two faults: to wit, inequality and cruelty. But He does not function as the Creator irrespective of any considerations. The Lord creates this world together with its inequalities after showing all [due] consideration. What is it to which he shows all [due] consideration? We answer: it is to the merit and the demerit. Consequently, that the creation shows inequalities in consideration of the merit and demerit of the creatures about to be created argues no fault in the Lord. The Lord should rather be viewed upon like the rain. For, just as the rain constitutes the common cause for the production of crops (like) rice, barley, etc., but as regards the differences in rice, barley, etc., it is the peculiar potences inherent in the various seeds of these that constitute the special causes: even so the Lord is the *common cause* for the production of the gods, men, and the rest of the creation, while as regards the inequalities between the gods, men, etc. it is the actions appertaining to the various souls that serve as the *special causes* for the same. Thus, in consequence of His showing [due] consideration, the Lord is not to be arraigned for the faults of inequality and cruelty.—But how do you know that it is out of such [due] consideration, that the Lord, creates this world with its differentiation of the high, the low, and the middling?—For so, in fact, the Scripture declares [Kaush. Br., iii. 8] —"It is indeed He alone who makes that man do a good action whom he desires to lift up to these higher worlds; and it is He likewise who makes another man do a bad action whom he desires to drag downwards;" or again, [Bṛih., iii. 2. 13]—"Good does one become by good action, bad, by bad action." Smṛiti too shows that the Lord metes out rewards and punishments only in consideration of the specific actions of beings, as in (the Bhagavadgītā iv. 11)—"Whatsoever people in whatsoever manner betake themselves to me, them in that very manner I accord treatment;"—and others of the same kind. 34.

If you say, 'there is no Karman, because of non-differentiation,' we reply: No, on account of beginninglessness. 35.

[**Page 42**] In consequence of the pronounced-declaration of non-differentiation prior to creation, as in the text [Chh., vi. 2. 1] —" Existence alone, My dear boy, was all this in the beginning: one and without a second," there does not exist any Karman out of consideration for which there might ensue inequalities in the creation. For, Karman comes into existence only at a time subsequent to the creation, as being dependent upon differentiation into the body and the like; and if the differentiation into the body and the like were to be dependent upon the Karman, there would arise the logical defect of a mutual interdependence (or of reasoning-in-a-circle). Consequently, if the Lord were to proceed, subsequent to such a differentiation, to create (in [due] consideration of the merit and demerit), He might do so. But prior to the differentiation, there being the absence of any Karman which could be the cause of the diversity (in the world), we are compelled to posit the *first* creation as being free from all inequalities. To this objection we demur, because of the beginninglessness of this transmigratory-creation. It might have been a defect, if this transmigratory-creation ever had had a starting-point. But the world, being without a beginning, and, between the Karman and the inequality in the creation there being established an unending chain of the relation of cause and effect—as in the case of the seed and the sprout—there is no contradiction present in the Lord's creative activity. 35.

But how do you know that this transmigratory-world is without a beginning ? So he recites the following—

It stands to reason, and is also attested. 36.

The beginninglessness of the transmigratory-world stands to reason. For, if it were to have a definite starting-point, coming into existence all of a sudden, (and without adequate causes) as it must then do, there would arise the contingency of even the liberated souls (in whose case all ground for rebirth has been destroyed) being again born into the world, as well as the contingency of one's being made liable for what he might not have himself done, inasmuch as no assignable cause can then exist for the inequalities of happiness and unhappiness (in the world). And it

has been said that the Lord cannot be the cause of this inequality. Nor can Nescience alone and by itself be the cause of this inequality, because it is of a uniform nature only (and as such incapable of causing any inequality). For, Nescience can be the cause of inequality only as circumscribed by the Karman induced by latent-impressions due to afflictions like passion, etc. But we cannot have a body unless there is Karman, and there cannot be Karman unless there be a body: so that there arises the fault of mutual interdependence. If, on the other hand, we assume a beginninglessness, there can be offered an explanation in conformity with the maxim of the seed and the sprout, and so there would be no defect of any kind.—Further, we have it attested also—this beginninglessness of the transmigratory-world—in the Scriptures and the Smṛitis. In the Scriptural-text, to begin with, there is an indication of the world's beginninglessness inasmuch as, at the very starting-point of the creation, the words [Chh., vi. 3. 2]—" By means of this Soul, this Self "—designate the embodied-self by the term *jīva* or individual-soul, which implies a sustenance of life (by the individual-soul in some existence prior to the creation that is to be). If there had been any definite beginning to the series-of-transmigrations, how could there have been, at the very threshold of the creation, a designation by the word *jīva*,—which implies as its basis a sustenance of life,—if the self had never (in any earlier creation) sustained life at all? Nor can you say that it is an (anticipatory) designation: because he is going to sustain life in the time to come; for, more powerful than the relation that is to come is the relation that has already been, because that stands forth as an accomplished fact. [Page 43] The words of the Saṁhitā also [Ṛigveda, x. 190. 3]—" The Creator fashioned the Sun and the Moon as before, "—testify to the existence of an antecedent fashioning (of the Sun, the Moon, and the whole creation). In the Smṛitis too we come across the beginninglessness of transmigratory-world, as in [Bhagavadgītā, xv. 3]—" There is not to be perceived here any form of it: neither the end, nor the beginning, nor the support. " And in the Purāṇa it has been established that there is no measuring of the world-creations that have been in times gone by or that are to follow in the time to come. **36.** Here ends the Topic (12) entitled Inequality and Cruelty.

TOPIC 13 : EVERYTHING IN ORDER

(*Sūtra* 37)

In the Vedic theory as hitherto demonstrated,– viz., that the sentient Brahman is the constituent as well as the efficient cause of the world—the defects alleged by our opponents, such as Disparity-in-Nature, and the like, have been now set at rest by the Great Teacher. Now, being about to commence a section principally devoted to a refutation of other people's theories, he brings to a conclusion the section principally devoted to (showing) the acceptability of his own theory—

And because all the qualities properly fit in. 37.

Since, with the acceptance of this Brahman as the cause of the world, all the characteristics that are demanded of a cause are seen, in the manner hitherto shown, to harmoniously subsist therein—namely, the Brahman's being Omniscient, Omnipotent, Master of the great Illusion, and so forth—therefore, no more can this Upanishadic theory be called into question. 37. Here ends the Topic (13) entitled Everything in Order.

Here ends—in the Work of the holy and blessed Feet of the Revered Śaṅkara, the Pupil of the holy Feet of the Revered Govinda, the blessed Ascetic-preceptor with the Title of " Paramahaṅsa,"—in this Comment expounding the Real Nature of the Embodied-Self—the First Quarter of the Second Chapter.

CHAPTER SECOND

QUARTER SECOND

TOPIC I: REFUTATION OF THE SĀṀKHYAS

(*Sūtras* 1-10)

[Page 45] Although the main-purpose of this Treatise is to expound the true intention of the Upanishadic texts and not, as of some rationalistic system, to establish or refute a dogma by mere reasonings, still it behoves those that claim to explain the Upanishadic texts to rebut systems of thought like that of the Sāṁkhyas and others that are opposed in tenor to the true [Vedāntic] philosophy: and it is for this purpose that the following Quarter is undertaken. Inasmuch as the determination of the real purport of the Upanishadic texts was conducive to [the attainment of] the true view, it was the establishment of our own theory by determining that purport that was effected at first; for, that is of more consequence than a [mere] refutation of the opponent's view. But [we will be told], for the sake of persons desirous of salvation [and not of earthly triumph] it would be proper, as being a means to that salvation, merely to establish what constitutes your own view, which is to help the discernment of the [so-called] true philosophy: of what use then the refutation of the opponent's views, which would [only] engender ill-will for others ? True what you say. Nevertheless the great treatises of the Sāṁkhyas and others are accepted by many master-minds: and finding that these treatises [also] profess to teach the "true philosophy," it is likely that some persons of dull intellect may form the notion that even these are to be followed for the acquisition of correct views. And they may come to believe in them because they claim to be based upon profound ratiocination, and also because their authors are declared to be omniscient. Hence it is that an effort is being made to demonstrate their utter worth-

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lessness. —But [again it would be urged] already before in Sūtras like [I. i. 5]—"In consequence of 'seing' not the non-Scriptural [Pradhāna]," or [I. i. 18]" By reason of 'desiring' there is no scope for the inference [-established Pradhāna]" or, [I. iv. 28] "And with this, all [texts] are explained — are explained " — a refutation of the Sāṁkhya and of other views was effected: why then repeat what had been already done? We reply—The Sāṁkhyas and others, in the establishing of their own theory, go to the length of even citing Upanishadic texts and interpreting them so as to make them conformable to their own theory. What was accomplished before was just to prove that what these persons offer as an interpretation is a sham interpretation, not the correct interpretation. Now, however, the special point is to effect an *independent* refutation of their reasonings without making any appeal to the Scriptures.

By reason also of the impossibility of design and arrangement, not the [Sāṁkhya] inference-[established Pradhāna]. 1.

[Page 46] Now the Sāṁkhyas argue thus:—Just as the pots, plates, and other discrete existences containing in them the common essence of clay, are observed in the world to be preceded by a totality constituted out of clay-essence, so similarly all the discrete existences whatsoever, internal as well as external, are interpenetrated by a pleasure-pain-infatuation nature, and must therefore be held to be preceded by a totality constituted out of the pleasure-pain-infatuation essence. Now this totality constituted out of the pleasure-pain-infatuation essence is no other than the Pradhāna with its three aspects (guṇas), which, like the clay, is non-sentient and which, with a view to achieve the purpose of the Purusha, evolves itself, and of its own accord, into the diversified modifications. So also, on the strength of inferential marks like finiteness [Sāṁkhyakārikā, 15], they establish the same Pradhāna. To that we reply—If the view is to be established only on the ground of analogical-instances [and not on the authority of the Scriptures], then, we say, that a non-sentient entity, unsupervised by one who is sentient, is never observed in the world to give rise, of its own accord, to modifications calculated to fully accomplish any specific ends of the Purusha. For, we notice that in our world objects like

houses, palaces, beds, seats, pleasure-grounds, etc.—capable as these are of securing and warding off pleasure and pain [respectively] as occcasions may arise—are constructed by talented artisans. In the same manner all this external world, the earth and the rest, which is capable of affording fruition unto all one's varied Karmans, as also the internal world, the body and the rest, with its attendant distribution into various classes, and exhibiting several specific dispositions of limbs, and forming the basis for our experiencing the fruition of multiform Karmans,—such as we actually see it to be : how can all this, impossible as it must be for even talented artisans—the most honoured amongst them—to asmuchas mentally grasp : how can the non-sentient Pradhāna construct it ? For, we do not observe such a power [of construction] amonst logs and stones and the like. So also in clay and the like, we observe an orderly arrangement of a specific form [only] when they are supervised by the pot-maker and others. On the same analogy there ensues the contingency of the Pradhāna also being regarded as supervised by some one else who is sentient. Further, [when the clay and the pot-maker together originate the pot.] there seems to be no constraining reason why the nature of the basic cause should be determined only by taking into consideration the nature of the material cause like clay, to the exclusion of all consideration of [the nature of] external (efficient) cause like the pot-maker. There is no contradiction involved if this be admitted : nay, we would thereby conform to the Scriptures by acknowledging a sentient [first] cause. Hence, on the strength of the argument that design-and-arrangement remains unexplained, no non-sentient world-cause could be established by inference.

On the basis of the word *cha* (also) [in the Sūtra] the author understands " as well as by reason of the impossibility of the [alleged] homogeneous-constitution (anvaya) etc.," and thereby he supplementarily establishes the untenability of one other [Sāṁkhya] inference. For, it is not possible to maintain that the discrete-existences, internal and external, are constituted out of pleasure-pain-infatuation, seeing that pleasure and the others are felt to be subjective, whereas sound and the other [physical qualities] are felt to be not of the nature of these, themselves, but are felt to be rather the causes (occasions) of these. Further, even

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though the sound and the other [physical qualities] remain the same, still, under different emotional-attitudes, differing varieties of pleasure etc. are experienced.— Then again, because the different discrete and finite existences like the root, the sprout, etc. are observed to be preceded by cohesion [of seed, soil, water, light, air, etc.,] and because the different internal and external existences are discrete-and-finite, therefore, if one is going to argue that these latter must also be preceded by the cohesion [of the three aspects with each other in varying proportion], then there will ensue the contingency of regarding even these aspects of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas as themselves preceded by a cohesion [of some other basic causes], seeing that the aspects also possess the same discreteness or finitness. — Lastly, as to the relation of cause and effect [as by itself a proof for Pradhāna], we see that relation in the case of beds, seats, and the like, which are effects brought into existence after intelligent-supervision, and therefore it is not possible to conceive that the different discrete existences, internal and external, could have, on the ground of that relation of cause and effect, any non-sentient principle as their [first] cause. 1.

As also because of the [impossibility of] activity. 2.

[Page 47] Never mind the design-and-arrangement. For the effecting of the same you cannot any better establish that activity—that deviation from the state of equipoise—that grouping-together of the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas with one as dominant and the other two as subsidiaries—that proclivity for originating specific products—as belonging to Pradhāna by itself, independently, because we do not observe it in the case of clay and the like, nor in the case of a chariot and the like. For, it is not the case that clay and the like, or the chariot and other objects, being by themselves non-sentient, and neither supervised by sentient beings like the pot-maker and others, nor by a horse and the like, are ever seen to put forth activity calculated to bring about a specific effect (or result). And from what is observed we prove what is not [and cannot be] observed. Hence, even on the ground of the impossibility of explaining activity, the non-sentient [Pradhāna] is not to be inferred as the world-cause. — But [our opponent may say], no more do we observe any activity in

the solitary sentient. That is very true. Nevertheless what we do observe is the activity of the non-sentient chariot etc. when it is joined to some sentient being. Yes; but we do not find the activity actually residing in the sentient being which is joined to something non-sentient. What then is the correct hypothesis? Is the activity to belong to that wherein it is actually perceived, or to that, being joined with whom it is observed to ensue? Is it not reasonable [our opponent may ask] to ascribe the activity to that in which it is actually seen, because we actually observe both [the activity and the chariot which is its substratum]; whereas there is no direct-perception—as there is of the chariot and the like—of the sentient as being, by himself, the substratum of the activity in question? Even the very existence of the sentient as conjoint with the body in which activity subsists is in fact to be proved by inference only, seeing that a living-body is found to be distinct-in-nature from a merely non-sentient chariot and the like. And it is as a consequence of this that the Materialists, finding that the sentiency can be perceived only when the body is perceived, and that the same cannot be perceived when the body is not perceived, have come to the conclusion that the sentiency belongs [as a property] to the body itself [there being no need to postulate an independent Ātman]. Hence, [concludes our opponent,] the activity belongs to the non-sentient itself. To this we reply—We do not wish to assert that the activity does not belong to where we all observe it, *viz.*, the non-sentient [chariot, or body]. Let it by all means belong to it: only we wish to point out that the activity proceeds from the sentient; because where this is, that is; and where this is not, that is not. Just as, that [peculiar] modification in the shape of [emitting] heat and light, which we see subsisting in the [burning] log-of-wood and the like, and which we do not perceive as existing in the fire by itself [without any fuel], has nevertheless to be regarded as proceeding from none but the fire [as its source], since it is observed upon its (fire's) contact, and not observed upon its separation; even so here. As to the Materialists, finding that it is the sentient body [of the horse etc.] that originates activity in the non-sentient chariot and the like, it is not-inconsistent [from their point of view] that they should concede the sentient to be the source of the activity.

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If it be urged—In your view the Ātman, although joined to the body etc., cannot, by reason of his having the nature of mere intelligence and nothing else,* itself move, and cannot [a fortiori] be a possible source of the activity [in others]; we say, No: for, like a magnet, or like the [qualities of] colour etc., he can, albeit devoid of activity himself, cause activity [in others]. Just as [that it to say] the magnet-bead, although itself not moving, can be the cause of the movement of the iron; or just as objects like colour etc., themselves not moving, can cause movements of the [senses of] eye etc., even so the Lord, although himself without movement, still, being omnipresent, and omniscient and omnipotent, as also the inward-soul of everything, can fitly cause everything else to move. And if it be argued that He, being severely alone [Page 48], cannot be properly the cause of motion, as there is nothing besides him that he can move, we say, No; for, this objection has been more than once rebutted by us on the ground of the infusion of the Cosmic Illusion which, through nescience, sets afoot all the varied names and forms. Hence it follows that activity becomes possible only on the theory of an omniscient Lord as the cause, and not on the theory of anything non-sentient as the cause. **2.**

If it be said—on the analogy of the milk, and of the water [Pradhāna can have activity], there too, [we reply, is the presence of the Sentient]. 3.

Well then, just as milk, itself non-sentient, moves of its own accord for the nourishment of the calf; or just as water, itself non-sentient, flows downwards of its own accord for the benefit of mankind; even so may the Pradhāna, itself non-sentient, put forth, of its own accord, activity for the purpose of accomplishing the ends of the Purusha. This, we reply, is not soundly argued; because, even there, in the case of the milk and of the water, we have to infer that the activity is only caused by their

* Reading *mātrāvyatirekeṇa* in line 22. The reading mātravyatirekeṇa, although given by some editors, does not seem to have sufficient Ms. authority. It can, however, be made to yield good sense. With that reading translate: If it be urged—in your view the Atman, although joined to the body etc., cannot possibly have an activity over and above his nature as pure intelligence, and so it cannot become a source of any activity; etc.

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being under the direction of a sentient cause; because in the mere non-sentient chariot, as is in fact assented to by both the parties to the dispute, there is not observed any activity. There is also the Scripture [Bṛih. Up., iii. 7. 4]—" He who, abiding amidst waters, controls the waters from within ..."; or [ibid., iii. 8. 9]—" It is at the behest, O Gārgī, of this the Immutable that the rivers flowing eastward and in other directions move on;" which proclaims the Lord as being the controlling cause of all the movements in the world down to the tiniest tremor. Consequently, the illustration of the milk and the water that is adduced is no illustration [allowable by us], because [to us] it is [not an indubitably established fact—as all illustrations must be—but] a matter falling under the category of what-is-yet-to-be-proved (sādhya). In the case before us, the sentient cow can properly be said to cause the movement of the milk [into the udders] through her affectionate desire, the sucking done by the calf merely occasioning the drawing outwards of the milk. Nor is there any absolute independence [of movement] in the case of the water; for, flowing does require the presence of a lower level of the ground. And it has been shown [by the Scriptures] that in all such cases there is the need of the sentient. — In Sūtra [II. i. 24]—" If one says No, because the accumulation [of causal paraphernalia] is observed, we demur: for, it is like the milk "—what was intended to be established by the illustration was that even in consonance with the common-sense point of view, it is possible for an effect to take place spontaneously and irrespective of any causal factors outside of itself. From the point of view of the Śāstric truth, however, the need of a [controlling] Lord that has to be acknowledged is by no means intended to be set aside. 3.

And because there is not [in the system] any entity outside [the Pradhāna to act as the controller, it] becomes unrestrained [as regards the activity]. 4.

In the Sāṁkhya view the three aspects (guṇas), when remaining in the condition of equipoise, are the Pradhāna; and beyond these naught else that is external to it exists as the source of the activity, or of the cessation-from-activity, of the Pradhāna. As to the Purusha he is unconcerned, and can accordingly neither

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cause nor inhibit the activity, with the consequence that the Pradhāha remains without restraint. And being so unrestrained, that the Pradhāna at times puts forth its modifications in the form of the Mahat and the rest, while at other times it does not do so : this is unreasonable. As to the Lord, He being omniscient and omnipotent and endowed with the great Cosmic-Illusion, His activity and cessation-from-activity do not involve any contradiction. 4.

And because of its absence elsewhere, [Pradhāna's activity is] not analogous to that of grass and the like. 5.

[Page 49] Be that as it may, just as grass, herbs and the like [when eaten by the cow] get transformed into milk etc., of their own nature and quite irrespective of any other inducing-cause, even so the Pradhāna may assume the modifications in the form of the Mahat and the rest. And if it be asked, how do we know that grass etc. work irrespective of any other inducing-cause, we reply, Because no other cause is observed to be operative. Had there indeed been observed any other cause as operating, then, at our pleasure, it should have been possible to join that cause to the grass and the like and so manufacture milk as much as needed. But we are not able to manufacture it. Hence the transformation of grass etc. takes place of its own accord. So can it be with the Pradhāna. — To this our reply : Pradhāna can have a spontaneous modification on the analogy of grass and the like provided of course the grass and the like can be assumed to get transformed of their own accord : but we do not make that assumption, because another inducing-cause is actually known to be operative. How is such a cause known to be operative? "Because of its absence elsewhere." For, it is only *that* grass etc. that is used by the cow that *alone* turns into milk, and not that rejected by her or used up by bulls etc. If the transformation were to be without [extraneous] cause, then grass and the like should have been turned into milk even without coming into contact with the cow's body. Further, just because men are not able to accomplish anything at their pleasure, that does not mean that the effect in question needs no cause at all. For, there is one class of effects that can be accomplished by men, and another class of effects, to be accomplished by supernatural

agency. And men too are able, by employing proper means, to secure grass and the like and manufacture it into milk. For, persons desirous of securing plenty of milk make the cow eat plenty of fodder, and thereby get plenty of milk. Hence, the modification of the Pradhāna does not, any more than that of grass and the like, take place of its own accord. 5.

And even though assumed, there is no [assignable] motive [for the Pradhāna's activity]. 6.

We have thus established that there is no spontaneous activity of the Pradhāna. And even though we were, forsooth, to humour your belief and assume a spontaneous activity for your Pradhāna, still there would persist a defect [in your theory]. Why ? "Because of an absence of motive." For, if it is to be argued that Pradhāna's activity is spontaneous and does not stand in need of anything else in connection with it, then just as there is no need of any co-operating cause, even so there will be no need for any motive for that activity; and as a consequence your doctrine that the Pradhāna puts forth its activity for accomplishing the ends of Purusha will have to be thrown overboard. And if our opponent were to urge that it is the co-operating cause that the Pradhāna can dispense with, but not as well the motive for its activity, we have to demand that he ought to exactly point out the motive alleged for Pradhāna's activity : whether it is the Purusha's pleasure-pain experience, or his salvation, or both. If it be the pleasure-pain experience, what kind of a thing can it be in the case of the Purusha whose real nature permits of no kind of accretion [for either the removal of an existing deficiency, or the acquiring of an adventitous property] ? And if assumed, it would involve the contingency of an obsence of liberation for the Purusha. If [the motive be] liberation, then [Page 50] liberation being already, even anterior to the Pradhāna's activity, a *fait accompli* for the Purusha, that activity would become unmotivated ; and as a consequence sound and the other objects in the world will remain unperceived by anybody. And even fi, finally, a double motive be assumed, still, in as much as there is an infinite number of forms which the Pradhāna can assume and which the Purūsha has to perceive [one and all], there is sure to ensue the same absence of libera-

tion. Nor can the activity be intended to dispel the longing [that might otherwise be felt]. For, the longing cannot belong to the Pradhāna which is non-sentient. Nor can the Purusha, pure and partless as he is, conceive any longing. If, as a last resort, the activity were to be believed in, as otherwise there would ensue tho contingency of the [Purusha's inherent] power to perceive and the [Pradhāna's inherent] power to transform itself being rendered nugatory, then, just as [admittedly] the power to perceive cannot be annihilated, so also the power to transform cannot be annihilated, thereby, once more, giving rise to the contingency of an absence of liberation, because the Saṁsāra will have to remain unannihilated. Consequently, it does not stand to reason to say that the Pradhāna's activity is for the sake of the Purusha. **6.**

And if on the analogy of the [lame and the blind] man, and of the magnet, even there [the argument is defective]. 7.

Let that remain. Just as a certain person endowed with the power of seeing but destitute of the power of movement—*i. e.*, a lame man—might mount upon the back of another person—the blind man—possessing the power to move but deprived of the power to see, and might lead to the latter's movement ; or just as the magnet-piece, although itself not moving, occasions movement in the iron ; even so might the Purusha originate activity in the Pradhāna : and it is on the strength of this analogy that our opponent might again enter the arena. To that we make the rejoinder that even so there is no getting rid of the deficiency. There ensues, to begin with, the defect of abandoning the accepted position ; for, there is the [Sāṁkhya] assumption of the Pradhāna spontaneously putting forth its activity, and the assumption, further, that the Purusha does not originate the activity. Further, how could the unconcerned Purusha originate the activity in Pradhāna ? For, the lame man [of the illustration] guides the movement of the blind man by means of speech etc. There cannot exist any such guiding activity in the Purusha, who is incapable of all activity whatsoever. Nor will he occasion movement by mere contiguity, as does the magnet : because, as the contiguity is an eternal fact, there would ensue eternal activity [and no liberation]. In the

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case of the magnet whose contiguity can be adventitious, there is the possibility of causal-activity for securing the contiguity, and the magnet also needs [once in a while] to be polished. Hence, the analogy of the [lame and the blind] man and of the magnet cannot be adduced. Thus then, the Pradhāna being non-sentient, and the Purusha being utterly unconcerned, and there being the absence of a *tertium quid* to bring them into relation, their relation cannot be established. And if a relation be assumed [merely] because there is the capacity for being related, then, inasmuch as that capacity cannot be destroyed, there would again ensue the same contingency of an absence of liberation. And [even if the analogies now adduced are held to explain the activity still,] as before, so here too can be urged the various alternatives eventuating the absence of a motive [for the activity]. Contrariwise, in the case of the Supreme Lord, He is unconcerned from the point of view of his real ultimate nature, while He can [yet] be the source of activity when viewed in relation to his power of Cosmic-Illusion, And this is the superiority of our own position. 7.

And also because the relation of dominance [and subservience] cannot be made cogent. 8.

And for this other reason too activity on the part of the Pradhāna is not possible. For, when the [three] aspects, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, abandon their [assumed] nature of natural subservience and dominance [in turn], and abide in their own [quiescent] nature of equipoise, that is the condition of the Pradhāna. [Page 51] Now in that condition [the three aspects], being self-determined as regards their own nature and unwilling to forego that nature, cannot possibly enter, with reference to one another, into the relation of subservience and dominance: and there being no extraneous factor to bestir and compel them, there cannot result the origination of Mahat and the rest, which requires a disturbance in the equilibrium of the aspects. 8.

And in case another inference [to meet the defect pointed out] be formulated, yet by reason of the privation of the power of intelligence [in Pradhāna the defect would persist]. 9.

But still it might be urged—We will formulate the inference in another manner so as to avoid the contingency of the defect just pointed out: for we do not, forsooth, assume the aspects to be absolutely self-determined and immutable, as there is no valid-proof for it. The nature of the aspects has always to be assumed conformably to the functions to be performed by them. Accordingly we can attribute to the aspects that type and variation of nature which would adequately explain the functions that they have to put forth. As a matter of fact it is our assumption that the nature of the guṇas is [constantly] mutable. Hence, even in the condition of equipoise, the guṇas can be taken to already possess the potentiality for being thrown into a state of uneven-poise.—Even so, [we reply] inasmuch as the Pradhāna is devoid of the power of intelligence, the defects already urged above, viz., impossibility of design-and-arrangement, and the others, remain intact. And in case you were to infer, for your Pradhāna the power of intelligence [because you require it], then you would cease to be our antagonist, because belief in one, sentient material-cause producing the infinite variety of this world is practically an assent to the Brahman-theory. Moreover, even when you ascribe to the guṇas, while yet abiding in the state of equipoise, the potentiality for being thrown into an uneven-poise, yet, in the absence of a specific inducing-cause, they may not at all [translate that potentiality into actuality] and be thrown into the uneven-poise, or in case they are so thrown, there being again an absence of any specific inducing-cause in the matter, they would always be thrown into that condition of uneven-poise, so that even the defect noticed in the immediately preceding [Sūtra] does stand attributable. 9.

And it is incoherent because of contradictions. 10.

Further, this Sāṁkhya theory is self-contradictory. Sometimes they enumerate seven indriyas, sometimes eleven. Similarly, in some places they advocate the origination of the Tanmātrās from the Mahat, in other places, from the Ahaṁkāra. So too at times they speak of three internal-senses, at times of only one. As to the contradiction with the Śruti teaching the Lord as the First Cause, and with the Smṛiti that follows in its wake, that is quite patent. For this reason likewise the theory of the

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Sāṁkhyas is incoherent. To this a rejoinder: But is not the theory of those who claim to follow the Upanishads equally incoherent inasmuch as they do not assume a class-distinction between what is oppressed (lit. heated) and what oppresses (heats) ? To explain, those who maintain the hypothesis that the Brahman, alone and the inner-self of all, is the cause of all this phenomenal-existence, must assume that the oppressed and the oppressor are specific-forms of one and the same Ātman, and not entities belonging to different classes. And if the oppressed and the oppressors are to be specific-forms (or attributes) of one and the same Ātman, he can never divest himself of these forms, namely, the oppressed and the oppressor, so that the Śāstra, prescribing right knowledge for the subdual of all suffering, loses all sense. For surely, a bright-lamp, possessing the attributes of heat and light, cannot—as long as it retains its essence—[Page 52] be ever imagined as divested of those two attributes. And then, as to the analogy of the water, waves, ripples, foam, and the like that was adduced [II. i. 13 [15-19]], there too the mass of water conceived as a unitary entity possesses the waves etc., in their alternating manifest and non-manifest forms as its attributes alike permanent, so that in that [illustration] too, water as an essence remains for ever incapable of being divested of [the attributes of] the waves and the rest. That the oppressed and the oppressor must belong to different classes is in fact quite well-known in the world. For, we always notice that the seeker and the object sought for are distinct from each other, If the object sought for were indeed to be not different from the seeker himself, then inasmuch as the object-sought-for—with reference to which a given person is to be the seeker—must be, for that seeker, ever permanently-present, he will not at all be a seeker with reference to it. Just as, analogously, a bright-lamp, the essence of which is light, possesses the object called light permanently present within itself, and so the lamp in question will never have to be a seeker of that light, seeing that it is with reference to an object that is yet to be attained that a seeker would ever care to seek. So too, the object sought for will cease to be an object of search. For if it were to be an object of search it can only search itself. And that can never be; because the seeker and the object sought for are relative terms, and a relation can subsist only

between two related objects and never in one and the same object. Consequently, the object-sought-for and the seeker must be distinct from one another. So also the object averted and the averter. What is agreeable to the seeker is to him an object to be sought for; what is disagreeable, an object to be averted. The one individual is coming alternatingly into relation with these two. Now what is to be sought for being very little and what is to be averted very great, both the one and the other can indifferently be styled objects to be averted ; and [the totality of] these, [as constituting the Saṁsāra], is designated the oppressor. And the one oppressed is the one Purusha who is alternatingly coming into relations with these two. This being the case, if the oppressed and the oppressor were to constitute only one essence, there would be the impossibility of any liberation. When on the contrary they constitute two distinct classes, then, by the avoidance of that which might cause their conjunction, liberation can be, some day or the other, deemed attainable.

To all this we say, Nay. It is because of this very oneness that the relation of the oppressed and the oppressor cannot be possible in the case. The defect pointed out might hold if, even while constituting a unity of essence, the oppressed and the oppressor were to come into relation with each other as the [oppressed] object and the [oppressing] subject. But this cannot be; and for the very reason that they constitute unity. For, the fire, surely, being a unity all by itself, cannot burn or illumine itself, even while granting that it possesses the distinctive attributes of heat and light and is also capable of assuming modifications. Is it then at all conceivable that the one absolutely-immutable Brahman can be susceptible to the relation of the oppressed and the oppressor ? — Where then, as a matter of fact, does this relation of the oppressed and the oppressor subsist ?—We reply, don't you see that it is the living body, upon which the action [of being scorched] takes place, that is the oppressed, while the sun is the oppressor ? But [objects our opponent] oppression is a kind of pain, and that can belong to some sentient entity, and not to the non-sentient body. For, if the oppression were to be endurable by the body alone, with the body's destruction [at death] there would be an effortless end to that, so that one might not have to long for any [other] means for the destruction of the

same. To this we reply as follows.—We do not observe that, in the absence of the body, the sentient, alone and by himself, undergoes the oppression. For, surely, you also do not ascribe—in the absence of the body—any modification in the form of suffering to the merely sentient [Purusha]. Nor do you as-muchas admit any [vital] connection between the body and the sentient, lest there might ensue [the Purusha's] impurity and other drawbacks. Nor, forsooth, do you allow oppression itself to be oppressed. How then is it possible even for you to explain the relation of the oppressed and the oppressor ? If you were to reply that it is the Sattva [aspect] which is the oppressed, and it is the Rajas which is the oppressor, we say, No ; because the sentient cannot possibly be deemed as coming into any vital-relation with these two aspects. If the sentient be asserted to be [Page 53] *as it were* undergoing the oppression, because he [for the time] accepts the lead of the Sattva, that implies—inasmuch as you use the words 'as it were'—that as a matter of fact the sentient does *not* undergo the oppression. If he really does not do so, the use of the words 'as it were' involves no defect. For, in virtue of the mere assertion that "the amphisbæna is like the serpent," the amphisbæna does not prove venomous; nor by reason of the assertion that "the serpent is like the amphisbæna" does the serpent lose its venom. Hence then it has to be assumed that this relation of the oppressed and the oppressor is an effect of nescience : it does not exist from the point of view of highest truth. And if this be the case, no deficiency of any kind can be urged against my own position. — But if you were to assume that the oppression has, as a matter of absolute reality, to be undergone by the sentient, then in that case it is under your system that there would ensue an utter impossibility of liberation, [especially] since you regard the oppressor [Pradhāna] as an eternal entity. To this it may be perhaps replied that, although the oppressed [Purusha] and the oppressing power [Pradhāna] be assumed to be permanent entities, yet inasmuch as the oppression requires for its happening a connection [between the two entities], which can result only from [a specific] cause, liberation for eternity can still be possible when the connection in question comes to be absolutely terminated, this last coming to pass when non-discrimination [between the Pradhāna and the Purusha], which is the cause of the

connection referred to, has been done away with. But we demur: because the specific cause assumed in the case, namely non-discrimination, is nothing but the guṇa called Tamas, and that too is assumed by you to be eternal. Further, there being no fixed rules as to when any given guṇa is to be dominant or subservient, no definite anticipation can be made as to when the cause of that connection would cease to be operative, and hence it would be equally uncertain as to when there would [possibly] result a disjunction [between the two]: so that it will be upon the Sāṁkhya himself that an impossibility of liberation will be inevitably forced. As to the follower of the Upanishadic doctrine, as he assumes that the Ātman is all alone, that Ātman cannot be at all liable to the relation of the subject or the object [of oppression]: and in the light of the Scriptural declaration to the effect that all phenomenal variety is merely word-initiated there cannot ensue, even in dream, any doubt as to an absence of liberation in his theory. From the point of view of phenomenal reality, however, the relation between the oppressed and the oppressor must be assumed to exist just there where, and just in the very manner in which, it is observed to exist. There can be no objection taken to it, nor any refutation offered of it. **10.**
Here ends the Topic (1) called the Refutation of the Sāṁkhyas.

TOPIC 2 : GROSS-LONG ANALOGY.

(*Sūtra* 11)

The theory which recognised Pradhāna as the cause has been refuted. Now it is the thoery recognising atoms as the cause that has to be refuted. To begin with, however, there is an objection raised by the Atomists against the Brahman-theory which we will set at rest. — Now, this is what the Vaiśeshikas assume. Qualities inherent in the cause-substance originate in the effect-substance other qualities of the same nature, as follows from the fact that from white threads we observe a white piece-of-cloth to originate, and we never observe its contrary occurence. Therefore, in case the sentient Brahman is to be assumed as the cause of the world, the [quality of] sentiency ought to be, likewise, inherent in the world, the effect. But inasmuch as we do not find that to be the case, it is not reasonable that the sentient

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Brahman should be the cause of the world. Now this presumption of theirs he is causing to run counter to their own basic theoretical position.—

Or, it may be on the analogy of the 'gross' and the 'long' as [effects originating] from the 'short' and the 'infinitesimally-spherical.' 11.

This is their theory. — The atoms, we are told, having ceased for a while [i. e., during world-dissolution] to originate effects, remain possessed of the qualities of colour etc., appropriate [to each class of atoms], and of their infinitesimally-spherical dimension. Subsequently, these atoms, being heralded by the "Unseen-principle" and helped on by mutual conjunctions and the like, give rise to all the varied assemblage of effects in an orderly-sequence, commencing with the binary-compound, [Page 54] — the qualities of the cause originating [invariably] other [accordant] qualities in the effect. When [for instance] two atoms originate the binary, then it is the special qualities of colour and the like residing in the atoms, say the white colour, that originate in the binary another white colour [and the other remaining qualities]. The distinctive quality belonging to the atoms, however, *viz.*, infinitesimal-sphericity, does not originate in the binary another infinitesimal-sphericity, since they assume that the binary has another dimension of its own. For, they tell us, minuteness and shortness are the [two] dimensions that belong to the binary.— When, furthermore, two binaries give rise to the quaternary-compound, then too, similarly, the qualities of whiteness and the like inherent in the binaries reproduce themselves [in the quaternary], while the minuteness and the shortness, even though inherent in the binaries, do not reproduce themselves inasmuch as they assume that the quarternary is endowed with grossness and length as its [special] dimensions. — So too, when a number of atoms, or a number of binaries, or a binary plus an atom, originate an effect, we have to understand a similar process of happenings.

Now then, just as from out of the atom possessing infinitesimal-sphericity there arises a binary which is minute and short, or there arises a gross and long tertiary and other atom-com-

pounds, but there is no reproduction of the infinitesimal-sphericity; or again, just as from the binary, which is minute and short, there arises a gross and long tertiary, but there is no reproduction of what is minute or short : even so, what do you lose if we make the assumption that from the sentient Brahman there can originate the non-sentient world? — And were you to urge that you assume that it is because the binary and the other effect-substances are under the incubus of another dimension [quality], therefore it is that the infinitesimal-sphericity and the other dimensions appertaining to the [atoms and other] causes do not reproduce themselves; whereas as regards the world, it is not under the incubus of some assignable quality opposed in nature to sentiency, by reason whereof the sentiency belonging to [Brahman] the cause could not give rise to a similar sentiency in the [effect, the] world. For, surely, non-sentiency is not some [positive] quality of a nature opposed to sentiency: it is merely the negation of sentiency. Consequently, inasmuch as there is a distinction between the case of infinitesimal-sphericity and that of sentiency, it *is* necessary that the sentiency should reproduce itself [in its effects]. Do not think so [we reply]. For, the two cases are partially analogous in so far at least as concerns the fact that infinitesimal-sphericity and the other qualities, even though present in the cause, do not reproduce themselves; and so likewise [may not] the sentiency. Nor can it be really the case [as maintained] that it is the fact of [the effect-substance] being under the incubus of another dimension that acts as the cause deterring infinitesimal-sphericity and the other qualities from producing their effect, because the infinitesimal-sphericity and the rest may legitimately find a scope for their productive-operation during the time that the new dimensions are yet to be; for, it is your own assumption that the effect-substance, although brought into existence, remains, for the space of just a moment and prior to the origination of the [new] qualities, without any qualities at all. Nor is it open to you to urge that the infinitesimal-sphericity and the rest are engrossed in the production of the other [new] dimensions, and that therefore they are unable to originate a dimension similar to themselves [in the effect-substances], because your own theory assigns other cause for the origination of the new dimensions. "From plurality of causes, from grossness of the causes, and from the loose-texture [of the

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components], grossness originates "—" Minuteness is the reverse of that"—" Hereby grossness and shortness are explained."— [Page 55] So run the aphorisms of Kaṇāda [VII i. 9, 10, 17]. Nor [finally] can it be contended that it is because the plurality and other [qualities, mentioned in aphorism VII. i. 9 as inhering in the] causes, happen to be placed, in some way or the other, in a specially favourable contiguity [with reference to the effect substance], therefore it is that these alone, and not the sphericity etc., are able to produce their effects : because, whenever a new substance or a new quality is to be generated, all the qualities of the effect whatsoever are without distinction equally inherent in their substrate, viz., the [cause-]substance. Hence it follows that infinitesimal-sphericity and the rest do not originate because it is their nature not to do so. So must it be understood even in the case of sentiency.

Furthermore, in assuming [qualities like] conjunction to produce disparate effects like substances and the rest, there has already happened [in your own system] a departure from the rule of class-homogeneity [between causes and effects]. And if to this it be objected that a quality [like conjunction] cannot be a proper instance to be adduced with reference to a substance [like Brahman], the subject under discussion, we demur because what the instance seeks to convey is no more than the [possibility of] a disparate origination. Nor is there any sense in laying down the rule that substance should form the instance when substance is under discussion, or a quality alone when a quality is under discussion. Even the author of your own Sūtras has instanced a quality with reference to a substance, as in the aphorism [IV. ii. 2] —" Because the conjunction of the visible and the non-visible is non-visible, therefore [the body] has not five-fold constituency. " Just as the [quality of] conjunction, inhering on the one hand in the earth which is visible, and on the other, in the ether which is non-visible, is non-visible, so also would the [substance] body [as a whole], inhering in [its supposed constituent parts,] the five elements, some visible and others non-visible, become non-visible ; whereas the body *is* visible. Hence it cannot be constituted out of five elements. The point being that conjunction [which is the instance cited] is a quality, whereas the body [with reference to which the illus-

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tration is adduced] is a substance.—In the aphorism [II. i. 6]—"But we do see it" there was given an exposition of [the possibility of] disparate-origination. If so, is not the present discussion redundant after that exposition ? No, we reply. That was an answer to the Sāṁkhyas, while this is to the Vaiśeshikas. But have you not also made an extension of the same argument on the ground of analogy in the aphorism [II. i. 12]—"Hereby are also explained away theories reprobated by men-of-position-and-competence ?" That is true. But here, in the present case, by adducing examples adaptable to their own theory, we have merely offered, inasmuch as we are about to commence a discussion of the Vaiśeshika system, a further exposition of the same. 11. Here ends the Topic (2) entitled the Gross-Long Analogy.

Topic 3 : REFUTATION OF THE ATOMIC THEORY.

(*Sūtras* 12-17)

Both ways no activity (is possible), hence an absence of that. 12.

Now he is going to refute the theory which regards the atoms as the world-cause. This is how their theory is set forth. We observe in the world substances like pieces of cloth, which are wholes made out of parts, originating from various substances like the threads, which operate by the help of [the quality called] conjunction, and which [as avayavas or parts] invariably inhere [in the piece of cloth, the avayayin or the whole]. Generalising from such individual instances we infer that whatever is possessed of parts, that must always originate from certain specific substances which operate by the help of conjunction, and which always inhere in the resulting avayavin itself. And that wherein this process of dividing and sub-dividing a given whole into small and smaller parts comes to an end, that is the atom the utmost limit of subdivision. [Page 56] Now, all this world beginning with mountains, oceans, etc. constitutes a whole made of parts; end being with parts, it also possesses a beginning and an end. And inasmuch as no effect can exist without [assignable] cause, therefore the Atoms are the cause of the whole world: that is the view of Kaṇāda. Finding, accordingly, that these four elements—known as the earth, the water, the

light, and the wind—are entities possessing parts, they imagine four kinds of Atoms to correspond. And as these [elements] reach [therein] the very limit of their sub-division, there being no further possibility of their division into yet smaller parts, when the earth and the other elements begin to be destroyed [by falling off into smaller and smaller parts] that division goes down as far as the atoms [and no farther]; and [when that happens] that is what is known as the state of World-dissolution. Subsequently, at the time of Creation, there originates in wind-atoms a motion depending upon the Unseen-principle. That motion causes the atom in which it inheres to collide with another atom, and then, in the sequence of the binaries and the rest, [the element] Wind is generated. In the same way is generated Fire, the same way, the Waters, and the same way, the Earth. In a like mannner too the body along with its sense-organs; so that in this fashion the whole world is born out of the Atoms. And from the colour etc. inhering in the Atoms proceed the colour etc. inhering in the binaries and the other products on the analogy of what happens in the case of the threads and the piece of cloth. Thus think the followers of Kaṇāda.

With reference to this theory we have to urge the following. The conjunction that is to take place between the atoms that are [at world dissolution] in a state of disjunction must be assumed to be due to movement, because we observe that the threads etc., only when being moved, give rise to the conjunctions [resulting into the piece of cloth and the like]. Now this movement, being an effect, there has to be assumed some cause for it. If none such is assumed, there being an [utter] absence of cause, there would not ever be produced in the atoms the initiatory motion [that is to lead to world-creation]. Now if a cause is to be assumed, whether it be an effort or an impact, or some cause invisibly operating to produce the movement, [in every case] it being impossible [of operation], there cannot at all arise that initiatory motion in the atoms. For, there cannot possibly exist in that state the effort, which is a quality belonging to the soul, because the soul is yet to be endowed with a body. And it is well-known that it is only when there is a mind located within a body that effort, which is a quality of the soul, can arise after the

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soul is conjoined with the mind. For a like reason also the impact and the other visible causes have to be ruled out. For, all these can become operative only in a period subsequent to conjunctions [giving rise to world-creation]: They can not possibly be a cause for the initiatory movement. In the next place, if the Unseen-principle were to be asserted as the cause of the initiatory movement, that principle could either be inherent in the soul or in the atoms. In both ways it is not possible that there can arise in the atoms a movement caused by the Unseen-principle; because the Unseen-principle by itself is non-sentient. For surely, nothing that is non-sentient and not controlled by the sentient can spontaneously move or cause movement in others—as was declared in connection with the Sāṁkhya theory. And as to the soul, he, in that [pralaya] condition, is non-sentient inasmuch as sentiency is yet to arise in him. Besides, being regarded as inhering in the soul, the Unseen-principle cannot be the cause of a motion in atoms; for with the latter it is not in relation. And if it be contended that there can well be a relation between the [omnipresent] Purusha (Soul) in whom the Unseen-principle inheres and the atoms, then in that case, that relation being always present, there would arise the contingency of the productive-movement in question being ever continuous, seeing that there exists nothing else to regulate it. So then, as there does not exist any definite-and-regularising cause of the movement, there cannot arise the initiatory movement in the atoms. And the movement not being present, the conjunction which is to depend upon it cannot happen either. And failing the conjunction, the series of effects beginning with the binaries, which depends upon that [conjunction] cannot originate.—And [assuming that the conjunction between atoms does somehow take place] the conjunction of one atom with another atom [Page 57] can happen either by total-interpenetration or else by partial-contact. If by total-interpenetration, there cannot ensue any increase in volume, so that [even after atoms join with atoms] the resulting magnitude would be just an atom—an eventuality that plainly contradicts what is observed. Because, what is normally observed is a conjunction between a substance having spatial-extension with another substance having [similar] spatial-extension. If, secondly, it is by partial-contact, that would make the atom capable of division into parts. And if it

were to be argued that the atoms might be assigned an imaginary extension in space, then, things imagined being always unreal, the conjunction in question would also be unreal, and such [unreal] conjunction cannot possibly be the non-inherent [or operative] cause of the effect which, however, is a reality. And when the operative-cause is absent there cannot originate the binaries and the rest which make up the substance [in the creation].— Furthermore, just as at the very beginning of Creation, there being no inducing-cause, there cannot originate that movement of the atoms which is to bring about their conjunction, even so, at the great Dissolution, there cannot possibly originate in the atoms that movement which is to bring about their disjunction. For, even in this case, there is not any definite and-regularising cause that is perceptible. And as to the Unseen-principle, that is [to be appealed to] for establishing the possibility of [pleasure-pain] experience and not of Dissolution. Consequently, there being no [possibility of] conjunction or disjunction, there would ensue the contingency of an absence of Creation and Dissolution, which depend upon them. For this reason, too, this theory which makes the atoms the cause does not stand to reason. 12.

Also in consequence of the hypothesis [of the relation] of Inherence, because there results, owing to parity of reasoning, a regressus in infinitum. 13.

And also in consequence of the hypothesis of the relation of Inherence— " there is an absence of that" — this is what has to be supplied, because a refutation of the atomic theory is the point at issue. The binary-compound, originating from two atoms, is absolutely distinct from the two atoms and is yet related to them by the relation of Inherence : that is your assumption. With this assumption it cannot at all be possible for you to substantiate the theory of atomic causation. Why ? " Because there results, owing to parity of reasoning, a *regressus in infinitum.*" Just as the binary-compound, being absolutely distinct from the [component] atoms, is yet [assumed to be] related to them by the relation of Inherence, even so the relation of Inherence itself, being absolutely distinct from the two objects between which it is to subsist, will require to be

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brought into relation with the objects wherein it inheres by means of another distinct relation precisely of the nature of Inherence; because, absolute distinction [which is the determinant motive] is equally present in both cases. And conceding this, we will have to imagine a new and yet newer relation [of Inherence] for each of the relations of Inherence successively postulated, so that there does ensue the clear contingency of a *regressus in infinitum*. — But, it will be urged, Inherence is a relation that can be vividly cognised as present here and before us, and it therefore is apprehended as being in permanent relation with objects wherein it inheres: it is never perceived as something unrelated and standing in need of a distinct act of relation; and, as a consequence of this, there cannot at all arise any further necessity of imagining a succession of possible relations with reference to each of them, thereby creating the contingency of a *regressus in infinitum*. We reply in the negative. For, in that case, the relation of Conjunction also is no less in permanent relation with the conjoint objects, so that it too should not have needed—any more than Inherence—another distinct relation. For, if Conjunction is to stand in need of a distinct relation (viz. Inherence) because it is a different entity from the conjoint-objects, then in that case, Inherence also ought to stand in need of a distinct relation, because it too is none the less a distinct object. Nor will it do to contend that Conjunction, being a quality, may reasonably require a distinct relation, but not the Inherence, because it is [a distinct category] and not a quality; because the circumstances necessitating a distinct act of relating are equally present in both cases; and as to the technicality making one [the Conjunction] a quality [and another a distinct-category], that is of no consequence [or, is not a universal technicality]. Therefore, [Page 58] if you are going to assume that the relation of Inherence is a distinct category, the *regressus in infinitum* is sure to face you as a contingency. And the contingency of the *regressus* being once driven home, with the untenability of any one member of the series, everything will become unsettled, so that there can never arise a binary-compound as an effect of two atoms. Hence too the theory which puts forth Atoms as the cause is lacking in cogency. 13.

And because [there will ensue the contingency] of [its] unceasing continuance. 14.

Besides, the atoms will have to be assumed to possess by nature either a tendency towards activity, or a tendency towards non-activity, or both the tendencies, or neither of the two,—there remaining no other possible alternative. None of these four alternatives can possibly be made to stand. If they were to possess a natural tendency to activity, then they would ever continue to be active, and there would ensue the contingency of an impossibility of the Dissolution. Again, if they were to possess a natural tendency to non-activity, they would ever continue to remain non-active, and there would ensue the contingency of an impossibility of Creation. As to their possessing both the natures, that is self-contradictory, and so impossible to maintain. If they, finally, were to possess neither of these tendencies by nature, then the activity or the non-activity will have to be assumed as due to specific inducing-causes ; and as regards these causes, if they are to be like the Unseen-principle, they will always be close at hand, and so there will ensue the contingency of a continuous activity. And if the Unseen-principle and the like were not to be essentially needed, (or be not acceptable to the System, there would ensue the contingency of a continuous non-activity. For this reason too the theory of atomic causation is untenable. 14.

Also, because they possess colour and the like [qualities], there will take place a reversal of their [assumed] nature, because so it is observed. 15.

The Vaiśeshikas put forward the hypothesis that, in the course of the successive disintegration into smaller parts of substances which are compounded out of parts, the stage at which no further division into parts can be effected are the atoms, which are eternal substances and which fall into the four classes, each possessing colour and the other qualities ; and that they originate the elements and the elemental products each possessing colour and the other [conforming] qualities. This hypothesis of theirs cannot be substantiated because, possessing as they do the colour and the other qualities, there would result the contingency of a reversal of the

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atoms' nature as atoms and as permanent substances; in other words, there will have to be ascribed to them grossness and non-permanence as compared with the ultimate first cause—whatever that may be—qualities just the opposites of what are [by you] sought to be established. Why? Because it is so observed in the world. For in this world, whenever a thing is possessed of colour and the other qualities, that thing is observed to be, in comparison with its own cause, gross and non-permanent. For example, the piece of cloth is gross and non-permanent as compared with the threads [out of which it is manufactured], and the threads are gross and not permanent as compared with their [constituent] fibres. On the very same analogy, inasmuch as these atoms are assumed by them to possess the qualities of colour and the like, they must also have other substances as cause, in comparison with which the atoms will have to be assumed as gross and non-permanent. And as to the proof they adduce for the permanence, namely [Vaiśeshika Aphorism, IV. i. 1]—"Whatever, having existence, has no assignable cause, that is permanent" — the characterisation in question cannot, under the circumstances, apply to the atoms, because in the manner just detailed, even the atoms will have to be maintained as possessing a cause. Next, as to the second ground establishing permanence that has been adduced, [Page 59] namely [Vaiś. Aphorism, IV. i. 4]—"There might otherwise be an impossibility of the specific negation in the form of "this is not permanent"— that does not necessarily establish the permanence of the atoms. For, had there been no permanent entity whatsoever, then of course there could not have happened the negative-compound with the permanent (*i. e.*, non-permanent); but the compound does not demand that the atoms alone should be the permanent entity in question. As a permanent entity [required for the exigencies of the compound] we can point to our Brahman which is the ultimate First Cause. Nor finally, can the existence of an object be established merely on the ground of the usage of words: it is entities established by other independent proofs that come to have words employed for them in ordinary parlance. Lastly, with reference to the third proof for permanence that is adduced, namely [Vaiś. Aphorism, IV. i. 5.]—" And absence of knowledge"—if the interpretation of the Aphorism is, that "absence of knowledge," means non-apprehension by direct-cognition of any

causes in the case of [the atoms, which are] existent-entities, and the effects of which are perceptible to sense, then the binary-compounds [which answer to the above description] will also have to be pronounced as permanent. And if you modify the statement by introducing the qualification—" provided there be no other substance [as their originating cause]"—then in that case the ground of permanence assigned will be tantamount to just, " not having a cause." This being already adduced before [in Vaiś. Aphorism, IV. i. 1], the present Aphorism [IV. i. 1] " And absence of knowledge" will be a mere repetition. Secondly, if " absence of knowledge " is to signify the impossibility of any third cause of destruction besides the two, viz., disintegration of the constituent causes or destruction of constituent-causes, and if it is explained that the " avidyā " so interpreted establishs the permanence of the atoms, we reply that there does not at all exist any invariable rule that a thing that is going to be destroyed must agree to be destroyed only in the above two modes. That might be the case only if it be assumed [as do the Vaiśeshikas] that a plurality of substances joined by conjunction can alone originate other substances. When however the assumption is [as of the Sāṁkhyas] that a cause possessing a generic nature freed from particularities can originate effect when it assumes that other state in which the particularities become manifest, then a destruction can properly be assumed to take place even when there results, as in the case of ghee, a destruction of its specific corporeality by the dissolution of its solidity. Thus, therefore, because the atoms are assumed to be endowed with colour and the other qualities, there will be a reversal of the nature intended to be ascribed to them. For this reason also the theory of atomic causation falls to the ground. 15.

And there is difficulty either way. 16.

Earth is gross and possesses the qualities of odour, taste, colour, and touch ; waters are subtle and have th equalities of colour, taste, and touch ; light is more subtle and is endowed with the qualities of colour and touch ; while wind is the most subtle and has [only] touch as its quality : in this fashion these four elements are assigned increasing or decreasing

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number of qualities and are observed, in the ordinary world, to constitute a graded-series according as they are gross, or subtle, or subtler, or subtlest. So too, we ask, are we to conceive of the atoms [of these respective elements] as possessing the increasing or the decreasing number of qualities ? In either alternative there does ensue the liability to encounter an unavoidable difficulty. For, if, as one alternative, we imagine that the atoms possess an increasing or a decreasing number of qualities, the atoms to which increasing number of qualities are attributed will exhibit a growth of bulk, and so there will follow the contingency of their being no longer atomic. [Page 60] And you do not surely argue that an increase in the number of qualities takes place even in the absence of a growth in bulk, seeing that in the case of the elements which are the products [of the atoms] we observe that with an increase in the number of qualities a growth in bulk follows. If, as the other alternative, an increase in the number of qualities be not ascribed, then, in order to establish the atomic character of all [the four elemental-atoms] alike, if they are all supposed to possess each merely one quality [distinctive of each element], then we would be unable to find touch in light [which will have only colour]; or to find colour and touch in water [which will have only taste]; or to find taste and colour and touch in earth [which will have only odour]; inasmuch as the qualities of the effect [e.g., the elements] have the qualities of the causes [e.g., the elemental-atoms] as their antecedents. If, however, all are assumed to possess [all] the four qualities, then we would find odour even in waters; odour and taste even in light; odour, taste and colour even in wind : a fact which we never observe. For this reason too the theory of atomic causation cannot be sustained. **16.**

And being reprobated, [the atomic theory] is to be absolutely discredited. 17.

The [Sāṁkhya] theory of the Pradhāna has been put forward even by a few [sages] like Manu who profess Vedic knowledge, in the belief that it will substantiate certain dogmas like that of the antecedent existence of effect [which is acceptable to followers of the Veda]. But the present atomic theory has not been adhered to in any part of its dogmas by any men-of-com-

petence-and-position, and so it deserves to be altogether discredited by those who claim to follow the Veda. — Moreover, the Vaiśeshikas posit, as constituting the main topics of their system, the existence of six categories—denominated as Substance, Quality, Action, Generality, Particularity, and Inherrence—absolutely distinct from each other and having—each of them—its own absolutely distinctive characteristics, as do for instance, a man or a horse or a hare. And having made this assumption, they further make the assumption—altogether contrary [to the one already made]— namely, that the Quality and the other categories are dependent upon [the first category of] Substance. This does not stand to reason. Why ? Just as, in our ordinary experience of the world, objects like hare, kuśa-grass, palāśa-tree etc.—being absolutely distinct from each other —are never found to be dependent upon each other, even so, and for the very reason that Subtance and the other categories are absolutely distinct from each other, Quality and the rest cannot possibly be dependent upon Substance. But if Quality and the rest are to be, in fact, dependent upon Substance, then, because when the Substance exists then only these exist, and when the Substance does not exist they also do not exist, therefore it is reasonable to believe that it is the one Substance itself that becomes, owing to a difference in posture etc., liable to be described by the different terms and ideas, quite on the analogy of the one Devadatta, who, although no more than one, becomes, through being placed in different conditions, liable to have different terms and ideas predicated of him. If this be granted then there would result the [unwelcome] acceptance of the Sāṁkhya dogma and the running counter to one's own accepted thesis. — But, it may be rejoined—do we not see that the smoke, albeit distinct from the fire, is seen to be dependent upon the latter ? Certainly it is so. But in this case, because smoke is known to be distinct from fire, therefore we conclude that the two must be distinct. In the present case, however, in the judgments such as—' white blanket,' ' ruddy cow,' or ' blue lotus ' — what we actually cognise is the one thing — Substance — that appears under these varied attributes [or aspects], so that there never exists in the case of the Substance and its Qualities a knowledge of their distinctness, as it does in the case of the fire and the smoke. Hence the Quality must be held to constitute

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the very essence of the substance. And by the same mode of reasoning can be established the fact of Action, Generality, Particularity, and Inherence constituting likewise the very essence of the Substance. — And if in this connection it were to be urged that the fact of the dependence of the Quality and the rest upon the Substance is due to Substance and Quality being "entities proved incapable of separated-existence," then in that case we demand, does this "non-separated existence" mean [Page 61] non-distinctness in space, or non-distinctness in time, or non-distinctness in nature? None of these alternatives can stand ground. If, to begin with, it were to denote non-distinctness in space, then it would run counter to your own assumption. How? For, you maintain that a piece of cloth originating from threads occupies the same space as the threads themselves, and not a new space to be occupied by the piece of cloth; and yet you believe that the qualities of the piece of cloth—whiteness and the rest—occupy the same space as the piece of cloth and not the same space as the threads. And in this connection it has been said [Vaiśeshika Aphorism, I. i. 10]—" It is the Substances that orginate other Substances, while it is Qualities that orginate other Qualities." The position held is that it is the threads—the cause-substances—that orginate the effect-substance, namely the piece of cloth, while it is whiteness and the other qualities belonging to the threads that originate, in the piece-of-cloth—the effect-substance—other [new and similar] qualities, like whiteness and the rest. This assumption of theirs would be thrown overboard if the Substance and the Qualities were to be assumed, as you want to do now, to exist in non-distinct (i. e. self-same) space. — If [as a second alternative] the "non-separated existence" be asserted to mean non-distinctness in time, then the right and the left horns of the bull will have to be conceded to possess non-separated existence. And if, finally, "non-separated existence" were to denote non-distinctness in nature, then there is no possibility of the Substance and the Qualities possessing any distinctness of essence inasmuch as they are always experienced as being of identical essence. — And as to their dogma to the effect that Conjunction is a relation between two things known to be capable of separated-existence, whereas Inherence is a relation between two things of established non-separated existence—this assumption is rendered quite nugatory

inasmuch as that relation of non-separated existence cannot cogently be predicated of the cause [the threads], which can exist as a distinct entity [long] prior to the effect. And if [to avoid this difficulty] the assumption in question were to be understood as referring to only one of the terms to the relation [i. e., the effect] so that Inherence is taken to denote the relation with the cause of the effect [the piece of cloth], which is never ascertained to have an existence separated [from the threads], even so the effect which was antecedently non-existing, cannot surely be held to be related to the cause unless and until it acquires the character of an existential entity; because relation always requires two [positive] terms between which it is to subsist. And if you were to say that the effect does first acquire the character of an existential entity, and then comes into relation, then inasmuch as you attribute to the effect an existential character prior to its coming into relation with the cause, the hypothesis of the effect not possessing any separated existence by itself falls to the ground, and the statement [Vaiś. Aphorism, VII ii. 13] — "There exists no possibility of conjunction or disjunction between effect and its cause" becomes an erroneous statement. Morecover, just as you assume that the relation between, on the one hand, the effect substance at the very first moment of its existence when it has no [quality or] activity, and on the other, all-pervading substances like Ether [which, being all-pervading, are incapable of activity] to be Conjunction itself [although, in strict theory, Conjunction requires activity on the part of at least one of the objects conjoined], and not Inherence: even so the relation of [that same effect-substance] to the cause-substance should be understood to be just Conjunction itself, and not Inherence.

Nor does there exist any valid-proof for ascribing to the relation of Conjunction or Inherence an existential character independently of the two objects which come to be joined by that relation. If you maintain that they must be regarded as existential entities, because we find the term Conjunction and Inherence and the ideas denoted by them as current [in the world] over and above the terms and the ideas belonging to the two objects brought together by these relations, we say, No; for even where the object is one, we observe the use of many terms and

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ideas with reference to the object according to its intrinsic and extrinsic predications. For instance, we find in the world one and the same Devadatta made the object of the use of many terms and ideas with reference to him, according as his own intrinsic nature and his extrinsic relations are taken into consideration: thus we call him a man, a Brahman, learned-in-Veda, affable, a boy, a youth and an old-man; as also a father, a son, a grandson, a brother, a son-in-law, etc. Thus too we make one and the same line, with reference to the different places where it may happen to be inserted, the object of the use of many terms and ideas like one, or ten, or hundred, [Page 62] or a thousand etc. Analogously it is the two objects that are brought together by a given relation that can themselves with property be the objects of the use of the terms and ideas of Conjunction and Inherence, besides being the objects of the use of the terms and ideas which belong to them as objects brought together by these relations; and they are *not* [the objects of the use of the terms and ideas of Conjunction and Inherence] *because* a distinct entity corresponding to these [relations] does actually exist [as a Padārtha]. Accordingly, by the proof of the "Non-perception" of an object which ought to have come [if it at all existed] under the range of perception, we conclude the non-existence of a distinct object [corresponding to the terms Conjunction and Inherence]. Nor can it be urged that the terms and ideas belonging to these relations, if assumed to refer only to the objects brought together by the relations, will have to be always predicable [of them because the objects always persist]: this has been already replied to [by explaining that objects can have different terms and ideas used with reference to them] according as the intrinsic or the extrinsic form of the objects is under reference. Then again, Conjunction is not possible in the case of atoms, and the self, and the mind, because, they are not divisible in space, seeing that Conjunction is everywhere seen to exist between a substance divisible in space and another substance similarly divisible in space. And if it be asserted that such divisibility in space can be imaginarily attributed to the atoms, the self and the mind, we say No; for, if one were free thus to imagine things that do not exist, there would result the contingency of all one's ideas being accomplished. That one ought to imagine, only upto such and such a limit, an object,

be it possible or impossible, that does not exist, and not beyond that limit—for imposing such a restriction no grounds of any kind exist. For, imagination depends solely upon one's will, and one can command any quantity of it. So that no restrictive ground can exist for not imagining, beyond the six categories imagined by the Vaiśeshikas, other additional categories, be they a hundred or a thousand. The result would be that any individual can establish anything whatever that might catch his fancy. Here we would have a benevolent man who might imagine that there should not exist any more this Saṁsāra which brings such voluminous suffering on mortals. There we would have another malevolent person who would even imagine that the liberated souls too might be born again. Who can have the right to come in the way of such men ?

Here is another argument. A biniary, which is a whole constituted out of parts, cannot reasonably be supposed to have any cohesion with the two impartite atoms [which are its constituents] any more than it can have that cohesion with Ether [which is also impartite]. For, it is admitted that [impartite substances like] Ether cannot possess cohesion with Earth and the like in the same fashion as there subsists such a cohesion between the wood and the lac-juice (within it). — If, however, it be argued that Inherence has got to be necessarily presupposed because, in its absence, we cannot otherwise explain the relation of dependence and substratum that obtains between the effect-substance and the cause-substance, we demur; because the argument involves [the deficiency of] mutual interdependence. For, it is only when the distinctness between the effect and the cause is established, that the relation of dependence and substratum can be established ; and it is only when the relation of dependence and substratum between the two is conceded that they can be assumed to be distinct. This would involve [the fault of] mutual interdependence as in [the familiar instance of] the pot and the Badara-tree. [Nor is this interdependence inevitable from the very nature of things, as in the case of the seeds and the tree ; for,] the followers of the Vedānta doctrine have not to assume a distinctness between the effect and the cause, or any relation of dependence and substratum between them, because they have adopted the theory that the effect is

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nothing more than a specific state-of-existence of the cause itself — Then again, inasmuch as the atoms are of a limited dimension, they must be assumed to possess delimiting parts in the direction of each of the six or eight or ten sides that one might imagine them to possess; and possessing these [delimiting] parts they must be assumed to be non-permanent, which involves the throwing overboard of the assumption of the eternal and impartite nature of the atoms. If to this it be replied: it is these very delimiting parts that you postulate as marking out the extension of the atom in each direction which are our [eternal and impartite] atoms, we say, No. For, [to consider the matter from a slightly different point of view] it stands to reason that—following the order of disintegration of the relatively gross into the relatively subtle—all things whatsoever, upto and including the [assumed] first cause [i e., the atoms], should meet their destruction. Just as earth, although a real existing entity, and although more gross when compared with the binaries etc, does nevertheless perish; and then perishes the subtle and the more subtle mass-of-matter possessing the same generic characteristic as the earth; and thereafter the binary: even so, finally, must the atoms meet their destruction inasmuch as they also possess the same generic characteristic as the earth. And if you urge that although they might meet their destruction, [Page 63] that would be always by a process of disintegration into [smaller] parts, we reply that that is no argument against us. For, we have already said that destruction can cogently be supposed to take place on the analogy of the solid-form of the ghee. For just as, in the case of the ghee, the gold, and the like, there results, upon their coming into contact with fire, a destruction of their solidity and a reduction of them to a fluid state although there may not take place any disintegration of them into parts, even so there might result in the case of the atoms a destruction of their corporeality and the like, by their being refunded back into their First Cause. In a like fashion, the origination of effects does not invariably take place by a mere [mechanical] joining together of constituent parts: for, we observe that from milk, water, and the like there do originate effects like curds, snow, and the rest, even in the absence of a joining together of constituent-parts. — So then, inasmuch as it is propped up by yet more flimsy ratiocinations, and because

it runs counter to the Scriptures that vouch for the existence of the Lord as the First Cause, and also for the reason that men-of-position-and-competence like Manu, and others like him who are [generally] disposed to follow the Scriptural teaching, have not expressed their acceptance of it, therefore this theory of atomic causation deserves to be altogether repudiated by persons who aspire for [spiritual] welfare. 17. Here ends the Topic (3) entitled Refutation of Atomic theory.

TOPIC 4 : REFUTATION OF AGGREGATES.

(*Sūtras* 18-27)

That the Vaiśeshika theory deserves to be discarded inasmuch as it is full of fallacious reasonings, runs counter to the Veda, and is repudiated by men-of-position-and-competence, has been above declared by us already. That theory is semi-nihilistic, and so we are here going to argue that a completely nihilistic theory [of the Buddhists]—inasmuch as both agree in being nihilistic—deserves *a fortiori* to be reprobated. Now, this theory appears in many forms, either because of the differences in the [Teacher's] own understanding [at the various stages of his intellectual and spiritual advancement], or because of the different pupils [of varying powers that he had to deal with]. Amongst them stand out the following three disputants. Some of them maintain the reality of everything; others maintain the reality only of the ideas; while a third class maintains that everything is a void. Of these, those who maintain the reality of everything postulate two classes of entities: the external and the internal, viz., (i) the elements and the elementals, as also (ii) the mind and the mentals. It is these that we take up first for refutation. Now, the "elements" stand for the earth and other element-substances, while the "elementals" are the colour and other [qualities] as also the eye and other [senses]. The four-fold atoms of earth and the rest are endowed with hard, adhesive, hot, and propulsive natures; and they think that these are (respectively) conglomerated into the earth and other [elements]. Likewise there are the five thought-phases (Skandhas) known as perceptions, conceptions, feelings, I-consciousness, and latent-impressions. And these also, in our psychic-experience, agglomerate into all that

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variety of thought-entities which, they think, renders all our ordinary dealings possible. Against this we have to say—

In both the [physical and the psychic] aggregates proceeding along two [distinct lines-of-causation] there is an impossibility of that. 18.

Now, those aggregates of two kinds proceeding along two [distinct] lines-of-causation which our opponents wish to postulate; viz. that springing from the atoms and consisting of the conglomerates of elements and elementals, and that springing from thought-phases and consisting of the five agglomerated thought-entities,—in postulating both these kinds of aggregates proceeding along two [distinct] lines-of-causation, there would result an impossibility of that : i. e. to say, there would ensue the inexplicability of the happening of the aggregation. Why ? Because the factors that are going to form the aggregates are themselves non-sentient; and as to the flaring out of the [isolated thought-phases into the agglomerate known as the] mind, that is contingent upon the (prior) achievement of the aggregation And also because you do not assume the existence of any other permanent sentient being—be he the experiencer, or the controller—that could bring about the conglomeration. And were you to assume a tendency-to-aggregate without any inducing-cause, [Page 64] there would ensue the contingency of the non-cessation of that activity [even at the Nirvāṇa]. And as regards the reflective-consciouness belonging to the self (āśaya)—[which is admitted to be a continuum]—it is impossible to make it out as either distinct or non-distinct [from the aggregate]; and inasmuch as it is assumed to be a momentary phenomenon, it will be incapable of starting any operation, with the result that activity remains unexplained. And because of this, the aggregation remains unexplained, and with the aggregation remaining unexplained, all the mundane-existence depending upon that will come to an end altogether. 18.

And if it be said that [aggregation can take place] because of the [Twelve Root-causes or " Nidānas "] being related by mutual causation, we say No; because thereby mere origination will [at the most] be effectuated [and not the aggregation]. 19.

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Even though there be not assumed any permanent sentient being—whether as the experiencer or as the controller—that could bring about the conglomeration, still, the mundane existence can well be explained through [the concatenated chain of] nescience and the rest serving as the causes of one another. And when once an explanation is offered of the mundane existence, nothing further need be demanded. The nescience and the rest include—(1) nescience, (2) latent-disposition, (3) rebirth-consciousness, (4) name-and-form, (5) the sense-sextet, (6) contact, (7) feelings, (8) craving, (9) effort, (10) hereditary-momentum, (11) birth, and (12) decay-death-sorrow-lament-suffering-despair, and the like. These are causes of each other, and they are enumerated in the Buddhistic Canon sometimes in a condensed and sometimes in an expanded manner. This chain of nescience etc. cannot of course be demurred to by any theorists. So then, with this chain of nescience etc., with its members related as the cause and the effect unto each other [in the cyclic order], continuing its incessant revolutions on the analogy of a water-wheel the conglomeration in question follows as a matter of course.— We deny [the force of the above argument]. Why? Because, " thereby mere origination can be effectuated." The conglomeration, in other words, might have become accountable if there had been postulated some inducing-cause of the conglomeration. But this is what we do not perceive. For even though nescience and the rest be assumed to be related mutually as causes and effects, still and earlier member of the cyclic-chain could become—if it is to become anything at all—a cause of just the origination of a later member of the series: but thereby we do not discover any cause for the formation of the conglomeration. But, [resumes our opponent,] have we not said that nescience and the rest necessarily imply the conglomeration ? To this we reply as follows : If [our opponent's] intention is that nescience and the rest, because they are incapable in the absence of the conglomeration to have any existential character at all, therefore they inevitably postulate the conglomeration,—we have in that case to demand an inducing-cause for this conglomeration. And such a cause, in our examination of the Vaiśeshika theory (Translation, page 89), we have already declared to be quite impossible even when there be admitted [as did those theorists] eternally-existing atoms as also experiencing-souls [also per-

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manent] who could serve as the substratum of the Karman-fluid (*reading*—āsravāśrayabhuteshu); how much the less possible must it then be, My dear Sir, when the atoms are assumed to be just momentary-phenomena, possessing no experiencing-souls [with whom to come into contact], and assuming no kind of a relation as between substratum and superstrata, as was postulated [between the self and the atoms] ! If, as a second alternative, the intention be that nescience and the rest are themselves the cause of the conglomeration, we must ask : How [the terms like] nescience etc.—when it is as dependent upon that same [conglomeration] that they have obtained their very existential character—how can they possibly be the inducing-cause of that same conglomeration ? If, as a last resort, you were to imagine that it is the actual series of [ready-made] conglomerations that exists in this beginningless Saṁsāra stretching along in a continuous line of succession, and that nescience and the rest are dependent upon that series, there too we demand : Is any new conglomeration that is to spring out of an earlier conglomeration required to be invariably similar [to its predecessor], or can it originate as similar or dissimilar without any definite rule in the matter ? If the rule of an invariably similar sequence be assumed, then there would arise the contingency of the human-body never being liable to attain rebirths as Gods or lower-animals, or denizens of Hell ; if, on the other hand, an [utter] absence of any fixed rule be assumed [Page 65] then in that case there would ensue the contingency of the human-body becoming in one moment an elephant, and in the [very] next moment a god or a man once more. Both these contingencies contradict the original hypothesis of our opponents. — Moreover, the experiencing-soul, for whose experience the conglomeration is assumed to take place, is not admitted into your system as a permanent experiencing-agent. Consequently the experience will have to be regarded as existing for the sake of the experience itself, and it cannot therefore be liable to be sought after by another. So too the liberation will have to be for the benefit of liberation itself ; and there cannot be any one else desirous of that liberation. For, if another were to strive for both [the experience and the liberation], that one will have to endure through the whole period covered by the experience and the liberation; and if he is to endure in this fashion, then there would be a going

against the hypothesis of momentariness. Therefore, the chain of nescience and the rest may—if you please—occasion (if it is to occasion anything at all) just the origination of one [member of the series] from another [in cyclic order], but conglomeration cannot be thereby effectuated by reason of the absence of an experiencing-agent : such is the intention [of the Aphorism]. **19.**

And also by reason of the sublation of the antecedent at the origination of the consequent. 20.

We have just said that inasmuch as nescience and the rest can become [at the most] the causes of the origination of each other, there can be no effectuation of the conglomeration. But even this " becoming the cause of the origination " [of each other] is not possible ; this is what is being expounded in what follows. The adherent of the doctrine of momentariness makes the assumption that when a subsequent moment is being originated the antecedent moment is being simultaneously sublated. With such an assumption it is not possible to establish a relation of cause and effect between the antecedent and the consequent moments, because the antecedent moment that is being sublated—whether the process of its sublation has just commenced or has just been finished—being alike under the umbra of non-existence, cannot with reason be held to become the cause of the subsequent moment. But in case the intention [of the opponent] be to assert that it is *that* antecedent moment which has assumed the character of existence and which has fully evolved its own individualistic essence that is to be the cause of the subsequent moment, even so the position lacks cogency ; for, if you were to ascribe, unto one that has already assumed a full-formed existence, an additional creationistic-activity, then there would arise the contingency of that one coming into relation with another [extra] moment. And if it be intended that this creationistic-activity is no other than its very coming into existence, then too the position becomes untenable, because no effect that has not been imbued with the character of its cause can ever come into existence. And if you admit such an imbuing [of the effect with the character of the cause], then as the characteristic of the cause is [under the admission] made to persist during the moment of the existence of the effect, you will be reduced to throw overboard

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your doctrine of the momentariness of things. But in case one were to asssme the possibility of a cause-effect relation even without the effect being imbued with the characteristic of the cause, then, as such [absence of imbuing] is possible everywhere, [anything can be the cause of anything else, and] there would result the possibility of an ultra-extension of the argument. — Then again, the so-called origination and sublation of objects must either constitute the very essence of the object, or may be different stages of the same object, or may be something altogether distinct from that object. Neither of these alternatives can be sustained. If, to begin with, origination and sublation were to constitute the very essence of the object, then there would arise the contingency of the term 'object' and the terms 'origination' and 'sublation' being understood always as synonyms. And if our opponent were to suppose that there is some sort of a distinction between the terms, and that the terms origination and sublation merely denote the two, i. e., the intitial and the final, stages of the object the existence of which forms the mid-point [of these stages], even so, inasmuch as the object is now made to come into relation with the three—the initial, the intermediate and the final—moments, there is here involved the renouncing of the doctrine of momentariness. If, finally, origination and sublation were to be two entities altogether distinct from the object, as the horse is distinct from the buffalo, then the object as such becomes in no way connected with origination and sublation, and so it will have to be admitted to be permanent. [Page 66]. And if one were to hold that origination and sublation signified only the perceiving or the non-perceiving of a given object, even so the perceiving and the non-perceiving are the attributes of the percipient, and not the attributes of the object, so that there still would ensue the contingency of the object being eternal. For this reason too the Buddhistic theory lacks consistency. 20.

If [origination is assumed] without the cause [enduring beyond its own moment], that would be a contradicting of the accepted dogma : or else, there would result the simultaneousness [of cause and effect]. 21.

We have just said that, under the theory of momentariness, an antecedent moment, being swallowed up by sublation, cannot

possibly be the cause of the subsequent moment. If now our opponent were to assert that even without the cause [i. e. the antecedent moment] persisting [on into the period of the effect], origination of the effect might follow, then that would involve the contradicting of an accepted dogma. The accepted-dogma, in other words, that the mind and the mental [phenomena] originate after the conjoint-operation of four kinds of causes will have to be given up. And if the origination be assumed to result even where there is an utter absence of all causes, then, there being no restraining agency, everything would originate everywhere. If, finally, he were to urge that the antecedent moment endures until the origination of the subsequent moment is accomplished, even so there would result the simultaneousness of the cause and the effect, and thereby also there would be the same running counter to an accepted position. It is the accepted dogma that all the composite-things are momentary that will now come to be contradicted. 21.

Conative-sublation and Nonconative-sublation cannot be substantiated, because of an impossibility of interruption [in the stream of moments]. 22.

Then there is the hypothesis of the Nihilists—"All besides the triad is cognisable by the mind, is a composite-entity, and is transitory"— the triad in question being explained as (1) conative-sublation, (2) non-conative (or voluntary) sublation, and (3) space. All these three they regard as of the nature of mere negation, and as non-substantial and indescribable. The explanation is vouchsafed that a sublation of things preceded by a deliberate act of the mind is to be styled conative-sublation, the reverse of this is styled the non-conative (or voluntary) sublation ; while space (ākāśa) signifies nothing more than a mere absence of limitation [in every direction]. Of the three, space will be refuted on a subsequent occasion, while here it is the two varieties of sublation that he is going to refute. "Conative-sublation and nonconative-sublation cannot be, "substantiated," are, in other words, untenable. Why? "Because of an impossibility of interruption." For, these conative and non-conative sublations must be held to belong to the stream [of momentary existences as a whole], or to the individual entities. Now they cannot

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possibly belong to the stream; because, in all streams whatsoever, the individual constituents of the stream form an uninterrupted succession of causes and effects, so that it is impossible that the stream could at any point be brought to a stand-still. Nor can the two refer to the individual entities (or constituents); for, it is not possible that existential entities can at any time be overtaken by an utter annihilation, leaving no bond or vestige of it behind; since, in all its states, an existential-entity, by the very force of recognition, is observed to maintain its [generic] features without interruption. And even in the few possible eventualities where the recognition is not manifestly present, we will have to infer, from the observed fact of the maintenance of the [earlier] bonds [in some well-ascertained cases], that a similar absence of interruption exists even there. Consequently both the varieties of sublation imagined by our opponent cannot be made to stand the test of reason. 22.

And there are defects both ways. 23.

[Page 67] As to the sublation of nescience and the rest as postulated by our opponent, and which is held to fall under the category of the conative-sublation, that might proceed either from Right Knowledge with all its accompaniments, or might be spontaneous. If the first alternative is accepted, that would entail the contingency of a running counter to the dogma of effortless sublation, which is maintained [by our opponent]. In the latter alternative, there would follow the contigency of the instructions as regards the Right Path etc. proving futile. So, under both the alternatives, there would ensue the contingency of some defect or the other [in the position]; and hence the [Buddhistic] theory is proved to be discordant. 23.

The case being also alike with regard to Space 24.

Next as to the view maintained by the same disputant that the two varieties of sublation and the space are non-substantial, [and eternal]: amongst these the non-substantiality [and non-eternality] of the two varities of sublation has been already refuted before : now he is going to do the same in the case of space (ākāśa). The hypothesis that space is non-substantial is

inadmissible, because, as in the case of the conative and non-conative sublation, so in the present case, there is absolutely the same perception of an entity. On the evidence of the Scriptural texts like [Tait. Up., ii. 1] —"From the ātman the ākāśa was born," and others there is, to begin with, a clear declaration of the reality of the ākāśa. And for those averse to admitting their validity, one can assert the possibility of its inference on the ground of [the inferential-mark of] sound, seeing that other qualities like odour etc. are seen to subsist upon real entities like the earth. Furthermore, when our opponents imagine space to be a mere absence of covering (or delimitation in every direction) they must be reduced to own that, when a bird is already flying in space, there being a delimitation [of space, and so no longer a mere vacuum] in that direction, another bird desirous of flying will not have any [free] space to fly into. And to say that the other bird might fly there, where the delimitation [caused by the earlier flying bird] does not exist would be to assign to space in which you are now able to distinguish one absence of delimitation from another absence of delimitation, the character of a real positive entity; and it cannot therefore be a mere [negative] absence of delimitation [as is alleged]. Moreover, the Buddhistic disputant who maintains that space is mere absence of delimitation will have thereby to run counter to another of his cherished dogmas. For, in the Buddhistic canon, in the series of questions and answers beginning with (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, page 16) — "Upon what, Revered Sir, does the Earth rest ?"—at the end of the series starting with earth and the rest there comes finally the question —"Upon what does the Wind rest ? "—to which the reply given is— "The Wind is grounded upon Space." And such a reply would not be plausible if space had been a mere unreality. Then again, there is a contradiction in the very assumption made that the two varieties of sublation and space—this triad— [Page 68] is indescribable, and withal unreal and eternal. For, there cannot possibly belong any such thing as eternality or non-eternality to what is admittedly an unreal entity; because all dealings based upon the relation of the substance and the attributes depend upon what is a real and positive entity. And once the relation of the attributes to the substance is conceded, then [space] will have to be reckoned as a real, existen-

tial entity, just like a jar and the like, and not as [a mere] nondescript unsubstantiality. 24.

And also owing to (the fact of) remembrance. 25.

Again, since our Nihilist opponent assumes the momentariness of all things, he ought to assume also the momentariness of even the percipient. But this is not possible because of the fact of remembrance. Remembrance is nothing but the memory arising subsequently to experience, i. e., perception. Now such remembrance is possible only if it belongs to the same subject who had the perception ; for we never notice that what has been the object of one man's perception that another person ever remembers. In the absence of some idential percepient who has the earlier and the later knowledge, how can a cognition of the form —I have [already] seen this and I am seeing it [again now] —at all rise ? Besides, it is a fact patent to all that it is only where one and the same person is the agent of perception and memory that there arises the recognition-consciousness in the form : I have [already] seen this, and I am seeing it again [now]. Had there been a distinct agent of knowledge in the two cases then the form of the consciousness should have been—I [only] remember, but it is someone else who has perceived it. — But nobody ever evinces such a consciousness. The whole world understands that where such consciousness exists, there the agent of perception and that of memory are two distinct individuals, as when it is said, I remember that this other person has seen it. But in the present case, in the consciousness of the form—I have [already] seen this [and am now seeing it again]—even our Nihilist friend would understand that the seeing and the remembering belong to one and the same agent ; and he would not say, " Not I " and so gainsay the fact of the perception that the agent had already had, just as if one were to say the fire is not hot or does not give light. This being so, if one and the same agent is to be in touch with the moment characterised by perception and the moment characterised by remembrance, it becomes inevitable that the Nihilist should surrender his dogma of momentariness. So too, in one successive moment after another, being aware of the recognitive consciousness of the sameness of the self as being the agent of

the different successive cognitions right up to the very last breath, and likewise identifying as belonging to the authorship of the same self the earlier cognitions beginning right from the very birth, should not the Nihilist be ashamed to maintain yet the doctrine of momentariness? Were he to reply that this takes place on account of similarity, we would make the following rejoinder. A similarity in the form, 'This is similar to that' depends upon two factors; and inasmuch as the maintainer of the theory of momentariness cannot point to any one agent who could perceive the two factors as similar, the assertion that the consciousness of identity is based upon mere similarity is nothing but deceitful nonsense. And were he to allow that there is some agent who apprehends the similarity between the earlier and the later moments, then in that case, as the agent in question will have to endure during [at least] two moments, the dogma of momentariness will have to be surrendered. And if it be urged that the perception in the form, 'That is similar to this' is a new cognition altogether, and is not based upon the apprehension of two moments, the earlier and the later, we say No. For, 'This in comparison with that' implies two distinct factors as forming the material [of the subsequent judgment of similarity]. If a distinct cognition were to be the material for the judgment of similarity, the use of the expression 'This is similar in comparison with that' would become meaningless [Page 69] and the only form of the judgment would be 'This is similarity.' When in this manner a fact patent to everybody in the world is not recognised by any theorists, then neither the establishment of one's own doctrines nor the demolishing of the views of the opponent by means of arguments can possibly effect entrance into the flux of one's own mind any more than into that of the theorists themselves. Hence it is necessary that one should assert that only with reference to which there is a definite agreement that the thing is thus or thus only. Anything other than that, when it is being put forward would only proclaim the excess of one's own garrulousness. The judgment in question, accordingly, cannot properly he held to be due to mere similarity; because we are aware of the later thing being one with that [earlier thing], and are not aware of their being simply similar to each other. It is at the most barely possible, with reference to objects outside ourselves, that there may at times arise doubt as

to whether a thing is the same as the other thing or is similar to the other thing, since a deception as to the fact is conceivable; but as regards the percipient himself no such doubt can ever arise as to whether I am the very same [as the earlier percipient] or only similar to him, seeing that there is the indubitable consciousness of the identity of the self in the form—" The same I that have seen [so and so] the other day, that same I am to-day remembering it." For this further reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is objectionable. 25.

[Entity can] never [originate] from non-entity, as it is nowhere observed [to do so]. 26.

For this additional reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be pronounced objectionable, since, without assuming a permanent and enduring cause [to the world], they are forced to maintain that there springs entity from non-entity. They in fact declare the orgination of entity from non-entity [in the text : compare Nyāyasūtra, IV. i. 14] —" As there is no coming into being without a [preceding] breaking asunder." For, they argue, it is from the seed that has been split asunder that sprout arises, so also from milk decomposed the curds, and from the lump of clay destroyed [as a lump] the jar, arises. If the effect were to spring up from an immutable cause, then, as there is no special determining circumstance, everything would originate from everything. Accordingly, inasmuch as it is from the seeds reduced to the condition of non-existence that sprouts and the like originate, they consider that existence originates from non-existence. To this we would make the reply—" Never from non-entity, as it is nowhere observed." From non-entity entity cannot arise. If entity were to be produced from non-entity, then as the non-existence [of the effect that is to be] can indifferently exist [everywhere], the assumption of a specific cause [to produce a specific effect] becomes uncalled for. For, that non-existence which results upon the destruction of the seeds etc. and the non-existence of the hare-horns and similar [impossible] things are both of them equally of the nature of non-entity; and so as regards their character as non-existences there is no distinction, which might lend significance to the assumption of specific causes to produce specific effects, as when it is held that it is from the

seed alone that the sprout is to be produced, and it is from the milk alone that the curds can be produced. When, however, the absolutely character-less non-existence is assumed to be the cause, then sprouts and the like might be produced even from hare-horns and the like—a thing that is nowhere met with. If, on the other hand, you were to postulate a specific characterisation even of non-existence, like blueness in the case of the lotuses etc., then on the ground of this very specific characterisation there would arise the contingency of even the non-existence being regarded as existence on the analogy of the lotus and the like. Nor can a mere non-existence by itself ever be the cause originating any effect, just because it has the character of mere non-existence, as for instance the hare-horn etc. Further, if existence were to originate from non-existence, then all its effects whatsoever would be imbued with a non-existential character, which however is never observed, seeing that everything [Page 70] whatsoever, in its own individual nature, is found to exist in its proper existential form. For, nobody, of course, ever regards plates and other effects exhibiting the characteristics of clay, as the effects belonging, say, to threads and the like. The world has agreed to regard effects possessing clay-characteristics as the products of clay and of nothing else. Next, as to the argument that, in the absence of an antecedent dissolution of the nature of the cause-substance, a something absolutely immutable cannot reasonably be assumed to function as the cause and that therefore it is right that entity should originate from non-entity, that, we say, is badly argued. Because, of a fact, it is gold and the like with their nature [as gold] altogether unchanged, which are recognised as being present in the ornaments and the other effects to which they are related as their causes. And in those causes such as the seeds wherein a destruction of their nature is actually observed, even there it is not the anterior [seed] state that is being thus destroyed which is to be assumed as the cause of the subsequent [sprout-state], but rather it is just those constituents of the seeds etc., which are *not* destroyed, and which continue over [into the effects], which have to be assumed as the cause of the sprouts and the like. Accordingly, inasmuch as mere non-entities like hare-horn etc. are not observed to give rise to any existential effects, and inasmuch as existing-entities like the gold etc. are observed to originate exis-

tential-effects, the [Buddhistic] assumption of an origination of existence out of non-existence cannot stand to reason. Moreover having made the assumption that the ' mind ' and the ' mentals ' orginate from a four-fold causation, and the assumption likewise that from the atoms the aggregates in the form of the ' elements' and the 'elementals' take place, the Nihilists in the same breath postulate the origination of entity out of non-entity, and thereby merely stultify their own [earlier] assumptions and so make the world's confusion worse confounded. **26**.

Besides thereby even the unseeking [people] might have an accomplishment [of their ends]. 27.

If indeed one were to postulate the origination of entity from non-entity, under that postulate even the unseeking and effortless persons might attain to an accomplishment of their ends. As non-existence is so easy to secure, the agriculturist, even though not spending any effort towards the cultivation of the field, might secure his harvest ; the pot-maker, even though not active in fashioning the clay, might have his earthenware ready-made ; and the weaver too, even though not stretching the threads [on the loom], might have his yarns-of-cloth as though he had stretched the threads. And then nobody would in any way be induced to asmuchas wish for heaven or for liberation. This, of course, is not proper, and nobody does ever make such an assumption. For this reason too the origination of entity out of non-entity is utterly untenable. **27**. Here ends the Topic (4) entitled the Refutation of the Aggregates.

TOPIC 5 : REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.

(*Sūtras* 28–32)

As we have thus brought forward, with reference to the theory which maintains the reality of the external world, the various objections such as the impossibility of aggregation, etc., the Buddhist who maintains the doctrine of idealism is now stepping into the arena. We are told that the theory of the reality of the external world was put forward [by the Buddha] to suit the understanding of those of his disciples in whom he saw a firm

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clinging to things of the outer world. That, however, was not the true intention of the Blessed One. His true intention was to assign reality only to the phases (skandha) of "vijñānas" or ideas. According to this theory of Idealism all our wordly experience, consisting of [the senses which are the] means of cognition, together with the objects which are the result of cognition, can be fully explained as existing *within* the percipient and existing only in the form in which his cognitive-faculty (buddhi) becomes aware of it; (Page 71) [particularly so] because an external object, even though assumed to [independently] exist, cannot come within the scheme of our daily experience of the means-of-cognition and the rest unless and in so far only as it comes within the scope of the cognition-faculty.—But [we might ask] how do you know that all this experience is internal only, and that there does not exist any external object outside one's vijñāna or ideas? To that our opponent replies: Because it cannot be proved to exist. For, [he argues,] this external object [the reality of] which is to be assumed can either be atoms or an enmassed-collection of the atoms as in pillars and the like. Now, to begin with, atoms cannot reasonably be held to be the things to be signified by the ideas of pillars etc., because a cognition consisting of the form of the [separate and small] atoms cannot properly be held to belong [to a pillar-cognition]. Nor can their enmassed-collections, the pillars, be held to be aggregates of atoms, because it is impossible to clearly explain whether these aggregates are distinct or non-distinct from the atoms. In an analogous manner one should refute Generality and the other Padārthas.—Furthermore, in the case of our cognitions as they arise within us, and which agree in possessing a uniform nature in so far as they are [parts of] our inner-experience, that bias which each of them takes in connection with each object, viz., that this is a pillar-cognition, a wall-cognition, a jar-cognition, and a cloth-cognition, that bias cannot properly be explained in the absence of some distinctive-aspect belonging to the cognition itself; and so, inevitably, we have to assume that our cognitions take on themselves the form of the [alleged] object. And once this is conceded, inasmuch as the cognition in question has already made as its own the form of the [alleged] object, the assumption of a really existing external object becomes altogether uncalled-

for. — Besides, from the fact of their invariably arising [within us] simultaneously, we should inevitably conclude that the idea and its object are not distinct from each other. For, when one of the two is not perceived, there is no perception of the other; and this ought not to have been the case if the two had been by nature distinct entities, since there is no restrictive ground [for the invariable relation just mentioned]. For this reason also external objects do not exist. — The world, then, is to be viewed upon like a dream and such other things. Just as, for instance, the [varied] perceptions in our dreams in illusions, in mirages, in the twilight-phantoms (gandharva-nagara), and the like assume, some of them, the forms of the objects and others, of the agents of perception, although there are no real external objects corresponding : even so must we legitimately infer in fact the perceptions of the waking-life, the pillars and so forth, to be: for they too no less are perceptions. —And if it be asked : How can there arise, in the absence of any really existing external object, that variety in our perceptions ? —the reply is, through the variety of our subliminal-impressions. For, in this beginningless mundane existence, there exists a mutual relation of cause and effect between our perceptions and the subliminal-impressions on the analogy of the seed and the sprout, and hence there is no contradiction of any kind involved. Moreover, through positive and negative judgments of concomitance, we infer that the variety of our perception is due to nothing save the variety of our subliminal impressions : for, in dreams and the like, even in the absence of any real external objects, we both of us agree in postulating a variety in the perceptions based upon a variety of the subliminal impressions ; whereas, in the absence of subliminal-impressions [to correspond], I am not prepared to admit any variety in the perceptions caused by the [so-called] external objects. For this reason, likewise, we have to deny the existence of any external object. To this argumentation we make the following reply —

Non-existence [of external object] cannot be [maintained] because [of the fact] of their being [actually] perceived. 28.

It is not possible that we can conclude that the external object does not at all exist. Why ? Because it *is* perceived. For, we

do perceive, corresponding to each [internal] idea, an external object such as a pillar, a wall, a jar, or a piece-of-cloth. For, we cannot assuredly deny the very thing that is being [actually] perceived. Just as some one, taking his meals and [Page 72] actually experiencing the satisfaction that the meal is calculated to give, were to say : "I am not taking my meals, nor am I experiencing the satisfaction"—even so a percipient actually perceiving—after the perceptive-contact of his sense with the object—an external object, were he to say : " I do not perceive the object, or that the object does not exist "—how could such a person gain any credence for his words ? — But, [our opponent may say,] I do not say that I do not perceive the object : I only say that I do not perceive it as outside my perception. — We reply, Well may you say this because your tongue is unfettered; but you do not say that which is conformable to reason. For, even the conclusion that the object exists outside the perception has to be *per force* accepted on the ground of the very fact of perception. For, nobody ever comes to have the perceptive-knowledge that the pillar or the wall is no other than his own perception. All men in the world invariably have the perceptive-knowledge that the pillar, wall, and the like are *objects* of perception. That all the men in the world have just such a perceptive knowledge has to be inferred from the other circumstance also that even those who deny the existence of the external object practically assert the existence of the same external object in that they say— " That within us which assumes the form of an internal object of perception, that same appears *as if* it were outside." For even the authors of this assertion do experience the perceptive knowledge which presents objects as existing outside, and which indeed is patent to everbody's experience ; but in their desire to repudiate that external object they use the word ' as if ' as when they say " *as if* it were outside." [This very fact testifies to their belief in the external object ;] for, otherwise why should they have used the expression " *as if* it were outside ? " For. assuredly, nobody will care to say that Vishṇumitra appears *as if* he is a barren-woman's son. Hence those who claim to conceive of the reality in strict accord with experience should properly speaking assert that the perception refers to the object which is actually outside, and they ought not to say that it appears '*as if* ' it were outside.'

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But, [continues our opponent.] it is just because the external object cannot possibly exist that we have to conclude that it appears "*as if* it were external." This, however, is not a correct conclusion : because the possibility and the impossibility [of the existence of an object] are contingent upon the operation and the non-operation [respectively] of valid-proofs regarding them ; and it is not the case that the operation and the non-operation cf the valid-proofs are to be made contingent upon whether [a priori] there is a possibility and impossibility [respectively of the things at all existing]. Accordingly, that which can be cognised by any one of the valid-proofs such as direct-preception and the rest, that is what is possible ; that, on the other hand, which is not to be cognised by any one of the valid-proofs, that is what is impossible. Now in the present case, when all valid-proofs whatsoever—each in its own fashion—are vouchsafing for the existence of the internal object, how can the same, in spite of the fact of its being perceived, be declared to be not possible on the strength of the untenability of all possible alternatives such as [the pillar's] being non-distinct or not non-distinct [from the atoms] ? And because the perceptive-cognition has the same form as the object that is no reason why the object be altogether annihilated ; because, if the object were not to exist at all, we could not reasonably explain the fact of the cognition having the same form as the object ; and also because the object is actually perceived as being outside. For this very reason also, the fact of the idea and its object invariably arising [within us] simultaneously has to be understood as being due to the two being related to each other as the means (the object) and the end (the idea), and not to their being identical. — Moreover, in the jar-cognition or the cloth-cognition, it is the attributes-of-the-perception, viz., jar-ness and cloth-ness, which differ, and not the perceptive-cognition itself, which is the subject-to-which-the-attributes-refer ; just as, in the expression 'a white bull' or a 'black bull,' it is the two attributes of whiteness and the blackness that differ, and not the generic-nature of the bull as such ; so that the two (jar-ness and cloth-ness) establish the distinctness [from themselves] of the one (viz. perceptive-cognition), and the one (perceptive-cognition) the distinctness of itself from the two (jar-ness and cloth-ness]. Accordingly, the object and the idea have to be regarded as distinct. So likewise we have to understand in the case of

the perceptive and the memory cognitions referring to a jar. For, even in this case, it is the perceptive and the memory cognitions, which are the objects-qualified-by-attribute, that differ, and not the jar, which is the attribute in question; [Page 73] just as in the expressions the "milk-odour" and the "milk-taste," it is the odour and the taste—which are the objects-qualified-by-attribute—that differ, and not the milk, which is the qualifying-attribute: even so in the present case. Furthermore the two ideas belonging, the one to the earlier and the other to the later moment, and each of them having achieved all its life-purpose by being brought into consciousness of itself, cannot any longer be supposed to stand to each other in the relation of the perceived and the perceiver. And as a consequence, all the classifications of the ideas, and even their characterisation as being momentary; the analysis [of the contents of an idea] into a factor which gives it its own specific-individuality, plus a generic knowledge-factor; the distinction between what gives rise to a subliminal-impression [viz., the specific-individuality of an idea] and the subliminal-impression itself [which colours the idea of the next moment]; the theory of the nescience-caused confusion of men's ideas; the prescriptions as to what constitutes or what does not constitute right conduct; the declarations as to bondage and liberation; and all other similar dogmas enunciated by the opponent's own Sacred-canon—they will have to be, one and all, contradicted.

Here is another argument. We would demand why it is that, while assuming ideas and nothing but ideas, our opponent hesitates to assume also the external objects like the pillar, the wall, and others of their kind If he makes the answer, Because idea is what is actually experienced, we would say it would be proper for him to assume that even the external object is as such actually experienced. And if it is argued that the idea—because, like a lamp, it is of the nature of luminosity—is experienced of its own nature, but not so the external object, [we reply] you are then prepared to admit what runs counter to all experience, viz., the agent's activity upon himself—as though the fire were to burn itself—and are yet unwilling to allow what is not contrary to experience and what is patent to the whole world, namely, that the external object is perceived by an idea which is distinct from

[the object] itself. Surely in this you have displayed your profound philosophical-insight! And besides, the idea, although conceded as being non-distinct* from the object, cannot be experienced by itself, for there too the same objection of making the agent operate upon himself holds. To this one may answer: If the idea were to be assumed as being the object of perception by an agent different from himself, then that agent will have to be perceived by a third, and so on, thereby starting a *regressus in infinitum*. Further, [he will argue,] if, in spite of the fact that the perceptive-cognition, like the lamp, is self-luminous, it were to be imagined to need another preceptive-cognition for its being perceived, then both [the perceptive cognitions] being exactly alike, there cannot obtain betweeen them the relation of the illumined and the illuminator, so that the whole assumption becomes futile. Both these [we reply] are fallacious arguments, For, in the bare act of the apprehension of a given idea there does not arise any expectancy as to the apprehension of the agent who apperceives the idea in question, so that the very contingency of a *regressus in infinitum* simply does not arise at all. And it is quite possible for the idea and the agent apperceiving the idea [i. e. the witnessing Self]—being as they are divergent in nature—to properly stand to each other in the relation of the percipient and the perceived-object. And as the apperceiver is [directly and] indubitably established [in one's own consciousness], he cannot possibly be gainsaid.

Here is one more argument. When our opponent asserts that the idea, like a lamp, reveals itself spontaneously without standing in need of anything else to illumine it, it is tantamount to asserting that the idea, which no means-of-proof can ever reveal, needs also no percipient for its perception, as though a thousand lamps, blazing in the interior of some rock, were to make themselves manifest therein. Quite so, [our opponent may retort,] only, that idea is of the nature of self-consciousness, and [with this proviso] you are then practically conceding our own position. To that we say, No. For, it is unto another distinct percipient,

* Reading "arthāvyatiriktam" which gives better sense, although it is not found in any edition. With the reading ."arthavyatiriktam" translate— And besides the idea, although distinct from the object, etc.

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endowed with means-of-knowledge like the eyes, that the lamp etc. are found to become manifest. On the same analogy, inasmuch as the idea is nonetheless an object that needs to be illumined, it is only when another distinct percipient exists that we can agree to assent to its being manifest like a lamp. But, [our opponent may urge,] when [the Vedāntin] puts forward his thesis of the self-luminousness of the percipient, i. e. to say, of the witnessing consciousness, is he not, under the cover of a difference in expression, assenting to my own theory that the idea spontaneously manifests itself ? To this we reply in the negative. For, you postulate for your " idea " origination, destruction, manifoldness, and [Page 74] many like attributes [which makes a world of difference between the " idea " and the witnessing-Self]. Consequently we have established the conclusion that the idea also, like unto the lamp, has to be an object of perception for some one else. 28.

And on account of divergence in nature, it is not like the dream and the like. 29.

Now, as to the statement made, while repudiating the external object, that the perceptions of waking-life such as the pillars etc. can exist, on the analogy of the perceptions of the dream and the like, even in the absence of any actual external object, because those also [no less than these] possess indifferently the nature of perception—to that we have to make the following rejoinder. To begin with, we have to point out that the perceptions of waking-life cannot possibly be on a par with the perceptions of dreams etc. Why ? Because of a divergence in nature. For there is a divergence between the perceptions of the dream and of the waking life. What is that divergence ? It is the presence and the absence of sublation, we reply. For, an object perceived in a dream is sublated as the sleeper becomes awake, [when he finds out—] " It is not true that I had fallen in with a crowd of people; for, I never had fallen in with the crowd : only my mind had become enervated by drowsiness, and so this erroneous notion sprang upon me." Just in an analogous fashion there arises a sublation, each in its own way, of magical visions and the like. An objection perceived during waking-life, on the other hand, say, the pillar etc., is not in this fashion

sublated in any other [subsequent] state. — Moreover, the dream-perception is no more than a recollection, while the waking-perception is a direct perception : and the distinction between recollection and direct-perception is plainly experienced by every one as being based upon contiguity and non-contiguity of the object in question, as when one says—" I remember my dear son but do not see him any longer, much as I wish to see him." The fact standing thus, it is not possible to formulate the syllogism—Waking-perception is false ; because it is a perception ; as for instance, the dream-perception—especially when the distinction between the two is a matter of one's own personal experience. It, above all, behoves those who pride themselves upon their "illumination" not to so flagrantly contradict one's own experience. — Then again, fearing lest it would entail a direct contravention of experience, our opponent recognises the impossibility of declaring outright that waking-perceptions have no real basis for themselves ; but yet he wishes to declare the same on the ground of the similarity [of-waking-percerption] with dream-perception. If now a given characteristic cannot belong to an object on its own merits, that same cannot belong to it because of the object's similarity with some other object. For, surely, while the fire is being actually felt as hot, it cannot become cool because of its being compared with water. And we *have* shown that the dreaming and the waking perceptions do differ. **29.**

There can be no existence [of subliminal-impressions] because [external objects are held to be] not perceived. 30.

Then as to the contention that, even in the absence of any [external] object, the variety in our cognitions can very well be made out to be the result of a variety of the subliminal-impressions, against that we have to make a rejoinder. Our reply on the question is—" No existence " of the subliminal impressions can be tenable under your view, " because of the non-perception" of external objects. For, it is on the basis of the perceptions of objects that there arise, in connection with each of the objects [perceived], different kinds of subliminal-impressions. When, however, the objects are [held to be] not perceived at all, on the basis of what can there arise those diversified subliminal im-

pressions? And in case a beginningless succession [of subliminal-impressions be postulated], it would be in accordance with the maxim of the row of the blind led by the blind, with the result that no stability can be attained and there would ensue a *regressus in infinitum* leading to the subversion of the entire phenomenal-experience [Page 75] without the point sought for being at all gained. Then, as to the positive and negative judgments that were put forth by our opponent while repudiating the external object, namely, that this mass of perceptions is based only upon the [assemblage of] subliminal-impressions, and not upon [any variety of] objects, even those, by virtue of the present argument, should be understood as having been controverted, seeing that in the absence of a perception of objects subliminal-impressions cannot properly be explained. On the contrary, inasmuch as, even in the absence of [previous] subliminal-impressions, a perception of objects [at times] actually occurs, and inasmuch as I do not admit, per contra, the possibility of subliminal-impressions arising in the absence of [previous] perception of objects: even the " positive and negative judgments " do, if anything, establish just the very existence of [external] objects. Finally, the subliminal-impressions are no other than latent-dispositions, and latent-dispositions cannot possibly be imagined to exist in the absence of a substratum [or subject, to whom they must belong]; for, such is the world's experience. Now, you have not [assumed] any substratum for your subliminal-impressions, because [as you allege] none such is attained by [any of the valid] means of knowledge. 30.

And also on account of momentariness. 31.

Next, as to the so-called " Receptacle-consciousness " which is brought forward for doing duty as the substratum for the subliminal-impressions, that too lacks in fixty of nature, because that too is assumed to be of momentary duration. It cannot therefore, any more than can the [transient] operative-phase-of-consciousness, serve as a proper abiding place for the subliminal-impressions. In fact, unless one assumes one abiding entity pervading the three [divisions of] time, or someone who is immutable and omniscient, it is not possible that there can be effected the ordinary activities such as the implanting of subliminal-impres-

sions conformable to specific place, time, and circumstances, or the [evoking and] joining together of memories [already implanted]. In case, however, the " Receptacle-consciousness " be assigned a permanence of nature, that would go against the tenet of your school.—Finally, inasmuch as there is the same assumption of momentariness even in this idealistic theory, all those objections on the score of momentariness which were raised against the Realistic schools of Buddhism, namely, [Brahmasūtra, II. ii. 20] — " And because at the origination of the subsequent there is [already] a sublation of the precedent," and the rest,—all those objections have to be applied against the present school also. — Thus then we have refuted both these Nihilistic schools, viz., the Buddhistic Realism and the Buddhistic Idealism. There is another school that maintains the doctrine of the Void ; but that is so flagrantly in contravention of all valid-proofs, that we do not wish to spend any special effort in refuting the same. For, assuredly, all this mundane existence that is warranted by every one of our valid-proofs—it is not ever possible to gainsay it all, until one is assured of a basic reality [of a distinctive order]. The currently-accepted dogmas, accordingly, must obtain free scope as long as an exceptionally convincing doctrine going against them [e. g., the Brahman theory] is not forthcoming. 31.

And because it lacks cogency in every way. 32.

Why say more ? From whatever point of view we try to test this Nihilistic philosophy to see if there be any substance underlying it, we find that in every manner of way it merely tumbles down like [the sides of] a well, dug amidst sands. We do not observe any rime or reason about it. And for this reason too any [further] dealing with this Nihilistic philosophy is absolutely futile. Furthermore, when the " Benevolent One " actually has taught three such doctrines opposed to one another, viz., Realism, Idealism, and the Doctrine of the Void, he has thereby plainly established his own propensity for incoherent prattle, or may-be, his malice for the world, evincing a desire that all the world might be confounded by believing in such contradictory theories. In every way therefore does this philosophy of the " Benevolent One " deserve to be condemned outright by persons

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desirous of salvation—this is the meaning of the Author. 32.
Here ends the Topic (5) entitled the Refutation of Idealism.

Topic 6 : Refutation of Jain Philosophy.

(*Sūtras* 33–36)

[Page 76] The theory of the "Benevolent One" has been disposed of. We now proceed to repudiate the theory of the "undressed" philosophers. These believe in seven categories named by them—the soul, the non-soul, the inflowing-fluid, the inlet-closing, the drying-up, the bondage, and the liberation. In brief however, they recognise only two categories, the soul and the non-soul, inasmuch as the others can be subsumed, conformably to the nature of each, under these two. The same categories again they expand into five "extended-entities," viz., the extended-entity called the soul, the extended-entity called the body (pudgala), the extended-entity called dynamic-space (dharma), the extended-entity called static-space (adharma), and lastly the extended-entity called the Ether. Of each of these, again, they detail many subsidiary varieties of different kinds as adopted in their own school. And with regard to all of them they bring into operation their Dialectics known as the "Logic of the Seven Modes"—namely, "May-be it somehow-is," "May-be it somehow-is-not," "May-be it somehow-is-as-well-as-is-not," "May-be it somehow-is-indescribable," "May-be it somehow-is-and-yet-indescribable," "May-be it somehow-is-not-and-yet-indescriable," and "May-be it somehow-is-as-well-as-is-not-and-yet-indescribable." It is in this very same fashion that they apply this Logic of the Seven Modes in regard to the problems of the One, the Eternal, and so forth. Against that we have to say—

No: on account of the impossiblity of [the contrary modes] applying to one and the same entity. 33.

The theory in question does not stand to reason. Why? "On account of the impossiblity in one and the same." For, it certainly is not possible that one and the same attribute-possessing-entity can have, simultaneously abiding within it, such contrary attributes as existence and non-existence, any more than it can

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be both cold and hot together. For, those seven categories that they have fixed upon, so many and with such natures [and sub-divisions] as might appertain to each : they must either be as they assert them to be, or they must not be so. For otherwise, if somehow they are to be as they describe them to be, and also somehow they are not to be as they describe them to be: such a non-determinate knowledge about them would by no means be valid, any more than a doubting judgment. But, [it may be urged,] when it is a knowledge of a determinate form—viz. that the essence of things is variable—that is being arrived at, that does not deserve to be invalidated like an ordinary doubting judgment. We say, No. For one who is proclaiming an absolutely unconditional variableness-of-essence in the case of all things whatsoever—for him even this so-called " determinate knowledge "—in so far as that is a thing (vastu)—will have to be submitted to the Disjunctive Dialectics of "May-be it somehow-is," " May-be it somehow-is-not, " so that that knowledge will have also to be just as much non-determinate. So too, he who is to have the [alleged] "determinate" knowledge, and the fruit of this "determinate" knowledge will have to be classed both under existence if we follow one of the alternative judgments, and under non-existence if we follow the other. This being the case, how can the propounder of a philosophical system, who must [as such] claim [full] authoritativeness, ever possibly propound anything at all when the means-of-knowledge, the objects-of-knowledge, the agent-of-knowledge, and the resulting-knowledge itself have all alike a non-determinate form ?—And how too can those who may claim to follow his teaching find an impulse to act up to the teaching laid down by him, when just what he has taught is itself of a non-determinate form ? For, it is only when the fruit [claimed for a doctrine] is definitely ascertained to be its unfailing consequence that all the world can, without confusion or hesitation, proceed to practice what may have been laid down as the means to that end ; and not otherwise. Hence it follows that one laying down a doctrine-and-code non-determinate in sense would, like a maniac or like one intoxicated, have his statements deemed unworthy of acceptance. — So also in the case of the five " extended-entities," [Page 77] by applying the Disjunctive Dialectics with reference to the number (five-ness) of these extended-entities, in one alternative we reach the con-

clusion that may-be they are [five,] and in the other, may-be they are not five, so that the entities in question will have to be conceded as either less than five or more than five. — Nor again can the various categories be said to be indescribable. If they are in sooth indescribable, they would not even be mentioned. That they are being mentioned and that they should at the same time be indescribable is a self-contradiction, no less than when, being described, they are ascertained to be just as they are described and at the same time not ascertained to be so. So too, when one is irresponsibly-declaring—may-be there does exist or may-be there does not exist that "Right Konwledge" which is to proceed from a " determinate " knowledge [of the categories] as above referred to ; or again — may-be there does exist or may-be there does not exist any " Wrong Knowledge " which is contrary to the former—he must clearly belong to the genus of the maniacs or the intoxicated, and never to that of persons deserving credence. Likewise when the heaven and the liberation are to be classed in one alternative under existence and in the other under non-existence, or when under one alternative they are classed as permanent and under another as non-permanent—with such an absence of determinateness prevailing, it is not possible that any one can be urged to activity [as laid down in the doctrine]. And there does also arise the contingency of the soul and the other categories—whose natures have been fixed all along this beginningless time, and are ascertained accordingly from one's own sacred canon— turning out to be not of the nature thus ascertained. Similarly also, as regards the soul and the other categories, since in one and the same attribute-possessing-entity two contradictory attributes of existence and non-existence cannot possibly co-exist,—in the one attribute of existence it being impossible to find the other attribute of non-existence, and in that of non-existence likewise it being impossible to find that of existence—the doctrine of the Arhat turns out to be quite incoherent. Hereby have to be understood as refuted the various non-determinist postulates as regards [one and the same entity possessing both] unity and plurality, permanence and transience, distinctness [from other entities] and non-distinctness, and the like. As regards the doctrine according to which they imagine that from atoms which they designate as " Pudgalas " there spring up [grosser] conglomerates, that is practically refuted by our earlier

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refutation of the Atomic Theory, and we do not therefore expend separate effort in this place upon its refutation. 33.

So too [there arises the contingency of] the Ātman's non-integration. 34.

Just as there arises the contingency in the " May-be " Dialectics of the fault of the impossibility of ascribing to one and the same attribute-possessing entity [two or more] contradictory attributes, so too there arises the further liability of the doctrine to the fault of the self or the soul losing his integral-nature. How so? Because, the followers of the doctrine of the Arhat consider that the soul has the same dimension as the body. And when the soul is to have the dimension of the body, he will have to lose his integral-nature, and be of limited pervasion and definite dimension; and as a consequence of this, the self will have to be regarded as, like the jar and so forth, non-eternal. Further, inasmuch as bodies are of [many and] non-determinate dimensions, the soul of a man, having become of the same dimension as the human body, may thereafter—in case he has, as an effect of the ripening of some one or the other of his karman, to assume the body of an elephant—not occupy the full space within the elephant's body; and in case he has to assume the body of an ant, equally may he not be fully contained within that ant's body. And this fault will alike hold, even during the tenure of one and the same life, in the conditions of boyhood, youth, oldage, and the rest.—That may be, [our opponent might reply,] but the soul has an infinity of parts. And the very same parts of the soul would be compressed within a small body or would expand to fill a large body. [To this we reply] by demanding whether these infinite particles of the soul are or are not capable of resisting being pressed together so as to occupy the same space. If there be a resistance then the infinite particles [Page 78] cannot be fully contained within a limited space. If they are not capable of resistance then all these particles could just as reasonably be made to occupy the space of one particle, so that there would result no grossness in size and you will be reduced to consider the soul as atomic only. Nor is it further even possible to imagine that particles of the soul, being compressed, as they are to be, within the limits of merely one body, could ever be infinite. 34.

If it be urged that turn by turn, as they attain a large body, certain particles of the soul become added to, and as they attain a small body, certain particles fall away, even so our reply is—

And not even by alternation [of accretion and depletion] can there be absence of contradiction; because of [the faults of] mutability and the like. 35.

Nor can it be possible, even by assuming an alternating accretion and depletion of particles, to maintain the soul's possessing —without involving any contradition—the same dimension as the body. Why ? Because of the contingency of the faults of mutability and the like. In case the soul be assumed to be accretive or depletive by the unceasing accession or attenuation of parts, it is inevitable that he should be liable to mutation ; and being liable to mutation, the contingency of his being impermanent like the skin [of the body] cannot be escaped. And then the postulate of bondage and liberation will be endangered, seeing that you assume that the soul enveloped within the eight-fold karmans is being drowned, like a gourd, into the ocean of mundane-existence, and it is through a snapping asunder of the bondage that he secures an up-rising motion. — Besides, these in-coming and out-going particles, inasmuch as they possess a liability to accretion and depletion, cannot — any more than the body and the like—be of the same essence as the soul. As a consequence, it will have to be supposed that some enduring particle is the soul. And it is not possible to clearly specify which one particle that soul is. Then too, you must specify to us from whence these in-coming soul-particles spring up and whither the out-going ones disappear. For, assuredly, they cannot spring up from or merge back into the elements, because the soul is non-elemental. Nor can there be put forth any other common or non-common store-house for all the soul-particles, because there is no valid-proof for it. Moreover, under the assumption, the soul will be non-determinate in form, because the in-coming and the out-going particles cannot be supposed to have the self-same dimensions. For these and other inevitable drawbacks it is not possible even to resort to the theory of the alternating accretion and depletion of soul-particles.

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There is also another explanation of the aphorism possible. The preceding sūtra having already brought home the [fault of the] soul's non-permanence by urging the contingency—under the hypothesis of the soul being of the same dimension as the body and taking on [in succession] bodies of augmented or attenuated size—of the soul's non-integration, the present aphorism anticipates the contention that, in spite of the non-fixity of the [soul's] dimension, the soul can yet be—in its successive phases (paryāya), and following the analogy of the permanence of the flowing-stream—likewise permanent, this present position of the "undressed" philosophers having its parallel in that of their "red-robed" [friends] who assign permanence to the stream-[of-ideas] in spite of the transitoriness of the ideas themselves : and thereupon the Sūtra offers the reply—If this "stream" that is posited be an unreal entity, there would be the contingency of your assenting to the doctrine of soul-less-ness ; while if the soul-[stream] be a reality, the position would be still untenable by reason of the contingency of the mutability and the other drawbacks. 35.

And owing to [the assumed] durability of the ultimate [dimension of the soul], the other two [initial and middle dimesions] will have to be permanent, so that no difference [in the soul's dimension is possible]. 36.

[Page 79] Furthermore, the Jainas desire to assert the permanence of the ultimate dimension of the soul which he assumes at the time of his liberation. There arises consequently a contingency of the two earlier dimensions, the initial as well as the middle, being allowed permanence, so that there will have to be admitted a non-difference [as regards all the dimensions of the soul]. This means that they will all be of the size of just one [the very last] body and cannot be liable to fit in with the size of any other body of increased or decreased dimension.

Or, [we might interpret the aphorism slightly differently:] inasmuch as the last dimension of the soul is something fixed, in the two earlier states also the soul will have to be allowed to possess an unchanging dimension. And as a consequence the soul will ever have to be assumed to be — not of the size of the body

—but rather atomic or all-pervading invariably. For this reason too the Jain doctrine, like that of the Buddhists, has to be discarded as being not consequential. 36. Here ends the Topic (6) entitled Refutation of Jain Philosophy.

TOPIC 7 : REFUTATION OF THEISM.

(*Sūtras* 37-41)

[Impossibility] of the Lord [being only the efficient cause] on account of [resulting] incoherence. 37.

Now there is going to be refuted the theory which regards the Lord as merely the efficient cause. How do you deduce this? Because in [the Vedānta Aphorism, I. iv. 23]— "As well the material-cause, because of [the necessity of] conforming with the formal-enunciation and the illustration"—and in [I. iv. 24] "Also because of [self-]reflection"—in these sūtras the Teacher has himself established the existence of the Lord possessing the nature of both the material as well as efficient cause. If there had been offered here a mere refutation of the Lord as the cause without any specification, then, because of the contradiction involved in that and the earlier positions, there would have resulted the liability to the charge that the Author of the Sūtras was speaking what was self-contradictory. Hence we conclude that the view that the Lord is not the material-cause, but only the controlling-agent, or merely the efficient-cause is the view which, as being opposed to the doctrine propounded in the Upanishads of the absolute unity of the Brahman, is here being carefully sought to be refuted. This doctrine of the Lord that runs counter to the Vedic doctrine appears under many forms. Some, to begin with, who take their stand upon Sāṁkhya-Yoga teaching, think that the Lord is the Controller of the Matter (Pradhāna) and of the Souls (Purushas), and is merely the efficient-cause; the Pradhāna, the Purushas, and the Lord being divergent in nature from one another. The Māheśvaras on the other hand hold that there are five categories, namely, the Effect, the Cause, the Application, the Devout-practice, and Cessation-of-pain, which were taught by the Lord, the "Herds-master," for attaining liberation from the fetters that bind the Herd,—the

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Lord, the "Herds-master," being the efficient cause. So too, certain other philosophers like the Vaiśeshikas, under one form or the other, declare, in conformity with their own philosophical position, the Lord as the efficient-cause. Hence the reply is given —" Of the Lord, on account of incoherence." Of the Lord, the Master of the Pradhāna and the Purusha, [Page 80] the functioning as the cause of the world by being merely the Controller, cannot be maintained. Why ? On account of incoherence. What now is this incoherence ? In the case of the Lord distributing beings into different classes as possessing base, middle, and highest natures, there arises the contingency of ascribing to him anger, hatred, and the like faults, as in the case of mortals like us, and so there has to be ascribed to him an unlordly character. And if it be contended that this is no deficiency because of [his showing due] consideration for the karman of beings, we say, No. Because if the karman and the Lord are to be the motivating and the motivated-principle in turn there results the contingency of the fault of mutual inter-dependence. And if it be retorted—No, because of beginninglessness, we demur ; because, as in the present period so in the past periods also, there being the same fault of mutual interdependence, we would be reduced to the plight of a row of successive blind men. Moreover, experts in the Nyāya unanimously hold that [Nyāya Aphorism, I. i. 11] —" Defects are the inducing-causes of all activities." For, nobody who is not impelled by any defect is ever observed to bestir himself either in his own interest or in that of others. Everyone, in fact, even while bestirring himself for the sake of another, really does it, being impelled by his own interest. For this reason also the doctrine is incoherent ; for, if the Lord be held to be actuated by self-interest, there would be the contingency of his being Lord no longer. Further, as the Lord is assumed to be a specific Purusha and as the Purusha is assumed to be characterised by utter-indifference [to all activity], the theory proclaims its own incoherence. 37.

And also on account of the impossibility of the connection. 38.

Once more there is the same incoherence. For, a Lord who is distinct from the Pradhāna and the Purushas cannot be the Con-

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troller of the Pradhāna and the Purushas unless there exists some kind of a connection between them. Now, conjunction cannot possibly be the [required] connection, because the Pradhāna, the Purushas, as well as the Lord are alike omnipresent, and so impartite. Nor can the connection be of the nature of Inherence, because the relation of the substratum and the superstrata has not been defined in the case. Nor is it possible to imagine any other kind of connection, inferrable from the effect produced, because, that there is the cause and the effect relation in question has itself to be yet established. How about the theory that regards the Brahman as the cause ?—it may be asked. We deny the charge, for in this case the fact can well be explained by the relation of identity that is posited. Besides, the follower of the Brahman doctrine expounds the nature of the cause etc. on the strength of the Scriptures. Consequently no compulsion exists in his case that he must postulate everything in strict conformity with actual experience. In the case of our opponent on the other hand, as he expounds the nature of the cause etc. on the strength of [mere] analogy, he has to postulate everything in strict accord with actual experience—and this gives us the palm. And if it be retorted, that the opponent also can lay claim to the authority of the Scriptures because he too has his Scriptures composed by the Omniscient Lord,—we say, No ; because it would involve the contingency of a mutual interdependence. For, the Omniscient Lord is to be established on the authority of the Scriptures, and the Scriptures are to be established on the authority of the Omniscient Lord. For this reason then the doctrine of the Lord as put forward by the followers of Sāṁkhya-Yoga and others is untenable. In a like manner, in the case also of the other theories about the Lord falling outside the Vedic doctrine, we can bring home, in accordance with the facts of each case, the charge of incoherence. 38.

And also because of the impossibility of [assigning] any operating-basis [for the Lord]. 39.

[Page 81] And for this other reason also the Lord as imagined [by the Theists] on the strength of mere logic cannot be properly substantiated. For, as established by them, he will have to be imagined as starting [the world-creation] upon the basis

of the [given material in the form of] the Pradhāna and the rest, as the pot-maker does on the basis of the clay and the like. But that cannot be maintained. For surely the Pradhāna which is incapable of direct-perception, as being devoid of colour and the other qualities, cannot form the operating-basis for the Lord, since it is, in this, different from the clay etc. 39.

If it be replied that it can be, on the analogy of the senses, we say, No ; because of the [faults of a liability to] pleasure-pain-experience, and the like. 40.

That may be. But just as the group of senses, the eye and the rest, being themselves devoid of colour and the other qualities, and so incapable of being directly seen, can form an adequate operating-basis for the individual soul, so too will the Lord make the Pradhāna his operating-basis. Even so, the position does not stand square to reason. For, we infer that the sense-group and the like must have been made the [soul] operating-basis, because we find the pleasure-pain-experience and the rest actually experienced. In the present case, however, no such things like the pleasure-pain-experience are experienced. And in case a complete analogy with the sense-group is to be postulated, then, on the analogy of the transmigrating Purushas, there will arise the contingency of the Lord too being ascribed the pleasure-pain-experience and the rest. 40.

The two Aphorisms can be interpreted in another manner—

Because also of the impossibility of embodied-ness. [39].

And for this other reason also the Lord as imagined [by the Theists] on the strength of mere logic cannot be properly substantiated. For, in our world we always observe that it is an embodied person—one having a [human] body—who governs, as does for instance a king his kingdom; but not one who is unembodied. Consequently, in conformity with that analogy, if one were to imagine some Lord not-warranted-by-Scriptures [as the cause of the world], there would have to be mentioned something possessing sense-apertures—a specific body—as belonging to the Lord. It is not possible to mention any such, because

bodies are things that are to be produced after the creative-process has been started, and they cannot possibly be postulated prior to the creation. And if the Lord is to be without any body, he cannot properly be the Creator, because that is what the world requires. [39].

If a sense-furnished [body be assigned to the Lord] then by reason of the contingency of the pleasure-pain-experience and the like. [40].

If now, in strict conformity with the experience of the world, even to the Lord one were to assign, as one chooses, a body endowed with sense-organs, even so the hypothesis cannot be tenable. For, were the Lord to be embodied, there will ensue the contingency of his too being, like the transmigrating soul, liable to pleasure-pain-experience and the like, and so being no longer the Lord at all. [40].

There would either ensue finiteness, or else non-omniscience. 41.

And for this other reason also the Lord as imagined by [the Theists] on the strength of mere logic cannot be properly substantiated. For, he is assumed by them to be omniscient as well as infinite. And they also assume that the Pradhāna too is infinite and the Purushas likewise are infinite and all differing from one another. [Page 82] Now, we ask, does the Omniscient Lord ever demarcate the very limits of the Pradhāna, of the Purushas, and of himself, or does he not so demarcate them ? Under either supposition there does cling to the view a deficiency. How ? If, in the first place, the earlier alternative is adopted, inasmuch as there is a demarcation of the limits of the Pradhāna, the Purushas, and the Lord, they will have to be necessarily liable to come to their end ; because that is what is observed in the world. For in this our world, whatever object, for instance the piece-of-cloth and the like, has a limitation [in size, number etc.] that is found to be liable to come to the end. So likewise the three entities of the Pradhāna, the Purushas, and the Lord, because they are all capable of limitation ; and hence they will all alike be liable to reach their end. The dimension of quantity, for instance, reaches its limitation in connection with the triad of entities consisting of the Pradhāna, the Purushas, and the

Lord. So too the qualitative dimension as appertaining to the triad, [because it is quite necessary that it be thoroughly encompassed] by the Lord. So would be the case also of the numerical dimension appertaining to the Purushas. This being the fact, if some ones from out of the transmigrating-souls who are limited as regards their number, were to be freed from mundane existence, then, in their case, the mundane existence will terminate, and so likewise will their liability for mundane-existence terminate. So too as regards the others when they are being one after another liberated; so that the mundane-existence itself as well as the Purusha's liability to undergo the mundane-existence will alike meet their end. Again, the Pradhāna along with its own mutations is believed to be, in the interest of the Purushas, the operating-basis for the Lord ; and that is what is meant by their being liable to transmigratory-process. When that [Pradhāna] itself comes to naught, what is there that can serve the Lord as the operating-basis,—and referring to what possible objects can we attribute to the Lord the powers of omniscience and control ? Thus then the Pradhāna, the Purushas, and the Lord being all liable to reach their end, there will arise the contingency of their being liable also to possess origination. If, however, they are to be attributed both origination and termination, then that would be an acceptance of the doctrine of the Void. — If, on the other hand, with a view to avoid the deficiency pointed out, the second of the above alternatives is adhered to, then, inasmuch as the Lord cannot, under the supposition, be able to demarcate the limits of the Pradhāna, the Purusha, and himself, there will ensue the contingency of this extra deficiency in that the postulate of the Lord's omniscience will have to be thrown overboard. For this reason too the theory of the Lord as the cause, as accepted by the Logicians, is full of incoherence. 41. Here ends the Topic (7) styled Refutation of Theism.

TOPIC 8 : REFUTATION OF PĀÑCHARĀTRA.

(*Sūtras* 42–45)

Those who regard the Lord as the non-material cause—as the [merely] controlling-cause, or as the efficient cause alone,—their view has been repudiated. Those, however, who regard the Lord

as the cause of both kinds—the material and the controlling cause—it is the view of these that is now about to be refuted. But, it may be asked, even on an appeal to the Scriptures, it was just this very nature of the Lord, viz. his being both the material-cause and the controlling-cause, that was previously ascertained. And it is an accepted principle that a Smṛiti text that agrees with the Scriptures is valid. For what reason then it is that such a view is now intended to be refuted ? Our reply is—Although in this and other parts of the doctrine there is agreement, and therefore there is no scope for any divergence, yet there is another part of the doctrine where room for divergence does exist; and hence we exert ourselves for its refutation.—Now the Bhāgavatas maintain that the one Adorable Lord, Vāsudeva, whose nature is stainless knowledge is the Highest Reality. He starts out by distributing himself into four parts: that in the form of the Mode Vāsudeva, in the form of Mode Saṁkarshaṇa, in the form of the Mode Pradyumna, and in the form of the Mode Aniruddha. What is called Vāsudeva is the Supreme Soul. Saṁkarshaṇa is the individual Soul. Pradyumna is the mind; [Page 83] while Aniruddha is the "I"-consciousness. Of these Vāsudeva is the Highest Cause, while Saṁkarshaṇa and others are effects. The Lord, then, as thus constituted, has to be worshipped for a hundred years by pilgrimage [to temples], by collecting materials of worship, by worship, by recitation of names-and-prayers, and by devout-meditation, so that thereafter, having reduced all his affliction, one attains the same Adorable Lord. — Now, that view in this theory wherein is maintained the well-known Supreme Soul, Nārāyaṇa, who is beyond the Unmanifest (Prakṛiti) and who, the Inward-Soul of all, abides in Himself after distributing Himself amongst the innumerable Modes—that it is not intended to gainsay, seeing that from Scriptural texts like [Chhāndogya, vii. 26. 2]—" He assumes one Mode, He assumes three Modes"...... the Supreme Soul is ascertained to be manifesting Himself into many Modes. Nor is it intended to contradict that worship of the same Adorable One in the form the pilgrimage etc., continuously and with concentrated mind, seeing that such devotion to the Lord is well-established in the Scriptures and in the Smṛitis. But as to the assertion, however, that Saṁkarshaṇa is produced from Vāsudeva,

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Pradyumna from Saṁkarshaṇa, and Aniruddha from Pradyumna ; as to that we have to say—

On account of the impossibility of origination. 42.

It is not possible that from the Supreme Soul known as Vāsudeva there should originate the Individual Soul known as Saṁkarshaṇa, because of the contingency of the faults of impermanence etc. For, if the Individual Soul is to be a produced entity, there could arise the contingency of the faults like the Individual Soul's being impermanent, etc. And as a consequence he cannot possibly attain the salvation consisting in an attainment of the Adorable Lord, because when an effect attains to its cause there arises the necessity of its being therein re-absorbed. Further the Teacher is going to repudiate the origination of the Individual Soul in the Aphorism [II. iii. 17]—" Not the Soul [to originate], because Scriptures do not enumerate him [amongst the produced entities], as it would lead to his impermanence etc., as follows from the same [texts]." So this view is not tenable. 42.

And there cannot be [origination] of the instrument from the agent. 43.

For this other reason too the view is untenable. For, we never observe that from an agent like Devadatta etc. an instrument like the axe etc. is produced ; whereas the Bhāgavatas maintain that from the soul styled by them as Saṁkarshaṇa the instrument—the mind—denominated as Pradyumna is produced ; and that from the mind thus produced from the Agent there originates the "I"-consciousness known as Aniruddha. We are unable to accept such a conclusion in the absence of any analogous illustration. Nor have we come across any Scriptural text to that effect. 43.

And in case knowledge and other [Divine] qualities [be ascribed] there is [still] a non-controverting of that [other objection]. 44.

But it may be urged—these Saṁkarshaṇa and the others—are not intended by us to be merely the Individual Souls, etc., but rather, they are assumed to be themselves the Lords, all of them endowed with Lordly qualities like knowledge, Lordship, capacity, power, prowess, and glory : [Page 84] they are in fact each

of them Vāsudeva himself:, stainless, self-sufficient and perfect. Hence the deficiency as above set forth, namely, impossibility of origination, does not become attributable. To that we make the reply—Even so there is a non-controverting of the impossibility of origination: the defect pointed above, namely, impossibility of origination, does still become attributable in another form, that is what he means. How? If your point is that the four [Modes] beginning with Vāsudeva are quite distinct from one another, they being Lords endowed with similar natures, then, inasmuch as they cannot all form only one entity, there results the gratuitous hypothesis of more than one Lord, because all purposes can well be accomplished by positing just one Lord. There would also be entailed a repudiation of one's own accepted dogma, because the assumption is made that the Adorable Lord Vāsudeva is the one and the only Highest Entity. If however the point be that these four Modes of similar natures belong to one and the same Adorable Lord, even so the 'impossibility of origination' remains [as a deficiency] equally patent as before. For, it is not possible that there should ensue the origination of Saṁkarshaṇa from Vāsudeva, of Pradyumna from Saṁkarshaṇa, and of Aniruddha from Pradyumna; because there does not exist any specific difference between the one or the other of them. For, it *is* necessary that there should exist some specific difference between the cause and its effects, as for instance, between the clay and the pots. For, in the absence of any such difference, it is not possible to discriminate between the effect and its cause [as effect and as cause]. And the followers of the "Pāñcharātra" theory do not assume in the case of Vāsudeva and the others any differentiation based upon a more or a less of the knowledge, Lordship, and the other qualities as existing in any one of them or in all of them. For, they maintain that all the Modes are equally Vāsudeva without any distinctions whatsoever. Then again, these Modes of the Adorable Lord need not be limited only to the number four: for, it is understood that the whole world, from Brahmadeva down to the blade-of-grass, constitutes so many Modes of the Adorable One. 44.

And also on account of contradictions. 45.

And there does exist many a contradiction in this system,

such as the imagining of the qualities as being at the same time the substrates-of-qualities. For, we find that they regard knowledge, Lordship, capacity, power, prowess, and glory as the qualities, and again call them as the Adorable Vāsudevas, as so many Selves, so to say. There exists also a contradiction of the Scriptures, inasmuch as we find them reprobating the Vedas as when it is said that Śāṇḍilya acquired this [Pāñcharātra] Philosophy after he found that none of the four Vedas could afford him the Highest Bliss. For this reason too it is evident that this theory is untenable. **45**. Here ends the Topic (8) entitled Refutation of Pāñcharātra.

Here ends— in the Work of the holy and blessed Feet of the Revered Śaṅkara, the Pupil of the holy Feet of the Revered Govinda, the blessed Ascetic-preceptor with the Title of "Paramahaṅsa," — in this Comment expounding the Real Nature of the Embodied Self— the Second Quarter of the Second Chapter, entitled the Tarka-pāda.

अथ

श्रीमद्बादरायणप्रणीतानि ब्रह्मसूत्राणि

श्रीशङ्कराचार्यविरचित-

शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्यसमेतानि

तत्र

अविरोधाख्यद्वितीयाध्यायस्य

प्रथम(स्मृति)पादः

Errata to Text

N. B.— The References are to Adhyāya, Pāda, Sūtra, and Line

	Correct	*Incorrect*
II. i. 1^{65}	वै(श्व)रूप्येण	वैश्वरूप्येण
II. i. 3^{18}	मभ्यधिका-	मप्यधिका-
II. i. 11^{34}	प्रसिद्धा	प्रसिद्धा
II. i. 12^{10}	परमगम्भीरस्य जग-त्कारणस्य	परमगम्भीरस्य
II. i. 13^{11}	भोग्ययोर्वि	भोग्ययार्वि
II. i. 13^{23}	स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य	स्रष्टुरेवत्विकृतस्य
II. i. 14^{9}, 14^{38}	[छा०, ६. २. ४]।	[छा०, ६. २. १]।
II. i. 14^{35}	काश्चित् ॥	काश्चित् ।
II. i. 14^{36}	वेदितव्यः ॥	वेदितव्यः ।
II. i 15^{6}	अग्निभाव एव	अग्निभावे ।
II. i. 27^{42}	नामरूप°	नापरूप°

अधिकरणसूत्राणां निर्घण्टपत्रिका

स्मृतिपादः

अधिकरणसूत्राणां निर्घण्टपत्रिका

तर्कपादः

अधिकरणम्	सूत्राणि	Page Trans.	Page मूलम्	Page Notes
१ रचनानुपपत्त्यधिकरणम्	१ रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम् ।	69	४५	57
	२ प्रवृत्तेश्च ।	72	४७	67
	३ पयोऽम्बुवच्चेत् तत्रापि ।	74	४८	69
	४ व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् ।	75	४८	71
	५ अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत् ।	76	४९	72
	६ अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् ।	77	४९	72
	७ पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत् तथापि ।	78	५०	74
	८ अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।	79	५०	75
	९ अन्यथानुमितौ च ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात् ।	79	५१	75
	१० विप्रतिषेधाच्चासमञ्जसम् ॥	80	५१	76
२ महद्दीर्घाधि°	११ महद्दीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ॥	84	५३	84
३ परमाणुजगदकारणत्वाधि°	१२ उभयथापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः ।	88	५५	95
	१३ समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः ।	91	५७	99
	१४ नित्यमेव च भावात् ।	93	५८	100
	१५ रूपादिमत्त्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात् ।	93	५८	100
	१६ उभयथा च दोषात् ।	95	५९	103
	१७ अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ॥	96	६०	104

अथ

ब्रह्मसूत्रशाङ्करभाष्ये

द्वितीयाध्यायस्य

प्रथमः पादः

१ स्मृत्यधिकरणम् ।

प्रथमेऽध्याये सर्वज्ञः सर्वेश्वरो जगत उत्पत्तिकारणं मृत्सुवर्णादय इव घटरुचकादीनाम्, उत्पन्नस्य जगतो नियन्तृत्वेन स्थितिकारणं मायावीव मायायाः, प्रसारितस्य च जगतः पुनः स्वात्मन्येवोपसंहारकारणमवनिरिव चतुर्विधस्य भूतग्रामस्य, स एव च सर्वेषां न आत्मेत्येतद्वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयप्रतिपादनेन प्रतिपादितम् । प्रधानादिकारणवादाश्चाशब्दत्वेन निराकृताः । इदानीं स्वपक्षे स्मृतिन्यायविरोधपरिहारः, प्रधानादिवादानां च न्यायाभासोपबृंहितत्वं, प्रतिवेदान्तं च सृष्ट्यादिप्रक्रियाया अविगीतत्वमित्यस्यार्थजातस्य प्रतिपादनाय द्वितीयोऽध्याय आरभ्यते । तत्र प्रथमं तावत् स्मृतिविरोधमुपन्यस्य परिहरति—

स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न, अन्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् ॥ १ ॥

यदुक्तं ब्रह्मैव सर्वज्ञं जगतः कारणमिति तदयुक्तम् । कुतः । स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् । स्मृतिश्च तन्त्राख्या परमर्षिप्रणीता शिष्टपरिगृहीता, अन्याश्च तदनुसारिण्यः स्मृतय एवं सत्यनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन् । तासु ह्यचेतनं प्रधानं स्वतन्त्रं जगतः कारणमुपनिबध्यते । मन्वादिस्मृतयस्तावच्चोदनालक्षणेनाग्निहोत्रादिना धर्मजातेनापेक्षितमर्थं समर्पयन्त्यः सावकाशा भवन्ति । अस्य वर्णस्यास्मिन् कालेऽनेन विधानेनोपनयनम्, ईदृशश्चाचारः, इत्थं वेदाध्ययनम्, इत्थं समावर्तनम्, इत्थं सहधर्मचारिणीसंयोग इति । तथा पुरुषार्थांश्च वर्णाश्रमधर्मान् नानाविधानादधति । नैवं कपिलादिस्मृतीनामनुष्ठेये विषयेऽवकाशोऽस्ति । मोक्षसाधन-

मेव हि सम्यग्दर्शनमधिकृत्य ताः प्रणीताः । यदि तत्राप्यनवकाशाः स्युरानर्थक्यमेवासां प्रसज्येत । तस्मात् तदविरोधेन वेदान्ता व्याख्यातव्याः ॥ कथं पुनरीक्षत्यादिभ्यो हेतुभ्यो ब्रह्मैव सर्वज्ञं जगतः कारणमित्यवधारितः श्रुत्यर्थः स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गेन पुनराक्षिप्यते । भवेदयमनाक्षेपः स्वतन्त्रप्रज्ञानाम् । परतन्त्रप्रज्ञास्तु प्रायेण जनाः स्वातन्त्र्येण श्रुत्यर्थमवधारयितुमशक्नुवन्तः प्रख्यातप्रणेतृकासु स्मृतिष्ववलम्बेरन्, तद्बलेन च श्रुत्यर्थं प्रतिपित्सेरन्। अस्मत्कृते च व्याख्याने न विश्वस्युर्बहुमानात् स्मृतीनां प्रणेतृषु । कपिलप्रभृतीनां चार्षं ज्ञानमप्रतिहतं स्मर्यते । श्रुतिश्च भवति [श्वेताश्वतर, ५·२]—

ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे
ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत् ।

इति। तस्मान्नैषां मतमयथार्थं शक्यं संभावयितुम्। तर्कावष्टम्भेन चैतेऽर्थं प्रतिष्ठापयन्ति। तस्मादपि स्मृतिबलेन वेदान्ता व्याख्येया इति पुनराक्षेपः॥

तस्य समाधिः । न, अन्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गादिति । यदि स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गेनेश्वरकारणवाद आक्षिप्येत, एवमप्यन्या ईश्वरकारणवादिन्यः स्मृतयोऽनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन् । ता उदाहरिष्यामः—

यत्तत् सूक्ष्ममविज्ञेयम्,

इति परं ब्रह्म प्रकृत्य [महा० भा०, १२·३४२·३०],

स ह्यन्तरात्मा भूतानां क्षेत्रज्ञश्चेति कथ्यते ।

इति चोक्त्वा [महा० भा०, १२·३४२·३१],

तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम ।

इत्याह [महा० भा०, १२·३४२·३२]। तथान्यत्रापि—

अव्यक्तं पुरुषे ब्रह्मन् निर्गुणे संप्रलीयते ।

इत्याह [महा० भा०, १२·३४७·३१] ।

अतश्च संक्षेपमिमं शृणुध्वं नारायणः सर्वमिदं पुराणः ।
स सर्गकाले च करोति सर्वं संहारकाले च तदत्ति भूयः ॥

इति पुराणे [महा०भा०, १२·३०७·११५]। भगवद्गीतासु च [७·६]—

अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ।

इति। परमात्मानमेव प्रकृत्यापस्तम्बः पठति [ध०सू०,१·८·२३·२]—

तस्मात् कायाः प्रभवन्ति सर्वे
स मूलं शाश्वतिकः स नित्यः ।

इति । एवमनेकशः स्मृतिष्वपीश्वरः कारणत्वेनोपादानत्वेन च प्रकाश्यते ॥

स्मृतिबलेन प्रत्यवतिष्ठमानस्य स्मृतिबलेनैवोत्तरं वक्ष्यामीत्यतोऽयमन्य-स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषोपन्यासः । दर्शितं तु श्रुतीनामीश्वरकारणवादं प्रति तात्पर्यम् । विप्रतिपत्तौ च स्मृतीनामवश्यकर्तव्येऽन्यतरपरिग्रहेऽन्यतरपरित्यागे च श्रुत्यनुसारिण्यः स्मृतयः प्रमाणमनपेक्ष्या इतराः । तदुक्तं प्रमाणलक्षणे [जै० सू०, १·३·३]—

विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम् ।

इति । नचातीन्द्रियानर्थाञ्श्रुतिमन्तरेण कश्चिदुपलभत इति शक्यं संभावयितुम् । निमित्ताभावात् । शक्यं कपिलादीनां सिद्धानामप्रतिहतज्ञानत्वादिति चेत् । न । सिद्धेरपि सापेक्षत्वात् । धर्मानुष्ठानापेक्षा हि सिद्धिः । स च धर्मश्चोदनालक्षणः । ततश्च पूर्वसिद्धाया श्चोदनाया अर्थो न पश्चिमसिद्धपुरुषवचनवशेनातिशङ्कितुं शक्यते । सिद्धव्यपाश्रयकल्पनायामपि बहुत्वात् सिद्धानां प्रदर्शितेन प्रकारेण स्मृतिविप्रतिपत्तौ सत्यां न श्रुतिव्यपाश्रयादन्यन्निर्णयकारणमस्ति । परतन्त्रप्रज्ञस्यापि नाकस्मात् स्मृतिविशेषविषयः पक्षपातो युक्तः, कस्यचित् क्वचित् पक्षपाते सति पुरुषमतिवैश्वरूप्येण तत्त्वाव्यवस्थानप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् तस्यापि स्मृतिविप्रतिपत्त्युपन्यासेन श्रुत्यनुसारानुसारविषयविवेचनेन च सन्मार्गे प्रज्ञा संग्रहणीया ॥

या तु श्रुतिः कपिलस्य ज्ञानातिशयं प्रदर्शयन्ती प्रदर्शिता न तया श्रुतिविरुद्धमपि कापिलं मतं श्रद्धातुं शक्यं कपिलमिति श्रुतिसामान्यमात्रत्वात्, अन्यस्य च कपिलस्य सगरपुत्राणां प्रतप्तुर्वासुदेवनाम्नः स्मरणात्, अन्यार्थदर्शनस्य च प्राप्तिरहितस्यासाधकत्वात् । भवति चान्या मनोर्माहात्म्यं प्रख्यापयन्ती श्रुतिः [तै० सं०,२·२·१०·२]–

यद्वै किं च मनुरवदत् तद्भेषजम् ।

इति । मनुना च [१२·९१]—

सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि ।
संपश्यन्नात्मयाजी वै स्वाराज्यमधिगच्छति ॥

इति सर्वात्मत्वदर्शनं प्रशंसता कापिलं मतं निन्द्यत इति गम्यते। कपिलो हि न सर्वात्मत्वदर्शनमनुमन्यते, आत्मभेदाभ्युपगमात् । महाभारतेऽपि च—

बहवः पुरुषा ब्रह्मन्नुताहो एक एव तु ।

इति विचार्य [१२.३६०.१],

बहवः पुरुषा राजन् सांख्ययोगविचारिणाम् ।

इति परमक्षमुपन्यस्य [महा०भा०, १२.३६०.२], तद्व्युदासेन—

बहूनां पुरुषाणां हि यथैका योनिरुच्यते ।
तथा तं पुरुषं विश्वमाख्यास्यामि गुणाधिकम् ॥

इत्युपक्रम्य [महा०भा०, १२.३६०.३],

ममान्तरात्मा तव च ये चान्ये देहसंस्थिताः ।
सर्वेषां साक्षिभूतोऽसौ न ग्राह्यः केनचित् क्वचित् ॥
विश्वमूर्धा विश्वभुजो विश्वपादाक्षिनासिकः ।
एकश्चरति भूतेषु स्वैरचारी यथासुखम् ॥

इति सर्वात्मतैव निर्धारिता [महा०भा०,१२.३६१.४,५]। श्रुतिश्च सर्वात्मतायां भवति [ई०, ७]—

यस्मिन् सर्वाणि भूतान्यात्मैवाभूद्विजानतः ।
तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥

इत्येवंविधा ॥ अतश्च सिद्धमात्मभेदकल्पनयापि कपिलस्य तन्त्रं वेदविरुद्धं वेदानुसारिमनुवचनविरुद्धं च, न केवलं स्वतन्त्रप्रकृतिकल्पनयैवेति । वेदस्य हि निरपेक्षं स्वार्थे प्रामाण्यं रवेरिव रूपविषये, पुरुषवचसां तु मूलान्तरापेक्षं वक्तृस्मृतिव्यवहितं चेति विप्रकर्षः । तस्माद्वेदविरुद्धे विषये स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो न दोषः ॥ १ ॥

कुतश्च स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो न दोषः—

इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः ॥ २ ॥

प्रधानादितराणि यानि प्रधानपरिणामत्वेन स्मृतौ कल्पितानि महदादीनि, न तानि वेदे लोके वोपलभ्यन्ते । भूतेन्द्रियाणि तावल्लोकवेदप्रसिद्धत्वाच्छक्यन्ते स्मर्तुम् । अलोकवेदप्रसिद्धत्वात् तु महदादीनां,

षष्ठस्येवेन्द्रियार्थस्य, न स्मृतिरवकल्पते । यदपि क्वचित् तत्परमिव श्रवणमवभासते तदप्यतत्परं व्याख्यातम्—आनुमानिकमप्येकेषाम् [ब्र० सू०, १·४·१] इत्यत्र । कार्यस्मृतेरप्रामाण्यात् कारणस्मृतेरप्यप्रामाण्यं युक्तमित्यभिप्रायः । तस्मादपि न स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो दोषः । तर्कावष्टम्भं तु—न विलक्षणत्वात् [ब्र० सू०, २·१·४] इत्यारभ्योन्मथिष्यति ॥ २ ॥

इति स्मृत्यधिकरणम् ॥ १ ॥

२ योगप्रत्युक्त्यधिकरणम् ।

एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः ॥ ३ ॥

एतेन सांख्यस्मृतिप्रत्याख्यानेन योगस्मृतिरपि प्रत्याख्याता द्रष्टव्येत्यतिदिशति । तत्रापि श्रुतिविरोधेन प्रधानं स्वन्तत्रमेव कारणं, महदादीनि च कार्याण्यलोकवेदप्रसिद्धानि कल्प्यन्ते ॥ नन्वेवं सति समानन्यायत्वात् पूर्वेणैवैतद्गतं किमर्थं पुनरतिदिश्यते । अस्ति ह्यत्राभ्यधिकाशङ्का । सम्यग्दर्शनाभ्युपायो हि योगो वेदे विहितः—

श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।

इति [बृ०, २·४·५] ।

त्रिरुन्नतं स्थाप्य समं शरीरम् ।

इत्यादिना [श्वे०, २·८] चासनादिकल्पनापुरःसरं बहुप्रपञ्चं योगविधानं श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि दृश्यते । लिङ्गानि च वैदिकानि योगविषयाणि सहस्रश उपलभ्यन्ते—

तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम् ।

इति [का०, २·३·११],

विद्यामेतां योगविधिं च कृत्स्नम् ।

इति [का०, २·३·१८] चैवमादीनि । योगशास्त्रेऽपि—

अथ तत्त्वदर्शनोपायो योगः ।

इति सम्यग्दर्शनाभ्युपायत्वेनैव योगोऽङ्गीक्रियते । अतः संप्रतिपन्नार्थैकदेशत्वादष्टकादिस्मृतिवद्योगस्मृतिरप्यनपवदनीया भविष्यतीतीयमप्यधिकाशङ्कातिदेशेन निवर्त्यते । अर्थैकदेशसंप्रतिपत्तावप्यर्थैकदेशविप्रतिपत्तेः पूर्वोक्ताया दर्शनात् ॥

सतीष्वप्यध्यात्मविषयासु बह्वीषु स्मृतिषु सांख्ययोगस्मृत्योरेव निराकरणे यत्नः कृतः। सांख्ययोगौ हि परमपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वेन लोके प्रख्यातौ, शिष्टैश्च परिगृहीतौ, लिङ्गेन च श्रौतेनोपबृंहितौ [श्वे०, ६.१३]—

तत् कारणं सांख्ययोगाभिपन्नं
ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः ।

इति। निराकरणं तु न सांख्यज्ञानेन वेदनिरपेक्षेण योगमार्गेण वा निःश्रेयसमधिगम्यत इति। श्रुतिर्हि वैदिकादात्मैकत्वविज्ञानादन्यन्निःश्रेयससाधनं वारयति [श्वे०, ३.८]—

तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति
नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ।

इति। द्वैतिनो हि ते सांख्या योगाश्च नात्मैकत्वदर्शिनः। यत्तु दर्शनमुक्तम् [श्वे०, ६.१३]—

तत् कारणं सांख्ययोगाभिपन्नम् ।

इति, वैदिकमेव तत्र ज्ञानं ध्यानं च सांख्ययोगशब्दाभ्यामभिलप्यते, प्रत्यासत्तेः, इत्यवगन्तव्यम्। येन त्वंशेन न विरुध्येते तेनेष्टमेव सांख्ययोगस्मृत्योः सावकाशत्वम्। तद्यथा—

असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः ।

इति [बृ०,४.३.१६] एवमादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धमेव पुरुषस्य विशुद्धत्वं निर्गुणपुरुषनिरूपणेन सांख्यैरभ्युपगम्यते। तथा च योगैरपि [जाबा०, ५]—

अथ परिव्राड् विवर्णवासा मुण्डोऽपरिग्रहः ।

इत्येवमादि श्रुतिप्रसिद्धमेव निवृत्तिनिष्ठत्वं प्रव्रज्याद्युपदेशेनानुगम्यते ॥

एतेन सर्वाणि तर्कस्मरणानि प्रतिवक्तव्यानि। तान्यपि तर्कोपपत्तिभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानायोपकुर्वन्तीति चेदुपकुर्वन्तु नाम। तत्त्वज्ञानं तु वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य एव भवति [तै० ब्रा०, ३.१२.९.७]—

नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम्,
तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि,

इति [बृ०,३.९.२६] एवमादिश्रुतिभ्यः ॥ ३ ॥ इति योगप्रत्युक्त्यधिकरणम् ॥ २ ॥

३ विलक्षणत्वाधिकरणम् ।

न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् ॥ ४ ॥

ब्रह्मास्य जगतो निमित्तकारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यस्य पक्षस्याक्षेपः स्मृतिनिमित्तः परिहृतः, तर्कनिमित्त इदानीमाक्षेपः परिह्रियते । कुतः पुनरस्मिन्नवधारित आगमार्थे तर्कनिमित्तस्याक्षेपस्यावकाशः । ननु धर्म इव ब्रह्मण्यप्यनपेक्ष आगमो भवितुमर्हति ॥ भवेदयमवष्टम्भो यदि प्रमाणान्तरानवगाह्य आगममात्रप्रमेयोऽयमर्थः स्यात्, अनुष्ठेयरूप इव धर्मः । परिनिष्पन्नरूपं तु ब्रह्मावगम्यते । परिनिष्पन्ने च वस्तुनि प्रमाणान्तराणामस्त्यवकाशो, यथा पृथिव्यादिषु। यथा च श्रुतीनां परस्परविरोधे सत्येकवशेनेतरा नीयन्ते, एवं प्रमाणान्तरविरोधेऽपि तद्वशेनैव श्रुतिर्नीयेत । दृष्टसाम्येन चादृष्टमर्थं समर्थयन्ती युक्तिरनुभवस्य संनिकृष्यते, विप्रकृष्यते तु श्रुतिरैतिह्यमात्रेण स्वार्थाभिधानात् । अनुभवावसानं च ब्रह्मविज्ञानमविद्याया निवर्तकं मोक्षसाधनं च दृष्टफलतयेष्यते । श्रुतिरपि [बृ०, २.४.५]—

श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः ।

इति श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण मननं विदधती तर्कमप्यत्रादर्तव्यं दर्शयति । अतस्तर्कनिमित्तः पुनराक्षेपः क्रियते—न, विलक्षणत्वादस्य, इति ॥

यदुक्तम्, चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिरिति, तन्नोपपद्यते । कस्मात् । विलक्षणत्वादस्य विकारस्य प्रकृत्याः। इदं हि ब्रह्मकार्यत्वेनाभिप्रेयमाणं जगद्ब्रह्मविलक्षणमचेतनमशुद्धं च दृश्यते, ब्रह्म च जगद्विलक्षणं चेतनं शुद्धं च श्रूयते । नच विलक्षणत्वे प्रकृतिविकारभावो दृष्टः । नहि रुचकादयो विकारा मृत्प्रकृतिका भवन्ति, शरावादयो वा सुवर्णप्रकृतिकाः । मृदैव तु मृदन्विता विकाराः क्रियन्ते, सुवर्णेन च सुवर्णान्विताः। तथेदमपि जगदचेतनं सुखदुःखमोहान्वितं सत् अचेतनस्यैव सुखदुःखमोहात्मकस्य कारणस्य कार्यं भवितुमर्हतीति न विलक्षणस्य ब्रह्मणः । ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वं चास्य जगतोऽशुद्ध्यचेतनत्वदर्शनादवगन्तव्यम् । अशुद्धं हि जगत् सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया, प्रीतिपरितापविषादादिहेतुत्वात्, स्वर्गनरकाद्युच्चावचप्रपञ्चत्वाच्च । अचेतनं चेदं जगत्, चेतनं प्रति कार्यकरणभावेनोपकरणभावोपगमात् । नहि साम्ये सत्युपकार्यो-

पकारकभावो भवति। नहि प्रदीपौ परस्परस्योपकुरुतः॥ ननु चेतनमपि कार्यकरणं स्वामिभृत्यन्यायेन भोक्तुरुपकरिष्यति। न। स्वामिभृत्ययोरप्यचेतनांशस्यैव चेतनं प्रत्युपकारकत्वात्। यो ह्येकस्य चेतनस्य परिग्रहो बुद्ध्यादिरचेतनभागः स एवान्यस्य चेतनस्योपकरोति, न तु स्वयमेव चेतनश्चेतनान्तरस्योपकरोत्यपकरोति वा। निरतिशया ह्यकर्तारश्चेतना इति सांख्या मन्यन्ते। तस्मादचेतनं कार्यकरणम्। नच काष्ठलोष्टादीनां चेतनत्वे किंचित् प्रमाणमस्ति। प्रसिद्धश्चायं चेतनाचेतनविभागो लोके। तस्माद्ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगत् तत्प्रकृतिकम्॥

योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत—श्रुत्वा जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकतां तद्बलेनैव समस्तं जगच्चेतनमवगमयिष्यामि, प्रकृतिरूपस्य विकारेऽन्वयदर्शनात्। अविभावनं तु चैतन्यस्य परिणामविशेषाद्भविष्यति। यथा स्पष्टचैतन्यानामप्यात्मनां स्वापमूर्च्छाद्यवस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते, एवं काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभावयिष्यते। एतस्मादेव च विभावितविभावितत्वकृताद्विशेषाद्रूपादिभावाभावाभ्यां च कार्यकरणानामात्मनां च चेतनत्वाविशेषेऽपि गुणप्रधानभावो न विरोत्स्यते। यथा च पार्थिवत्वाविशेषेऽपि मांससूपौदनादीनां प्रत्यात्मवर्तिनो विशेषात् परस्परोपकारित्वं भवति, एवमिहापि भविष्यति। प्रविभागप्रसिद्धिरप्यत एव न विरोत्स्यते—इति। तेनापि कथंचिच्चेतनाचेतनत्वलक्षणं विलक्षणत्वं परिहियेत। शुद्ध्यशुद्धित्वलक्षणं तु विलक्षणत्वं नैव परिहियते॥

नचेतरदपि विलक्षणत्वं परिहर्तुं शक्यत इत्याह—तथात्वं च शब्दादिति। अनवगम्यमानमेव हीदं लोके समस्तस्य वस्तुनश्चेतनत्वं चेतनप्रकृतिकत्वश्रवणाच्छब्दशरणतया केवलयोत्प्रेक्ष्यते। तच्च शब्देनैव विरुध्यते, यतः शब्दादपि तथात्वमवगम्यते। तथात्वमिति प्रकृतिविलक्षणत्वं कथयति। शब्द एव [तै० उ०, २.६]—

विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च,

इति कस्यचिद्विभागस्याचेतनतां श्रावयंश्चेतनाद्ब्रह्मणो विलक्षणमचेतनं जगच्छ्रावयति॥ ४॥

ननु चेतनत्वमपि क्वचिदचेतनत्वाभिमतानां भूतेन्द्रियाणां श्रूयते, यथा—

मृदब्रवीत् । आपोऽब्रुवन् ।

इति [श० प० ब्रा०, ६·१·३·२,४] ।

तत्तेज ऐक्षत । ता आप ऐक्षन्त ।

इति [छा०, ६·२·३,४] चैवमाद्या भूतविषया चेतनत्वश्रुतिः । इन्द्रियविषयापि—

ते हेमे प्राणा अहंश्श्रेयसे विवदमाना ब्रह्म जग्मुः ।

इति [बृ०, ६·१·७] ।

ते ह वाचमूचुस्त्वं न उद्गायेति ।

इति [बृ०, १·३·२] एवमाद्येन्द्रियविषयेति ॥ अत उत्तरं पठति—

अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ॥ ५ ॥

तुशब्द आशङ्कामपनुदति । न खलु मृदब्रवीदित्येवंजातीयकया श्रुत्या भूतेन्द्रियाणां चेतनत्वमाशङ्कनीयम्, यतोऽभिमानिव्यपदेश एषः । मृदाद्यभिमानिन्यो वागाद्यभिमानिन्यश्च चेतना देवता वदनसंवदनादिषु चेतनोचितेषु व्यवहारेषु व्यपदिश्यन्ते, न भूतेन्द्रियमात्रम् । कस्मात् । विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् । विशेषो हि भोक्तॄणां भूतेन्द्रियाणां च चेतनाचेतनप्रविभागलक्षणः प्रागभिहितः । सर्वचेतनतायां चासौ नोपपद्येत । अपिच कौषीतकिनः प्राणसंवादे करणमात्राशङ्काविनिवृत्तयेऽधिष्ठातृचेतनपरिग्रहाय देवताशब्देन विशिंषन्ति—

एता ह वै देवता अहंश्श्रेयसे विवदमानाः ।

इति [कौ०, २·१४],

ता वा एताः सर्वा देवताः प्राणे निःश्रेयसं विदित्वा ।

इति [कौ०, २·१४] च । अनुगताश्च सर्वत्राभिमानिन्यश्चेतना देवता मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणादिभ्योऽवगम्यन्ते ।

अग्निर्वाग्भूत्वा मुखं प्राविशत् ।

इति [ऐ० आ०, २·४·२४] एवमादिका च श्रुतिः करणेष्वनुग्राहिकां देवतामनुगतां दर्शयति । प्राणसंवादवाक्यशेषे च—

ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्योचुः ।

इति [छा०, ५·१·७] श्रेष्ठत्वनिर्धारणाय प्रजापतिगमनं, तद्वचनाच्चैकैकोत्क्रमणेनान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्राणश्रैष्ठ्यप्रतिपत्तिः,

तस्मै बलिहरणम् ।

इति [बृ०, ६·१·१३] चैवंजातीयकोऽस्मदादिष्विव व्यवहारोऽनुगम्यमानोऽभिमानिव्यपदेशं द्रढयति ।

तत्तेज ऐक्षत ।

इति [छा०, ६·२·३] अपि परस्या एव देवताया अधिष्ठात्र्याः स्वविकारेष्वनुगताया इयमीक्षा व्यपदिश्यत इति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ ५ ॥

तस्माद्विलक्षणमेवेदं ब्रह्मणो जगत् । विलक्षणत्वाच्च न ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकमित्याक्षिप्ते प्रतिविधत्ते—

दृश्यते तु ॥ ६ ॥

तुशब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति । यदुक्तं विलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगद्ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकमिति, नायमेकान्तः । दृश्यते हि लोके चेतनत्वेन प्रसिद्धेभ्यः पुरुषादिभ्यो विलक्षणानां केशनखादीनामुत्पत्तिः, अचेतनत्वेन च प्रसिद्धेभ्यो गोमयादिभ्यो वृश्चिकादीनाम् । नन्वचेतनान्येव पुरुषादिशरीराण्यचेतनानां केशनखादीनां कारणानि, अचेतनान्येव च वृश्चिकादिशरीराण्यचेतनानां गोमयादीनां कार्याणीति । उच्यते । एवमपि किंचिदचेतनं चेतनस्यायतनभावमुपगच्छति, किंचिन्नेत्यस्त्येव वैलक्षण्यम् । महांश्चायं पारिणामिकः स्वभावविप्रकर्षः पुरुषादीनां केशनखादीनां च स्वरूपादिभेदात्, तथा गोमयादीनां वृश्चिकादीनां च । अत्यन्तसारूप्ये च प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव प्रलीयेत । अथोच्येत, अस्ति कश्चित् पार्थिवत्वादिस्वभावः पुरुषादीनां केशनखादिष्वनुवर्तमानो गोमयादीनां वृश्चिकादिष्विति, ब्रह्मणोऽपि तर्हि सत्तालक्षणः स्वभाव आकाशादिष्वनुवर्तमानो दृश्यते । विलक्षणत्वेन च कारणेन ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वं जगतो दूषयता किमशेषस्य ब्रह्मस्वभावस्याननुवर्तनं विलक्षणत्वमभिप्रेयते, उत यस्यकस्यचित्, अथ चैतन्यस्येति वक्तव्यम् । प्रथमे विकल्पे समस्तप्रकृतिविकारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । नह्यसत्यतिशये प्रकृतिविकार इति भवति । द्वितीये चासिद्धत्वम् । दृश्यते हि सत्तालक्षणो ब्रह्मस्वभाव आका-

शादिष्वनुवर्तमान इत्युक्तम् । तृतीये तु दृष्टान्ताभावः । किं हि यच्चैतन्येनानन्वितं तदब्रह्मप्रकृतिकं दृष्टमिति ब्रह्मवादिनं प्रत्युदाह्रियेत, समस्तस्य वस्तुजातस्य ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । आगमविरोधस्तु प्रसिद्ध एव । चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यागमतात्पर्यस्य प्रसाधितत्वात् ॥

यत्तूक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वाद्ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि संभवेयुरिति, तदपि मनोरथमात्रम् । रूपाद्यभावाद्धि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः । लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनाम् । आगममात्रसमधिगम्य एव त्वयमर्थो धर्मवत् । तथा च श्रुतिः—

नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया प्रोक्तान्येनैव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ठ ।

इति [का०, १·२·९],

को अद्धा वेद क इह प्रवोचत् ।
इयं विसृष्टिर्यत आबभूव ।

इति [ऋ०सं०, १०·१२९·६,७] च, एते ऋचौ सिद्धानामपीश्वराणां दुर्बोधतां जगत्कारणस्य दर्शयतः । स्मृतिरपि भवति—

अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत् ।

इति [महा० भा०, ६·५·१२],

अव्यक्तोऽयमचिन्त्योऽयमविकार्योऽयमुच्यते ।

इति [भ० गी०, २·२५] च,

न मे विदुः सुरगणाः प्रभवं न महर्षयः ।
अहमादिर्हि देवानां महर्षीणां च सर्वशः ॥

इति [भ० गी०, १०·२] चैवंजातीयका । यदपि श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण मननं विदधच्छब्द एव तर्कमप्यादर्तव्यं दर्शयतीत्युक्तम्, नानेन मिषेण शुष्कतर्कस्यात्रात्मलाभः संभवति । श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभवाङ्गत्वेनाश्रीयते । स्वप्नान्तबुद्धान्तयोरुभयोरितरेतरव्यभिचारादात्मनोऽनन्वागतत्वं, संप्रसादे च प्रपञ्चपरित्यागेन सदात्मना संपत्तेर्निष्प्रपञ्चसदात्मत्वं, प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वात् कार्यकारणानन्यत्वन्यायेन ब्रह्माव्यतिरेक इत्येवंजातीयकः । तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात् [ब्र० सू०, २·१·११] इति च

केवलस्य तर्कस्य विप्रलम्भकत्वं दर्शयिष्यति ॥ योऽपि चेतनकारणश्रवणबलेनैव समस्तस्य जगतश्चेतनतामुत्प्रेक्षते तस्यापि—

विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च ।

इति [तै०उ०,२·६] चेतनाचेतनविभागश्रवणं विभावनाविभावनाभ्यां चैतन्यस्य शक्यत एव योजयितुम् । परस्यैव त्विदमपि विभागश्रवणं न युज्यते । कथम् । परमकारणस्य ह्यत्र समस्तजगदात्मना समवस्थानं श्राव्यते—

विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं चाभवत् ।

इति [तै०उ०,२·६] । तत्र यथा चेतनस्याचेतनभावो नोपपद्यते विलक्षणत्वात्, एवमचेतनस्यापि चेतनभावो नोपपद्यते । प्रत्युक्तत्वात् तु विलक्षणत्वस्य यथाश्रुत्यैव चेतनं कारणं ग्रहीतव्यं भवति ॥ ६ ॥

असदिति चेन्न, प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् ॥ ७ ॥

यदि चेतनं शुद्धं शब्दादिहीनं च ब्रह्म तद्विपरीतस्याचेतनस्याशुद्धस्य शब्दादिमतश्च कार्यस्य कारणमिष्येत, असत् तर्हि कार्यं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति प्रसज्येत । अनिष्टं चैतत् सत्कार्यवादिनस्तवेति चेत् । नैष दोषः । प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् । प्रतिषेधमात्रं हीदं, नास्य प्रतिषेधस्य प्रतिषेध्यमस्ति । नह्ययं प्रतिषेधः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रतिषेद्धुं शक्नोति । कथम् । यथैव हीदानीमपीदं कार्यं कारणात्मना सत्, एवं प्रागुत्पत्तेरपीति गम्यते । नहीदानीमपीदं कार्यं कारणात्मानमन्तरेण स्वतन्त्रमेवास्ति—

सर्वं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद ।

इत्यादि [बृ०,२·४·६] श्रवणात् । कारणात्मना तु सत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेरविशिष्टम् ॥ ननु शब्दादिहीनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणम् । बाढम् । नतु शब्दादिमत् कार्यं कारणात्मना हीनं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिदानीं वास्ति । तेन न शक्यते वक्तुं प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत् कार्यमिति । विस्तरेण चैतत् कार्यकारणानन्यत्ववादे [ब्र०सू०, २·१·१४] वक्ष्यामः ॥ ७ ॥

अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् ॥ ८ ॥

अत्राह—यदि स्थौल्यसावयवत्वाचेतनत्वपरिच्छिन्नत्वाशुध्यादिधर्मकं कार्यं ब्रह्मकारणमभ्युपगम्येत, तदपीतौ प्रलये प्रतिसंसृज्यमानं कार्यं

कारणाविभागमापद्यमानं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण दूषयेदित्यपीतौ कारणस्यापि ब्रह्मणः कार्यस्येवाशुद्ध्यादिरूपप्रसङ्गात् सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणमित्यसमञ्जसमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनम् । अपिच समस्तस्य विभागस्याविभागप्राप्तेः पुनरुत्पत्तौ नियमकारणाभावाद्भोक्तृभोग्यादिविभागेनोत्पत्तिर्न प्राप्नोतीत्यसमञ्जसम् । अपिच भोक्तॄणां परेण ब्रह्मणाऽविभागं गतानां कर्मादिनिमित्तप्रलयेऽपि पुनरुत्पत्तावभ्युपगम्यमानायां मुक्तानामपि पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् । अथेदं जगदपीतावपि विभक्तमेव परेण ब्रह्मणावतिष्ठेत, एवमप्यपीतिश्च न संभवति, कारणाव्यतिरिक्तं च कार्यं न संभवतीत्यसमञ्जसमेवेति ॥ ८ ॥

अत्रोच्यते—

न तु दृष्टान्तभावात् ॥ ९ ॥

नैवास्मदीये दर्शने किंचिदसामञ्जस्यमस्ति । यत् तावदभिहितं कारणमपिगच्छत् कार्यं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण दूषयेदिति, तददूषणम् । कस्मात् । दृष्टान्तभावात् । सन्ति हि दृष्टान्ता यथा कारणमपिगच्छत् कार्यं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण न दूषयति । तद्यथा शरावादयो मृत्प्रकृतिका विकारा विभागावस्थायामुच्चावचमध्यमप्रभेदाः सन्तः पुनः प्रकृतिमपिगच्छन्तो न तामात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजन्ति । रुचकादयश्च सुवर्णविकारा अपीतौ न सुवर्णमात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजन्ति । पृथिवीविकारश्चतुर्विधो भूतग्रामो न पृथिवीमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजति । त्वत्पक्षस्य तु न कश्चिद् दृष्टान्तोऽस्ति । अपीतिरेव हि न संभवेद्यदि कारणे कार्यं स्वधर्मेणैवावतिष्ठेत । अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं नतु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम्, आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः, इति वक्ष्यामः [ब्र० सू०, २·१·१४] ॥ अत्यल्पं चेदमुच्यते कार्यमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्मेण कारणं संसृजेदिति । स्थितावपि समानोऽयं प्रसङ्गः, कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् ।

इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा [बृ०, २·४·६],
आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् [छा०, ७·२५·२],
ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात् [मु०, २·२·११],
सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म [छा०, ३·१४·१],

इत्येवमाद्याभिर्हि श्रुतिभिरविशेषेण त्रिष्वपि कालेषु कार्यस्य कारणानन्यत्वं श्राव्यते । तत्र यः परिहारः, कार्यस्य तद्धर्माणां चाविद्याध्यारोपितत्वान्न तैः कारणं संसृज्यत इति, अपीतावपि स समानः ॥

अस्ति चायमपरो दृष्टान्तो—यथा स्वयंप्रसारितया मायया मायावी त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृश्यते, अवस्तुत्वात्, एवं परमात्मापि संसारमायया न संस्पृश्यत इति । यथाच स्वप्नदृगेकः स्वप्नदर्शनमायया न संस्पृश्यते प्रबोधसंप्रसादयोरनन्वागतत्वात्, एवमवस्थात्रयसाक्ष्येकोऽव्यभिचार्यवस्थात्रयेण व्यभिचारिणा न संस्पृश्यत इति । मायामात्रं ह्येतत् परमात्मनोऽवस्थात्रयात्मनावभासनम्, रज्ज्वा इव सर्पादिभावेनेति । अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसंप्रदायविद्भिराचार्यैः [गौड० कारि०, १·१६]—

अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।
अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥

इति । तत्र यदुक्तमपीतौ कारणस्यापि कार्यस्येव स्थौल्यादिदोषप्रसङ्ग इति एतदयुक्तम् । यत् पुनरेतदुक्तं समस्तस्य विभागस्याविभागप्राप्तेः पुनर्विभागेनोत्पत्तौ नियमकारणं नोपपद्यत इति, अयमप्यदोषः । दृष्टान्तभावादेव । यथाहि सुषुप्तिसमाध्यादावपि सत्यां स्वाभाविक्यामविभागप्राप्तौ मिथ्याज्ञानस्यानपोदितत्वात् पूर्ववत् पुनः प्रबोधे विभागो भवति, एवमिहापि भविष्यति । श्रुतिश्चात्र भवति—

इमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति संपद्य न विदुः सति संपद्यामह इति । त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा कीटो वा पतङ्गो वा दंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तदाभवन्ति ।

इति [छा०, ६·९·२,३] । यथा ह्यविभागेऽपि परमात्मनि, मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिबद्धो विभागव्यवहारः स्वप्नवदव्याहतः स्थितौ दृश्यते, एवमपीतावपि मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिबद्धैव विभागशक्तिरनुमास्यते । एतेन मुक्तानां पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः प्रत्युक्तः, सम्यग्ज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञानस्यापोदितत्वात् । यः पुनरयमन्तेऽपरो विकल्प उत्प्रेक्षितः, अथेदं जगदपीतावपि विभक्तमेव परेण ब्रह्मणावतिष्ठेतेति, सोऽप्यनभ्युपगमादेव प्रतिषिद्धः । तस्मात् समञ्जसमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनम् ॥ ९ ॥

स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ॥ १० ॥

स्वपक्षे चैते प्रतिवादिनः साधारणा दोषाः प्रादुःष्युः । कथमित्युच्यते । यत् तावदभिहितं विलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगद्ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकमिति, प्रधानप्रकृतिकतायामपि समानमेतत्, शब्दादिहीनात् प्रधानाच्छब्दादिमतो जगत उत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात् । अत एव च विलक्षणकार्योत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात् समानः प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत्कार्यवादप्रसङ्गः । तथापीतौ कार्यस्य कारणाविभागाभ्युपगमात् तद्वत्प्रसङ्गोऽपि समानः । तथा मृदितसर्वविशेषेषु विकारेष्वपीतावविभागात्मतां गतेष्विदमस्य पुरुषस्योपादानमिदमस्येति प्राक्प्रलयात् प्रतिपुरुषं ये नियता भेदा न ते तथैव पुनरुत्पत्तौ नियन्तुं शक्यन्ते, कारणाभावात् । विनैव कारणेन नियमेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कारणाभावसाम्यान्मुक्तानामपि पुनर्बन्धप्रसङ्गः । अथ केचिद्भेदा अपीतावविभागमापद्यन्ते केचिन्नेति चेत्, ये नापद्यन्ते तेषां प्रधानकार्यत्वं न प्राप्नोति । इत्येवमेते दोषाः साधारणत्वान्नान्यतरस्मिन् पक्षे चोदयितव्या भवन्तीत्यदोषतामेवैषां दृढयति, अवश्याश्रयितव्यत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यविमोक्षप्रसङ्गः ॥ ११ ॥

इतश्च नागमगम्येऽर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यं यस्मान्निरागमाः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनास्तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति, उत्प्रेक्षाया निरङ्कुशत्वात् । तथाहि कैश्चिदभियुक्तैर्यत्नेनोत्प्रेक्षितास्तर्का अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैराभास्यमाना दृश्यन्ते, तैरप्युत्प्रेक्षिताः सन्तस्ततोऽन्यैराभास्यन्ते, इति न प्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्काणां शक्यमाश्रयितुं, पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात् । अथ कस्यचित् प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यस्य कपिलस्यान्यस्य वा संमतस्तर्कः प्रतिष्ठित इत्याश्रीयेत, एवमप्यप्रतिष्ठितत्वमेव, प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यानुमतानामपि तीर्थकराणां कपिलकणभुक्प्रभृतीनां परस्परविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात् ॥ अथोच्येत अन्यथा वयमनुमास्यामहे यथा नाप्रतिष्ठादोषो भविष्यति । न हि प्रतिष्ठितस्तर्क एव नास्तीति शक्यते वक्तुम् । एतदपि हि तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्केणैव प्रतिष्ठाप्यते, केषांचित् तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वदर्शनेनान्येषामपि तज्जातीयकानां तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वकल्पनात् । सर्वतर्काप्रतिष्ठायां

च लोकव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । अतीतवर्तमानाध्वसाम्येन ह्यनागतेऽप्यध्वनि सुखदुःखप्राप्तिपरिहाराय प्रवर्तमानो लोको दृश्यते । श्रुत्यर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ चार्थाभासनिराकरणेन सम्यगर्थनिर्धारणं तर्केणैव वाक्यवृत्तिनिरूपणरूपेण क्रियते । मनुरपि चैवं मन्यते—

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम् ।
त्रयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता ॥

इति [१२·१०५],

आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना ।
यस्तर्केणानुसंधत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः ॥

इति [१२·१०६] च ब्रुवन् । अयमेव तर्कस्यालंकारो यदप्रतिष्ठितत्वं नाम । एवंहि सावद्यतर्कपरित्यागेन निरवद्यस्तर्कः प्रतिपत्तव्यो भवति । नहि पूर्वजो मूढ आसीदित्यात्मनापि मूढेन भवितव्यमिति किंचिदस्ति प्रमाणम् । तस्मान्न तर्काप्रतिष्ठानं दोष इति चेत्, एवमप्यविमोक्षप्रसङ्गः । यद्यपि कचिद्विषये तर्कस्य प्रतिष्ठितत्वमुपलक्ष्यते, तथापि प्रकृते तावद्विषये प्रसज्यत एवाप्रतिष्ठितत्वदोषादनिर्मोक्षस्तर्कस्य । नहीदमतिगम्भीरं भावयाथात्म्यं मुक्तिनिबन्धनमागममन्तरेणोत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम् । रूपाद्यभावाद्धि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षगोचरः, लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनामिति चावोचाम । अपिच सम्यग्ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति सर्वेषां मोक्षवादिनामभ्युपगमः । तच्च सम्यग्ज्ञानमेकरूपम्, वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् । एकरूपेण ह्यवस्थितो योऽर्थः स परमार्थः । लोके तद्विषयं ज्ञानं सम्यग्ज्ञानमित्युच्यते, यथाग्निरुष्ण इति । तत्रैवं सति, सम्यग्ज्ञाने पुरुषाणां विप्रतिपत्तिरनुपपन्ना । तर्कज्ञानानां त्वन्योन्यविरोधात् प्रसिद्धा विप्रतिपत्तिः । यद्धि केनचित् तार्किकेणेदमेव सम्यग्ज्ञानमिति प्रतिपादितं तदपरेण व्युत्थाप्यते, तेनापि प्रतिष्ठापितं ततोऽपरेण व्युत्थाप्यते, इति प्रसिद्धं लोके । कथमेकरूपानवस्थितविषयं तर्कप्रभवं सम्यग्ज्ञानं भवेत् । नच प्रधानवादी तर्कविदामुत्तम इति सर्वैस्तार्किकैः परिगृहीतो येन तदीयं मतं सम्यग्ज्ञानमिति प्रतिपद्येमहि । नच शक्यन्तेऽतीतानागतवर्तमानास्तार्किका एकस्मिन् देशे काले च समाहर्तुं, येन तन्मतिरेकरूपैकार्थविषया सम्यङ्मतिरिति स्यात् । वेदस्य तु नित्यत्वे विज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वे

च सति व्यवस्थितार्थविषयत्वोपपत्तेस्तज्जनितस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यक्त्वमतीतानागतवर्तमानैः सर्वैरपि तार्किकैरपह्नोतुमशक्यम्। अतः सिद्धमस्यैवौपनिषदस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वम्। अतोऽन्यत्र सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वानुपपत्तेः संसाराविमोक्ष एव प्रसज्येत। अत आगमवशेनागमानुसारितर्कवशेन च चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेति स्थितम्॥ ११॥ इति विलक्षणत्वाधिकरणम्॥ ३॥

४ शिष्टापरिग्रहाधिकरणम्।

एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः॥ १२॥

वैदिकस्य दर्शनस्य प्रत्यासन्नत्वाद्गुरुतरतर्कबलोपेतत्वाद्वेदानुसारिभिश्च कैश्चिच्छिष्टैः केनचिदंशेन परिगृहीतत्वात् प्रधानकारणवादं तावद्व्यपाश्रित्य यस्तर्कनिमित्त आक्षेपो वेदान्तवाक्येषूद्भावितः स परिहृतः। इदानीमण्वादिवादव्यपाश्रयेणापि कैश्चिन्मन्दमतिभिर्वेदान्तवाक्येषु पुनस्तर्कनिमित्त आक्षेप आशङ्क्यते, इत्यतः प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्यायेनातिदिशति। परिगृह्यन्त इति परिग्रहाः, न परिग्रहा अपरिग्रहाः, शिष्टानामपरिग्रहाः शिष्टापरिग्रहाः। एतेन प्रकृतेन प्रधानकारणवादनिराकरणकारणेन शिष्टैर्मनुव्यासप्रभृतिभिः केनाचिदप्यंशेनापरिगृहीता येऽण्वादिकारणवादास्तेऽपि प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याता निराकृता द्रष्टव्याः। तुल्यत्वान्निराकरणकारणस्य नात्र पुनराशङ्कितव्यं किंचिदस्ति। तुल्यमत्रापि परमगम्भीरस्य तर्कानवगाह्यत्वम्, तर्कस्याप्रतिष्ठितत्वम्, अन्यथानुमानेऽप्यविमोक्षः, आगमविरोधश्चेत्येवंजातीयकं निराकरणकारणम्॥ १२॥ इति शिष्टापरिग्रहाधिकरणम्॥ ४॥

५ भोक्त्रापत्त्यधिकरणम्।

भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत् स्याल्लोकवत्॥ १३॥

अन्यथा पुनर्ब्रह्मकारणवादस्तर्कबलेनैवाक्षिप्यते। यद्यपि श्रुतिः प्रमाणं स्वविषये भवति, तथापि प्रमाणान्तरेण विषयापहारेऽन्यपरा भवितुमर्हति, यथा मन्त्रार्थवादौ। तर्कोऽपि स्वविषयादन्यत्राप्रतिष्ठितः स्यात्, यथा धर्माधर्मयोः। किमतः। यद्येवम्, अत इदमयुक्तं यत् प्रमाणान्तरप्रसि-

द्वार्थबाधनं श्रुतेः। कथं पुनः प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धोऽर्थः श्रुत्या बाध्यत इति। अत्रोच्यते। प्रसिद्धो ह्ययं भोक्तृभोग्यविभागो लोके, भोक्ता चेतनः शारीरो, भोग्याः शब्दादयो विषया इति। यथा भोक्ता देवदत्तो, भोज्य ओदन इति। तस्य च विभागस्याभावः प्रसज्येत यदि भोक्ता भोग्यभावमापद्येत, भोग्यं वा भोक्तृभावमापद्येत। तयोश्चेतरेतरभावापत्तिः परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वात् प्रसज्येत। न चास्य प्रसिद्धस्य विभागस्य बाधनं युक्तम्। यथा त्वद्यत्वे भोक्तृभोग्ययोर्विभागो दृष्टस्तथातीतानागतयोरपि कल्पयितव्यः। तस्मात् प्रसिद्धस्यास्य भोक्तृभोग्यविभागस्याभावप्रसङ्गादयुक्तमिदं ब्रह्मकारणतावधारणमिति चेत् कश्चिच्चोदयेत्, तं प्रतिब्रूयात्—स्याल्लोकवदिति। उपपद्यत एवायमस्मत्पक्षेऽपि विभागः, एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात्। तथाहि समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि तद्विकाराणां फेनवीचीतरङ्गबुद्बुदादीनामितरेतरविभाग इतरेतरसंश्लेषादिलक्षणश्च व्यवहार उपलभ्यते। नच समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि तद्विकाराणां फेनतरङ्गादीनामितरेतरभावापत्तिर्भवति। नच तेषामितरेतरभावानापत्तावपि समुद्रात्मनोऽन्यत्वं भवति। एवमिहापि नच भोक्तृभोग्ययोरितरेतरभावापत्तिः, नच परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्वं भविष्यति॥ यद्यपि भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणो विकारः,

तत् सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्।

इति [तै० उ०, २ · ६] स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्वश्रवणात्, तथापि कार्यमनुप्रविष्टस्यास्त्युपाधिनिमित्तो विभाग आकाशस्येव घटाद्युपाधिनिमित्त इत्यतः परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वेऽप्युपपद्यते भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणो विभागः समुद्रतरङ्गादिन्यायेनेत्युक्तम्॥ १३॥ इति भोक्त्रापत्त्यधिकरणम्॥ ५॥

६ आरम्भणाधिकरणम्।

तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः॥ १४॥

अभ्युपगम्य चेमं व्यावहारिकं भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणं विभागं स्याल्लोकवदिति परिहारोऽभिहितः। नत्वयं विभागः परमार्थतोऽस्ति, यस्मात् तयोः कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वमवगम्यते। कार्यमाकाशादिकं बहुप्रपञ्चं जगत्,

कारणं परं ब्रह्म, तस्मात् कारणात् परमार्थतोऽनन्यत्वं व्यतिरेकेणाभावः कार्यस्यावगम्यते। कुतः। आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः। आरम्भणशब्दस्तावत्—एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाय, दृष्टान्तापेक्षायामुच्यते—

यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं
विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।

इति [छा०, ६·१·१]। एतदुक्तं भवति। एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन परमार्थतो मृदात्मना विज्ञातेन सर्वं मृन्मयं घटशरावोदञ्चनादिकं मृदात्मकत्वाविशेषाद्विज्ञातं भवेत्, यतो वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं, वाचैव केवलमस्तीत्यारभ्यते विकारो घटः शराव उदञ्चनं चेति। नतु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति। नामधेयमात्रं ह्येतदनृतम्, मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमिति। एष ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्त आम्नातः। तत्र श्रुताद्वाचारम्भणशब्दाद्दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपि ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण कार्यजातस्याभाव इति गम्यते। पुनश्च तेजोबन्नानां ब्रह्मकार्यतामुक्त्वा तेजोबन्नकार्याणां तेजोबन्नव्यतिरेकेणाभावं ब्रवीति [छा०, ६·४·१]—

अपागादग्नेरग्नित्वं, वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं, त्रीणि
रूपाणीत्येव सत्यम् ।

इत्यादिना। आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्य इत्यादिशब्दात् [छा०, ६·८·७]—

ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं, तत् सत्यं, स आत्मा, तत् त्वमसि,
इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा [बृ०, २·४·६],
ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम् [मु०, २·२·११],
आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् [छा०, ७·२५·२],
नेह नानास्ति किंचन [बृ०, ४·४·१९],

इत्येवमाद्यप्यात्मैकत्वप्रतिपादनपरं वचनजातमुदाहर्तव्यम्। नचान्यथैकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं संपद्यते। तस्माद्यथा घटकरकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशानन्यत्वम्, यथाच मृगतृष्णिकोदकादीनामूषरादिभ्योऽनन्यत्वम्, दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्वात् स्वरूपेणानुपाख्यत्वात्, एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्चजातस्य ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेणाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

नन्वनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म, यथा वृक्षोऽनेकशाख एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म। अत एकत्वं नानात्वं चोभयमपि सत्यमेव, यथा वृक्ष

इत्येकत्वं शाखा इति नानात्वम्, यथाच समुद्रात्मनैकत्वं फेनतरङ्गाद्यात्मना नानात्वम्, यथाच मृदात्मनैकत्वं घटशरावाद्यात्मना नानात्वम् । तत्रैकत्वांशेन ज्ञानान्मोक्षव्यवहारः सेत्स्यति, नानात्वांशेन तु कर्मकाण्डाश्रयौ लौकिकवैदिकव्यवहारौ सेत्स्यत इति । एवंच मृदादिदृष्टान्ता अनुरूपा भविष्यन्तीति ॥ नैवं स्यात्—

मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् [छा०, ६·१·१],

इति प्रकृतिमात्रस्य दृष्टान्ते सत्यत्वावधारणात्, वाचारम्भणशब्देन विकारजातस्यानृतत्वाभिधानात्, दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपि —

ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं, तत् सत्यम् [छा०, ६·८·७],

इति च परमकारणस्यैवैकस्य सत्यत्वावधारणात्,—

स आत्मा, तत् त्वमसि, श्वेतकेतो [छा०, ६·८·७],

इति च शारीरस्य ब्रह्मभावोपदेशात् । स्वयंप्रसिद्धं ह्येतच्छारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वमुपदिश्यते, न यत्नान्तरप्रसाध्यम् । अतश्चेदं शास्त्रीयं ब्रह्मात्मत्वमवगम्यमानं स्वाभाविकस्य शारीरात्मत्वस्य बाधकं संपद्यते, रज्ज्वादिबुद्धय इव सर्पादिबुद्धीनाम् । बाधिते च शारीरात्मत्वे तदाश्रयः समस्तः स्वाभाविको व्यवहारो बाधितो भवति, यत्प्रसिद्धये नानात्वांशोऽपरो ब्रह्मणः कल्प्येत । दर्शयति च—

यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत् ।

इत्यादिना [बृ०, ४·५·१५] ब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्शिनं प्रति समस्तस्य क्रियाकारकफललक्षणस्य व्यवहारस्याभावम् । न चायं व्यवहाराभावोऽवस्थाविशेषनिबद्धोऽभिधीयत इति युक्तं वक्तुम्,—

तत् त्वमसि [छा०, ६·८·७]

इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्यानवस्थाविशेषनिबन्धनत्वात् । तस्करदृष्टान्तेन चानृताभिसंधस्य बन्धनं सत्याभिसंधस्य च मोक्षं दर्शयन्नेकत्वमेवैकं पारमार्थिकं दर्शयति [छा०, ६·१६] मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितं च नानात्वम् । उभयसत्यतायां हि कथं व्यवहारगोचरोऽपि जन्तुरनृताभिसंध इत्युच्येत ।

मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।

इति [बृ०, ४·४·१९] च भेददृष्टिमपवदन्नेवैतद्दर्शयति । न चास्मिन्

दर्शने ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इत्युपपद्यते, सम्यग्ज्ञानापनोद्यस्य कस्यचिन्मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संसारकारणत्वेनानभ्युपगमात् । उभयसत्यतायां हि कथमेकत्वज्ञानेन नानात्वज्ञानमपनुद्यत इत्युच्येत ॥

नन्वेकत्वैकान्ताभ्युपगमे नानात्वाभावात् प्रत्यक्षादीनि लौकिकानि प्रमाणानि व्याहन्येरन् निर्विषयत्वात्, स्थाण्वादिष्विव पुरुषादिज्ञानानि । तथा विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रमपि भेदापेक्षत्वात् तदभावे व्याहन्येत । मोक्षशास्त्रस्यापि शिष्यशासित्रादिभेदापेक्षत्वात् तदभावे व्याघातः स्यात्, कथं चानृतेन मोक्षशास्त्रेण प्रतिपादितस्यात्मैकत्वस्य सत्यत्वमुपपद्येतेति ॥ अत्रोच्यते—नैष दोषः, सर्वव्यवहाराणामेव प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानात् सत्यत्वोपपत्तेः, स्वप्नव्यवहारस्येव प्राक् प्रबोधात् । यावद्धि न सत्यात्मैकत्वप्रतिपत्तिस्तावत् प्रमाणप्रमेयफललक्षणेषु विकारेष्वनृतत्वबुद्धिर्न कस्यचिदुत्पद्यते । विकारानेव त्वहं ममेत्यविद्ययात्मात्मीयेन भावेन सर्वो जन्तुः प्रतिपद्यते स्वाभाविकीं ब्रह्मात्मतां हित्वा । तस्मात् प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताप्रतिबोधादुपपन्नः सर्वो लौकिको वैदिकश्च व्यवहारः । यथा सुप्तस्य प्राकृतस्य जनस्य स्वप्न उच्चावचान् भावान् पश्यतो निश्चितमेव प्रत्यक्षाभिमतं विज्ञानं भवति प्राक् प्रबोधात्, नच प्रत्यक्षाभासाभिप्रायस्तत्काले भवति, तद्वत् ॥ कथं त्वसत्येन वेदान्तवाक्येन सत्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वस्य प्रतिपत्तिरुपपद्येत । नहि रज्जुसर्पेण दष्टो म्रियते, नापि मृगतृष्णिकाम्भसा पानावगाहनादिप्रयोजनं क्रियत इति । नैष दोषः । शङ्काविषादिनिमित्तमरणादिकार्योपलब्धेः । स्वप्नदर्शनावस्थस्य च सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यदर्शनात् । तत् कार्यमप्यनृतमेवेति चेद्ब्रूयात्, तत्र ब्रूमः—यद्यपि स्वप्नदर्शनावस्थस्य सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यमनृतम्, तथापि तदवगतिः सत्यमेव फलं, प्रतिबुद्धस्याप्यबाध्यमानत्वात् । नहि स्वप्नादुत्थितः स्वप्नदृष्टं सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यं मिथ्येति मन्यमानस्तदवगतिमपि मिथ्येति मन्यते कश्चित् । एतेन स्वप्नदृशोऽवगत्यबाधनेन देहमात्रात्मवादो दूषितो वेदितव्यः । तथाच श्रुतिः—

यदा कर्मसु काम्येषु स्त्रियं स्वप्नेषु पश्यति ।
समृद्धिं तत्र जानीयात् तस्मिन् स्वप्ननिदर्शने ॥

इति [छा०, ५·२·९] असत्येन स्वप्नदर्शनेन सत्यायाः समृद्धेः प्रतिपत्तिं दर्शयति । तथा प्रत्यक्षदर्शनेषु केषुचिदरिष्टेषु जातेषु—

न चिरमिव जीविष्यतीति विद्यात् ।

इत्युक्त्वा [ऐ० आ०, ३·२·४·७],—

अथ स्वप्नाः । पुरुषं कृष्णं कृष्णदन्तं पश्यति, स एनं हन्ति ।

इत्यादिना [ऐ० आ०, ३·२·४·१५] तेनतेनासत्येनैव स्वप्नदर्शनेन सत्यं मरणं सूच्यत इति दर्शयति । प्रसिद्धं चेदं लोकेऽन्वयव्यतिरेककुशलानामीदृशेन स्वप्नदर्शनेन साध्वागमः सूच्यत ईदृशेनासाध्वागम इति । तथाकारादिसत्याक्षरप्रतिपत्तिर्दृष्टा रेखानृताक्षरप्रतिपत्तेः ॥ अपि चान्त्यमिदं प्रमाणमात्मैकत्वस्य प्रतिपादकं—नातः परं किंचिदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति । यथाहि लोके यजेतेत्युक्ते किं केन कथमित्याकाङ्क्ष्यते, नैवं—

तत् त्वमसि [छा०, ६·८·७],

अहं ब्रह्मास्मि [बृ०, १·४·१०],

इत्युक्ते किंचिदन्यदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति, सर्वात्मैकत्वविषयत्वावगतेः । सति ह्यन्यस्मिन्नवशिष्यमाणेऽर्थ आकाङ्क्षा स्यात्, नत्वात्मैकत्वव्यतिरेकेणावशिष्यमाणोऽन्योऽर्थोस्ति य आकाङ्क्ष्येत । न चेयमवगतिर्नोत्पद्यत इति शक्यं वक्तुम्—

तद्धास्य विजज्ञौ [छा०, ६·१६·३],

इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः, अवगतिसाधनानां च श्रवणादीनां वेदानुवचनादीनां च विधानात् । नचेयमवगतिरनर्थिका भ्रान्तिर्वेति शक्यं वक्तुम्, अविद्यानिवृत्तिफलदर्शनात्, बाधकज्ञानान्तराभावाच्च । प्राक् चात्मैकत्वावगतेरव्याहतः सर्वः सत्यानृतव्यवहारो लौकिको वैदिकश्चेत्यवोचाम । तस्मादन्त्येन प्रमाणेन प्रतिपादित आत्मैकत्वे समस्तस्य प्राचीनस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य बाधितत्वान्नानेकात्मकब्रह्मकल्पनावकाशोऽस्ति ॥

ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनात् परिणामवद्ब्रह्म शास्त्रस्याभिमतमिति गम्यते, परिणामिनो हि मृदादयोऽर्था लोके समधिगता इति । नेत्युच्यते—

स वा एष महानज आत्माऽजरोऽमरोऽमृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म [बृ०, ४·४·२५],

स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा [बृ०, ३.९.२६],
अस्थूलमनणु [बृ०, ३.८.८],

इत्याद्याभ्यः सर्वविक्रियाप्रतिषेधश्रुतिभ्यो ब्रह्मणः कूटस्थत्वावगमात्। नह्येकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मत्वं तद्रहितत्वं च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम्। स्थितिगतिवत् स्यादिति चेत्। न। कूटस्थस्येति विशेषणात्। नहि कूटस्थस्य ब्रह्मणः स्थितिगतिवदनेकधर्माश्रयत्वं संभवति। कूटस्थं च नित्यं ब्रह्म सर्वविक्रियाप्रतिषेधादित्यवोचाम। नच यथा ब्रह्मण आत्मैकत्वदर्शनं मोक्षसाधनमेवं जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्शनमपि स्वतन्त्रमेव कस्मैचित् फलायाभिप्रेयते। प्रमाणाभावात्। कूटस्थब्रह्मात्मत्वविज्ञानादेव हि फलं दर्शयति शास्त्रम्—

स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा।

इत्युपक्रम्य [बृ०, ४.२.४],

अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि।

इति [बृ०, ४.२.४] एवंजातीयकम्। तत्रैतत् सिद्धं भवति, ब्रह्मप्रकरणे सर्वधर्मविशेषरहितब्रह्मदर्शनादेव फलसिद्धौ सत्यां, यत् तत्राफलं श्रूयते, ब्रह्मणो जगदाकारपरिणामित्वादि, तद्ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेनैव विनियुज्यते, फलवत्संनिधावफलं तदङ्गमितिवत्, नतु स्वतन्त्रं फलाय कल्प्यत इति। नहि परिणामवत्त्वविज्ञानात् परिणामवत्त्वमात्मनः फलं स्यादिति वक्तुं युक्तम्, कूटस्थनित्यत्वान्मोक्षस्य॥ कूटस्थब्रह्मात्मवादिन एकत्वैकान्त्यादीशित्रीशितव्याभाव ईश्वरकारणप्रतिज्ञाविरोध इति चेत्। न। अविद्यात्मकनामरूपबीजव्याकरणापेक्षत्वात् सर्वज्ञत्वस्य।

तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः [तै० उ०, १.१]

इत्यादिवाक्येभ्यो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वरूपात् सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेरीश्वराज्जगज्जनिस्थितिप्रलयाः, नाचेतनात् प्रधानादन्यस्माद्वेत्येषोऽर्थः प्रतिज्ञातः—जन्माद्यस्य यतः [ब्र०सू०, १.१.२] इति। सा प्रतिज्ञा तदवस्थैव, न तद्विरुद्धोऽर्थः पुनरिहोच्यते। कथं नोच्यतेऽत्यन्तमात्मन एकत्वमद्वितीयत्वं च ब्रुवता। शृणु यथा नोच्यते। सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्यात्मभूते इवाविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीये संसारप्रपञ्च-

बीजभूते सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य माया, शक्तिः, प्रकृतिरिति च श्रुतिस्मृत्योरभिलप्येते । ताभ्यामन्यः सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः—

आकाशो वै नाम नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता । ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म ।

इति [छा०, ८·१४·१] श्रुतेः ।

नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि [छा०, ६·३·२],

सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरो
नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन् यदास्ते । [तै० आ०, ३·१२·७],

एकं बीजं बहुधा यः करोति [श्वे०, ६·२],

इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च । एवमविद्याकृतनामरूपोपाध्यनुरोधीश्वरो भवति, व्योमेव घटकरकाद्युपाध्यनुरोधि । स च स्वात्मभूतानेव घटाकाशस्थानीयानविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतकार्यकरणसंघातानुरोधिनो जीवाख्यान् विज्ञानात्मनः प्रतीष्टे व्यवहारविषये । तदेवमविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं च, न परमार्थतो विद्ययापास्तसर्वोपाधिस्वरूप आत्मनीशित्रीशितव्यसर्वज्ञत्वादिव्यवहार उपपद्यते । तथा चोक्तम्—

यत्र नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा ।

इति [छा०, ७·२४·१] ।

यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत् ।

इत्यादिना [बृ०, ४·५·१५] च । एवं परमार्थावस्थायां सर्वव्यवहाराभावं वदन्ति वेदान्ताः सर्वे । तथेश्वरगीतास्वपि [५·१४,१५]—

न कर्तृत्वं न कर्माणि लोकस्य सृजति प्रभुः ।
न कर्मफलसंयोगं स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्तते ॥
नादत्ते कस्यचित् पापं न चैव सुकृतं विभुः ।
अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः ॥

इति परमार्थावस्थायामीशित्रीशितव्यादिव्यवहाराभावः प्रदर्श्यते । व्यवहारावस्थायां तूक्तः श्रुतावपीश्वरादिव्यवहारः—

एष सर्वेश्वर एष भूताधिपतिरेष भूतपाल एष सेतुर्विधरण एषां लोकानामसंभेदाय ।

इति [बृ०, ४·४·२२] । तथाचेश्वरगीतास्वपि [१८·६१]—

ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।
भ्रामयन् सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥

इति । सूत्रकारोऽपि परमार्थाभिप्रायेण तदनन्यत्वमित्याह । व्यवहाराभिप्रायेण तु स्याल्लोकवदिति महासमुद्रस्थानीयतां ब्रह्मणः कथयति, अप्रत्याख्यायैव कार्यप्रपञ्चं परिणामप्रक्रियां चाश्रयति, सगुणेषूपासनेषूपयोक्ष्यत इति ॥ १४ ॥

भावे चोपलब्धेः ॥ १५ ॥

इतश्च कारणादनन्यत्वं कार्यस्य, यत्कारणं भाव एव कारणस्य कार्यमुपलभ्यते, नाभावे । तद्यथा सत्यां मृदि घट उपलभ्यते, सत्सु च तन्तुषु पटः । नच नियमेनान्यभावेऽन्यस्योपलब्धिर्दृष्टा । नह्यश्वो गोरन्यः सन् गोर्भाव एवोपलभ्यते । नच कुलालभाव एव घट उपलभ्यते, सत्यपि निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेऽन्यत्वात् ॥ नन्वन्यस्य भावेऽप्यन्यस्योपलब्धिर्नियता दृश्यते, यथाग्निभावे धूमस्येति । नेत्युच्यते । उद्वापितेऽप्यग्नौ गोपालघुटिकादिधारितस्य धूमस्य दृश्यमानत्वात् । अथ धूमं कयाचिदवस्थया विशिंष्यात्, ईदृशो धूमो नासत्यग्नौ भवतीति, नैवमपि कश्चिद्दोषः । तद्भावानुरक्तां हि बुद्धिं कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वे हेतुं वयं वदामः । न चासावग्निधूमयोर्विद्यते ॥

भावाच्चोपलब्धेरिति वा सूत्रम् । न केवलं शब्दादेव कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं, प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धिभावाच्च तयोरनन्यत्वमित्यर्थः । भवति हि प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धिः कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वे । तद्यथा, तन्तुसंस्थाने पटे तन्तुव्यतिरेकेण पटो नाम कार्यं नैवोपलभ्यते, केवलास्तु तन्तव आतानवितानवन्तः प्रत्यक्षमुपलभ्यन्ते, तथा तन्तुष्वंशवोंऽशुषु तदवयवाः । अनया प्रत्यक्षोपलब्ध्या लोहितशुक्लकृष्णानि त्रीणि रूपाणि, ततो वायुमात्रम्, आकाशमात्रं चेत्यनुमेयम् । ततः परं ब्रह्मैकमेवाद्वितीयं, तत्र सर्वप्रमाणानां निष्ठामवोचाम ॥ १५ ॥

सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य ॥ १६ ॥

इतश्च कारणात् कार्यस्यानन्यत्वं, यत्कारणं प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणात्मनैव कारणे सत्त्वमवरकालीनस्य कार्यस्य श्रूयते—

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् [छा०, ६·२·१],

आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् [ऐ०आ०,२·४·१·१],

इत्यादाविदंशब्दगृहीतस्य कार्यस्य कारणेन सामानाधिकरण्यात् । यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्तते, न तत् तत उत्पद्यते, यथा सिकताभ्यस्तैलम् । तस्मात् प्रागुत्पत्तेरनन्यत्वादुत्पन्नमप्यनन्यदेव कारणात् कार्यमित्यवगम्यते । यथाच कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति, एवं कार्यमपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति । एकं च पुनः सत्त्वम्, अतोऽप्यनन्यत्वं कारणात् कार्यस्य ॥ १६ ॥

असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न, धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषात् ॥ १७ ॥

ननु क्वचिदसत्त्वमपि प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य व्यपदिशति श्रुतिः—

असदेवेदमग्र आसीत् ।

इति [छा०, ३·१९·१],

असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् ।

इति [तै० उ०,२·७·१] च । तस्मादसद्व्यपदेशान्न प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वमिति चेत् । नेति ब्रूमः । नह्ययमत्यन्तासत्त्वाभिप्रायेण प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्यासद्व्यपदेशः, किंतर्हि व्याकृतनामरूपत्वाद्धर्मादव्याकृतनामरूपत्वं धर्मान्तरं, तेन धर्मान्तरेणायमसद्व्यपदेशः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत एव कार्यस्य कारणरूपेणानन्यस्य । कथमेतदवगम्यते । वाक्यशेषात् । यदुपक्रमे संदिग्धार्थं वाक्यं, तच्छेषान्निश्चीयते । इह च तावत्—

असदेवेदमग्र आसीत् ।

इति [छा०, ३·१९·१] असच्छब्देनोपक्रमे निर्दिष्टं यत् तदेव पुनस्तच्छब्देन परामृश्य सदिति विशिनष्टि—

तत् सदासीत् ।

इति [छा०, ३·१९·१] । असतश्च पूर्वापरकालासंबन्धादासीच्छब्दानुपपत्तेश्च ।

असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् ।

इति [तै० उ०, २·७·१] अत्रापि—

तदात्मान ँ स्वयमकुरुत ।

इति [तै० उ०, २·७·१] वाक्यशेषे विशेषणान्नात्यन्तासत्त्वम् । तस्माद्धर्मान्तरेणैवायमसद्व्यपदेशः प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य । नामरूपव्याकृतं हि वस्तु सच्छब्दार्हं लोके प्रसिद्धम् । अतः प्राङ्नामरूपव्याकरणादसदिवासीदित्युपचर्यते ॥ १७ ॥

युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च ॥ १८ ॥

युक्तेश्च प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वमनन्यत्वं च कारणादवगम्यते, शब्दान्तराच्च । युक्तिस्तावद्वर्ण्यते । दधिघटरुचकाद्यर्थिभिः प्रतिनियतानि क्षीरमृत्तिकासुवर्णादीन्युपादीयमानानि लोके दृश्यन्ते । नहि दध्यर्थिभिर्मृत्तिकोपादीयते, न घटार्थिभिः क्षीरम् । तदसत्कार्यवादे नोपपद्येत । अविशिष्टे हि प्रागुत्पत्तेः सर्वस्य सर्वत्रासत्त्वे कस्मात् क्षीरादेव दध्युत्पद्यते न मृत्तिकाया, मृत्तिकाया एव च घट उत्पद्यते न क्षीरात् । अथाविशिष्टेऽपि प्रागसत्त्वे क्षीर एव दध्नः कश्चिदतिशयो न मृत्तिकायां, मृत्तिकायामेव च घटस्य कश्चिदतिशयो न क्षीर इत्युच्येत, तर्ह्यतिशयवत्त्वात् प्रागवस्थाया असत्कार्यवादहानिः सत्कार्यवादसिद्धिश्च । शक्तिश्च कारणस्य कार्यनियमार्था कल्प्यमाना नान्यासती वा कार्यं नियच्छेत्, असत्त्वाविशेषादन्यत्वाविशेषाच्च । तस्मात् कारणस्यात्मभूता शक्तिः शक्तेश्चात्मभूतं कार्यम् ॥ अपिच कार्यकारणयोर्द्रव्यगुणादीनां चाश्वमहिषवद्भेदबुद्ध्यभावात् तादात्म्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । समवायकल्पनायामपि समवायस्य समवायिभिः संबन्धेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने तस्य तस्यान्योऽन्यः संबन्धः कल्पयितव्य इत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । अनभ्युपगम्यमाने च विच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । अथ समवायः स्वयं संबन्धरूपत्वादनपेक्ष्यैवापरं संबन्धं संबध्यते, संयोगोऽपि तर्हि स्वयं संबन्धरूपत्वादनपेक्ष्यैव समवायं संबध्येत । तादात्म्यप्रतीतेश्च द्रव्यगुणादीनां समवायकल्पनानर्थक्यम् ॥ कथंच कार्यमवयविद्रव्यं कारणेष्ववयवद्रव्येषु वर्तमानं वर्तते—किं समस्तेष्ववयवेषु वर्तेत, उत प्रत्यवयवम् । यदि तावत् समस्तेषु वर्तेत, ततोऽवयव्यनुपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत, समस्तावयवसंनिकर्षस्याशक्यत्वात् । नहि बहुत्वं समस्तेष्वाश्रयेषु वर्तमानं व्यस्ताश्रयग्रहणेन गृह्यते । अथावयवशः समस्तेषु वर्तेत, तदाप्यारम्भकावयवव्यतिरेकेणावयविनोऽवयवाः कल्प्येरन् यैरारम्भकेष्ववयवशोऽवयवी वर्तेत । कोशावयवव्यतिरिक्तैर्ह्यवयवैरसिः कोशं व्याप्नोति । अनवस्था चैवं प्रसज्येत

तेषु तेष्ववयवेषु वर्तयितुमन्येषामन्येषामवयवानां कल्पनीयत्वात् । अथ प्रत्यवयवं वर्तेत, तदैकत्र व्यापारेऽन्यत्राव्यापारः स्यात् । नहि देवदत्तः स्रुघ्ने संनिधीयमानस्तदहरेव पाटलिपुत्रेऽपि संनिधीयेत । युगपदनेकत्र वृत्तावनेकत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोरिव स्रुघ्नपाटलिपुत्रनिवासिनोः । गोत्वादिवत् प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तेर्न दोष इति चेत् । न । तथा प्रतीत्यभावात् । यदि गोत्वादिवत् प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तोऽवयवी स्यात्, यथा गोत्वं प्रतिव्यक्ति प्रत्यक्षं गृह्यत एवमवयव्यपि प्रत्यवयवं प्रत्यक्षं गृह्येत । नचैवं नियतं गृह्यते । प्रत्येकपरिसमाप्तौ चावयविनः कार्येणाधिकारात्, तस्य चैकत्वात्, शृङ्गेणापि स्तनकार्यं कुर्यादुरसा च पृष्ठकार्यम् । नचैवं दृश्यते ॥

प्रागुत्पत्तेश्च कार्यस्यासत्त्व उत्पत्तिरकर्तृका निरात्मिका च स्यात् । उत्पत्तिश्च नाम क्रिया, सा सकर्तृकैव भवितुमर्हति, गत्यादिवत् । क्रिया च नाम स्यादकर्तृका चेति विप्रतिषिध्येत । घटस्य चोत्पत्तिरुच्यमाना न घटकर्तृका, किंतर्हि, अन्यकर्तृकेति कल्प्या स्यात् । तथा कपालादीनामप्युत्पत्तिरुच्यमानान्यकर्तृकैव कल्प्येत । तथाच सति, घट उत्पद्यत इत्युक्ते कुलालादीनि कारणान्युत्पद्यन्त इत्युक्तं स्यात् । नच लोके घटोत्पत्तिरित्युक्ते कुलालादीनामप्युत्पद्यमानता प्रतीयते, उत्पन्नताप्रतीतेश्च ॥ अथ स्वकारणसत्तासंबन्ध एवोत्पत्तिरात्मलाभश्च कार्यस्येति चेत्, कथमलब्धात्मकं संबध्येतेति वक्तव्यम् । सतोर्हि द्वयोः संबन्धः संभवति, न सदसतोरसतोर्वा । अभावस्य च निरुपाख्यत्वात् प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति मर्यादाकरणमनुपपन्नम् । सतां हि लोके क्षेत्रगृहादीनां मर्यादा दृष्टा, नाभावस्य । नहि वन्ध्यापुत्रो राजा बभूव प्राक्पूर्णवर्मणोऽभिषेकादित्येवंजातीयकेन मर्यादाकरणेन निरुपाख्यो वन्ध्यापुत्रो राजा बभूव, भवति, भविष्यति, इति वा विशेष्यते । यदिच वन्ध्यापुत्रोऽपि कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वमभविष्यत्, तत इदमप्युपापत्स्यत कार्याभावोऽपि कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वं भविष्यतीति । वयं तु पश्यामो वन्ध्यापुत्रस्य कार्याभावस्य चाभावत्वाविशेषाद्यथा वन्ध्यापुत्रः कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वं न भविष्यत्येवं कार्याभावोऽपि कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वं न भविष्यतीति ॥

नन्वेवं सति कारकव्यापारोऽनर्थकः प्रसज्येत । यथैव हि प्राक्सिद्धत्वात् कारणस्वरूपसिद्धये न कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते, एवं प्राक्सिद्धत्वादनन्य-

त्वाच्च कार्यस्य स्वरूपसिद्धयेऽपि न कश्चिद्व्याप्रियेत । व्याप्रियते च । अतः कारकव्यापारार्थवत्त्वाय मन्यामहे प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावः कार्यस्येति । नैष दोषः । यतः कार्याकारेण कारणं व्यवस्थापयतः कारकव्यापारस्यार्थवत्त्वमुपपद्यते । कार्याकारोऽपि कारणस्यात्मभूत एव, अनात्मभूतस्यानारभ्यत्वात्, इत्यभाणि ॥ नच विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति । नहि देवदत्तः संकोचितहस्तपादः प्रसारितहस्तपादश्च विशेषेण दृश्यमानोऽपि वस्त्वन्यत्वं गच्छति, स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । तथा प्रतिदिनमनेकसंस्थानानामपि पित्रादीनां न वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति, मम पिता, मम भ्राता, मम पुत्र, इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । जन्मोच्छेदानन्तरितत्वात् तत्र युक्तम्, नान्यत्र इति चेत् । न । क्षीरादीनामपि दध्याद्याकारसंस्थानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । अदृश्यमानानामपि वटधानादीनां समानजातीयावयवान्तरोपचितानामङ्कुरादिभावेन दर्शनगोचरतापत्तौ जन्मसंज्ञा । तेषामेवावयवानामपचयवशाददर्शनापत्तावुच्छेदसंज्ञा । तत्रेदृग्जन्मोच्छेदान्तरितत्वाच्चेदसतः सत्त्वापत्तिः, सतश्चासत्त्वापत्तिः, तथा सति गर्भवासिन उत्तानशायिनश्च भेदप्रसङ्गः, तथाच बाल्ययौवनस्थाविरेष्वपि भेदप्रसङ्गः, पित्रादिव्यवहारलोपप्रसङ्गश्च ॥ एतेन क्षणभङ्गवादः प्रतिवदितव्यः ॥ यस्य पुनः प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत् कार्यं तस्य निर्विषयः कारकव्यापारः स्यात्, अभावस्य विषयत्वानुपपत्तेराकाशहननप्रयोजनखड्गाद्यनेकायुधप्रयुक्तिवत् । समवायिकारणविषयः कारकव्यापारः स्यादिति चेत् । न । अन्यविषयेण कारकव्यापारेणान्यनिष्पत्तेरतिप्रसङ्गात् । समवायिकारणस्यैवात्मातिशयः कार्यमिति चेत् । न । सत्कार्यतापत्तेः । तस्मात् क्षीरादीन्येव द्रव्याणि दध्यादिभावेनावतिष्ठमानानि कार्याख्यां लभन्त इति न कारणादन्यत् कार्यं वर्षशतेनापि शक्यं निश्चेतुम् । तथा मूलकारणमेवान्यात् कार्यात् तेनतेन कार्याकारेण नटवत् सर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते । एवं युक्तेः कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्त्वमनन्यत्वं च कारणादवगम्यते ॥

शब्दान्तराच्चैतदवगम्यते । पूर्वसूत्रेऽसद्व्यपदेशिनः शब्दस्योदाहृतत्वात् ततोऽन्यः सद्व्यपदेशी शब्दः शब्दान्तरम्—

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।

इत्यादि [छा०, ६·२·१],

तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीत् ।

इति चासत्पक्षमुपक्षिप्य [छा०, ६·२·१],

कथमसतः सज्जायेत ।

इति [छा०, ६·२·२] आक्षिप्य,

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् ।

इति [छा०, ६·२·३] अवधारयति । तत्रेदंशब्दवाच्यस्य कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेः सच्छब्दवाच्येन कारणेन सामानाधिकरण्यस्य श्रूयमाणत्वात् सत्त्वानन्यत्वे प्रसिध्यतः । यदितु प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत् कार्यं स्यात्, पश्चाच्चोत्पद्यमानं कारणे समवेयात्, तदान्यत् कारणात् स्यात् । तत्र—

येनाश्रुतꣳ श्रुतं भवति ।

इति [छा०, ६·१·३] इयं प्रतिज्ञा पीड्येत । सत्त्वानन्यत्वावगतेस्त्वियं प्रतिज्ञा समर्थ्यते ॥ १८ ॥

पटवच्च ॥ १९ ॥

यथाच संवेष्टितः पटो न व्यक्तं गृह्यते किमयं पटः किंवान्यद्द्रव्यमिति, स एव प्रसारितो यत् संवेष्टितं द्रव्यं तत् पट एवेति प्रसारणेनाभिव्यक्तो गृह्यते । यथाच संवेष्टनसमये पट इति गृह्यमाणोऽपि न विशिष्टायामविस्तारो गृह्यते, स एव प्रसारणसमये विशिष्टायामविस्तारो गृह्यते, न संवेष्टितरूपादन्योऽयं भिन्नः पट इति । एवं तन्त्वादिकारणावस्थं पटादिकार्यमस्पष्टं सत् तुरीवेमकुविन्दादिकारकव्यापारादिभिर्व्यक्तं स्पष्टं गृह्यते । अतः संवेष्टितप्रसारितपटन्यायेनैवानन्यत् कारणात् कार्यमित्यर्थः ॥ १९ ॥

यथाच प्राणादि ॥ २० ॥

यथाच लोके प्राणापानादिषु प्राणभेदेषु प्राणायामेन निरुद्धेषु कारणमात्रेण रूपेण वर्तमानेषु जीवनमात्रं कार्यं निर्वर्त्यते, नाकुञ्चनप्रसारणादिकं कार्यान्तरम् । तेष्वेव प्राणभेदेषु पुनःप्रवृत्तेषु जीवनादधिकमाकुञ्चनप्रसारणादिकमपि कार्यान्तरं निर्वर्त्यते । नच प्राणभेदानां प्रभेदवतः प्राणादन्यत्वं, समीरणस्वभावाविशेषात् । एवं कार्यस्य कारणादनन्यत्वम् ।

अतश्च कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वात् तदनन्यत्वाच्च सिद्धैषा श्रौती प्रतिज्ञा—

येनाश्रुत ९ श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम् ।

इति [छा०, ६·१·१] ॥ २७ ॥ इत्यारम्भणाधिकरणम् ॥ ६ ॥

७ इतरव्यपदेशाधिकरणम् ।

इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः ॥ २१ ॥

अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकारणवाद आक्षिप्यते । चेतनाद्धि जगत्प्रक्रियायामाश्रीयमाणायां हिताकरणादयो दोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते । कुतः । इतरव्यपदेशात् । इतरस्य शारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वं व्यपदिशति श्रुतिः—

स आत्मा, तत् त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो ।

इति [छा०, ६·८·७] प्रतिबोधनात् ॥ यद्वा । इतरस्य च ब्रह्मणः शारीरात्मत्वं व्यपदिशति—

तत् सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् ।

इति [तै० उ०, २·६] स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यानुप्रवेशेन शारीरात्मत्वप्रदर्शनात् ।

अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि ।

इति [छा०, ६·३·२] च परा देवता जीवमात्मशब्देन व्यपदिशन्ती न ब्रह्मणो भिन्नः शारीर इति दर्शयति । तस्माद्यद्ब्रह्मणः स्रष्टृत्वं तच्छारीरस्यैवेति । अतः स स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता सन् हितमेवात्मनः सौमनस्यकरं कुर्यान्नाहितं जन्ममरणजरारोगाद्यनेकानर्थजालम् । नहि कश्चिदपरतन्त्रो बन्धनागारमात्मनः कृत्वानुप्रविशति । नच स्वयमत्यन्तनिर्मलः सन्नत्यन्तमलिनं देहमात्मत्वेनोपेयात् । कृतमपि कथंचिद्यद्दुःखकरं तदिच्छया जह्यात् । सुखकरं चोपाददीत । स्मरेच्च मयेदं जगद्बिम्बं विचित्रं विरचितमिति । सर्वो हि लोकः स्पष्टं कार्यं कृत्वा स्मरति मयेदं कृतमिति । यथाच मायावी स्वयं प्रसारितां मायामिच्छयानायासेनैवोपसंहरति, एवं शारीरोऽपीमां सृष्टिमुपसंहरेत् । स्वमपि तावच्छरीरं शारीरो न शक्नोत्यनायासेनोपसंहर्तुम् । एवं हितक्रियाद्यदर्शनादन्याय्या चेतनाज्जगत्प्रक्रियेति गम्यते ॥ २१ ॥

अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ॥ २२ ॥

तुशब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति । यत् सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं शारीरादधिकमन्यत्, तद्वयं जगतः स्रष्टृ ब्रूमः । न तस्मिन् हिताकरणादयो दोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते । नहि तस्य हितं किंचित् कर्तव्यमस्त्यहितं वा परिहर्तव्यं, नित्यमुक्तस्वभावत्वात् । नच तस्य ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धो वा क्वचिदप्यास्ति, सर्वज्ञत्वात् सर्वशक्तित्वाच्च । शारीरस्त्वनेवंविधः । तस्मिन् प्रसज्यन्ते हिताकरणादयो दोषाः । नतु तं वयं जगतः स्रष्टारं ब्रूमः । कुत एतत् । भेदनिर्देशात् ।

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः [बृ०, २·४·५],
सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः [छा०, ८·७·१],
सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति [छा०, ६·८·१],
शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढः [बृ०, ४·३·३५],

इत्येवंजातीयकः कर्तृकर्मादिभेदनिर्देशो जीवादधिकं ब्रह्म दर्शयति ॥

नन्वभेदनिर्देशोऽपि दर्शितः—

तत् त्वमसि [छा०, ६·८·६],

इत्येवंजातीयकः । कथं भेदाभेदौ विरुद्धौ संभवेयाताम् । नैष दोषः, आकाशघटाकाशन्यायेनोभयसंभवस्य तत्रतत्र प्रतिष्ठापितत्वात् । अपिच यदा तत् त्वमसि [छा०, ६·८·६], इत्येवंजातीयकेनाभेदनिर्देशेनाभेदः प्रतिबोधितो भवति, अपगतं भवति तदा जीवस्य संसारित्वं, ब्रह्मणश्च स्रष्टृत्वं, समस्तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात् । तत्र कुत एव सृष्टिः कुतो वा हिताकरणादयो दोषाः । अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतकार्यकरणसंघातोपाध्यविवेककृता हि भ्रान्तिर्हिताकरणादिलक्षणः संसारो, नतु परमार्थतोऽस्तीत्यसकृदवोचाम, जन्ममरणच्छेदनभेदनाद्यभिमानवत् । अबाधिते तु भेदव्यवहारे—

सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः ।

इति [छा०, ८·७·१] एवंजातीयकेन भेदनिर्देशेनावगम्यमानं ब्रह्मणोऽधिकत्वं हिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिं निरुणद्धि ॥ २२ ॥

अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ॥ २३ ॥

यथा च लोके पृथिवीत्वसामान्यान्वितानामप्यश्मनां केचिन्महार्हा मणयो वज्रवैडूर्यादयोऽन्ये मध्यमवीर्याः सूर्यकान्तादयोऽन्ये प्रहीणाः श्ववायसप्रक्षेपणार्हाः पाषाणा इत्यनेकविधं वैचित्र्यं दृश्यते, यथा चैकपृथिवीव्यपाश्रयाणामपि बीजानां बहुविधं पत्रपुष्पफलगन्धरसादिवैचित्र्यं चन्दनकिंपाकादिषूपलक्ष्यते, यथा चैकस्याप्यन्नरसस्य लोहितादीनि केशलोमादीनि च विचित्राणि कार्याणि भवन्ति, एवमेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो जीवप्राज्ञपृथक्त्वं कार्यवैचित्र्यं चोपपद्यत इत्यतस्तदनुपपत्तिः, परपरिकल्पितदोषानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः । श्रुतेश्च प्रामाण्याद्विकारस्य च वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वात् स्वप्नदृश्यभाववैचित्र्यवच्चेत्यभ्युच्चयः ॥ २३ ॥ इतीतरव्यपदेशाधिकरणम् ॥ ७ ॥

८ उपसंहारदर्शनाधिकरणम् ।

उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेत्, न, क्षीरवद्धि ॥ २४ ॥

चेतनं ब्रह्मैकमद्वितीयं जगतः कारणमिति यदुक्तं तन्नोपपद्यते । कस्मात् । उपसंहारदर्शनात् । इह हि लोके कुलालादयो घटपटादीनां कर्तारो मृद्दण्डचक्रसूत्राद्यनेककारकोपसंहारेण संगृहीतसाधनाः सन्तस्तत्तत् कार्यं कुर्वाणा दृश्यन्ते । ब्रह्म चासहायं तवाभिप्रेतम् । तस्य साधनान्तरानुपसंग्रहे सति कथं स्रष्टृत्वमुपपद्येत । तस्मान्न ब्रह्म जगत्कारणमिति चेत् । नैष दोषः । यतः क्षीरवद्द्रव्यस्वभावविशेषादुपपद्यते । यथा हि लोके क्षीरं जलं वा स्वयमेव दधिहिमभावेन परिणमतेऽनपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं, तथेहापि भविष्यति ॥ ननु क्षीराद्यपि दध्यादिभावेन परिणममानमपेक्षत एव बाह्यं साधनमौष्ण्यादिकम्, कथमुच्यते क्षीरवद्धीति । नैष दोषः । स्वयमपि हि क्षीरं यां च यावतीं च परिणाममात्रामनुभवति, तावत्येव त्वार्यते त्वौष्ण्यादिना दधिभावाय । यदि च स्वयं दधिभावशीलता न स्यात्, नैवौष्ण्यादिनापि बलाद्दधिभावमापद्येत । नहि वायुराकाशो वौष्ण्यादिना बलाद्दधिभावमापद्यते । साधनसामग्र्या च तस्य पूर्णता संपाद्यते । परिपूर्णशक्तिकं तु ब्रह्म, न तस्यान्येन केनचित् पूर्णता संपादयितव्या । श्रुतिश्च भवति—

न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते
न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते ।
परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते
स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ॥

इति [श्वे०, ६. ८]। तस्मादेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विचित्रशक्तियोगात् क्षीरादिवद्विचित्रपरिणाम उपपद्यते ॥ २४ ॥

देवादिवदपि लोके ॥ २५ ॥

स्यादेतत् । उपपद्यते क्षीरादीनामचेतनानामनपेक्ष्यापि बाह्यं साधनं दध्यादिभावः, दृष्टत्वात् । चेतनाः पुनः कुलालादयः साधनसामग्रीमपेक्ष्यैव तस्मै तस्मै कार्याय प्रवर्तमाना दृश्यन्ते । कथं ब्रह्म चेतनं सदसहायं प्रवर्तेतेति ॥ देवादिवदिति ब्रूमः । यथा लोके देवाः पितर ऋषय इत्येवमादयो महाप्रभावाश्चेतना अपि सन्तोऽनपेक्ष्यैव किंचिद्बाह्यं साधनमैश्वर्यविशेषयोगादभिध्यानमात्रेण स्वत एव बहूनि नानासंस्थानानि शरीराणि प्रासादादीनि च रथादीनि च निर्मिमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते, मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणप्रामाण्यात् । तन्तुनाभश्च स्वत एव तन्तून् सृजति । बलाका चान्तरेणैव शुक्रं गर्भं धत्ते । पद्मिनी चानपेक्ष्य किंचित् प्रस्थानसाधनं सरोन्तरात् सरोन्तरं प्रतिष्ठते । एवं चेतनमपि ब्रह्मानपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं स्वत एव जगत् स्रक्ष्यति ॥ स यदि ब्रूयाद्य एते देवादयो ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्ता उपात्तास्ते दार्ष्टान्तिकेन ब्रह्मणा न समाना भवन्ति । शरीरमेव ह्यचेतनं देवादीनां शरीरान्तरादिविभूत्युत्पादन उपादानम्, नतु चेतन आत्मा । तन्तुनाभस्य च क्षुद्रतरजन्तुभक्षणाल्लाला कठिनतामापद्यमाना तन्तुर्भवति । बलाका च स्तनयित्नुरवश्रवणाद्गर्भं धत्ते । पद्मिनी च चेतनप्रयुक्ता सत्यचेतनेनैव शरीरेण सरोन्तरात् सरोन्तरमुपसर्पति, वल्लीव वृक्षं, न तु स्वयमेवाचेतना सरोन्तरोपसर्पणे व्याप्रियते । तस्मान्नैते ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्ता इति । तं प्रतिब्रूयान्नायं दोषः, कुलालादिदृष्टान्तवैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वादिति । यथाहि कुलालादीनां देवादीनां च समाने चेतनत्वे कुलालादयः कार्यारम्भे बाह्यं साधनमपेक्षन्ते, न देवादयः, तथा ब्रह्म चेतनमपि न बाह्यं

साधनमपेक्षिष्यत इत्येतावद्वयं देवाद्युदाहरणेन विवक्ष्यामः । तस्माद्यथैकस्य सामर्थ्यं दृष्टं तथा सर्वेषामेव भवितुमर्हतीति नास्त्येकान्त इत्यभिप्रायः ॥ २५ ॥ इत्युपसंहारदर्शनाधिकरणम् ॥ ८ ॥

९ कृत्स्नप्रसक्त्यधिकरणम् ।

चेतनमेकमद्वितीयं ब्रह्म क्षीरादिवद्देवादिवच्चानपेक्ष्य बाह्यसाधनं स्वयं परिणममानं जगतः कारणमिति स्थितम् । शास्त्रार्थपरिशुद्धये तु पुनराक्षिपति—

कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा ॥ २६ ॥

कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिः कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यरूपेण परिणामः प्राप्नोति, निरवयवत्वात् । यदि ब्रह्म पृथिव्यादिवत् सावयवमभविष्यत् ततोऽस्यैकदेशः पर्यणंस्यदेकदेशश्चावास्थास्यत । निरवयवं तु ब्रह्म श्रुतिभ्योऽवगम्यते—

निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम् [श्वे०, ६·१९]
दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः [मु०, २·१·२],
इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन एव [बृ०, २·४·१२],
स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा [बृ०, ३·९·२६],
अस्थूलमनणु [बृ०, ३·८·८],

इत्याद्याभ्यः सर्वविशेषप्रतिषेधिनीभ्यः । ततश्चैकदेशपरिणामासंभवात् कृत्स्नपरिणामप्रसक्तौ सत्यां मूलोच्छेदः प्रसज्येत । द्रष्टव्यतोपदेशानर्थक्यं चापन्नमयत्नदृष्टत्वात् कार्यस्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽसंभवात्, अजत्वादिशब्दकोपश्च । अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया सावयवमेव ब्रह्माभ्युपगम्येत, तथापि ये निरवयवत्वस्य प्रतिपादकाः शब्दाः उदाहृतास्ते प्रकुप्येयुः । सावयवत्वे चानित्यत्वप्रसङ्ग इति । सर्वथायं पक्षो न घटयितुं शक्यत इत्याक्षिपति ॥ २६ ॥

श्रुतेस्तु, शब्दमूलत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

तुशब्देनाक्षेपं परिहरति । न खल्वस्मत्पक्षे कश्चिदपि दोषोऽस्ति । न तावत् कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिरस्ति । कुतः । श्रुतेः । यथैव हि ब्रह्मणो जग-

दुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते एवं विकारव्यतिरेकेणापि ब्रह्मणोऽवस्थानं श्रूयते, प्रकृतिविकारयोर्भेदेन व्यपदेशात्—

> सेयं देवतैक्षत, हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता, अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि ।

इति [छा०, ६·३·२]

> तावानस्य महिमा ततो ज्यायाꣳश्च पूरुषः ।
> पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि ॥

इति [छा०, ३·१२·६] चैवंजातीयकात् । तथा हृदयायतनत्ववचनात् सत्संपत्तिवचनाच्च । यदि च कृत्स्नं ब्रह्म कार्यभावेनोपयुक्तं स्यात्—

> सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति ।

इति [छा०, ६·८·१] सुषुप्तिगतं विशेषणमनुपपन्नं स्यात्, विकृतेन ब्रह्मणा नित्यसंपन्नत्वादविकृतस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽभावात् । तथेन्द्रियगोचरत्वप्रतिषेधाद्ब्रह्मणो विकारस्य चेन्द्रियगोचरत्वोपपत्तेः । तस्मादस्त्यविकृतं ब्रह्म ॥ नच निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपोऽस्ति, श्रूयमाणत्वादेव निरवयवत्वस्याप्यभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात् । शब्दमूलं च ब्रह्म शब्दप्रमाणकम्, नेन्द्रियादिप्रमाणकम् । तद्यथाशब्दमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । शब्दश्चोभयमपि ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादयति, अकृत्स्नप्रसक्तिं निरवयवत्वं च । लौकिकानामपि मणिमन्त्रौषधिप्रभृतीनां देशकालनिमित्तवैचित्र्यवशाच्छक्तयो विरुद्धानेककार्यविषया दृश्यन्ते ता अपि तावन्नोपदेशमन्तरेण केवलेन तर्केणावगन्तुं शक्यन्ते, अस्य वस्तुन एतावत्य एतत्सहाया एतद्विषया एतत्प्रयोजनाश्च शक्तय इति । किमुताचिन्त्यस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्देन न निरूप्येत । तथाचाहुः पौराणिकाः [महा० भा०, ६·५·१२]—

> अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत् ।
> प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य लक्षणम् ॥

इति । तस्माच्छब्दमूल एवातीन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधिगमः ॥

ननु शब्देनापि न शक्यते विरुद्धोऽर्थः प्रत्याययितुं, निरवयवं च ब्रह्म परिणमते, न च कृत्स्नमिति । यदि निरवयवं ब्रह्म स्यान्नैव परिणमेत, कृत्स्नमेव वा परिणमेत । अथ केनचिद्रूपेण परिणमेत केनचिच्चा-

वतिष्ठेतेति रूपभेदकल्पनात् सावयवमेव प्रसज्येत । क्रियाविषये हि—

अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति, नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति ।

इति [जै०, १०·८·६] एवंजातीयकायां विरोधप्रतीतावपि विकल्पाश्रयणं विरोधपरिहारकारणं भवति, पुरुषतन्त्रत्वाच्चानुष्ठानस्य । इह तु विकल्पाश्रयणेनापि न विरोधपरिहारः संभवति, अपुरुषतन्त्रत्वाद्वस्तुनः । तस्माद्दुर्घटमेतदिति । नैष दोषः । अविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदाभ्युपगमात् । नह्यविद्याकल्पितेन रूपभेदेन सावयवं वस्तु संपद्यते । नहि तिमिरोपहतनयनेनानेक इव चन्द्रमा दृश्यमानोऽनेक एव भवति । अविद्याकल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयेन ब्रह्म परिणामादिसर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते, पारमार्थिकेन च रूपेण सर्वव्यवहारातीतमपरिणतमवतिष्ठते । वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वाच्चाविद्याकल्पितस्य नामरूपभेदस्येति न निरवयवत्वं ब्रह्मणः कुप्यति ॥ नचेयं परिणामश्रुतिः परिणामप्रतिपादनार्था, तत्प्रतिपत्तौ फलानवगमात् । सर्वव्यवहारहीनब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनार्था त्वेषा, तत्प्रतिपत्तौ फलावगमात्—

स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा ।

इत्युपक्रम्याह [बृ०, ४·२·४]—

अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि ।

इति । तस्मादस्मत्पक्षे न कश्चिदपि दोषप्रसङ्गोऽस्ति ॥ २७ ॥

आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि ॥ २८ ॥

अपिच नैवात्र विवदितव्यं कथमेकस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिः स्यादिति, यत आत्मन्यप्येकस्मिन् स्वप्नदृशि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिः पठ्यते [बृ०, ४·३·१०]—

न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्त्यथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजते ।

इत्यादिना । लोकेऽपि देवादिषु मायाव्यादिषु च स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैव विचित्रा हस्त्यश्वादिसृष्टयो दृश्यन्ते । तथैकस्मिन्नपि ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिर्भविष्यतीति ॥ २८ ॥

स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ॥ २९ ॥

परेषामप्येष समानः स्वपक्षे दोषः । प्रधानवादिनोऽपि हि निरवयवमपरिच्छिन्नं शब्दादिहीनं प्रधानं सावयवस्य परिच्छिन्नस्य शब्दादिमतः कार्यस्य कारणमिति स्वपक्षः । तत्रापि कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वात् प्रधानस्य प्राप्नोति, निरवयवत्वाभ्युपगमकोपो वा ॥ ननु नैव तैर्निरवयवं प्रधानमभ्युपगम्यते, सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि त्रयो गुणा नित्याः, तेषां साम्यावस्था प्रधानम्, तैरेवावयवैस्तत् सावयवमिति ॥ नैवंजातीयकेन सावयवत्वेन प्रकृतो दोषः परिहर्तुं पार्यते, यतः सत्त्वरजस्तमसामप्येकैकस्य समानं निरवयवत्वम् । एकैकमेव चेतरद्वयानुगृहीतं सजातीयस्य प्रपञ्चस्योपादानमिति समानत्वात् स्वपक्षदोषप्रसङ्गस्य । तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात् सावयवत्वमेवेति चेत्, एवमप्यनित्यत्वादिदोषप्रसङ्गः । अथ शक्तय एव कार्यवैचित्र्यसूचिता अवयवा इत्यभिप्रायः, तास्तु ब्रह्मवादिनोऽप्यविशिष्टाः ॥ तथाणुवादिनोऽप्यणुरण्वन्तरेण संयुज्यमानो निरवयवत्वाद्यदि कार्त्स्न्येन संयुज्येत, ततः प्रथिमानुपपत्तेरणुमात्रत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथैकदेशेन संयुज्येत, तथापि निरवयवत्वाभ्युपगमकोप इति स्वपक्षेऽपि समान एष दोषः । समानत्वाच्च नान्यतरस्मिन्नेव पक्ष उपक्षेप्तव्यो भवति । परिहृतस्तु ब्रह्मवादिना स्वपक्षे दोषः ॥ २९ ॥ इति कृत्स्नप्रसक्त्यधिकरणम् ॥ ९ ॥

१० सर्वोपेताधिकरणम् ।

एकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विचित्रशक्तियोगादुपपद्यते विचित्रो विकारप्रपञ्च इत्युक्तम् । तत् पुनः कथमवगम्यते विचित्रशक्तियुक्तं परं ब्रह्मेति । तदुच्यते—

सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ३० ॥

सर्वशक्तियुक्ता च परा देवतेत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । कुतः । तद्दर्शनात् । तथाहि दर्शयति श्रुतिः सर्वशक्तियोगं परस्या देवतायाः—

> सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादरः [छा०, ३·१४·४],
>
> सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः [छा०, ८·७·१],
>
> यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् [मुण्ड०, १·१·९],

एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः [बृ०, ३·८·९],

इत्येवंजातीयका ॥ ३० ॥

विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत् तदुक्तम् ॥ ३१ ॥

स्यादेतत् । विकरणां परां देवतां शास्ति शास्त्रम् [बृ०, ३·८·८]-

अचक्षुष्कमश्रोत्रमवागमनाः ।

इत्येवंजातीयकम् । कथं सा सर्वशक्तियुक्तापि सती कार्याय प्रभवेत् । देवादयो हि चेतनाः सर्वशक्तियुक्ता अपि सन्त आध्यात्मिककार्यकरणसंपन्ना एव तस्मैतस्मै कार्याय प्रभवन्तो विज्ञायन्ते ॥ कथं च—

नेति नेति [बृ०, ३·९·२६],

इति प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषाया देवतायाः सर्वशक्तियोगः संभवेदिति चेत् । यदत्र वक्तव्यं तत् पुरस्तादेवोक्तम् । श्रुत्यवगाह्यमेवेदमतिगम्भीरं ब्रह्म, न तर्कावगाह्यम् । न च यथैकस्य सामर्थ्यं दृष्टं तथान्यस्यापि सामर्थ्येन भवितव्यमिति नियमोऽस्तीति । प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगः संभवतीत्येतदप्यविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदोपन्यासेनोक्तमेव । तथा च शास्त्रम् [श्वे०, ३·१९]—

अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः ।

इत्यकरणस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वसामर्थ्ययोगं दर्शयति ॥ ३१ ॥ इति सर्वोपेताधिकरणम् ॥ १० ॥

११ प्रयोजनवत्त्वाधिकरणम् ।

अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकर्तृत्वं जगत आक्षिपति—

न, प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् ॥ ३२ ॥

न खलु चेतनः परमात्मेदं जगद्बिम्बं विरचयितुमर्हति । कुतः । प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् प्रवृत्तीनाम् । चेतनो हि लोके बुद्धिपूर्वकारी पुरुषः प्रवर्तमानो न मन्दोपक्रमामपि तावत् प्रवृत्तिमात्मप्रयोजनानुपयोगिनीमारभमाणो दृष्टः, किमुत गुरुतरसंरम्भाम् । भवति च लोकप्रसिद्ध्यनुवादिनी श्रुतिः—

न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति ।

इति [बृ०, २·४·५]। गुरुतरसंरम्भा चेयं प्रवृत्तिर्यदुच्चावचप्रपञ्चं जगद्बिम्बं विरचयितव्यम् । यदीयमपि प्रवृत्तिश्चेतनस्य परमात्मन आत्मप्रयोजनोपयोगिनी परिकल्प्येत, परितृप्तत्वं परमात्मनः श्रूयमाणं बाध्येत। प्रयोजनाभावे वा प्रवृत्त्यभावोऽपि स्यात् । अथ चेतनोऽपि सन्नुन्मत्तो बुद्धयपराधादन्तरेणैवात्मप्रयोजनं प्रवर्तमानो दृष्टस्तथा परमात्मापि प्रवर्तिष्यत इत्युच्येत, तथा सति सर्वज्ञत्वं परमात्मनः श्रूयमाणं बाध्येत। तस्मादश्लिष्टा चेतनात् सृष्टिरिति ॥ ३२ ॥

लोकवत् तु लीलाकैवल्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥

तुशब्देनाक्षेपं परिहरति । यथा लोके कस्यचिदाप्तैषणस्य राज्ञो राजामात्यस्य वा व्यतिरिक्तं किंचित् प्रयोजनमनभिसंधाय केवलं लीलारूपाः प्रवृत्तयः क्रीडाविहारेषु भवन्ति, यथा चोच्छ्वासप्रश्वासादयोऽनभिसंधाय बाह्यं किंचित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव संभवन्ति, एवमीश्वरस्याप्यनपेक्ष्य किंचित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव केवलं लीलारूपा प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति । न हीश्वरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं निरूप्यमाणं न्यायतः श्रुतितो वा संभवति । नच स्वभावः पर्यनुयोक्तुं शक्यते । यद्यप्यस्माकमियं जगद्बिम्बविरचना गुरुतरसंरम्भेवाभाति, तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव केवलेयम्, अपरिमितशक्तित्वात् । यदि नाम लोके लीलास्वपि किंचित् प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्ष्येत, तथापि नैवात्र किंचित् प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते, आप्तकामश्रुतेः । नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तप्रवृत्तिर्वा, सृष्टिश्रुतेः सर्वज्ञश्रुतेश्च । न चेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः, अविद्याकल्पितनामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वात्, ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्चेत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥ इति प्रयोजनवत्त्वाधिकरणम् ॥ ११ ॥

१२ वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याधिकरणम् ।

पुनश्च जगज्जन्मादिहेतुत्वमीश्वरस्याक्षिप्यते स्थूणानिखननन्यायेन प्रतिज्ञातस्यार्थस्य दृढीकरणाय—

वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न, सापेक्षत्वात्, तथाहि दर्शयति ॥ ३४ ॥

नेश्वरो जगतः कारणमुपपद्यते । कुतः । वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रसङ्गात् । कांश्चिदत्यन्तसुखभाजः करोति देवादीन्, कांश्चिदत्यन्तदुःखभाजः पश्वादीन्, कांश्चिन्मध्यमभोगभाजो मनुष्यादीनित्येवं विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमाणस्येश्वरस्य पृथग्जनस्येव रागद्वेषोपपत्तेः श्रुतिस्मृत्यवधारितस्वच्छत्वादीश्वरस्वभावविलोपः प्रसज्येत । तथा खलजनैरपि जुगुप्सितं निर्घृणत्वमतिक्रूरत्वं दुःखयोगविधानात् सर्वप्रजोपसंहाराच्च प्रसज्येत । तस्माद्वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रसङ्गान्नेश्वरः कारणमित्येवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये नेश्वरस्य प्रसज्येते । कस्मात् । सापेक्षत्वात् । यदि हि निरपेक्षः केवल ईश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीत; स्यातामेतौ दोषौ वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यं च । नतु निरपेक्षस्य निर्मातृत्वमस्ति । सापेक्षो हीश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते । किमपेक्षत इति चेत् । धर्माधर्मावपेक्षत इति वदामः । अतः सृज्यमानप्राणिधर्माधर्मापेक्षा विषमा सृष्टिरिति नायमीश्वरस्यापराधः । ईश्वरस्तु पर्जन्यवद्द्रष्टव्यः । यथाहि पर्जन्यो व्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति, व्रीहियवादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तद्बीजगतान्येवासाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति, एवमीश्वरो देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति । देवमनुष्यादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तज्जीवगतान्येवासाधारणानि कर्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति । एवमीश्वरः सापेक्षत्वान्न वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याभ्यां दुष्यति ॥ कथं पुनरवगम्यते सापेक्ष ईश्वरो नीचमध्यमोत्तमं संसारं निर्मिमीत इति । तथाहि दर्शयति श्रुतिः—

एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति तं, यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषत,
एष उ एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं, यमधो निनीषते ।

इति [कौ० ब्रा०, ३·८],

पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेन ।

इति [बृ०, ३·२·१३] च । स्मृतिरपि प्राणिकर्मविशेषापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्यानुग्रहीतृत्वं निग्रहीतृत्वं च दर्शयति—

ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम् ।

इति [भ० गी०, ४·११] एवंजातीयका ॥ ३४ ॥

न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्न, अनादित्वात् ॥ ३५ ॥

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।

इति [छा०, ६·२·१] प्राक् सृष्टेरविभागावधारणान्नास्ति कर्म, यदपेक्ष्य विषमा सृष्टिः स्यात् । सृष्ट्युत्तरकालं हि शरीरादिविभागापेक्षं कर्म, कर्मापेक्षश्च शरीरादिविभागः, इतीतरेतराश्रयत्वं प्रसज्येत । अतो विभागादूर्ध्वं कर्मापेक्ष ईश्वरः प्रवर्ततां नाम । प्राग्विभागाद्वैचित्र्यनिमित्तस्य कर्मणोऽभावात् तुल्यैवाद्या सृष्टिः प्राप्नोतीति चेत् । नैष दोषः । अनादित्वात् संसारस्य । भवेदेष दोषो यद्यादिमान् संसारः स्यात् । अनादौ तु संसारे, बीजाङ्कुरवद्धेतुहेतुमद्भावेन कर्मणः सर्गवैषम्यस्य च, प्रवृत्तिर्न विरुध्यते ॥ ३५ ॥

कथं पुनरवगम्यतेऽनादिरेष संसार इति । अत उत्तरं पठति—

उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च ॥ ३६ ॥

उपपद्यते च संसारस्यानादित्वम् । आदिमत्त्वे हि संसारस्याकस्मादुद्भूतेर्मुक्तानामपि पुनः संसारोद्भूतिप्रसङ्गः, अकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गश्च, सुखदुःखादिवैषम्यस्य निर्निमित्तत्वात् । न चेश्वरो वैषम्यहेतुरित्युक्तम् । न चाविद्या केवला वैषम्यस्य कारणं, एकरूपत्वात् । रागादिक्लेशवासनाक्षिप्तकर्मापेक्षा त्वविद्या वैषम्यकरी स्यात् । न च कर्मान्तरेण शरीरं संभवति, न च शरीरमन्तरेण कर्म संभवति, इतीतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गः । अनादित्वे तु, बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेनोपपत्तेर्न कश्चिद्दोषो भवति ॥ उपलभ्यते च संसारस्यानादित्वं श्रुतिस्मृत्योः । श्रुतौ तावत् [छा०, ६·३·२]—

अनेन जीवेनात्मना ।

इति सर्गप्रमुखे शारीरमात्मानं जीवशब्देन प्राणधारणनिमित्तेनाभिलपन्ननादिः संसार इति दर्शयति । आदिमत्त्वे तु प्रागनवधारितप्राणः सन् कथं प्राणधारणनिमित्तेन जीवशब्देन सर्गप्रमुखेऽभिलप्येत । न च धारयिष्यतीत्यतोऽभिलप्येत, अनागताद्धि संबन्धादतीतः संबन्धो बलवान् भवति, अभिनिष्पन्नत्वात् ।

सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् ।

इति च मन्त्रवर्णः [ऋ० सं०, १०·१९०·३] पूर्वकल्पसद्भावं दर्शयति । स्मृतावप्यनादित्वं संसारस्योपलभ्यते [भ० गी०, १५·३]—

न रूपमस्येह तथोपलभ्यते
नान्तो न चादिर्न च संप्रतिष्ठा ।

इति । पुराणे चातीतानागतानां च कल्पानां न परिमाणमस्तीति स्थापितम् ॥ ३६ ॥ इति वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याधिकरणम् ॥ १२ ॥

१३ सर्वधर्मोपपत्त्यधिकरणम् ।

चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यस्मिन्नवधारिते वेदार्थे परैरुपक्षिप्तान् विलक्षणत्वादीन् दोषान् पर्यहार्षीदाचार्यः । इदानीं परपक्षप्रतिषेधप्रधानं प्रकरणं प्रारिप्समाणः स्वपक्षपरिग्रहप्रधानं प्रकरणमुपसंहरति—

सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३७ ॥

यस्मादस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि कारणे परिगृह्यमाणे प्रदर्शितेन प्रकारेण सर्वे कारणधर्मा उपपद्यन्ते सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति महामायं च ब्रह्मेति, तस्मादनतिशङ्कनीयमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनमिति ॥ ३७ ॥ इति सर्वधर्मोपपत्त्यधिकरणम् ॥ १३ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यगोविन्दभगवत्पूज्यपादशिष्य-
श्रीमच्छङ्करभगवत्पादकृतौ शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये
द्वितीयाध्यायस्य प्रथमः स्मृतिपादः समाप्तः ॥

अथ

श्रीमद्बादरायणप्रणीतानि ब्रह्मसूत्राणि

श्रीशङ्कराचार्यविरचित-

शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्यसमेतानि

तत्र

अविरोधाख्यद्वितीयाध्यायस्य

द्वितीय(तर्क)पादः

Errata to Text

N. B.—The References are to Adhyāya, Pāda, Sūtra and Line

	Correct	*Incorrect*
II. ii. 11[19]	°भ्युपगमात् ।	°भ्युपगमात् ॥
II. ii. 11[21]	योजना ॥	योजना ।
II. ii. 11[11]	क्रमेण कृत्स्नं	क्रमेणकृत्स्नं
II. ii. 15[7]	रूपादिमद्वस्तु, तत्	रूपादिमद्वस्तु, । तत्
II. ii. 17[38]	दर्शनात् ॥	°दर्शनात् ।
II. 17[65]	संश्लेषोऽस्ति ॥	संश्लेषोऽस्ति ।
II. ii. 18[7]	चैत्तं च ।	चैत्तं च,
II. ii. 18[10]	पञ्च स्कन्धाः	पञ्चस्कन्धाः
II. ii. 18[11]	मन्यन्ते	मन्यते
II. ii. 19[4]	नामरूपं	नाम रूपं
II. ii. 19[12]	किंचिन्निमित्तं	किंचिन्नित्तं
II. ii. 25[21]	तथा सत्येकस्य	तथासत्येकस्य
II. ii. 25[34]	॥ २५ ॥	॥ २२ ॥
II. ii. 28[57]	विशेष्यस्य	विशेषस्य
II. ii. 30[2]	मुपपद्यते	मुपपद्येत
II. ii. 31[8]	संधातव्यानि ॥	संधातव्यानि ।
II. ii. 33[18]	प्रतिजानानस्य निर्धा- रणस्यापि, वस्तुत्वाविशेषात्,	प्रतिजानानस्य, निर्धा- रणस्यापि वस्तुत्वाविशेषात्,
II. ii. 34[4]	आत्मेत्यतो	आत्मेत्यता

अथ

ब्रह्मसूत्रशाङ्करभाष्ये

द्वितीयाध्यायस्य

द्वितीयः पादः

१ रचनानुपपत्त्यधिकरणम् ।

यद्यपीदं वेदान्तवाक्यानामैदंपर्यं निरूपयितुं शास्त्रं प्रवृत्तं, न तर्कशास्त्रवत् केवलाभिर्युक्तिभिः कंचित् सिद्धान्तं साधयितुं दूषयितुं वा प्रवृत्तम्, तथापि वेदान्तवाक्यानि व्याचक्षाणैः सम्यग्दर्शनप्रतिपक्षभूतानि सांख्यादिदर्शनानि निराकरणीयानीति तदर्थः परः पादः प्रवर्तते । वेदान्तार्थनिर्णयस्य च सम्यग्दर्शनार्थत्वात् तन्निर्णयेन स्वपक्षस्थापनं प्रथमं कृतं, तद्ध्यभ्यर्हितं परपक्षप्रत्याख्यानादिति ॥ ननु मुमुक्षूणां मोक्षसाधनत्वेन सम्यग्दर्शननिरूपणाय स्वपक्षस्थापनमेव केवलं कर्तुं युक्तम्, किं परपक्षनिराकरणेन परविद्वेषकरेण । बाढमेवम् । तथापि महाजनपरिगृहीतानि महान्ति सांख्यादितन्त्राणि सम्यग्दर्शनापदेशेन प्रवृत्तान्युपलभ्य भवेत् केषांचिन्मन्दमतीनामेतान्यपि सम्यग्दर्शनायोपादेयानीत्यपेक्षा, तथा युक्तिगाढत्वसंभवेन सर्वज्ञभाषितत्वाच्च श्रद्धा च तेषु । इत्यतस्तदसारतोपपादनाय प्रयत्यते ॥ ननु—ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् [ब्र० सू०, १·१·५], कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा [ब्र० सू०, १·१·१८], एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः [ब्र० सू०, १·४·२८] इति च पूर्वत्रापि सांख्यादिपक्षप्रतिक्षेपः कृतः, किं पुनः कृतकरणेनेति । तदुच्यते—सांख्यादयः स्वपक्षस्थापनाय वेदान्तवाक्यान्यप्युदाहृत्य स्वपक्षानुगुण्येनैव योजयन्तो व्याचक्षते । तेषां यद्व्याख्यानं तद्व्याख्यानाभासं, न सम्यग्व्याख्यानम्, इत्येतावत् पूर्वं कृतम् । इह तु वाक्यनिरपेक्षः स्वतन्त्रस्तद्युक्तिप्रतिषेधः क्रियत इत्येष विशेषः ॥

रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम् ॥ १ ॥

तत्र सांख्या मन्यन्ते—यथा घटशरावादयो भेदा मृदात्मनान्वीयमाना मृदात्मकसामान्यपूर्वका लोके दृष्टाः, तथा सर्व एव बाह्याध्यात्मिका भेदाः सुखदुःखमोहात्मतयान्वीयमानाः सुखदुःखमोहात्मकसामान्यपूर्वका भवितुमर्हन्ति । यत् तत् सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं सामान्यं तत् त्रिगुणं प्रधानं मृद्वदचेतनं चेतनस्य पुरुषस्यार्थं साधयितुं स्वभावेनैव विचित्रेण विकारात्मना विवर्तत इति । तथा परिमाणादिभिरपि लिङ्गैस्तदेव प्रधानमनुमिमते ॥ तत्र वदामः—यदि दृष्टान्तबलेनैवैतन्निरूप्येत, नाचेतनं लोके चेतनानधिष्ठितं स्वतन्त्रं किंचिद्विशिष्टपुरुषार्थनिर्वर्तनसमर्थान् विकारान् विरचयद्दृष्टम् । गेहप्रासादशयनासनविहारभूम्यादयो हि लोके प्रज्ञावद्भिः शिल्पिभिर्यथाकालं सुखदुःखप्राप्तिपरिहारयोग्या रचिता दृश्यन्ते । तथेदं जगदखिलं पृथिव्यादि नानाकर्मफलोपभोग्यं बाह्यम्, आध्यात्मिकं च शरीरादि नानाजात्यन्वितं प्रतिनियतावयवविन्यासमनेककर्मफलानुभवाधिष्ठानं दृश्यमानम्, प्रज्ञावद्भिः संभाविततमैः शिल्पिभिर्मनसाप्यालोचयितुमशक्यं सत्, कथमचेतनं प्रधानं रचयेत् । लोष्टपाषाणादिष्वदृष्टत्वात् । मृदादिष्वपि कुम्भकाराद्यधिष्ठितेषु विशिष्टाकारा रचना दृश्यते । तद्वत् प्रधानस्यापि चेतनान्तराधिष्ठितत्वप्रसङ्गः । नच मृदाद्युपादानस्वरूपव्यपाश्रयेणैव धर्मेण मूलकारणमवधारणीयम्, न बाह्यकुम्भकारादिव्यपाश्रयेणेति किंचिन्नियामकमस्ति । नचैवं सति किंचिद्विरुध्यते, प्रत्युत श्रुतिरनुगृह्यते चेतनकारणसमर्पणात् । अतो रचनानुपपत्तेश्च हेतोर्नाचेतनं जगत्कारणमनुमातव्यं भवति ॥ अन्वयाद्यनुपपत्तेश्चेति चशब्देन हेतोरसिद्धिं समुच्चिनोति । नहि बाह्याध्यात्मिकानां भेदानां सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतयान्वय उपपद्यते, सुखादीनां चान्तरत्वप्रतीतेः शब्दादीनां चातद्रूपत्वप्रतीतेः, तन्निमित्तत्वप्रतीतेश्च । शब्दाद्यविशेषेऽपि च भावनाविशेषात् सुखादिविशेषोपलब्धेः ॥ तथा परिमितानां भेदानां मूलाङ्कुरादीनां संसर्गपूर्वकत्वं दृष्ट्वा बाह्याध्यात्मिकानां भेदानां परिमितत्वात् संसर्गपूर्वकत्वमनुमिमानस्य सत्त्वरजस्तमसामपि संसर्गपूर्वकत्वप्रसङ्गः परिमितत्वाविशेषात् । कार्यकारणभावस्तु प्रेक्षापूर्वकनिर्मितानां शयनासनादीनां दृष्ट इति न कार्यकारणभावाद्बाह्याध्यात्मिकानां भेदानामचेतनपूर्वकत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम् ॥ १ ॥

प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ २ ॥

आस्तां तावदियं रचना । तत्सिद्ध्यर्था या प्रवृत्तिः, साम्यावस्थानात् प्रच्युतिः सत्त्वरजस्तमसामङ्गाङ्गिभावरूपापत्तिर्विशिष्टकार्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तिता, सापि नाचेतनस्य प्रधानस्य स्वतन्त्रस्योपपद्यते, मृदादिष्वदर्शनाद्रथादिषु च । नहि मृदादयो रथादयो वा स्वयमचेतनाः सन्तश्चेतनैः कुलालादिभिरश्वादिभिर्वानधिष्ठिता विशिष्टकार्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तयो दृश्यन्ते । दृष्टाच्चादृष्टसिद्धिः । अतः प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि हेतोर्नाचेतनं जगत्कारणमनुमातव्यं भवति ॥ ननु चेतनस्यापि प्रवृत्तिः केवलस्य न दृष्टा । सत्यमेतत् । तथापि चेतनसंयुक्तस्य रथादेरचेतनस्य प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा, नत्वचेतनसंयुक्तस्य चेतनस्य प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा । किं पुनरत्र युक्तम् । यस्मिन् प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा तस्य सा, उत यत्संप्रयुक्तस्य दृष्टा तस्य सेति । ननु यस्मिन् दृश्यते प्रवृत्तिस्तस्यैव सेति युक्तमुभयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात्, नतु प्रवृत्त्याश्रयत्वेन केवलश्चेतनो रथादिवत् प्रत्यक्षः । प्रवृत्त्याश्रयदेहादिसंयुक्तस्यैव तु चेतनस्य सद्भावसिद्धिः, केवलाचेतनरथादिवैलक्षण्यं जीवद्देहस्य दृष्टमिति । अत एव च प्रत्यक्षे देहे सति दर्शनादसति चादर्शनाद्देहस्यैव चैतन्यमपीति लोकायतिकाः प्रतिपन्नाः । तस्मादचेतनस्यैव प्रवृत्तिरिति ॥ तदभिधीयते— न ब्रूमो यस्मिन्नचेतने प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते न तस्य सेति । भवतु तस्यैव सा । सा तु चेतनाद्भवतीति ब्रूमः, तद्भावे भावात् तदभावे चाभावात् । यथा काष्ठादिव्यपाश्रयापि दाहप्रकाशलक्षणा विक्रिया, अनुपलभ्यमानापि च केवले ज्वलने, ज्वलनादेव भवति, तत्संयोगे दर्शनात् तद्वियोगे चादर्शनात्, तद्वत् । लोकायतिकानामपि चेतन एव देहोऽचेतनानां रथादीनां प्रवर्तको दृष्ट इत्यविप्रतिषिद्धं चेतनस्य प्रवर्तकत्वम् ॥ ननु तव देहादिसंयुक्तस्याप्यात्मनो विज्ञानस्वरूपमात्राव्यतिरेकेण प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरनुपपन्नं प्रवर्तकत्वमिति चेत् । न । अयस्कान्तवद्रूपादिवच्च प्रवृत्तिरहितस्यापि प्रवर्तकत्वोपपत्तेः । यथायस्कान्तो मणिः स्वयं प्रवृत्तिरहितोऽप्ययसः प्रवर्तको भवति । यथा वा रूपादयो विषयाः स्वयं प्रवृत्तिरहिता अपि चक्षुरादीनां प्रवर्तका भवन्ति । एवं प्रवृत्तिरहितोऽपीश्वरः सर्वगतः सर्वात्मा सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिश्च सन् सर्वं प्रवर्तयेदित्युपपन्नम् । एकत्वात्

प्रवर्त्याभावे प्रवर्तकत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत् न । अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपमायावेशवशेनासकृत्प्रत्युक्तत्वात् । तस्मात् संभवति प्रवृत्तिः सर्वज्ञकारणत्वे, नत्वचेतनकारणत्वे ॥ २ ॥

पयोम्बुवच्चेत् तत्रापि ॥ ३ ॥

स्यादेतत् । यथा क्षीरमचेतनं स्वभावेनैव वत्सविवृद्ध्यर्थं प्रवर्तते, यथाच जलमचेतनं स्वभावेनैव लोकोपकाराय स्यन्दते, एवं प्रधानमचेतनं स्वभावेनैव पुरुषार्थसिद्धये प्रवर्तिष्यत इति । नैतत् साधूच्यते, यतस्तत्रापि पयोम्बुनोश्चेतनाधिष्ठितयोरेव प्रवृत्तिरित्यनुमिमीमहे । उभयवादिप्रसिद्धे रथादावचेतने केवले प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात् । शास्त्रं च [बृ०, ३·७·४],

योऽप्सु तिष्ठन् योऽपोऽन्तरो यमयति ।

एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि प्राच्योऽन्या नद्यः स्यन्दन्ते ।

इति [बृ०, ३·८·९] एवंजातीयकं समस्तस्य लोकपरिस्पन्दितस्येश्वराधिष्ठिततां श्रावयति । तस्मात् साध्यपक्षनिक्षिप्तत्वात् पयोम्बुवदित्यनुपन्यासः । चेतनायाश्च धेन्वाः स्नेहेच्छया पयसः प्रवर्तकत्वोपपत्तेः वत्सचोषणेन च पयस आकृष्यमाणत्वात् । न चाम्बुनोऽप्यत्यन्तमनपेक्षा, निम्नभूम्याद्यपेक्षत्वात् स्यन्दनस्य । चेतनापेक्षत्वं तु सर्वत्रोपदर्शितम् ॥ उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न, क्षीरवद्धि [ब्र० सू०, २·१·२४], इत्यत्र तु बाह्यनिमित्तनिरपेक्षमपि स्वाश्रयं कार्यं भवतीत्येतल्लोकदृष्ट्या निदर्शितम् । शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तु पुनः सर्वत्रैवेश्वरापेक्षत्वमापद्यमानं न पराणुद्यते ॥ ३ ॥

व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

सांख्यानां त्रयो गुणाः साम्येनावतिष्ठमानाः प्रधानम् । नतु तद्व्यतिरेकेण प्रधानस्य प्रवर्तकं निवर्तकं वा किंचिद्बाह्यमपेक्ष्यमवस्थितमस्ति । पुरुषस्तूदासीनो न प्रवर्तको न निवर्तक इत्यतोऽनपेक्षं प्रधानम् । अनपेक्षत्वाच्च कदाचित् प्रधानं महदाद्याकारेण परिणमते, कदाचिन्न परिणमते इत्येतदयुक्तम् । ईश्वरस्य तु सर्वज्ञत्वात् सर्वशक्तित्वान्महामायत्वाच्च प्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती न विरुध्येते ॥ ४ ॥

अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत् ॥ ५ ॥

स्यादेतत् । यथा तृणपल्लवोदकादि निमित्तान्तरनिरपेक्षं स्वभावादेव क्षीराद्याकारेण परिणमते, एवं प्रधानमपि महदाद्याकारेण परिणंस्यत इति । कथं च निमित्तान्तरनिरपेक्षं तृणादीति गम्यते । निमित्तान्तरानुपलम्भात् । यदि हि किंचिन्निमित्तमुपलभेमहि, ततो यथाकामं तेन तृणाद्युपादाय क्षीरं संपादयेमहि । नतु संपादयामहे । तस्मात् स्वाभाविकस्तृणादेः परिणामः । तथा प्रधानस्यापि स्यादिति । अत्रोच्यते— भवेत् तृणादिवत् स्वाभाविकः प्रधानस्यापि परिणामो यदि तृणादेरपि स्वाभाविकः परिणामोऽभ्युपगम्येत । नत्वभ्युपगम्यते, निमित्तान्तरोपलब्धेः । कथं निमित्तान्तरोपलब्धिः । अन्यत्राभावात् । धेन्वैव ह्युपयुक्तं तृणादि क्षीरीभवति, न प्रहीणमनडुदाद्युपयुक्तं वा । यदि हि निर्निमित्तमेतत् स्यात्, धेनुशरीरसंबन्धादन्यत्रापि तृणादि क्षीरीभवेत् । नच यथाकामं मानुषैर्न शक्यं संपादयितुमित्येतावता निर्निमित्तं भवति । भवति हि किंचित् कार्यं मानुषसंपाद्यम्, किंचिद्दैवसंपाद्यम् । मनुष्या अपि शक्नुवन्त्येवोचितेनोपायेन तृणाद्युपादाय क्षीरं संपादयितुम् । प्रभूतं हि क्षीरं कामयमानाः प्रभूतं घासं धेनुं चारयन्ति, ततश्च प्रभूतं क्षीरं लभन्ते । तस्मान्न तृणादिवत् स्वाभाविकः प्रधानस्य परिणामः ॥ ५ ॥

अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् ॥ ६ ॥

स्वाभाविकी प्रधानप्रवृत्तिर्न भवतीति स्थापितम् । अथापि नाम भवतः श्रद्धामनुरुध्यमानाः स्वाभाविकीमेव प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिमभ्युपगच्छेम, तथापि दोषोऽनुषज्येतैव । कुतः । अर्थाभावात् । यदि तावत् स्वाभाविकी प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिर्न किंचिदन्यादिहापेक्षत इत्युच्येत, ततो यथैव सहकारि किंचिन्नापेक्षत एवं प्रयोजनमपि किंचिन्नापेक्षिष्यते, इत्यतः प्रधानं पुरुषस्यार्थं साधयितुं प्रवर्तत इतीयं प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत ॥ स यदि ब्रूयात् सहकार्येव केवलं नापेक्षते, न प्रयोजनमपीति । तथापि प्रधानप्रवृत्तेः प्रयोजनं विवेक्तव्यम्, भोगो वा स्यादपवर्गो वोभयं वेति । भोगश्चेत् कीदृशोऽनाधेयातिशयस्य पुरुषस्य भोगो भवेत् । अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गश्च । अपवर्गश्चेत्

प्रागपि प्रवृत्तेरपवर्गस्य सिद्धत्वात् प्रवृत्तिरनर्थिका स्यात् । शब्दाद्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गश्च । उभयार्थताभ्युपगमेऽपि भोक्तव्यानां प्रधानमात्राणामानन्त्यादनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्ग एव । नचौत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्था प्रवृत्तिः । नहि प्रधानस्याचेतनस्यौत्सुक्यं संभवति । नच पुरुषस्य निर्मलस्य निष्कलस्यौत्सुक्यम् । दृक्शक्तिसर्गशक्तिवैयर्थ्यभयाच्चेत् प्रवृत्तिस्तर्हि दृक्शक्त्यनुच्छेदवत् सर्गशक्त्यनुच्छेदात् संसारानुच्छेदादनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्ग एव । तस्मात् प्रधानस्य पुरुषार्था प्रवृत्तिरित्येतदयुक्तम् ॥ ६ ॥

पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्, तथापि ॥ ७ ॥

स्यादेतत् । यथा कश्चित् पुरुषो दृक्शक्तिसंपन्नः प्रवृत्तिशक्तिविहीनः पङ्गुरपरं पुरुषं प्रवृत्तिशक्तिसंपन्नं दृक्शक्तिविहीनमन्धमधिष्ठाय प्रवर्तयति, यथा वायस्कान्तोऽश्मा स्वयमप्रवर्तमानोऽप्ययः प्रवर्तयति, एवं पुरुषः प्रधानं प्रवर्तयिष्यतीति दृष्टान्तप्रत्ययेन पुनः प्रत्यवस्थानम् ॥ अत्रोच्यते—तथापि नैव दोषान्निर्मोक्षोऽस्ति । अभ्युपेतहानं तावद्दोष आपतति । प्रधानस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य प्रवृत्त्यभ्युपगमात्, पुरुषस्य च प्रवर्तकत्वानभ्युपगमात् । कथं चोदासीनः पुरुषः प्रधानं प्रवर्तयेत् । पङ्गुरपि ह्यन्धं वागादिभिः पुरुषं प्रवर्तयति । नैवं पुरुषस्य कश्चिदपि प्रवर्तनव्यापारोऽस्ति, निष्क्रियत्वाच्च । नाप्ययस्कान्तवत् संनिधिमात्रेण प्रवर्तयेत्, संनिधिनित्यत्वेन प्रवृत्तिनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अयस्कान्तस्य त्वनित्यसंनिधेरस्ति सव्यापारः संनिधिः, परिमार्जनाद्यपेक्षा चास्यास्ति, इत्यनुपन्यासः पुरुषाश्मवदिति । तथा प्रधानस्याचैतन्यात् पुरुषस्य चौदासीन्यात् तृतीयस्य च तयोः संबन्धयितुरभावात्, संबन्धानुपपत्तिः । योग्यतानिमित्ते च संबन्धे योग्यतानुच्छेदादनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः । पूर्ववच्चेहाप्यर्थाभावो विकल्पयितव्यः । परमात्मनस्तु स्वरूपव्यपाश्रयमौदासीन्यं मायाव्यपाश्रयं च प्रवर्तकत्वमित्यस्त्यतिशयः ॥ ७ ॥

अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ८ ॥

इतश्च न प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिरवकल्पते । यद्धि सत्त्वरजस्तमसामन्योन्यगुणप्रधानभावमुत्सृज्य साम्येन स्वरूपमात्रेणावस्थानं सा प्रधानावस्था ।

तस्यामवस्थायामनपेक्षस्वरूपाणां स्वरूपप्रणाशभयात् परस्परं प्रत्यङ्गाङ्गिभावानुपपत्तेः, बाह्यस्य च कस्यचित् क्षोभयितुरभावाद्गुणवैषम्यनिमित्तो महदाद्युत्पादो न स्यात् ॥ ८ ॥

अन्यथानुमितौ च ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात् ॥ ९ ॥

अथापि स्यादन्यथा वयमनुमिमीमहे यथा नायमनन्तरो दोषः प्रसज्येत । नह्यनपेक्षस्वभावाः कूटस्थाश्चास्माभिर्गुणा अभ्युपगम्यन्ते । प्रमाणाभावात् । कार्यवशेन तु गुणानां स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते, यथायथा कार्योत्पाद उपपद्यते तथातथैषां स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते । चलं गुणवृत्तमिति चास्त्यभ्युपगमः । तस्मात् साम्यावस्थायामपि वैषम्योपगमयोग्या एव गुणा अवतिष्ठन्त इति । एवमपि प्रधानस्य ज्ञशक्तिवियोगाद्रचनानुपपत्त्यादयः पूर्वोक्ता दोषास्तदवस्था एव । ज्ञशक्तिमपि त्वनुमिमानः प्रतिवादित्वान्निवर्तेत, चेतनमेकमनेकप्रपञ्चस्य जगत उपादानमिति ब्रह्मवादप्रसङ्गात् । वैषम्योपगमयोग्या अपि गुणाः साम्यावस्थायां निमित्ताभावान्नैव वैषम्यं भजेरन्, भजमाना वा निमित्ताभावाविशेषात् सर्वदैव वैषम्यं भजेरन्निति प्रसज्यत एवायमनन्तरोऽपि दोषः ॥ ९ ॥

विप्रतिषेधाच्चासमञ्जसम् ॥ १० ॥

परस्परविरुद्धश्चायं सांख्यानामभ्युपगमः । क्वचित् सप्तेन्द्रियाण्यनुक्रामन्ति, क्वचिदेकादश । तथा क्वचिन्महतस्तन्मात्रसर्गमुपदिशन्ति, क्वचिदहंकारात् । तथा क्वचित् त्रीण्यन्तःकरणानि वर्णयन्ति, क्वचिदेकमिति । प्रसिद्ध एव तु श्रुत्येश्वरकारणवादिन्या विरोधस्तदनुवर्तिन्या च स्मृत्या । तस्मादप्यसमञ्जसं सांख्यानां दर्शनमिति ॥ अत्राह—नन्वौपनिषदानामप्यसमञ्जसमेव दर्शनम्, तप्यतापकयोर्जात्यन्तरभावानभ्युपगमात् । एकं हि ब्रह्म सर्वात्मकं सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चस्य कारणमभ्युपगच्छतामेकस्यैवात्मनो विशेषौ तप्यतापकौ, न जात्यन्तरभूतौ, इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यं स्यात् । यदि चैतौ तप्यतापकावेकस्यात्मनो विशेषौ स्याताम्, स ताभ्यां तप्यतापकाभ्यां न निर्मुच्यत इति, तापोपशान्तये सम्यग्दर्शनमुपदिशच्छास्त्रमनर्थकं स्यात् । नह्यौष्ण्यप्रकाशधर्मकस्य प्रदीपस्य तदवस्थस्यैव ताभ्यां

निर्मोक्ष उपपद्यते । योऽपि जलतरङ्गवीचीफेनाद्युपन्यासः, तत्रापि जलात्मन एकस्य वीच्यादयो विशेषा आविर्भावतिरोभावरूपेण नित्या एवेति समानो जलात्मनो वीच्यादिभिरनिर्मोक्षः । प्रसिद्धश्चायं तप्यतापकयोर्जात्यन्तरभावो लोके । तथाहि–अर्थी चार्थश्चान्योन्यभिन्नौ लक्ष्येते । यद्यर्थिनः स्वतोऽन्योऽर्थो न स्यात्, यस्यार्थिनो यद्विषयमर्थित्वं स तस्यार्थो नित्यसिद्ध एवेति न तस्य तद्विषयमर्थित्वं स्यात् । यथा प्रकाशात्मनः प्रदीपस्य प्रकाशाख्योऽर्थो नित्यसिद्ध एवेति न तस्य तद्विषयमर्थित्वं भवति, अप्राप्ते ह्यर्थेऽर्थिनोऽर्थित्वं स्यादिति । तथार्थस्याप्यर्थत्वं न स्यात् । यदि स्यात् स्वार्थत्वमेव स्यात् । नचैतदस्ति । संबन्धिशब्दौ ह्येतावर्थी चार्थश्चेति । द्वयोश्च संबन्धिनोः संबन्धः स्यात्, नैकस्यैव । तस्माद्भिन्नावेतावर्थार्थिनौ । तथानर्थानर्थिनावपि । अर्थिनोऽनुकूलोऽर्थः प्रतिकूलोऽनर्थः, ताभ्यामेकः पर्यायेणोभाभ्यां संबध्यते । तत्रार्थस्याल्पीयस्त्वाद्भूयस्त्वाच्चानर्थस्योभावप्यर्थानर्थावनर्थ एवेति तापकः स उच्यते । तप्यस्तु पुरुषो य एकः पर्यायेणोभाभ्यां संबध्यत इति । तयोस्तप्यतापकयोरेकात्मतायां मोक्षानुपपत्तिः । जात्यन्तरभावे तु तत्संयोगहेतुपरिहारात् स्यादपि कदाचिन्मोक्षोपपत्तिरिति ॥

अत्रोच्यते—न । एकत्वादेव तप्यतापकभावानुपपत्तेः । भवेदेष दोषो यद्येकात्मतायां तप्यतापकावन्योन्यस्य विषयविषयिभावं प्रतिपद्येयाताम् । नत्वेतदस्ति, एकत्वादेव । नह्यग्निरेकः सन् स्वमात्मानं दहति प्रकाशयति वा, सत्यप्यौष्ण्यप्रकाशादिधर्मभेदे परिणामित्वे च । किं कूटस्थे ब्रह्मण्येकस्मिंस्तप्यतापकभावः संभवेत् ॥ क्व पुनरयं तप्यतापकभावः स्यादिति । उच्यते—किं न पश्यसि कर्मभूतो जीवद्देहस्तप्यस्तापकः सवितेति । ननु तप्तिर्नाम दुःखम्, सा चेतयितुर्नाचेतनस्य देहस्य । यदि हि देहस्यैव तप्तिः स्यात्, सा देहनाशे स्वयमेव नश्यतीति तन्नाशाय साधनं नैषितव्यं स्यादिति । उच्यते—देहाभावेऽपि केवलस्य चेतनस्य तप्तिर्न दृष्टा । नच त्वयापि तप्तिर्नाम विक्रिया चेतयितुः केवलस्येष्यते । नापि देहचेतनयोः संहतत्वमशुद्ध्यादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् । नच तप्तेरेव तप्तिमभ्युपगच्छसि । कथं तवापि तप्यतापकभावः । सत्त्वं तप्यम्, तापकं रज इति चेत् । न । ताभ्यां चेतनस्य संहतत्वानुपपत्तेः । सत्त्वानुरोधित्वा-

चेतनोऽपि तप्यत इवेति चेत्, परमार्थतस्तर्हि नैव तप्यत इत्यापतति, इवशब्दप्रयोगात् । न चेत् तप्यते, नेवशब्दो दोषाय । नहि डुण्डुभः सर्प इवेत्येतावता सविषो भवति । सर्पो वा डुण्डुभ इवेत्येतावता निर्विषो भवति । अतश्चाविद्याकृतोऽयं तप्यतापकभावो न पारमार्थिक इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति । नैवं सति ममापि किंचिद्दुष्यति ॥ अथ पारमार्थिकमेव चेतनस्य तप्यत्वमभ्युपगच्छसि तवैव सुतरामनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्येत, नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च तापकस्य । तप्यतापकशक्त्योर्नित्यत्वेऽपि सनिमित्तसंयोगापेक्षत्वात् तप्तेः, संयोगनिमित्तादर्शननिवृत्तावात्यान्तिकः संयोगोपरमः, ततश्चात्यन्तिको मोक्ष उपपन्न इति चेत् । न । अदर्शनस्य तमसो नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । गुणानां चोद्भवाभिभवयोरनियतत्वादनियतः संयोगनिमित्तोपरम इति वियोगस्याप्यनियतत्वात् सांख्यस्यैवानिर्मोक्षोऽपरिहार्यः स्यात् । औपनिषदस्य त्वात्मैकत्वाभ्युपगमात् तस्य च विषयविषयिभावानुपपत्तेः, विकारभेदस्य च वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वश्रवणात्, अनिर्मोक्षशङ्का स्वप्नेऽपि नोपजायते । व्यवहारे तु यत्र यथा दृष्टस्तप्यतापकभावस्तत्र तथैव स इति न चोदयितव्यः परिहर्तव्यो वा भवति ॥ १० ॥

इति रचनानुपपत्त्यधिकरणम् ॥ १ ॥

२ महद्दीर्घाधिकरणम् ।

प्रधानकारणवादो निराकृतः । परमाणुकारणवाद इदानीं निराकर्तव्यः । तत्रादौ तावद्योऽणुवादिना ब्रह्मवादिनि दोष उत्प्रेक्ष्यते स प्रतिसमाधीयते ॥ तत्रायं वैशेषिकाणामभ्युपगमः—कारणद्रव्यसमवायिनो गुणाः कार्यद्रव्ये समानजातीयं गुणान्तरमारभन्ते, शुक्लेभ्यस्तन्तुभ्यः शुक्लस्य पटस्य प्रसवदर्शनात् तद्विपर्ययादर्शनाच्च । तस्माच्चेतनस्य ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कार्येऽपि जगति चैतन्यं समवेयात् । तददर्शनात् तु न चेतनं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं भवितुमर्हतीति । इममभ्युपगमं तदीययैव प्रक्रियया व्यभिचारयति—

महद्दीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ॥ ११ ॥

एषा तेषां प्रक्रिया—परमाणवः किल कंचित् कालमनारब्धकार्या यथायोगं रूपादिमन्तः पारिमाण्डल्यपरिमाणाश्च तिष्ठन्ति । ते च पश्चाददृष्टादिपुरःसराः संयोगसचिवाश्च सन्तो द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेणकृत्स्नं कार्य-

जातमारभन्ते, कारणगुणाश्च कार्ये गुणान्तरम् । यदा द्वौ परमाणू द्व्यणुकमारभेते तदा परमाणुगता रूपादिगुणविशेषाः शुक्लादयो द्व्यणुके शुक्लादीनपरानारभन्ते । परमाणुगुणविशेषस्तु पारिमाण्डल्यं न द्व्यणुके पारिमाण्डल्यमपरमारभते, द्व्यणुकस्य परिमाणान्तरयोगाभ्युपगमात् । अणुत्वह्रस्वत्वे हि द्व्यणुकवर्तिनी परिमाणे वर्णयन्ति ॥ यदापि द्वे द्व्यणुके चतुरणुकमारभेते तदापि समानं द्व्यणुकसमवायिनां शुक्लादीनामारम्भकत्वम्, अणुत्वह्रस्वत्वे तु द्व्यणुकसमवायिनी अपि नैवारभेते, चतुरणुकस्य महत्त्वदीर्घत्वपरिमाणयोगाभ्युपगमात् ॥ यदापि बहवः परमाणवः बहूनि वा द्व्यणुकानि द्व्यणुकसहितो वा परमाणुः कार्यमारभते तदापि समानैषा योजना । तदेवं यथा परमाणोः परिमण्डलात् सतोऽणु ह्रस्वं च द्व्यणुकं जायते, महद्दीर्घं च त्र्यणुकादि, न परिमण्डलम्, यथा वा द्व्यणुकादणोर्ह्रस्वाच्च सतो महद्दीर्घं त्र्यणुकं जायते, नाणु नो ह्रस्वम्, एवं चेतनाद्ब्रह्मणोऽचेतनं जगज्जनिष्यत इत्यभ्युपगमे किं तव च्छिन्नम् ॥ अथ मन्यसे विरोधिना परिमाणान्तरेणाक्रान्तं कार्यद्रव्यं द्व्यणुकादि, इत्यतो नारम्भकाणि कारणगतानि पारिमाण्डल्यादीनीत्यभ्युपगच्छामि, नतु चेतनाविरोधिना गुणान्तरेण जगत आक्रान्तत्वमस्ति, येन कारणगता चेतना कार्ये चेतनान्तरं नारभेत । नह्यचेतना नाम चेतनाविरोधी कश्चिद्गुणोऽस्ति, चेतनाप्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् । तस्मात् पारिमाण्डल्यादिवैषम्यात् प्राप्नोति चेतनाया आरम्भकत्वमिति मैवं मंस्थाः । यथा कारणे विद्यमानानामपि पारिमाण्डल्यादीनामनारम्भकत्वम्, एवं चैतन्यस्यापीत्यस्यांशस्य समानत्वात् । नच परिमाणान्तराक्रान्तत्वं पारिमाण्डल्यादीनामनारम्भकत्वे कारणं, प्राक् परिमाणान्तरारम्भात् पारिमाण्डल्यादीनामारम्भकत्वोपपत्तेः । आरब्धमपि कार्यद्रव्यं प्राग्गुणारम्भात् क्षणमात्रमगुणं तिष्ठतीत्यभ्युपगमात् । नच परिमाणान्तरारम्भे व्यग्राणि पारिमाण्डल्यादीनीत्यतः स्वसमानजातीयं परिमाणान्तरं नारभन्ते, परिमाणान्तरस्यान्यहेतुत्वाभ्युपगमात्—

कारणबहुत्वात् कारणमहत्त्वात् प्रचयविशेषाच्च महत् ।

तद्विपरीतमणु ।

एतेन दीर्घत्वह्रस्वत्वे व्याख्याते ।

इति हि काणभुजानि सूत्राणि [७·१·९, १०, १७] । नच संनिधानविशेषात् कुतश्चित् कारणबहुत्वादीन्येवारभन्ते न पारिमाण्डल्यादीनीत्युच्येत, द्रव्यान्तरे गुणान्तरे वारभ्यमाणे सर्वेषामेव कारणगुणानां स्वाश्रयसमवायाविशेषात् । तस्मात् स्वभावादेव पारिमाण्डल्यादीनामनारम्भकत्वम् । तथा चेतनाया अपीति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ संयोगाच्च द्रव्यादीनां विलक्षणानामुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् समानजातीयोत्पत्तिव्यभिचारः । द्रव्ये प्रकृते गुणोदाहरणमयुक्तमिति चेत् । न । दृष्टान्तेन विलक्षणारम्भमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । नच द्रव्यस्य द्रव्यमेवोदाहर्तव्यम्, गुणस्य वा गुण एव, इति कश्चिन्नियमे हेतुरस्ति । सूत्रकारोऽपि भवतां द्रव्यस्य गुणमुदाजहार [वै० सू०, ४·२·२]—

प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षाणामप्रत्यक्षत्वात् संयोगस्य पञ्चात्मकं न विद्यते ।

इति । यथा प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षयोर्भूम्याकाशयोः समवयन् संयोगोऽप्रत्यक्षः, एवं प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षेषु पञ्चसु भूतेषु समवयच्छरीरमप्रत्यक्षं स्यात् । प्रत्यक्षं हि शरीरम् । तस्मान्न पाञ्चभौतिकमिति । एतदुक्तं भवति—गुणश्च संयोगो, द्रव्यं शरीरम् ॥ दृश्यते तु [ब्र० सू०, २·१·६] इति चात्रापि विलक्षणोत्पत्तिः प्रपञ्चिता । नन्वेवं सति तेनैवैतद्गतम् । नेति ब्रूमः । तत् सांख्यं प्रत्युक्तम्, एतत् तु वैशेषिकं प्रति । नन्वतिदेशोऽपि समानन्यायतया कृतः—एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः । इति [ब्र० सू०, २·१·१२] । सत्यमेतत् । तस्यैव त्वयं वैशेषिकप्रक्रियारम्भे तत्प्रक्रियानुगतेन निदर्शनेन प्रपञ्चः कृतः ॥ ११ ॥ इति महद्दीर्घाधिकरणम् ॥ २ ॥

३ परमाणुजगदकारणत्वाधिकरणम् ।

उभयथापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः ॥ १२ ॥

इदानीं परमाणुकारणवादं निराकरोति । स च वाद इत्थं समुत्तिष्ठति । पटादीनि हि लोके सावयवानि द्रव्याणि स्वानुगतैरेव संयोगसचिवैस्तन्त्वादिभिर्द्रव्यैरारभ्यमाणानि दृष्टानि । तत्सामान्येन यावत्किंचित् सावयवं तत् सर्वं स्वानुगतैरेव संयोगसचिवैस्तैस्तैर्द्रव्यैरारब्धमिति गम्यते । स चायमवयवावयविविभागो यतो निवर्तते सोऽपकर्षपर्यन्तगतः परमाणुः ।

सर्वं चेदं जगद्गिरिसमुद्रादिकं सावयवं, सावयवत्वाच्चाद्यन्तवत्। नचाकारणेन कार्येण भवितव्यमित्यतः परमाणवो जगतः कारणमिति कणभुगभिप्रायः। तानीमानि चत्वारि भूतानि, भूम्युदकतेजःपवनाख्यानि, सावयवान्युपलभ्य चतुर्विधाः परमाणवः परिकल्प्यन्ते। तेषां चापकर्षपर्यन्तगतत्वेन परतो विभागासंभवाद्विनश्यतां पृथिव्यादीनां परमाणुपर्यन्तो विभागो भवति, स प्रलयकालः। ततः सर्गकाले च वायवीयेष्वणुष्वदृष्टापेक्षं कर्मोत्पद्यते, तत् कर्म स्वाश्रयमणुमण्वन्तरेण संयुनक्ति, ततो द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण वायुरुत्पद्यते। एवमग्निरेवमाप एवं पृथिवी। एवमेव शरीरं सेन्द्रियमित्येवं सर्वमिदं जगदणुभ्यः संभवति। अणुगतेभ्यश्च रूपादिभ्यो द्व्यणुकादिगतानि रूपादीनि संभवन्ति तन्तुपटन्यायेन, इति काणादा मन्यन्ते॥

तत्रेदमभिधीयते। विभागावस्थानां तावदणूनां संयोगः कर्मापेक्षोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, कर्मवतां तन्त्वादीनां संयोगदर्शनात्। कर्मणश्च कार्यत्वान्निमित्तं किमप्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। अनभ्युपगमे, निमित्ताभावान्नाणुष्वाद्यं कर्म स्यात्। अभ्युपगमेऽपि, यदि प्रयत्नोऽभिघातादिर्वा, अथादृष्टं किमपि कर्मणो निमित्तमभ्युपगम्येत, तस्यासंभवान्नैवाणुष्वाद्यं कर्म स्यात्। नहि तस्यामवस्थायामात्मगुणः प्रयत्नः संभवति, शरीराभावात्। शरीरप्रतिष्ठे हि मनस्यात्मनः संयोगे सत्यात्मगुणः प्रयत्नो जायते। एतेनाभिघाताद्यपि दृष्टं निमित्तं प्रत्याख्यातव्यम्। सर्गोत्तरकालं हि तत् सर्वं, नाद्यस्य कर्मणो निमित्तं संभवति। अथादृष्टमाद्यस्य कर्मणो निमित्तमित्युच्येत, तत् पुनरात्मसमवायि वा स्यादणुसमवायि वा। उभयथापि नादृष्टनिमित्तमणुषु कर्मावकल्पेत, अदृष्टस्याचेतनत्वात्। नह्यचेतनं चेतनेनानधिष्ठितं स्वतन्त्रं प्रवर्तते प्रवर्तयति वेति सांख्यप्रक्रियायामभिहितम्। आत्मनश्चानुत्पन्नचैतन्यस्य तस्यामवस्थायामचेतनत्वात्। आत्मसमवायित्वाभ्युपगमाच्च नादृष्टमणुषु कर्मणो निमित्तं स्यात्, असंबन्धात्। अदृष्टवता पुरुषेणास्त्यणूनां संबन्ध इति चेत्, संबन्धसातत्यात् प्रवृत्तिसातत्यप्रसङ्गः, नियामकान्तराभावात्। तदेवं नियतस्य कस्यचित् कर्मनिमित्तस्याभावान्नाणुष्वाद्यं कर्म स्यात्। कर्माभावात् तन्निबन्धनः संयोगो न स्यात्। संयोगाभावाच्च तन्निबन्धनं द्व्यणुकादि कार्यजातं न स्यात्॥ संयोगश्चाणोरण्वन्तरेण

सर्वात्मना वा स्यादेकदेशेन वा। सर्वात्मना चेत् उपचयानुपपत्तेरणुमात्रत्वप्रसङ्गो दृष्टविपर्ययप्रसङ्गश्च, प्रदेशवतो द्रव्यस्य प्रदेशवता द्रव्यान्तरेण संयोगस्य दृष्टत्वात्। एकदेशेन चेत्, सावयवत्वप्रसङ्गः। परमाणूनां कल्पिताः प्रदेशाः स्युरिति चेत्, कल्पितानामवस्तुत्वादवस्त्वेव संयोग इति वस्तुनः कार्यस्यासमवायिकारणं न स्यात्। असति चासमवायिकारणे द्व्यणुकादिकार्यद्रव्यं नोत्पद्येत॥ यथाचादिसर्गे निमित्ताभावात् संयोगोत्पत्त्यर्थं कर्म नाणूनां संभवति, एवं महाप्रलयेऽपि विभागोत्पत्त्यर्थं कर्म नैवाणूनां संभवेत्। नहि तत्रापि किंचिन्नियतं तन्निमित्तं दृष्टमस्ति। अदृष्टमपि भोगप्रसिद्ध्यर्थम्, न प्रलयप्रसिद्ध्यर्थम्, इत्यतो निमित्ताभावान्न स्यादणूनां संयोगोत्पत्त्यर्थं विभागोत्पत्त्यर्थं वा कर्म। अतश्च संयोगविभागाभावात् तदायत्तयोः सर्गप्रलययोरभावः प्रसज्येत। तस्मादनुपपन्नोऽयं परमाणुकारणवादः॥ १२॥

समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः॥ १३॥

समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च—तदभावः, इति प्रकृतेनाणुवादनिराकरणेन संबध्यते। द्वाभ्यां चाणुभ्यां द्व्यणुकमुत्पद्यमानमत्यन्तभिन्नमणुभ्यामण्वोः समवैतीत्यभ्युगम्यते भवता। नचैवमभ्युपगच्छता शक्यतेऽणुकारणता समर्थयितुम्। कुतः। साम्यादनवस्थितेः। यथैव ह्यणुभ्यामत्यन्तभिन्नं सद्द्व्यणुकं समवायलक्षणेन संबन्धेन ताभ्यां संबध्यते, एवं समवायोऽपि समवायिभ्योऽत्यन्तभिन्नः सन् समवायलक्षणेनान्येनैव संबन्धेन समवायिभिः संबध्येत, अत्यन्तभेदसाम्यात्। ततश्च तस्यतस्यान्योन्यः संबन्धः कल्पयितव्य इत्यनवस्थैव प्रसज्येत॥ नन्विहप्रत्ययग्राह्यः समवायो नित्यसंबद्ध एव समवायिभिर्गृह्यते, नासंबद्धः संबन्धान्तरापेक्षो वा। ततश्च न तस्यान्यः संबन्धः कल्पयितव्यो येनानवस्था प्रसज्येतेति। नेत्युच्यते। संयोगोऽप्येवं सति संयोगिभिर्नित्यसंबद्ध एवेति समवायवन्नान्यं संबन्धमपेक्षेत। अथार्थान्तरत्वात् संयोगः संबन्धान्तरमपेक्षेत, समवायोऽपि तर्ह्यर्थान्तरत्वात् संबन्धान्तरमपेक्षेत। नच गुणत्वात् संयोगः संबन्धान्तरमपेक्षते, न समवायः, अगुणत्वादिति युज्यते वक्तुम्। अपेक्षाकारणस्य तुल्यत्वात्, गुणपरिभाषायाश्चातन्त्रत्वात्। तस्मादर्थान्तरं

समवायमभ्युपगच्छतः प्रसज्येतैवानवस्था । प्रसज्यमानायां चानवस्थायामेकासिद्धौ सर्वासिद्धेर्द्वाभ्यामणुभ्यां द्व्यणुकं नैवोत्पद्येत । तस्मादप्यनुपपन्नः परमाणुकारणवादः ॥ १३ ॥

नित्यमेव च भावात् ॥ १४ ॥

अपिचाणवः प्रवृत्तिस्वभावा वा, निवृत्तिस्वभावा वा, उभयस्वभावा वा, अनुभयस्वभावा वाभ्युपगम्यन्ते, गत्यन्तराभावात् । चतुर्धापि नोपपद्यते । प्रवृत्तिस्वभावत्वे नित्यमेव प्रवृत्तेर्भावात् प्रलयाभावप्रसङ्गः । निवृत्तिस्वभावत्वेऽपि नित्यमेव निवृत्तेर्भावात् सर्गाभावप्रसङ्गः । उभयस्वभावत्वं च विरोधादसमञ्जसम् । अनुभयस्वभावत्वे तु निमित्तवशात् प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरभ्युपगम्यमानयोरदृष्टादेर्निमित्तस्य नित्यसंनिधानान्नित्यप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । अतन्त्रत्वेऽप्यदृष्टादेर्नित्याप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मादप्यनुपपन्नः परमाणुकारणवादः ॥ १४ ॥

रूपादिमत्त्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात् ॥ १५ ॥

सावयवानां द्रव्याणामवयवशो विभज्यमानानां यतः परो विभागो न संभवति ते चतुर्विधा रूपादिमन्तः परमाणवश्चतुर्विधस्य रूपादिमतो भूतभौतिकस्यारम्भका नित्याश्चेति यद्वैशेषिका अभ्युपगच्छन्ति, स तेषामभ्युपगमो निरालम्बन एव यतो रूपादिमत्त्वात् परमाणूनामणुत्वनित्यत्वविपर्ययः प्रसज्येत, परमकारणापेक्षया स्थूलत्वमनित्यत्वं च तेषामभिप्रेतविपरीतमापद्येतेत्यर्थः । कुतः । एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात् । यद्धि लोके रूपादिमद्वस्तु, । तत् स्वकारणापेक्षया स्थूलमनित्यं च दृष्टम् । तद्यथा, पटस्तन्तूनपेक्ष्य स्थूलोऽनित्यश्च भवति, तन्तवश्चांशूनपेक्ष्य स्थूला अनित्याश्च भवन्ति । तथाचामी परमाणवो रूपादिमन्तस्तैरभ्युपगम्यन्ते । तस्मात् तेऽपि कारणवन्तस्तदपेक्षया स्थूला अनित्याश्च प्राप्नुवन्ति ॥ यच्च नित्यत्वे कारणं तैरुक्तम्—

सदकारणवन्नित्यम् [वै० सू०, ४·१·१] ।

इति । तदप्येवं सत्यणुषु न संभवति, उक्तेन प्रकारेणाणूनामपि कारणवत्त्वोपपत्तेः ॥ यदपि नित्यत्वे द्वितीयं कारणमुक्तम्—

अनित्यमिति च विशेषतः प्रतिषेधाभावः [वै०सू०, ४·१·४]। इति। तदपि नावश्यं परमाणूनां नित्यत्वं साधयति। असति हि यस्मिन्कस्मिंश्चिन्नित्ये वस्तुनि नित्यशब्देन नञः समासो नोपपद्यते। न पुनः परमाणुनित्यत्वमेवापेक्ष्यते। तच्चास्त्येव नित्यं परमकारणं ब्रह्म। नच शब्दार्थव्यवहारमात्रेण कस्यचिदर्थस्य प्रसिद्धिर्भवति, प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धयोः शब्दार्थयोर्व्यवहारावतारात् ॥ यदपि नित्यत्वे तृतीयं कारणमुक्तम्—

अविद्या च [वै. सू०, ४·१·५]।

इति, तद्यद्येवं विव्रियेत, सतां परिदृश्यमानकार्याणां कारणानां प्रत्यक्षेणाग्रहणमविद्येति, ततो द्व्यणुकनित्यताप्यापद्येत। अथाद्रव्यत्वे सतीति विशेष्येत, तथाप्यकारणवत्त्वमेव नित्यतानिमित्तमापद्येत। तस्य च प्रागेवोक्तत्वात्—अविद्या च [वै० सू०, ४·१·५] इति पुनरुक्तं स्यात्। अथापि कारणविभागात् कारणविनाशाच्चान्यस्य तृतीयस्य विनाशहेतोरसंभवोऽविद्या, सा परमाणूनां नित्यत्वं ख्यापयति, इति व्याख्यायेत। नावश्यं विनश्यद्वस्तु द्वाभ्यामेव हेतुभ्यां विनष्टुमर्हतीति नियमोऽस्ति। संयोगसचिवे ह्यनेकस्मिंश्च द्रव्ये द्रव्यान्तरस्यारम्भकेऽभ्युपगम्यमान एतदेवं स्यात्। यदा त्वपास्तविशेषं सामान्यात्मकं कारणं विशेषवदवस्थान्तरमापद्यमानमारम्भकमभ्युपगम्यते तदा घृतकाठिन्यविलयनवन्मूर्त्यवस्थाविलयनेनापि विनाश उपपद्यते। तस्माद्रूपादिमत्त्वात् स्यादभिप्रेतविपर्ययः परमाणूनाम्। तस्मादप्यनुपपन्नः परमाणुकारणवादः ॥ १५ ॥

उभयथा च दोषात् ॥ १६ ॥

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शगुणा स्थूला पृथिवी, रूपरसस्पर्शगुणाः सूक्ष्मा आपः, रूपस्पर्शगुणं सूक्ष्मतरं तेजः, स्पर्शगुणः सूक्ष्मतमो वायुः, इत्येवमेतानि चत्वारि भूतान्युपचितापचितगुणानि स्थूलसूक्ष्मसूक्ष्मतरसूक्ष्मतमतारतम्योपेतानि च लोके लक्ष्यन्ते। तद्वत् परमाणवोऽप्युपचितापचितगुणाः कल्प्येरन्न वा। उभयथापि च दोषानुषङ्गोऽपरिहार्य एव स्यात्। कल्प्यमाने तावदुपचितापचितगुणत्वे, उपचितगुणानां मूर्त्युपचयादपरमाणुत्व-

प्रसङ्गः । नचान्तरेणापि मूर्त्युपचयं गुणोपचयो भवतीत्युच्यते, कार्येषु भूतेषु गुणोपचये मूर्त्युपचयदर्शनात् । अकल्प्यमाने तूपचितगुणत्वे, परमाणुत्वसाम्यप्रसिद्धये यदि तावत् सर्व एकैकगुणा एव कल्प्येरंस्ततस्तेजसि स्पर्शस्योपलब्धिर्न स्यात्, अप्सु रूपस्पर्शयोः, पृथिव्यां च रसरूपस्पर्शानां, कारणगुणपूर्वकत्वात् कार्यगुणानाम् । अथ सर्वे चतुर्गुणा एव कल्प्येरन्, ततोऽप्स्वपि गन्धस्योपलब्धिः स्यात्, तेजसि गन्धरसयोः, वायौ गन्धरूपरसानाम् । नचैवं दृश्यते । तस्मादप्यनुपपन्नः परमाणुकारणवादः ॥ १६ ॥

अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ॥ १७ ॥

प्रधानकारणवादो वेदविद्भिरपि कैश्चिन्मन्वादिभिः सत्कार्यत्वाद्यंशोपजीवनाभिप्रायेणोपनिबद्धः । अयं तु परमाणुकारणवादो न कैश्चिदपि शिष्टैः केनचिदप्यंशेन परिगृहीत इत्यत्यन्तमेवानादरणीयो वेदवादिभिः । अपिच वैशेषिकास्तन्त्रार्थभूतान् षट् पदार्थान् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाख्यानत्यन्तभिन्नान् भिन्नलक्षणानभ्युपगच्छन्ति, यथा मनुष्योऽश्वः शश इति । तथात्वं चाभ्युगम्य, तद्विरुद्धं द्रव्याधीनत्वं शेषाणामभ्युपगच्छन्ति । तन्नोपपद्यते । कथम् । यथाहि लोके शशकुशपलाशप्रभृतीनामत्यन्तभिन्नानां सतां नेतरेतराधीनत्वं भवति, एवं द्रव्यादीनामत्यन्तभिन्नत्वान्नैव द्रव्याधीनत्वं गुणादीनां भवितुमर्हति । अथ भवति द्रव्याधीनत्वं गुणादीनाम्, ततो द्रव्यभावे भावाद्द्रव्याभावेऽभावाद्द्रव्यमेव संस्थानादिभेदादनेकशब्दप्रत्ययभाग्भवति, यथा देवदत्त एक एव सन्नवस्थान्तरयोगादनेकशब्दप्रत्ययभाग्भवति तद्वत् । तथा सति सांख्यसिद्धान्तप्रसङ्गः स्वसिद्धान्तविरोधश्चापद्येयाताम् ॥ नन्वग्नेरन्यस्यापि सतो धूमस्याग्न्यधीनत्वं दृश्यते । सत्यं दृश्यते । भेदप्रतीतेस्तु तत्राग्निधूमयोरन्यत्वं निश्चीयते । इह तु शुक्लः कम्बलो, रोहिणी धेनुर्नीलमुत्पलमिति द्रव्यस्यैव तस्य तस्य तेन तेन विशेषणेन प्रतीयमानत्वान्नैव द्रव्यगुणयोरग्निधूमयोरिव भेदप्रतीतिरस्ति । तस्माद्द्रव्यात्मकता गुणस्य । एतेन कर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां द्रव्यात्मकता व्याख्याता ॥ गुणानां द्रव्याधीनत्वं द्रव्यगुणयोरयुतसिद्धत्वादिति यद्युच्येत, तत् पुनरयुतसिद्धत्वम-

पृथग्देशत्वं वा स्यात्, अपृथक्कालत्वं वा, अपृथक्स्वभावत्वं वा । सर्वथापि नोपपद्यते । अपृथग्देशत्वे तावत् स्वाभ्युपगमो विरुध्येत । कथम् । तन्त्वारब्धो हि पटस्तन्तुदेशोऽभ्युपगम्यते, न पटदेशः । पटस्य तु गुणाः शुक्लत्वादयः पटदेशा अभ्युपगम्यन्ते, न तन्तुदेशाः । तथा चाहुः [वै० सू०, १·१·१०]—

द्रव्याणि द्रव्यान्तरमारभन्ते गुणाश्च गुणान्तरम् ।

इति । तन्तवो हि कारणद्रव्याणि कार्यद्रव्यं पटमारभन्ते, तन्तुगताश्च गुणाः शुक्लादयः कार्यद्रव्ये पटे शुक्लादिगुणान्तरमारभन्ते, इति हि तेऽभ्युपगच्छन्ति । सोऽभ्युपगमो द्रव्यगुणयोरपृथग्देशत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने बाध्येत । अथापृथक्कालत्वमयुतसिद्धत्वमुच्येत, सव्यदक्षिणयोरपि गोविषाणयोरयुतसिद्धत्वं प्रसज्येत । तथाऽपृथक्स्वभावत्वे त्वयुतसिद्धत्वे न द्रव्यगुणयोरात्मभेदः संभवति, तस्य तादात्म्येनैव प्रतीयमानत्वात् ॥ युतसिद्धयोः संबन्धः संयोगोऽयुतसिद्धयोस्तु समवाय इत्ययमभ्युपगमो मृषैव तेषां प्राक्सिद्धस्य कार्यात् कारणस्यायुतसिद्धत्वानुपपत्तेः । अथान्यतरापेक्ष एवायमभ्युपगमः स्यात्, अयुतसिद्धस्य कार्यस्य कारणेन संबन्धः समवाय इति, एवमपि प्रागसिद्धस्यालब्धात्मकस्य कार्यस्य कारणेन संबन्धो नोपपद्यते, द्वयायत्तत्वात् संबन्धस्य । सिद्धं भूत्वा संबध्यत इति चेत्, प्राक् कारणसंबन्धात् कार्यस्य सिद्धावभ्युपगम्यमानायामयुतसिद्ध्यभावात्—कार्यकारणयोः संयोगविभागौ न विद्येते [वै० सू०, ७·२·१३] इतीदं दुरुक्तं स्यात् । यथा चोत्पन्नमात्रस्याक्रियस्य कार्यद्रव्यस्य विभुभिराकाशादिभिर्द्रव्यान्तरैः संबन्धः संयोग एवाभ्युपगम्यते, न समवायः, एवं कारणद्रव्येणापि संबन्धः संयोग एव स्यात्, न समवायः ॥

नापि संयोगस्य समवायस्य वा संबन्धस्य संबन्धिव्यतिरेकेणास्तित्वे किंचित् प्रमाणमस्ति । संबन्धिशब्दप्रत्ययव्यतिरेकेण संयोगसमवायशब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात् तयोरस्तित्वमिति चेत् । न । एकत्वेऽपि स्वरूपबाह्यरूपापेक्षयानेकशब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात् । यथैकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तो लोके स्वरूपं संबन्धिरूपं चापेक्ष्यानेकशब्दप्रत्ययभाग्भवति, मनुष्यो ब्राह्मणः श्रोत्रियो वदान्यो बालो युवा स्थविरः पिता पुत्रः पौत्रो भ्राता जामातेति, यथा चैकापि सती रेखा स्थानान्यत्वेन निविशमानैकदशशतसह-

स्वादिशब्दप्रत्ययभेदमनुभवति, तथा संबन्धिनोरेव संबन्धिशब्दप्रत्ययव्यतिरेकेण संयोगसमवायशब्दप्रत्ययार्हत्वम्, न व्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वस्तित्वेन, इत्युपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धेरभावो वस्त्वन्तरस्य । नापि संबन्धिविषयत्वे संबन्धशब्दप्रत्यययोः संततभावप्रसङ्गः, स्वरूपबाह्यरूपापेक्षयेत्युक्तोत्तरत्वात् ॥ तथाण्वात्ममनसामप्रदेशत्वान्न संयोगः संभवति, प्रदेशवतो द्रव्यस्य प्रदेशवता द्रव्यान्तरेण संयोगदर्शनात् । कल्पिताः प्रदेशा अण्वात्ममनसां भविष्यन्तीति चेत् । न । अविद्यमानार्थकल्पनायां सर्वार्थसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । इयानेवाविद्यमानो विरुद्धोऽविरुद्धो वार्थः कल्पनीयो नातोऽधिक इति नियमहेत्वभावात् । कल्पनायाश्च स्वायत्तत्वात् प्रभूतत्वसंभवाच्च । नच वैशेषिकैः कल्पितेभ्यः षड्भ्यः पदार्थेभ्योऽन्येऽधिकाः शतं सहस्रं वार्था न कल्पयितव्या इति निवारको हेतुरस्ति । तस्माद्यस्मैयस्मै यद्यद्रोचते तत्तत् सिद्ध्येत् । कश्चित् कृपालुः प्राणिनां दुःखबहुलः संसार एव माभूदिति कल्पयेत्, अन्यो वा व्यसनी मुक्तानामपि पुनरुत्पत्तिं कल्पयेत्, कस्तयोर्निवारकः स्यात् ॥

किंचान्यत् । द्वाभ्यां परमाणुभ्यां निरवयवाभ्यां सावयवस्य द्व्यणुकस्याकाशेनेव संश्लेषानुपपत्तिः । नह्याकाशस्य पृथिव्यादीनां च जतुकाष्ठवत् संश्लेषोऽस्ति । कार्यकारणद्रव्ययोराश्रिताश्रयभावोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्यवश्यं कल्प्यः समवाय इति चेत् । न । इतरेतराश्रयत्वात् । कार्यकारणयोर्हि भेदसिद्धावाश्रिताश्रयभावसिद्धिः, आश्रिताश्रयभावसिद्धौ च तयोर्भेदसिद्धिः कुण्डबदरवत्, इतीतरेतराश्रयता स्यात् । नहि कार्यकारणयोर्भेद आश्रिताश्रयभावो वा वेदान्तवादिभिरभ्युपगम्यते, कारणस्यैव संस्थानमात्रं कार्यमित्यभ्युपगमात् ॥ किं चान्यत् । परमाणूनां परिच्छिन्नत्वाद्यावत्यो दिशः षडष्टौ दश वा तावद्भिरवयवैः सावयवास्ते स्युः, सावयवत्वादनित्याश्चेति नित्यत्वनिरवयवत्वाभ्युपगमो बाध्येत । यांस्त्वं दिग्भेदभेदिनोऽवयवान् कल्पयसि त एव परमाणव इति चेत् । न । स्थूलसूक्ष्मतारतम्यक्रमेणा परमकारणाद्विनाशोपपत्तेः । यथा पृथिवी द्व्यणुकाद्यपेक्षया स्थूलतमा वस्तुभूतापि विनश्यति, ततः सूक्ष्मं सूक्ष्मतरं च पृथिव्येकजातीयकं विनश्यति, ततो द्व्यणुकम्, तथा परमाणवोऽपि पृथिव्येकजातीयकत्वाद्विनश्येयुः । विनश्यन्तोऽप्यवयवविभागेनैव

विनश्यन्तीति चेत्। नायं दोषः। यतो घृतकाठिन्यविलयनवदपि विनाशोपपत्तिमवोचाम। यथाहि घृतसुवर्णादीनामविभज्यमानावयवानामप्यग्निसंयोगाद्द्रवभावापत्त्या काठिन्यविनाशो भवति, एवं परमाणूनामपि परमकारणभावापत्त्या मूर्तत्वादिविनाशो भविष्यति। तथा कार्यारम्भोऽपि नावयवसंयोगेनैव केवलेन भवति, क्षीरजलादीनामन्तरेणाप्यवयवसंयोगान्तरं दधिहिमादिकार्यारम्भदर्शनात्। तदेवमसारतरतर्कसंदब्धत्वादीश्वरकारणश्रुतिविरुद्धत्वाच्छ्रुतिप्रवणैश्च शिष्टैर्मन्वादिभिरपरिगृहीतत्वादत्यन्तमेवानपेक्षास्मिन् परमाणुकारणवादे कार्या श्रेयोर्थिभिरिति वाक्यशेषः॥ १७॥

इति परमाणुजगदकारणत्वाधिकरणम्॥ ३॥

४ समुदायाधिकरणम्।

वैशेषिकराद्धान्तो दुर्युक्तियोगाद्वेदविरोधाच्छिष्टापरिग्रहाच्च नापेक्षितव्य इत्युक्तम्। सोऽर्धवैनाशिक इति वैनाशिकत्वसाम्यात् सर्ववैनाशिकराद्धान्तो नतरामपेक्षितव्य इतीदमिदानीमुपपादयामः। स च बहुप्रकारः, प्रतिपत्तिभेदाद्विनेयभेदाद्वा। तत्रैते त्रयो वादिनो भवन्ति—केचित् सर्वास्तित्ववादिनः, केचिद्विज्ञानास्तित्वमात्रवादिनः, अन्ये पुनः सर्वशून्यत्ववादिन इति। तत्र ते सर्वास्तित्ववादिनो बाह्यमान्तरं च वस्त्वभ्युपगच्छन्ति, भूतं भौतिकं च, चित्तं चैत्तं च, तांस्तावत् प्रतिब्रूमः। तत्र भूतं पृथिवीधात्वादयः, भौतिकं रूपादयश्चक्षुरादयश्च। चतुष्टये च पृथिव्यादिपरमाणवः खरस्नेहोष्णेरणस्वभावाः, ते पृथिव्यादिभावेन संहन्यन्त इति मन्यन्ते। तथा रूपविज्ञानवेदनासंज्ञासंस्कारसंज्ञकाः पञ्चस्कन्धाः। तेऽप्याध्यात्मं सर्वव्यवहारास्पदभावेन संहन्यन्त इति मन्यते। तत्रेदमभिधीयते—

समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः॥ १८॥

योऽयमुभयहेतुक उभयप्रकारः समुदायः परेषामभिप्रेतः, अणुहेतुकश्च भूतभौतिकसंहतिरूपः स्कन्धहेतुकश्च पञ्चस्कन्धीरूपः, तस्मिन्नुभयहेतुकेऽपि समुदायेऽभिप्रेयमाणे तदप्राप्तिः स्यात्—समुदायाप्राप्तिः, समुदायभावानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः। कुतः। समुदायिनामचेतनत्वात्, चित्ताभिज्वलनस्य च समुदायसिद्ध्यधीनत्वात्, अन्यस्य च कस्यचिच्चेतनस्य भोक्तुः प्रशासितुर्वा स्थिरस्य संहन्तुरनभ्युपगमात्, निरपेक्षप्रवृत्त्यभ्यु-

पगमे च प्रवृत्त्यनुपरमप्रसङ्गात् । आशयस्याप्यन्यत्वानन्यत्वाभ्यामनिरूप्यत्वात् । क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च निर्व्यापारत्वात् प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । तस्मात् समुदायानुपपत्तिः । समुदायानुपपत्तौ च तदाश्रया लोकयात्रा लुप्येत ॥ १८ ॥

इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादिति चेन्न, उत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात् ॥ १९ ॥

यद्यपि भोक्ता प्रशासिता वा कश्चिच्चेतनः संहन्ता स्थिरो नाभ्युपगम्यते, तथाप्यविद्यादीनामितरेतरकारणत्वादुपपद्यते लोकयात्रा । तस्यां चोपपद्यमानायां न किंचिदपरमपेक्षितव्यमस्ति । ते चाविद्यादयः—अविद्या संस्कारो विज्ञानं नाम रूपं षडायतनं स्पर्शो वेदना तृष्णा उपादानं भवो जातिर्जरामरणं शोकः परिदेवना दुःखं दुर्मनस्तेत्येवंजातीयका इतरेतरहेतुकाः सौगते समये क्वचित् संक्षिप्ता निर्दिष्टाः क्वचित् प्रपञ्चिताः। सर्वेषामप्ययमविद्यादिकलापोऽप्रत्याख्येयः । तदेवमविद्यादिकलापे परस्परनिमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेन घटीयन्त्रवदनिशमावर्तमानेऽर्थाक्षिप्त उपपन्नः संघात इति चेत् । तन्न, कस्मात् । उत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात् । भवेदुपपन्नः संघातो यदि संघातस्य किंचिन्निमित्तमवगम्येत । न त्ववगम्यते । यत इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वेऽप्यविद्यादीनां पूर्वपूर्वमुत्तरोत्तरस्योत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तं भवद्भवेत्, न तु संघातोत्पत्तेः किंचिन्निमित्तं संभवति ॥ नन्वविद्यादिभिरर्थादाक्षिप्यते संघात इत्युक्तम् । अत्रोच्यते—यदि तावदयमभिप्रायः अविद्यादयः संघातमन्तरेणात्मानमलभमाना अपेक्षन्ते संघातमिति, ततस्तस्य संघातस्य निमित्तं वक्तव्यम् । तच्च नित्येष्वप्यणुष्वभ्युपगम्यमानेषु, आश्रयाश्रयि(?आस्रवाश्रय)भूतेषु च भोक्तृषु सत्सु, न संभवतीत्युक्तं वैशेषिकपरीक्षायाम्, किमङ्ग पुनः क्षणिकेष्वप्यणुषु भोक्तृरहितेष्वाश्रयाश्रयिशून्येषु वाभ्युपगम्यमानेषु संभवेत् । अथायमभिप्रायः अविद्यादय एव संघातस्य निमित्तमिति, कथं तमेवाश्रित्यात्मानं लभमानास्तस्यैव निमित्तं स्युः । अथ मन्यसे संघाता एवानादौ संसारे संतत्यानुवर्तन्ते, तदाश्रयाश्चाविद्यादय इति, तदपि संघातात् संघातान्तरमुत्पद्यमानं, नियमेन वा सदृशमेवोत्पद्येत, अनियमेन वा सदृशं विसदृशं वोत्पद्येत । नियमाभ्युपगमे मनुष्यपुद्गलस्य देवतिर्यग्योनिनारकप्राप्त्यभावः प्राप्नुयात् । अनियमाभ्यु-

पगमेऽपि मनुष्यपुद्गलः कदाचित् क्षणेन हस्ती भूत्वा देवो वा पुनर्मनुष्यो वा भवेदिति प्राप्नुयात् । उभयमप्यभ्युपगमविरुद्धम् । अपिच यद्भोगार्थः संघातः स्यात् स नास्ति स्थिरो भोक्तेति तवाभ्युपगमः । ततश्च भोगो भोगार्थ एव स नान्येन प्रार्थनीयः, तथा मोक्षो मोक्षार्थ एवेति मुमुक्षुणा नान्येन भवितव्यम् । अन्येन चेत् प्रार्थ्येतोभयम्, भोगमोक्षकालावस्थायिना तेन भवितव्यम् । अवस्थायित्वे क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमविरोधः । तस्मादितरेतरोत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वमविद्यादीनां यदि भवेद्भवतु नाम, नतु संघातः सिध्येत्, भोक्त्रभावात्, इत्यभिप्रायः ॥ १९ ॥

उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् ॥ २० ॥

उक्तमेतदविद्यादीनामुत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वान्न संघातसिद्धिरस्तीति । तदपि तूत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वं न संभवतीतीदमिदानीमुपपाद्यते । क्षणभङ्गवादिनोऽयमभ्युपगम उत्तरस्मिन् क्षण उत्पद्यमाने पूर्वः क्षणो निरुध्यत इति । नचैवमभ्युपगच्छता पूर्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोर्हेतुफलभावः शक्यते संपादयितुम्, निरुध्यमानस्य निरुद्धस्य वा पूर्वक्षणस्याभावग्रस्तत्वादुत्तरक्षणहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः । अथ भावभूतः परिनिष्पन्नावस्थः पूर्वक्षण उत्तरक्षणस्य हेतुरित्यभिप्रायस्तथापि नोपपद्यते, भावभूतस्य पुनर्व्यापारकल्पनायां क्षणान्तरसंबन्धप्रसङ्गात् । अथ भाव एवास्य व्यापार इत्यभिप्रायस्तथापि नैवोपपद्यते, हेतुस्वभावानुपरक्तस्य फलस्योत्पत्त्यसंभवात् । स्वभावोपरागाभ्युपगमे च हेतुस्वभावस्य फलकालावस्थायित्वे सति क्षणभङ्गाभ्युपगमत्यागप्रसङ्गः । विनैव वा स्वभावोपरागेण हेतुफलभावमभ्युपगच्छतः सर्वत्र तत्प्राप्तेरतिप्रसङ्गः ॥ अपिचोत्पादनिरोधौ नाम वस्तुनः स्वरूपमेव वा स्यातामवस्थान्तरं वा वस्त्वन्तरमेव वा । सर्वथापि नोपपद्यते । यदि तावद्वस्तुनः स्वरूपमेवोत्पादनिरोधौ स्याताम्, ततो वस्तुशब्द उत्पादनिरोधशब्दौ च पर्यायाः प्राप्नुयुः । अथास्ति कश्चिद्विशेष इति मन्येत, उत्पादनिरोधशब्दाभ्यां मध्यवर्तिनो वस्तुन आद्यन्ताख्ये अवस्थे अभिलप्येते इति, एवमप्याद्यन्तमध्यक्षणत्रयसंबन्धित्वाद्वस्तुनः क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमहानिः । अथात्यन्तव्यतिरिक्तावेवोत्पादनिरोधौ वस्तुनः स्यातामश्वमहिषवत्, ततो वस्तूत्पादनिरोधाभ्यामसंसृष्टमिति वस्तुनः शाश्वतत्वप्रसङ्गः ।

यदि च दर्शनादर्शने वस्तुन उत्पादनिरोधौ स्यातामु, एवमपि द्रष्टृधर्मौ तौ न वस्तुधर्माविति वस्तुनः शाश्वतत्वप्रसङ्ग एव । तस्मादप्यसंगतं सौगतं मतम् ॥ २० ॥

असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा ॥ २१ ॥

क्षणभङ्गवादे पूर्वक्षणो निरोधग्रस्तत्वान्नोत्तरस्य क्षणस्य हेतुर्भवतीत्युक्तम् । अथासत्येव हेतौ फलोत्पत्तिं ब्रूयात्, ततः प्रतिज्ञोपरोधः स्यात्, चतुर्विधान् हेतून् प्रतीत्य चित्तचैत्ता उत्पद्यन्त इतीयं प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत । निर्हेतुकायां चोत्पत्तावप्रतिबन्धात् सर्वं सर्वत्रोत्पद्येत । अथोत्तरक्षणोत्पत्तिर्यावत् तावदवतिष्ठते पूर्वक्षण इति ब्रूयात्, ततो यौगपद्यं हेतुफलयोः स्यात् । तथापि प्रतिज्ञोपरोध एव स्यात्, क्षणिकाः सर्वे संस्कारा इतीयं प्रतिज्ञोपरुध्येत ॥ २१ ॥

प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात् ॥ २२ ॥

अपिच वैनाशिकाः कल्पयन्ति—बुद्धिबोध्यं त्रयादन्यत् संस्कृतं क्षणिकं च इति । तदपि च त्रयं प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधावाकाशं चेत्याचक्षते । त्रयमपि चैतदवस्त्वभावमात्रं निरुपाख्यमिति मन्यन्ते । बुद्धिपूर्वकः किल विनाशो भावानां प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधो नाम भाष्यते, तद्विपरीतोऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः, आवरणाभावमात्रमाकाशमिति । तेषामाकाशं परस्तात् प्रत्याख्यास्यति, निरोधद्वयमिदानीं प्रत्याचष्टे । प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधयोरप्राप्तिः, असंभव इत्यर्थः । कस्मात् । अविच्छेदात् । एतौ हि प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधौ संतानगोचरौ वा स्यातां भावगोचरौ वा । न तावत् संतानगोचरौ संभवतः, सर्वेष्वपि संतानेषु संतानिनामविच्छिन्नेन हेतुफलभावेन संतानविच्छेदस्यासंभवात् । नापि भावगोचरौ संभवतः । नहि भावानां निरन्वयो निरुपाख्यो विनाशः संभवति, सर्वास्वप्यवस्थासु प्रत्यभिज्ञानबलेनान्वय्यविच्छेददर्शनात् । अस्पष्टप्रत्यभिज्ञानास्वप्यवस्थासु क्वचिद्दृष्टेनान्वय्यविच्छेदेनान्यत्रापि तदनुमानात् । तस्मात् परपरिकल्पितस्य निरोधद्वयस्यानुपपत्तिः ॥ २२ ॥

उभयथा च दोषात् ॥ २३ ॥

योऽयमविद्यादिनिरोधः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधान्तःपाती परपरिकल्पितः, स सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्वा सपरिकरात् स्यात्, स्वयमेव वा । पूर्वस्मिन् विकल्पे निर्हेतुकविनाशाभ्युपगमहानिप्रसङ्गः, उत्तरस्मिंस्तु मार्गोपदेशानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः । एवमुभयथापि दोषप्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसमिदं दर्शनम् ॥ २३ ॥

आकाशे चाविशेषात् ॥ २४ ॥

यच्च तेषामेवाभिप्रेतं निरोधद्वयमाकाशं च निरुपाख्यमिति, तत्र निरोधद्वयस्य निरुपाख्यत्वं पुरस्तान्निराकृतम्, आकाशस्येदानीं निराक्रियते । आकाशे चायुक्तो निरुपाख्यत्वाभ्युपगमः, प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधयोरिव वस्तुत्वप्रतिपत्तेरविशेषात् । आगमप्रामाण्यात् तावत्—

आत्मन आकाशः संभूतः [तै० उ०, २·१],

इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः आकाशस्य च वस्तुत्वप्रसिद्धिः । विप्रतिपन्नान् प्रति तु शब्दगुणानुमेयत्वं वक्तव्यम्, गन्धादीनां गुणानां पृथिव्यादिवस्त्वाश्रयत्वदर्शनात् ॥ अपिचावरणाभावमात्रमाकाशमिच्छतामेकस्मिन् सुपर्णे पतत्यावरणस्य विद्यमानत्वात् सुपर्णान्तरस्योत्पित्सतोऽनवकाशत्वप्रसङ्गः । यत्रावरणाभावस्तत्र पतिष्यतीति चेत्, येनावरणाभावो विशेष्यते तत् तर्हि वस्तुभूतमेवाकाशं स्यात्, नावरणाभावमात्रम् । अपिचावरणाभावमात्रमाकाशं मन्यमानस्य सौगतस्य स्वाभ्युपगमविरोधः प्रसज्येत । सौगते हि समये—

पृथिवी भगवः किंसंनिश्रया ।

इत्यस्मिन् प्रश्नप्रतिवचनप्रवाहे [अभिधर्मकोशव्याख्या, पृ० १६] पृथिव्यादीनामन्ते—

वायुः किंसंनिश्रयः ।

इत्यस्य प्रश्नस्य प्रतिवचनं भवति—

वायुराकाशसंनिश्रयः ।

इति । तदाकाशस्यावस्तुत्वे न समञ्जसं स्यात् । तस्मादप्ययुक्तमाकाशस्यावस्तुत्वम् ॥ अपिच निरोधद्वयमाकाशं च त्रयमप्येतन्नि-

रुपाख्यमवस्तु नित्यं चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । नह्यवस्तुनो नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं वा संभवति, वस्त्वाश्रयत्वाद्धर्मधर्मिव्यवहारस्य । धर्मधर्मिभावे हि घटादिवद्वस्तुत्वमेव स्यान्न निरुपाख्यत्वम् ॥ २४ ॥

अनुस्मृतेश्च ॥ २५ ॥

अपिच वैनाशिकः सर्वस्य वस्तुनः क्षणिकतामभ्युपयन्नुपलब्धुरपि क्षणिकतामभ्युपेयात् । नच सा संभवति । अनुस्मृतेः । अनुभवमुपलब्धिमनूत्पद्यमानं स्मरणमेवानुस्मृतिः । सा चोपलब्ध्येककर्तृका सती संभवति, पुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिविषये पुरुषान्तरस्य स्मृत्यदर्शनात् । कथं ह्यहमदोऽद्राक्षमिदं पश्यामीति च पूर्वोत्तरदर्शिन्येकस्मिन्नसति प्रत्ययः स्यात् । अपिच दर्शनस्मरणयोः कर्तर्येकस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्ययः सर्वस्य लोकस्य प्रसिद्धोऽहमदोऽद्राक्षमिदं पश्यामीति । यदि हि तयोर्भिन्नः कर्ता स्यात् ततोऽहं स्मराम्यद्राक्षीदन्य इति प्रतीयात् । नत्वेवं प्रत्येति कश्चित् । यत्रैवं प्रत्ययस्तत्र दर्शनस्मरणयोर्भिन्नमेव कर्तारं सर्वलोकोऽवगच्छति, स्मराम्यहमसावदोऽद्राक्षीदिति । इह त्वहमदोऽद्राक्षमिति दर्शनस्मरणयोर्वैनाशिकोऽप्यात्मानमेवैकं कर्तारमवगच्छति, न नाहमित्यात्मनो दर्शनं निर्वृत्तं निह्नुते, यथाग्निरनुष्णोऽप्रकाश इति वा । तत्रैवं सत्येकस्य दर्शनस्मरणलक्षणक्षणद्वयसंबन्धे क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमहानिरपरिहार्या वैनाशिकस्य स्यात् । तथानन्तरामनन्तरामात्मन एव प्रतिपत्तिं प्रत्यभिजानन्नेककर्तृकामोत्तमादुच्छ्वासादतीताश्च प्रतिपत्तीरा जन्मन आत्मैककर्तृकाः प्रतिसंदधानः कथं क्षणभङ्गवादी वैनाशिको नापत्रपेत । स यदि ब्रूयात् सादृश्यादेतत् संपत्स्यत इति, तं प्रतिब्रूयात्। तेनेदं सदृशमिति द्वयायत्तत्वात् सादृश्यस्य, क्षणभङ्गवादिनः सदृशयोर्द्वयोर्वस्तुनोर्ग्रहीतुरेकस्याभावात्, सादृश्यनिमित्तं प्रतिसंधानमिति मिथ्याप्रलाप एव स्यात् । स्याच्चेत् पूर्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोः सादृश्यस्य ग्रहीतैकः, तथासत्येकस्य क्षणद्वयावस्थानात् क्षणिकत्वप्रतिज्ञा पीड्येत । तेनेदं सदृशमिति प्रत्ययान्तरमेवेदम्, न पूर्वोत्तरक्षणद्वयग्रहणनिमित्तमिति चेत् । न । तेनेदमिति भिन्नपदार्थोपादानात् । प्रत्ययान्तरमेव चेत् सादृश्यविषयं स्यात्, तेनेदं सदृशमिति वाक्यप्रयोगोऽनर्थकः स्यात्,

सादृश्यमित्येव प्रयोगः प्राप्नुयात् । यदा हि लोकप्रसिद्धः पदार्थः परीक्षकैर्न परिगृह्यते, तदा स्वपक्षसिद्धिः परपक्षदोषो वोभयमप्युच्यमानं परीक्षकाणामात्मनश्च यथार्थत्वेन न बुद्धिसंतानमारोहति । एवमेवैषोऽर्थ इति निश्चितं यत् तदेव वक्तव्यम् । ततोऽन्यदुच्यमानं बहुप्रलापित्वमात्मनः केवलं प्रख्यापयेत् । नचायं सादृश्यात् संव्यवहारो युक्तः, तद्भावावगमात् तत्सदृशभावानवगमाच्च । भवेदपि कदाचिद्बाह्यवस्तुनि विप्रलम्भसंभवात् तदेवेदं स्यात् तत्सदृशं वेति संदेहः । उपलब्धरि तु संदेहोऽपि न कदाचिद्भवति, स एवाहं स्यां तत्सदृशो वेति, य एवाहं पूर्वेद्युरद्राक्षं स एवाहमद्य स्मरामीति निश्चिततद्भावोपलम्भात् । तस्मादप्यनुपपन्नो वैनाशिकसमयः ॥ २२ ॥

नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

इतश्चानुपपन्नो वैनाशिकसमयः, यतः स्थिरमनुयायि कारणमनभ्युपगच्छतामभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरित्येतदापद्यते । दर्शयन्ति चाभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिम्—

नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात् ।

इति । विनष्टाद्धि किल बीजादङ्कुर उत्पद्यते, तथा विनष्टात् क्षीराद्दधि, मृत्पिण्डाच्च घटः । कूटस्थाच्चेत् कारणात् कार्यमुत्पद्येत, अविशेषात् सर्वं सर्वत उत्पद्येत । तस्मादभावग्रस्तेभ्यो बीजादिभ्योऽङ्कुरादीनामुत्पद्यमानत्वादभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरिति मन्यन्ते । तत्रेदमुच्यते—नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् । इति । नाभावाद्भाव उत्पद्यते । यद्यभावाद्भाव उत्पद्येताभावत्वाविशेषात् कारणविशेषाभ्युपगमोऽनर्थकः स्यात् । नहि बीजादीनामुपमृदितानां योऽभावस्तस्याभावस्य शशविषाणादीनां च निःस्वभावत्वाविशेषादभावत्वे कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्ति, येन बीजादेवाङ्कुरो जायते क्षीरादेव दधीत्येवंजातीयकः कारणविशेषाभ्युपगमोऽर्थवान् स्यात् । निर्विशेषस्य त्वभावस्य कारणत्वाभ्युपगमे शशविषाणादिभ्योऽप्यङ्कुरादयो जायेरन् । नचैवं दृश्यते । यदि पुनरभावस्यापि विशेषोऽभ्युपगम्येतोत्पलादीनामिव नीलत्वादिः, ततो विशेषवत्त्वादेवाभावस्य भावत्वमुत्पलादिवत् प्रसज्येत । नाप्यभावः कस्यचिदुत्पत्तिहेतुः स्यात्, अभावत्वादेव, शशविषाणादिवत् । अभावाच्च भावोत्पत्तावभावान्वितमेव सर्वं कार्यं स्यात् । नचैवं दृश्यते, सर्वस्य च

वस्तुनः स्वेनस्वेन रूपेण भावात्मनैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात् । नच मृदन्विताः शरावादयो भावास्तन्त्वादिविकाराः केनचिदभ्युपगम्यन्ते, मृद्विकारानेव तु मृदन्वितान् भावांल्लोकः प्रत्येति । यत् तूक्तं स्वरूपोपमर्दमन्तरेण कस्यचित् कूटस्थस्य वस्तुनः कारणत्वानुपपत्तेरभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्भवितुमर्हतीति । तदुरुक्तम् । स्थिरस्वभावानामेव सुवर्णादीनां प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानानां रुचकादिकार्यकारणभावदर्शनात् । येष्वपि बीजादिषु स्वरूपोपमर्दो लक्ष्यते, तेष्वपि नासावुपमृद्यमाना पूर्वावस्थोत्तरावस्थायाः कारणमभ्युपगम्यते, अनुपमृद्यमानानामेवानुयायिनां बीजाद्यवयवानामङ्कुरादिकारणभावाभ्युपगमात् । तस्मादसद्भ्यः शशविषाणादिभ्यः सदुत्पत्त्यदर्शनात् सद्भ्यश्च सुवर्णादिभ्यः सदुत्पत्तिदर्शनादनुपपन्नोऽयमभावाद्भावोत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमः । अपिच चतुर्भिश्चित्तचैत्ता उत्पद्यन्ते, परमाणुभ्यश्च भूतभौतिकलक्षणः समुदाय उत्पद्यते, इत्यभ्युपगम्य पुनरभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिं कल्पयद्भिरभ्युपगतमपह्नुवानैर्वैनाशिकैः सर्वो लोक आकुलीक्रियते ॥ २६ ॥

उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः ॥ २७ ॥

यदि चाभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरभ्युपगम्येत, एवं सत्युदासीनानामनीहमानानामपि जनानामभिमतसिद्धिः स्यात् । अभावस्य सुलभत्वात् कृषीवलस्य क्षेत्रकर्मण्यप्रयतमानस्यापि सस्यनिष्पत्तिः स्यात्, कुलालस्य च मृत्संस्क्रियायामप्रयतमानस्याप्यमत्रोत्पत्तिः, तन्तुवायस्यापि तन्तूनतन्वानस्यापि तन्वानस्येव वस्त्रलाभः । स्वर्गापवर्गयोश्च न कश्चित् कथंचित् समीहेत । नचैतद्युज्यतेऽभ्युपगम्यते वा केनचित् । तस्मादप्यनुपपन्नोऽयमभावाद्भावोत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमः ॥ २७ ॥ इति समुदायाधिकरणम् ॥ ४ ॥

५ अभावाधिकरणम् ।

एवं बाह्यार्थवादमाश्रित्य समुदायाप्राप्त्यादिषु दूषणेषूद्भावितेषु विज्ञानवादी बौद्ध इदानीं प्रत्यवतिष्ठते । केषांचित् किल विनेयानां बाह्ये वस्तुन्यभिनिवेशमालक्ष्य तदनुरोधेन बाह्यार्थवादप्रक्रियेयं विरचिता । नासौ सुगताभिप्रायः, तस्य तु विज्ञानैकस्कन्धवाद एवाभिप्रेतः । तस्मिंश्च विज्ञानवादे बुद्ध्यारूढेन रूपेणान्तस्थ एव प्रमाणप्रमेयफलव्यवहारः सर्व उप-

पद्यते सत्यपि बाह्येऽर्थे बुद्ध्यारोहमन्तरेण प्रमाणादिव्यवहारानवतारात् । कथं पुनरवगम्यतेऽन्तस्थ एवायं सर्वव्यवहारः, न विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तो बाह्योऽर्थोऽस्तीति । तदसंभवादित्याह । स हि बाह्योऽर्थोऽभ्युपगम्यमानः परमाणवो वा स्युस्तत्समूहा वा स्तम्भादयः स्युः । तत्र न तावत् परमाणवः स्तम्भादिप्रत्ययपरिच्छेद्या भवितुमर्हन्ति, परमाण्वाभासज्ञानानुपपत्तेः। नापि तत्समूहाः स्तम्भादयः, तेषां परमाणुभ्योऽन्यत्वानन्यत्वाभ्यां निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात् । एवं जात्यादीनपि प्रत्याचक्षीत ॥ अपिचानुभवमात्रेण साधारणात्मनो ज्ञानस्य जायमानस्य योऽयं प्रतिविषयं पक्षपातः स्तम्भज्ञानं कुड्यज्ञानं घटज्ञानं पटज्ञानमिति, नासौ ज्ञानगतविशेषमन्तरेणोपपद्यते, इत्यवश्यं विषयसारूप्यं ज्ञानस्याङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । अङ्गीकृते च तस्मिन् विषयाकारस्य ज्ञानेनैवावरुद्धत्वादपार्थिका बाह्यार्थसद्भावकल्पना ॥ अपिच सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो विषयविज्ञानयोरापतति । नह्यनयोरेकस्यानुपलम्भेऽन्यस्योपलम्भोऽस्ति । नचैतत् स्वभावविवेके युक्तं, प्रतिबन्धकारणाभावात् । तस्मादप्यर्थाभावः ॥ स्वप्नादिवच्चेदं द्रष्टव्यम् । यथाहि स्वप्नमायामरीच्युदकगन्धर्वनगरादिप्रत्यया विनैव बाह्येनार्थेन ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारा भवन्ति, एवं जागरितगोचरा अपि स्तम्भादिप्रत्यया भवितुमर्हन्तीत्यवगम्यते, प्रत्ययत्वाविशेषात् ॥ कथं पुनरसति बाह्यार्थे प्रत्ययवैचित्र्यमुपपद्यते । वासनावैचित्र्यादित्याह । अनादौ हि संसारे बीजाङ्कुरवद्विज्ञानानां वासनानां चान्योन्यनिमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेन वैचित्र्यं न विप्रतिषिध्यते । अपिचान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वासनानिमित्तमेव ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमित्यवगम्यते, स्वप्नादिष्वन्तरेणाप्यर्थं वासनानिमित्तस्य ज्ञानवैचित्र्यस्योभाभ्यामप्यावाभ्यामभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात्, अन्तरेण तु वासनामर्थनिमित्तस्य ज्ञानवैचित्र्यस्य मयानभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात् । तस्मादप्यभावो बाह्यार्थस्येति ॥ एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—

नाभाव उपलब्धेः ॥ २८ ॥

न खल्वभावो बाह्यस्यार्थस्याध्यवसातुं शक्यते । कस्मात् । उपलब्धेः । उपलभ्यते हि प्रतिप्रत्ययं बाह्योऽर्थः स्तम्भः कुड्यं घटः पट इति । नचोपलभ्यमानस्यैवाभावो भवितुमर्हति । यथा हि कश्चिद्भुञ्जानो भुजि-

साध्यायां तृप्तौ स्वयमनुभूयमानायामेवं ब्रूयान्नाहं भुञ्जे न वा तृप्यामीति, तद्वदिन्द्रियसंनिकर्षेण स्वयमुपलभमान एव बाह्यमर्थं नाहमुपलभे नच सोऽस्तीति ब्रुवन् कथमुपादेयवचनः स्यात् ॥ ननु नाहमेवं ब्रवीमि, न कंचिदर्थमुपलभ इति, किंतूपलब्धिव्यतिरिक्तं नोपलभ इति ब्रवीमि । बाढमेवं ब्रवीषि निरङ्कुशत्वात् ते तुण्डस्य । नतु युक्त्युपेतं ब्रवीषि । यत उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकोऽपि बलादर्थस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यः, उपलब्धेरेव । नहि कश्चिदुपलब्धिमेव स्तम्भः कुड्यं चेत्युपलभते । उपलब्धिविषयत्वेनैव तु स्तम्भकुड्यादीन् सर्वे लौकिका उपलभन्ते ॥ अतश्चैवमेव सर्वे लौकिका उपलभन्ते यत् प्रत्याचक्षाणा अपि बाह्यार्थमेव व्याचक्षते यदन्तर्ज्ञेयरूपं तद्बहिर्वदवभासत इति । तेऽपि सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धां बहिरवभासमानां संविदं प्रतिलभमानाः प्रत्याख्यातुकामाश्च बाह्यमर्थं बहिर्वदिति वत्कारं कुर्वन्ति । इतरथा हि कस्माद्बहिर्वदिति ब्रूयुः । नहि विष्णुमित्रो वन्ध्यापुत्रवदवभासत इति कश्चिदाचक्षीत । तस्माद्यथानुभवं तत्त्वमभ्युपगच्छद्भिर्बहिरेवावभासत इति युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुं, नतु बहिर्वदवभासत इति ॥

ननु बाह्यस्यार्थस्यासंभवाद्बहिर्वदवभासत इत्यध्यवसितम् । नायं साधुरध्यवसायो यतः प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वकौ संभवासंभवाववधार्येते, न पुनः संभवासंभवपूर्विके प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती । यद्धि प्रत्यक्षादीनामन्यतमेनापि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तत् संभवति । यत्तु न केनचिदपि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तन्न संभवति। इह तु यथास्वं सर्वैरेव प्रमाणैर्बाह्योऽर्थ उपलभ्यमानः कथं व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकादिविकल्पैर्न संभवतीत्युच्येतोपलब्धेरेव॥ नच ज्ञानस्य विषयसारूप्याद्विषयनाशो भवति, असति विषये विषयसारूप्यानुपपत्तेः, बहिरुपलब्धेश्च विषयस्य । अत एव सहोपलम्भनियमोऽपि प्रत्ययविषययोरुपायोपेयभावहेतुको नाभेदहेतुक इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अपिच घटज्ञानं पटज्ञानमिति विशेषणयोरेव घटपटयोर्भेदो, न विशेषस्य ज्ञानस्य । यथा शुक्लो गौः कृष्णो गौरिति शौक्ल्यकार्ष्ण्ययोरेव भेदो न गोत्वस्य । द्वाभ्यां च भेद एकस्य सिद्धो भवत्येकस्माच्च द्वयोः । तस्मादर्थज्ञानयोर्भेदः । तथा घटदर्शनं घटस्मरणमित्यत्रापि प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । अत्रापि हि विशेष्ययोरेव दर्शनस्मरणयोर्भेदो न विशेषणस्य घटस्य ।

यथा क्षीरगन्धः क्षीररस इति विशेष्ययोरेव गन्धरसयोर्भेदो न विशेषणस्य क्षीरस्य तद्वत् ॥ अपिच द्वयोर्विज्ञानयोः पूर्वोत्तरकालयोः स्वसंवेदनेनैवोपक्षीणयोरितरेतरग्राह्यग्राहकत्वानुपपत्तिः । ततश्च विज्ञानभेदप्रतिज्ञा, क्षणिकत्वादिधर्मप्रतिज्ञा, स्वलक्षणसामान्यलक्षणवास्यवासकत्वाविद्योपप्लवसदसद्धर्मबन्धमोक्षादिप्रतिज्ञाश्च स्वशास्त्रगतास्ता हीयेरन् ॥

किंचान्यत् । विज्ञानं विज्ञानमित्यभ्युपगच्छता बाह्योऽर्थः स्तम्भः कुड्यमित्येवंजातीयकः कस्मान्नाभ्युपगम्यत इति वक्तव्यम् । विज्ञानमनुभूयत इति चेत् । बाह्योऽप्यर्थोऽनुभूयत एवेति युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुम् । अथ विज्ञानं प्रकाशात्मकत्वात् प्रदीपवत् स्वयमेवानुभूयते न तथा बाह्योऽप्यर्थ इति चेत् । अत्यन्तविरुद्धां स्वात्मनि क्रियामभ्युपगच्छस्यग्निरात्मानं दहतीतिवत्, अविरुद्धं तु लोकप्रसिद्धं स्वात्मव्यतिरिक्तेन विज्ञानेन बाह्योऽर्थोऽनुभूयत इति नेच्छसि, अहो पाण्डित्यं महद्दर्शितम् । नचार्थव्यतिरिक्तमपि विज्ञानं स्वयमेवानुभूयते, स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधादेव । ननु विज्ञानस्य स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तग्राह्यत्वे तदप्यन्येन ग्राह्यं तदप्यन्येनेत्यनवस्था प्राप्नोति । अपिच प्रदीपवदवभासात्मकत्वाज्ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानान्तरं कल्पयतः समत्वादवभास्यावभासकभावानुपपत्तेः कल्पनानर्थक्यमिति । तदुभयमप्यसत् । विज्ञानग्रहणमात्र एव विज्ञानसाक्षिणो ग्रहणाकाङ्क्षानुत्पादादनवस्थाशङ्कानुपपत्तेः । साक्षिप्रत्यययोश्च स्वभाववैषम्यादुपलब्ध्रुपलभ्यभावोपपत्तेः । स्वयंसिद्धस्य च साक्षिणोऽप्रत्याख्येयत्वात् ॥

किंचान्यत् । प्रदीपवद्विज्ञानमवभासकान्तरनिरपेक्षं स्वयमेव प्रथत इति ब्रुवताप्रमाणगम्यं विज्ञानमनवगन्तृकमित्युक्तं स्यात्, शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीपसहस्रप्रथनवत् । बाढमेवम्, अनुभवरूपत्वात् तु विज्ञानस्येष्टो नः पक्षस्त्वयानुज्ञायत इति चेत् । न । अन्यस्यावगन्तुश्चक्षुःसाधनस्य प्रदीपादिप्रथनदर्शनात् । अतो विज्ञानस्याप्यवभास्यत्वाविशेषात् सत्येवान्यस्मिन्नवगन्तरि प्रथनं प्रदीपवदित्यवगम्यते । साक्षिणोऽवगन्तुः स्वयंसिद्धतामुपक्षिपता स्वयं प्रथते विज्ञानमित्येष एव मम पक्षस्त्वया वाचोयुक्त्यन्तरेणाश्रित इति चेत् । न । विज्ञानस्योत्पत्तिप्रध्वंसानेक-

त्वादिविशेषत्वाभ्युपगमात् । अतः प्रदीपवद्विज्ञानस्यापि व्यतिरिक्तावगम्यत्वमस्माभिः प्रसाधितम् ॥ २८ ॥

वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ॥ २९ ॥

यदुक्तं बाह्यार्थापलापिना स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवज्जागरितगोचरा अपि स्तम्भादिप्रत्यया विनैव बाह्येनार्थेन भवेयुः प्रत्ययत्वाविशेषादिति, तत् प्रतिवक्तव्यम् । अत्रोच्यते । न स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवज्जाग्रत्प्रत्यया भवितुमर्हन्ति । कस्मात् । वैधर्म्यात् । वैधर्म्यं हि भवति स्वप्नजागरितयोः । किं पुनर्वैधर्म्यम् । बाधाबाधाविति ब्रूमः । बाध्यते हि स्वप्नोपलब्धं वस्तु प्रतिबुद्धस्य, मिथ्या मयोपलब्धो महाजनसमागम इति, नह्यस्ति मम महाजनसमागमः, निद्राग्लानं तु मे मनो बभूव, तेनैषा भ्रान्तिरुद्बभूवेति । एवं मायादिष्वपि भवति यथायथं बाधः । नैवं जागरितोपलब्धं वस्तु स्तम्भादिकं कस्यांचिदप्यवस्थायां बाध्यते ॥ अपिच स्मृतिरेषा यत् स्वप्नदर्शनम् । उपलब्धिस्तु जागरितदर्शनम् । स्मृत्युपलब्ध्योश्च प्रत्यक्षमन्तरं स्वयमनुभूयतेऽर्थविप्रयोगसंप्रयोगात्मकम्, इष्टं पुत्रं स्मरामि नोपलभ उपलब्धुमिच्छामीति । तत्रैवं सति न शक्यते वक्तुं मिथ्या जागरितोपलब्धिः, उपलब्धित्वात्, स्वप्नोपलब्धिवदिति, उभयोरन्तरं स्वयमनुभवता । नच स्वानुभवापलापः प्राज्ञमानिभिर्युक्तः कर्तुम् । अपिचानुभवविरोधप्रसङ्गाज्जागरितप्रत्ययानां स्वतो निरालम्बतां वक्तुमशक्नुवता स्वप्नप्रत्ययसाधर्म्याद्वक्तुमिष्यते । नच यो यस्य स्वतो धर्मो न संभवति सोऽन्यस्य साधर्म्यात् तस्य संभविष्यति । नह्यग्निरुष्णोऽनुभूयमान उदकसाधर्म्याच्छीतो भविष्यति । दर्शितं तु वैधर्म्यं स्वप्नजागरितयोः ॥ २९ ॥

न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥ ३० ॥

यदप्युक्तं विनाप्यर्थेन ज्ञानवैचित्र्यं वासनावैचित्र्यादेवावकल्प्यत इति, तत् प्रतिवक्तव्यम् । अत्रोच्यते—न भावो वासनानामुपपद्येत त्वत्पक्षे, अनुपलब्धेर्बाह्यानामर्थानाम् । अर्थोपलब्धिनिमित्ता हि प्रत्यर्थं नानारूपा वासना भवन्ति । अनुपलभ्यमानेषु त्वर्थेषु किंनिमित्ता विचित्रा वासना भवेयुः । अनादित्वेऽप्यन्धपरंपरान्यायेनाप्रतिष्ठैवानवस्था व्यवहारलोपिनी

स्यात्, नाभिप्रायसिद्धिः । यावप्यन्वयव्यतिरेकावर्थोपलापिनोपन्यस्तौ, वासनानिमित्तमेवेदं ज्ञानजातं नार्थनिमित्तमिति, तावप्येवं सति प्रत्युक्तौ द्रष्टव्यौ, विनार्थोपलब्ध्या वासनानुत्पत्तेः । अपिच विनापि वासनाभिरर्थोपलब्ध्युपगमाद्विना त्वर्थोपलब्ध्या वासनोत्पत्त्यनभ्युपगमादर्थसद्भावमेवान्वयव्यतिरेकावपि प्रतिष्ठापयतः । अपिच वासना नाम संस्कारविशेषाः । संस्काराश्च नाश्रयमन्तरेणावकल्पन्ते । एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात् । नच तव वासनाश्रयः कश्चिदस्ति, प्रमाणतोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥ ३० ॥

क्षणिकत्वाच्च ॥ ३१ ॥

यदप्यालयविज्ञानं नाम वासनाश्रयत्वेन परिकल्पितम्, तदपि क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमादनवस्थितस्वरूपं सत् प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानवन्न वासनानामधिकरणं भवितुमर्हति । नहि कालत्रयसंबन्धिन्येकस्मिन्नन्वयिन्यसति कूटस्थे वा सर्वार्थदर्शिनि देशकालनिमित्तापेक्षवासनाधानस्मृतिप्रतिसंधानादिव्यवहारः संभवति । स्थिरस्वरूपत्वे त्वालयविज्ञानस्य सिद्धान्तहानिः । अपिच विज्ञानवादेऽपि क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमस्य समानत्वाद्यानि बाह्यार्थवादे क्षणिकत्वनिबन्धनानि दूषणान्युद्भावितानि—उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् [ब्र० सू०, २·२·२०], इत्येवमादीनि तानीहाप्यनुसंधातव्यानि । एवमेतौ द्वावपि वैनाशिकपक्षौ निराकृतौ, बाह्यार्थवादिपक्षो विज्ञानवादिपक्षश्च । शून्यवादिपक्षस्तु सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्ध इति तन्निराकरणाय नादरः क्रियते । नह्ययं सर्वप्रमाणप्रसिद्धो लोकव्यवहारोऽन्यत् तत्त्वमनधिगम्य शक्यतेऽपह्नोतुमपवादाभाव उत्सर्गप्रसिद्धेः ॥ ३१ ॥

सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३२ ॥

किं बहुना । सर्वप्रकारेण यथायथायं वैनाशिकसमय उपपत्तिमत्त्वाय परीक्ष्यते तथातथा सिकताकूपवद्विदीर्यत एव । न कांचिदप्यत्रोपपत्तिं पश्यामः । अतश्चानुपपन्नो वैनाशिकतन्त्रव्यवहारः । अपिच बाह्यार्थविज्ञानशून्यवादत्रयमितरेतरविरुद्धमुपदिशता सुगतेन स्पष्टीकृतमात्मनोऽसंबद्धप्रलापित्वं, प्रद्वेषो वा प्रजासु, विरुद्धार्थप्रतिपत्त्या विमुह्येयुरिमाः प्रजा इति । सर्वथाप्यनादरणीयोऽयं सुगतसमयः श्रेयस्कामैरित्यभिप्रायः ॥ ३२ ॥ इत्यभावाधिकरणम् ॥ ५ ॥

६ एकस्मिन्नसंभवाधिकरणम् ।

निरस्तः सुगतसमयः । विवसनसमय इदानीं निरस्यते । सप्त चैषां पदार्थाः संमता जीवाजीवास्रवसंवरनिर्जरबन्धमोक्षा नाम । संक्षेपतस्तु द्वावेव पदार्थौ जीवाजीवाख्यौ, यथायोगं तयोरेवेतरान्तर्भावादिति मन्यन्ते। तयोरिममपरं प्रपञ्चमाचक्षते—पञ्चास्तिकाया नाम—जीवास्तिकायः पुद्गलास्तिकायो धर्मास्तिकायोऽधर्मास्तिकाय आकाशास्तिकायश्चेति । सर्वेषामप्येषामवान्तरप्रभेदान् बहुविधान् स्वसमयपरिकल्पितान् वर्णयन्ति । सर्वत्र चेमं सप्तभङ्गीनयं नाम न्यायमवतारयन्ति—स्यादस्ति, स्यान्नास्ति, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च, स्यादवक्तव्यः, स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यश्च, स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्च, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्चेति । एवमेवैकत्वनित्यत्वादिष्वपीमं सप्तभङ्गीनयं योजयन्ति । अत्राचक्ष्महे—

न, एकस्मिन्नसंभवात् ॥ ३३ ॥

नायमभ्युपगमो युक्त इति । कुतः । एकस्मिन्नसंभवात् । नह्येकस्मिन् धर्मिणि युगपत् सदसत्त्वादिविरुद्धधर्मसमावेशः संभवति, शीतोष्णवत् । य एते सप्त पदार्था निर्धारिताः, एतावन्त एवंरूपाश्चेति, ते तथैव वा स्युर्नैव वा तथा स्युः । इतरथा हि तथा वा स्युरतथा वेत्यनिर्धारितरूपं ज्ञानं संशयज्ञानवदप्रमाणमेव स्यात् । नन्वनेकात्मकं वस्त्विति निर्धारितरूपमेव ज्ञानमुत्पद्यमानं संशयज्ञानवन्नाप्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति । नेति ब्रूमः । निरङ्कुशं ह्यनेकान्तत्वं सर्ववस्तुषु प्रतिजानानस्य, निर्धारणस्यापि वस्तुत्वाविशेषात्, स्यादस्ति स्यान्नास्तीत्यादिविकल्पोपनिपातादनिर्धारणात्मकतैव स्यात् । एवं निर्धारयितुर्निर्धारणफलस्य च स्यात् पक्षेऽस्तिता, स्याच्च पक्षे नास्तितेति । एवं सति कथं प्रमाणभूतः संस्तीर्थकरः प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमातृप्रमितिष्वनिर्धारितासूपदेष्टुं शक्नुयात्, कथं वा तदभिप्रायानुसारिणस्तदुपदिष्टेऽर्थेऽनिर्धारितरूपे प्रवर्तेरन् । ऐकान्तिकफलत्वनिर्धारणे हि सति तत्साधनानुष्ठानाय सर्वो लोकोऽनाकुलः प्रवर्तते, नान्यथा । अतश्चानिर्धारितार्थं शास्त्रं प्रणयन् मत्तोन्मत्तवदनुपादेयवचनः स्यात् ॥ तथा पञ्चानामस्तिकायानां

पञ्चत्वसंख्यास्ति वा नास्ति वेति विकल्प्यमाना, स्यात् तावदेकस्मिन् पक्षे, पक्षान्तरे तु न स्यात्, इत्यतो न्यूनसंख्यात्वमधिकसंख्यात्वं वा प्राप्नुयात्। नचैषां पदार्थानामवक्तव्यत्वं संभवति । अवक्तव्याश्चेन्नोच्येरन् । उच्यन्ते चावक्तव्याश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । उच्यमानाश्च तथैवावधार्यन्ते नावधार्यन्त इति च । तथा तदवधारणफलं सम्यग्दर्शनमस्ति वा नास्ति वा, एवं तद्विपरीतमसम्यग्दर्शनमप्यस्ति वा नास्ति वा, इति प्रलपन् मत्तोन्मत्त-पक्षस्यैव स्यान्न प्रत्यायितव्यपक्षस्य। स्वर्गापवर्गयोश्च पक्षे भावः पक्षे चा-भावस्तथा पक्षे नित्यता पक्षे चानित्यतेत्यनवधारणायां प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः। अनादिसिद्धजीवप्रभृतीनां च स्वशास्त्रावधृतस्वभावानामयथावधृतस्वभाव-त्वप्रसङ्गः । एवं जीवादिषु पदार्थेष्वेकस्मिन् धर्मिणि सत्त्वासत्त्वयोर्विरु-द्धयोर्धर्मयोरसंभवात्, सत्त्वे चैकस्मिन् धर्मेऽसत्त्वस्य धर्मान्तरस्यासं-भवात्, असत्त्वे चैवं सत्त्वस्यासंभवादसंगतमिदमार्हतं मतम् । एते-नैकानेकनित्यानित्यव्यतिरिक्ताव्यतिरिक्ताद्यनेकान्ताभ्युपगमा निराकृता मन्तव्याः । यत् तु पुद्गलसंज्ञकेभ्योऽणुभ्यः संघाताः संभवन्तीति कल्प-यन्ति, तत् पूर्वेणैवाणुवादनिराकरणेन निराकृतं भवतीत्यतो न पृथक् तन्निराकरणाय प्रयत्यते ॥ ३३ ॥

एवं चात्माकार्त्स्न्यम् ॥ ३४ ॥

यथैकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विरुद्धधर्मासंभवो दोषः स्याद्वादे प्रसक्तः, एवमा-त्मनोऽपि जीवस्याकार्त्स्न्यमपरो दोषः प्रसज्येत। कथम् । शरीरपरिमाणो हि जीव इत्यार्हता मन्यन्ते । शरीरपरिमाणतायां च सत्यामकृत्स्नोऽ-सर्वगतः परिच्छिन्न आत्मेत्यतो घटादिवदनित्यत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत । शरीराणां चानवस्थितपरिमाणत्वान्मनुष्यजीवो मनुष्यशरीरपरिमाणो भूत्वा पुनः केनचित् कर्मविपाकेन हस्तिजन्म प्राप्नुवन् न कृत्स्नं हस्ति-शरीरं व्याप्नुयात्। पुत्तिकाजन्म च प्राप्नुवन् न कृत्स्नः पुत्तिकाशरीरे सं-मीयेत । समान एष एकस्मिन्नपि जन्मनि कौमारयौवनस्थाविरेषु दोषः॥ स्यादेतत् । अनन्तावयवो जीवः। तस्य त एवावयवा अल्पे शरीरे संकु-चेयुर्महति च विकसेयुरिति । तेषां पुनरनन्तानां जीवावयवानां समान-देशत्वं प्रतिहन्यते वा न वेति वक्तव्यम् । प्रतिघाते तावन्नानन्तावयवाः

परिच्छिन्ने देशे संमीयेरन् । अप्रतिघातेऽप्येकावयवदेशत्वोपपत्तेः सर्वेषामवयवानां प्रथिमानुपपत्तेर्जीवस्याणुमात्रत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात् । अपिच शरीरमात्रपरिच्छिन्नानां जीवावयवानामानन्त्यं नोत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम् ॥३४॥

अथ पर्यायेण बृहच्छरीरप्रतिपत्तौ केचिज्जीवावयवा उपगच्छन्ति तनुशरीरप्रतिपत्तौ च केचिदपगच्छन्तीत्युच्येत, तत्राप्युच्यते—

नच पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ॥ ३५ ॥

नच पर्यायेणाप्यवयवोपगमापगमाभ्यामेतद्देहपरिमाणत्वं जीवस्याविरोधेनोपपादयितुं शक्यते । कुतः । विकारादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् । अवयवोपगमापगमाभ्यां ह्यनिशमापूर्यमाणस्यापक्षीयमाणस्य च जीवस्य विक्रियावत्त्वं तावदपरिहार्यम्, विक्रियावत्त्वे च चर्मादिवदनित्यत्वं प्रसज्येत । ततश्च बन्धमोक्षाभ्युपगमो बाध्येत, कर्माष्टकपरिवेष्टितस्य जीवस्यालाबुवत् संसारसागरे निमग्नस्य बन्धनोच्छेदादूर्ध्वगामित्वं भवतीति । किंचान्यत् । आगच्छतामपगच्छतां चावयवानामागमापायधर्मवत्त्वादेवानात्मत्वं शरीरादिवत् । ततश्चावस्थितः कश्चिदवयव आत्मेति स्यात् । नच स निरूपयितुं शक्यतेऽयमसाविति । किंचान्यत् । आगच्छन्तश्चैते जीवावयवाः कुतः प्रादुर्भवन्ति, अपगच्छन्तश्च क्व वा लीयन्त इति वक्तव्यम् । नहि भूतेभ्यः प्रादुर्भवेयुर्भूतेषु च निलीयेरन्, अभौतिकत्वाज्जीवस्य । नापि कश्चिदन्यः साधारणोऽसाधारणो वा जीवानामवयवाधारो निरूप्यते प्रमाणाभावात् । किंचान्यत् । अनवधृतस्वरूपश्चैवं सत्यात्मा स्यात्, आगच्छतामपगच्छतां चावयवानामनियतपरिमाणत्वात् । अत एवमादिदोषप्रसङ्गान्न पर्यायेणाप्यवयवोपगमापगमावात्मन आश्रयितुं शक्येते ॥ अथवा पूर्वेण सूत्रेण शरीरपरिमाणस्यात्मन उपचितापचितशरीरान्तरप्रतिपत्तावकार्त्स्न्यप्रसञ्जनद्वारेणानित्यतायां चोदितायां, पुनः पर्यायेण परिमाणानवस्थानेऽपि स्रोतःसंताननित्यतान्यायेनात्मनो नित्यता स्यात् । यथा रक्तपटानां विज्ञानानवस्थानेऽपि तत्संताननित्यता तद्वद्विसिचामपीत्याशङ्कयानेन सूत्रेणोत्तरमुच्यते । संतानस्य तावदवस्तुत्वे नैरात्म्यवादप्रसङ्गः, वस्तुत्वेऽप्यात्मनो विकारादिदोषप्रसङ्गादस्य पक्षस्यानुपपत्तिरिति ॥ ३५ ॥

अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः ॥ ३६ ॥

अपिचान्त्यस्य मोक्षावस्थाभाविनो जीवपरिमाणस्य नित्यत्वमिष्यते जैनैः । तद्वत् पूर्वयोरप्याद्यमध्यमयोर्जीवपरिमाणयोर्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादविशेषप्रसङ्गः स्यात् । एकशरीरपरिमाणतैव स्यान्नोपचितापचितशरीरान्तरप्राप्तिः ॥ अथवान्त्यस्य जीवपरिमाणस्यावस्थितत्वात् पूर्वयोरप्यवस्थयोरवस्थितपरिमाण एव जीवः स्यात्, ततश्चाविशेषेण सर्वदैवाणुर्महान् वा जीवोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यो न शरीरपरिमाणः । अतश्च सौगतवदार्हतमपि मतमसंगतमित्युपेक्षितव्यम् ॥ ३६ ॥ इत्येकस्मिन्नसंभवाधिकरणम् ॥ ६ ॥

७ पत्यधिकरणम् ।

पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात् ॥ ३७ ॥

इदानीं केवलाधिष्ठात्रीश्वरकारणवादः प्रतिषिध्यते । तत् कथमत्रगम्यते,

प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् [ब्र० सू०, १·४·२३],
अभिध्योपदेशाच्च [ब्र० सू०, १·४·२४],

इत्यत्र प्रकृतिभावेनाधिष्ठातृभावेन चोभयस्वभावस्येश्वरस्य स्वयमेवाचार्येण प्रतिष्ठापितत्वात् । यदि पुनरविशेषेणेश्वरकारणवादमात्रमिह प्रतिषिध्येत, पूर्वोत्तरविरोधाद्व्याहताभिव्याहारः सूत्रकार इत्येतदापद्येत । तस्मादप्रकृतिरधिष्ठाता केवलं निमित्तकारणमीश्वर इत्येष पक्षो वेदान्तविहितब्रह्मैकत्वप्रतिपक्षत्वाद्यत्नेनात्र प्रतिषिध्यते । सा चेयं वेदबाह्येश्वरकल्पनानेकप्रकारा । केचित् तावत् सांख्ययोगव्यपाश्रयाः कल्पयन्ति, प्रधानपुरुषयोरधिष्ठाता केवलं निमित्तकारणमीश्वरः, इतरेतरविलक्षणाः प्रधानपुरुषेश्वरा इति । माहेश्वरास्तु मन्यन्ते कार्यकारणयोगविधिदुःखान्ताः पञ्च पदार्थाः पशुपतिनेश्वरेण पशुपाशविमोक्षणायोपदिष्टाः, पशुपतिरीश्वरो निमित्तकारणम्, इति । तथा वैशेषिकादयोऽपि केचित् कथंचित् स्वप्रक्रियानुसारेण निमित्तकारणमीश्वर इति वर्णयन्ति । अत उत्तरमुच्यते—पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात्, इति । पत्युरीश्वरस्य प्रधानपुरुषयो-

रधिष्ठातृत्वेन जगत्कारणत्वं नोपपद्यते । कस्मात् । असामञ्जस्यात् । किं पुनरसामञ्जस्यम् । हीनमध्यमोत्तमभावेन हि प्राणिभेदान् विदधत ईश्वरस्य रागद्वेषादिदोषप्रसक्तेरस्मदादिवदनीश्वरत्वं प्रसज्येत । प्राणिकर्मापेक्षितत्वाददोष इति चेत् । न । कर्मेश्वरयोः प्रवर्त्यप्रवर्तयितृत्व इतरेतराश्रयदोषप्रसङ्गात् । न, अनादित्वादिति चेत् । न वर्तमानकालवदतीतेष्वपि कालेष्वितरेतराश्रयदोषाविशेषादन्धपरंपरान्यायापत्तेः । अपिच—

प्रवर्तनालक्षणा दोषाः [न्या० सू०, १·१·१८],

इति न्यायवित्समयः । नहि कश्चिददोषप्रयुक्तः स्वार्थे परार्थे वा प्रवर्तमानो दृश्यते, स्वार्थप्रयुक्त एव च सर्वो जनः परार्थेऽपि प्रवर्तत इत्येवमप्यसामञ्जस्यम्, स्वार्थवत्त्वादीश्वरस्यानीश्वरत्वप्रसङ्गात् । पुरुषविशेषत्वाभ्युपगमाच्चेश्वरस्य, पुरुषस्य चौदासीन्याभ्युपगमादसामञ्जस्यम् ॥ ३७ ॥

संबन्धानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

पुनरप्यसामञ्जस्यमेव । नहि प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरोऽन्तरेण संबन्धं प्रधानपुरुषयोरीशिता । न तावत् संयोगलक्षणः संबन्धः संभवति, प्रधानपुरुषेश्वराणां सर्वगतत्वान्निरवयवत्वाच्च । नापि समवायलक्षणः संबन्धः, आश्रयाश्रयिभावानिरूपणात् । नाप्यन्यः कश्चित् कार्यगम्यः संबन्धः शक्यते कल्पयितुम्, कार्यकारणभावस्यैवाद्याप्यसिद्धत्वात् ॥ ब्रह्मवादिनः कथमिति चेत् । न । तस्य तादात्म्यलक्षणसंबन्धोपपत्तेः । अपिचागमबलेन ब्रह्मवादी कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतीति, नावश्यं तस्य दृष्टमेव सर्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति नियमोऽस्ति । परस्य तु दृष्टान्तबलेन कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतो यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यमित्ययमस्त्यतिशयः ॥ परस्यापि सर्वज्ञप्रणीतागमसद्भावात् समानमागमबलमिति चेत् । न । इतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । आगमप्रत्ययात् सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्धिः, सर्वज्ञप्रत्ययाच्चागमसिद्धिरिति । तस्मादनुपपन्ना सांख्ययोगवादिनामीश्वरकल्पना ॥ एवमन्यास्वपि वेदबाह्यास्वीश्वरकल्पनासु यथासंभवमसामञ्जस्यं योजयितव्यम् ॥ ३८ ॥

अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३९ ॥

इतश्चानुपपत्तिस्तार्किकपरिकल्पितस्येश्वरस्य । स हि परिकल्प्यमानः कुम्भकार इव मृदादीनि प्रधानादीन्यधिष्ठाय प्रवर्तयेत् । नचैवमुपपद्यते । नह्यप्रत्यक्षं रूपादिहीनं च प्रधानमीश्वरस्याधिष्ठेयं संभवति, मृदादिवैलक्षण्यात् ॥ ३९ ॥

करणवच्चेन्न भोगादिभ्यः ॥ ४० ॥

स्यादेतत् । यथा करणग्रामं चक्षुरादिकमप्रत्यक्षं रूपादिहीनं च पुरुषोऽधितिष्ठति, एवं प्रधानमपीश्वरोऽधिष्ठास्यतीति । तथापि नोपपद्यते । भोगादिदर्शनाद्धि करणग्रामस्याधिष्ठितत्वं गम्यते । नचात्र भोगादयो दृश्यन्ते । करणग्रामसाम्ये वाभ्युपगम्यमाने संसारिणामिवेश्वरस्यापि भोगादयः प्रसज्येरन् ॥

अन्यथा वा सूत्रद्वयं व्याख्यायते—

अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च [२.२.३९] ।

इतश्चानुपपत्तिस्तार्किकपरिकल्पितस्येश्वरस्य । साधिष्ठानो हि लोके सशरीरो राजा राष्ट्रस्येश्वरो दृश्यते, न निरधिष्ठानः । अतश्च तद्दृष्टान्तवशेनादृष्टमीश्वरं कल्पयितुमिच्छत ईश्वरस्यापि किंचिच्छरीरं करणायतनं वर्णयितव्यं स्यात् । नच तद्वर्णयितुं शक्यते, सृष्ट्युत्तरकालभावित्वाच्छरीरस्य प्राक् सृष्टेस्तदनुपपत्तेः । निरधिष्ठानत्वे चेश्वरस्य प्रवर्तकत्वानुपपत्तिः, एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात् ॥

करणवच्चेन्न भोगादिभ्यः [२.२.४०] ।

अथ लोकदर्शनानुसारेणेश्वरस्यापि किंचित् करणानामायतनं शरीरं कामेन कल्प्येत, एवमपि नोपपद्यते । सशरीरत्वे हि सति संसारिवद्भोगादिप्रसङ्गादीश्वरस्याप्यनीश्वरत्वं प्रसज्येत ॥ ४० ॥

अन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा ॥ ४१ ॥

इतश्चानुपपत्तिस्तार्किकपरिकल्पितस्येश्वरस्य । स हि सर्वज्ञस्तैरभ्युपगम्यतेऽनन्तश्च । अनन्तं च प्रधानमनन्ताश्च पुरुषा मिथो भिन्ना अभ्यु-

पगम्यन्ते । तत्र सर्वज्ञेनेश्वरेण प्रधानस्य पुरुषाणामात्मनश्चेयत्ता परिच्छिद्येत वा, न वा परिच्छिद्येत । उभयथापि दोषोऽनुषक्त एव । कथम् । पूर्वस्मिंस्तावद्विकल्प इयत्तापरिच्छिन्नत्वात् प्रधानपुरुषेश्वराणामन्तवत्त्वमवश्यं भावि, एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात् । यद्धि लोक इयत्तापरिच्छिन्नं वस्तु पटादि तदन्तवद्दृष्टम् । तथा प्रधानपुरुषेश्वरत्रयमपीयत्तापरिच्छिन्नत्वादन्तवत् स्यात् । संख्यापरिमाणं तावत् प्रधानपुरुषेश्वरत्रयरूपेण परिच्छिन्नम् । स्वरूपपरिमाणमपि तद्गतमीश्वरेण परिच्छिद्येत । पुरुषगता च महासंख्या । ततश्चेयत्तापरिच्छिन्नानां मध्ये ये संसारिणः संसारान्मुच्यन्ते, तेषां संसारोऽन्तवान्, संसारित्वं च तेषामन्तवत् । एवमितरेष्वपि क्रमेण मुच्यमानेषु संसारस्य संसारिणां चान्तवत्त्वं स्यात् । प्रधानं च सविकारं पुरुषार्थमीश्वरस्याधिष्ठेयं संसारित्वेनाभिमतम्, तच्छून्यतायामीश्वरः किमधितिष्ठेत् । किंविषये वा सर्वज्ञतेश्वरते स्याताम् । प्रधानपुरुषेश्वराणां चैवमन्तवत्त्वे सत्यादिमत्त्वप्रसङ्गः । आद्यन्तवत्त्वे च शून्यवादप्रसङ्गः । अथ मा भूदेष दोष इत्युत्तरो विकल्पोऽभ्युपगम्येत, न प्रधानस्य पुरुषाणामात्मनश्चेयत्तेश्वरेण परिच्छिद्यत इति, तत ईश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञत्वाभ्युपगमहानिरपरो दोषः प्रसज्येत । तस्मादप्यसंगतस्तार्किकपरिगृहीत ईश्वरकारणवादः ॥ ४१ ॥ इति पत्यधिकरणम् ॥ ७ ॥

८ उत्पत्त्यसंभवाधिकरणम् ।

येषामप्रकृतिरधिष्ठाता केवलनिमित्तकारणमीश्वरोऽभिमतस्तेषां पक्षः प्रत्याख्यातः । येषां पुनः प्रकृतिश्चाधिष्ठाता चोभयात्मकं कारणमीश्वरोऽभिमतस्तेषां पक्षः प्रत्याख्यायते । ननु श्रुतिसमाश्रयणेनाप्येवंरूप एवेश्वरः प्राङ्निर्धारितः प्रकृतिश्चाधिष्ठाता चेति । श्रुत्यनुसारिणी च स्मृतिः प्रमाणमिति स्थितिः । तत् कस्य हेतोरेष पक्षः प्रत्याचिख्यासित इति । उच्यते—यद्यप्येवंजातीयकोंऽशः समानत्वान्न विसंवादगोचरो भवति, अस्ति त्वंशान्तरं विसंवादस्थानमित्यतस्तत्प्रत्याख्यानायारम्भः ॥ तत्र भागवता मन्यन्ते । भगवानेवैको वासुदेवो निरञ्जनज्ञानस्वरूपः परमार्थतत्त्वं, स चतुर्धात्मानं प्रविभज्य प्रतिष्ठितो—वासुदेवव्यूहरूपेण संकर्षणव्यूहरूपेण प्रद्युम्नव्यूहरूपेणानिरुद्धव्यूहरूपेण च । वासुदेवो नाम परमात्मोच्यते, संकर्षणो नाम जीवः, प्रद्युम्नो नाम मनः, अनि-

रुद्धो नामाहंकारः । तेषां वासुदेवः परा प्रकृतिरितरे संकर्षणादयः कार्यम् । तमित्थंभूतं परमेश्वरं भगवन्तमभिगमनोपादानेज्यास्वाध्याययोगैर्वर्षशतमिष्ट्वा क्षीणक्लेशो भगवन्तमेव प्रतिपद्यत इति ॥ तत्र यत् तावदुच्यते, योऽसौ नारायणः परोऽव्यक्तात् प्रसिद्धः परमात्मा सर्वात्मा स आत्मनात्मानमनेकधा व्यूह्यावस्थित इति, तन्न निराक्रियते,

स एकधा भवति त्रिधा भवति [छा०, ७·२६·२],

इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः परमात्मनोऽनेकधाभावस्याधिगतत्वात् । यदपि तस्य भगवतोऽभिगमनादिलक्षणमाराधनमजस्रमनन्यचित्ततयाभिप्रेयते, तदपि न प्रतिषिध्यते, श्रुतिस्मृत्योरीश्वरप्रणिधानस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । यत् पुनरिदमुच्यते वासुदेवात् संकर्षण उत्पद्यते, संकर्षणाच्च प्रद्युम्नः, प्रद्युम्नाच्चानिरुद्ध इति, अत्र ब्रूमः—

उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् ॥ ४२ ॥

न वासुदेवसंज्ञकात् परमात्मनः संकर्षणसंज्ञकस्य जीवस्योत्पत्तिः संभवति, अनित्यत्वादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् । उत्पत्तिमत्त्वे हि जीवस्यानित्यत्वादयो दोषाः प्रसज्येरन् । ततश्च नैवास्य भगवत्प्राप्तिर्मोक्षः स्यात्, कारणप्राप्तौ कार्यस्य प्रविलयप्रसङ्गात् । प्रतिषेधिष्यति चाचार्यो जीवस्योत्पत्तिम्—नात्माश्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः [ब्र० सू०, २·३·१७] इति । तस्मादसंगतैषा कल्पना ॥ ४२ ॥

नच कर्तुः करणम् ॥ ४३ ॥

इतश्चासंगतैषा कल्पना, यस्मान्नहि लोके कर्तुर्देवदत्तादेः करणं परश्वाद्युत्पद्यमानं दृश्यते । वर्णयन्ति च भागवताः कर्तुर्जीवात् संकर्षणसंज्ञकात् करणं मनः प्रद्युम्नसंज्ञकमुत्पद्यते, कर्तृजाच्च तस्मादनिरुद्धसंज्ञकोऽहंकार उत्पद्यत इति । नचैतद्दृष्टान्तमन्तरेणाध्यवसातुं शक्नुमः । नचैवंभूतां श्रुतिमुपलभामहे ॥ ४३ ॥

विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४४ ॥

अथापि स्यान्न चैते संकर्षणादयो जीवादिभावेनाभिप्रेयन्ते, किंतर्हि, ईश्वरा एवैते सर्वे ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजोभिरैश्वरैर्धर्मैरन्विता अभ्युप-

गम्यन्ते, वासुदेवा एवैते सर्वे निर्दोषा निरधिष्ठाना निरवद्याश्चेति । तस्मान्नायं यथावर्णित उत्पत्त्यसंभवो दोषः प्राप्नोतीति । अत्रोच्यते—एवमपि तदप्रतिषेध उत्पत्त्यसंभवस्याप्रतिषेधः, प्राप्नोत्येवायमुत्पत्त्यसंभवो दोषः प्रकारान्तरेणेत्यभिप्रायः । कथम् । यदि तावदयमभिप्रायः परस्परभिन्ना एवैते वासुदेवादयश्चत्वार ईश्वरास्तुल्यधर्माणः, नैषामेकात्मकत्वमस्तीति, ततोऽनेकेश्वरकल्पनानर्थक्यम्, एकेनैवेश्वरेणेश्वरकार्यसिद्धेः । सिद्धान्तहानिश्च, भगवानेवैको वासुदेवः परमार्थतत्त्वमित्यभ्युपगमात् । अथायमभिप्रायः, एकस्यैव भगवत एते चत्वारो व्यूहास्तुल्यधर्माण इति, तथापि तदवस्थ एवोत्पत्त्यसंभवः । नहि वासुदेवात् संकर्षणस्योत्पत्तिः संभवति, संकर्षणाच्च प्रद्युम्नस्य, प्रद्युम्नाच्चानिरुद्धस्य, अतिशयाभावात् । भवितव्यं हि कार्यकारणयोरतिशयेन यथा मृद्घटयोः । नह्यसत्यतिशये कार्यं कारणमित्यवकल्पते । नच पञ्चरात्रसिद्धान्तिभिर्वासुदेवादिष्वेकस्मिन् सर्वेषु वा ज्ञानैश्वर्यादितारतम्यकृतः कश्चिद्भेदोऽभ्युपगम्यते । वासुदेवा एव हि सर्वे व्यूहा निर्विशेषा इष्यन्ते । नचैते भगवद्व्यूहाश्चतुःसंख्यायामेवावतिष्ठेरन्, ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तस्य समस्तस्यैव जगतो भगवद्व्यूहत्वावगमात् ॥ ४४ ॥

विप्रतिषेधाच्च ॥ ४५ ॥

विप्रतिषेधश्चास्मिञ्छास्त्रे बहुविध उपलभ्यते गुणगुणित्वकल्पनादिलक्षणः । ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजांसि गुणाः, आत्मान एवैते भगवन्तो वासुदेवाः, इत्यादिदर्शनात् । वेदविप्रतिषेधश्च भवति, चतुर्षु वेदेषु परं श्रेयोऽलब्ध्वा शाण्डिल्य इदं शास्त्रमधिगतवानित्यादिवेदनिन्दादर्शनात् । तस्मादसंगतैषा कल्पनेति सिद्धम् ॥ ४५ ॥ इत्युत्पत्त्यसंभवाधिकरणम् ॥ ८ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यगोविन्दभगवत्पूज्यपादशिष्यश्रीमच्छङ्करभगवत्पादकृतौ शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये द्वितीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयस्तर्कपादः समाप्तः ॥

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS

(EXCLUDING PROPER NAMES)

WITH THEIR ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS*

ब्रह्मसूत्रशाङ्करभाष्ये स्मृतितर्कपादयोः

पारिभाषिकशब्दानां सार्थसूचिः

अकार्त्स्न्य II. ii. 34—non-integration.

अकृताभ्यागम II. i. 36^{3}—liability for what is not done.

अङ्गाङ्गिभाव II. ii. 2^{2}—relation of the principal and the subsidiary ; of subservience and dominance.

अजीव II. ii. 33^{2}—no-soul.

अतन्त्र II. ii. 13^{15}—not an accepted technicality ; what is of no consequence ; not essentially needed.

अतिदेश II. ii. 11^{57}—analogical transference ; analogical extension of an argument.

अतिप्रसङ्ग II. i. 18^{74}—unwarranted license in reasoning.

अतिशय II. i. 6^{18}—(i) specific difference ; II. i. 18^{7}—(ii) subtle pre-disposing form; II. ii. 6^{9}—(iii) accretion; also *under* आत्मातिशय, निरतिशय.

अतीन्द्रिय II. i. 1^{57}—beyond the range or purview of the senses.

अदृष्ट II. ii. 11^{10}—unseen-principle.

अधर्म II. ii. 33^{5}—static-space ; also *under* धर्माधर्मौ.

अधिकार II. i. 18^{32}—status.

अधिष्ठातृ II. ii. 37^{17}—controller.

अधिष्ठान II. ii. 39—(i) operating-basis; (ii) embodied-ness.

अधिष्ठेय II. ii. 39^{3}—operating-ground.

अन्धपङ्गु[न्याय] *under* न्याय.

अन्धपरंपरान्याय *under* न्याय.

अध्यात्म II. i. 3^{21}—dealing with soul.

अध्यारोपित *under* अविद्याध्यारोपित.

अनागतसंबन्धादतीतसंबन्धो बलवान् [न्याय] *under* न्याय.

अनपेक्ष II. i. 4^{1}—absolutely or independently valid.

अनवकाश II. i. 1—possessing no scope.

* Normally only one occurrence of a term is noted, except where it has more than one sense.

अनवस्था II. i. 18[14]—(i) non-finality ; II. ii. 30[5]—(ii) *regressus in infinitum.*

अनाक्षेप II. i. 1[23]—nugatory attack or objection.

अनुग्रहीतृत्व II. i. 34[26]—function of meting out rewards.

अनुग्राहिका II. i. 5[26]—one guarding over.

अनुपपत्ति II. ii. 39[1]—inexplicability ; impossibility to establish or substantiate.

अनुपमर्द *under* स्वरूपानुपमर्द.

अनुयायिन् II. ii. 26[1]—enduring, continuing over into.

अनुषङ्ग *under* दोषानुषङ्ग.

अनुष्ठान *under* धर्मानुष्ठान.

अनुष्ठेय II. i. 1[18]—involving exercise of activity.

अनुष्ठेयरूप II. i. 4[5]—implying specific course of action.

अनुस्मृति II. ii. 25[3]—memory ; recognitive consciousness.

अनेकात्मक II. i. 14[31]—(i) possessing more than one nature ; II. ii. 33[15]—(ii) having variable essence.

अन्यार्थदर्शन II. i. 1[71]—text(darśana) possessing something else as its main-topic(artha).

अन्वय II. i. 4[37]—(i) continuance or persistence ; II. ii. 1[39]—(ii) homogeneous-constitution; also *under* निरन्वय.

अन्वयव्यतिरेक II. i. 5[30]—invariable concomitance and non-concomitance ; positive and negative judgments of concomitance.

अन्वय्यविच्छेद II. ii. 22[12]—non-interruption in the continuity of generic-features, or persistent-factors.

अपकर्ष II. ii. 12[5]—limit of sub-division.

अपचय II. i. 18[67]—wasting-away or depletion.

अपदेश II. ii. 1[9]—pretext ; profession.

अपरिग्रह II. i. 3[40]—rid of all ties and possessions.

अपरिच्छिन्न II. i. 29[2]—infinite ; of unlimited dimension.

अपवर्ग II. ii. 6[8]—salvation ; liberation.

अपवाद II. ii. 31[12]—exception ; what repudiates.

अपवादाभावे उत्सर्गप्रसिद्धिन्याय *under* न्याय.

अपीति II. i. 8—[world-]dissolution.

अप्रतिघात II. ii. 34[12]—absence of resistance.

अप्रतिष्ठान *under* तर्काप्रतिष्ठान.

अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोध II. ii. 22—non-conative sublation.

अप्रदेशत्व II. ii. 17[53]—non-divisibility in space.

अप्रवृत्ति *under* प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वक.

अभावान्वित II. ii. 26[17]—imbued with non-existential character.

अभिगमन II. ii. 42^{13}—pilgrimage [to temples and holy places].
अभिज्वलन *under* चित्ताभिज्वलन.
अभिध्या II. ii. 37^{4}—[self-]reflection.
अभिध्यान II. i. 25^{6}—meditation.
अभिभव *under* उद्भवाभिभव.
अभियुक्त II. i. 11^{3}—learned.
अभिमानिव्यपदेश II. i. 5—statement concerning Superintendents.
अभौतिक II. ii. 35^{13}—non-elemental; not element-produced.
अभ्युपगमविरोध II. ii. 24^{12}—running counter to cherished or accepted dogma.
अभ्युच्चय II. i. 23^{9}—cumulation of arguments.
अभ्युपाय II. i. 3^{5}—means, mode, method.
अभ्युपेतहान II. ii. 7^{5}—abandoning an accepted position.
अयुतसिद्ध II. ii. 17^{19}—entities proved incapable of separate existence.
अर्थयाथात्म्य II. i. 27^{27}—true-nature-as-it-is of things.
अर्थवाद II. i. 5^{24}—amplificatory statement.
अर्धवैनाशिक II. ii. 18^{2}—semi-nihilist.
अवभास्यावभासकभाव II. ii. 28^{77}—relation of the illumined and the illuminator.
अवयवावयविविभाग II. ii. 12^{5}—process of dividing a whole into its component-parts.
अवयविन् II. i. 18^{20}—whole; aggregate-of-parts; also *under* अवयवावयविविभाग.
अवष्टम्भ II. i. 4^{4}—bar-to-further-procedure; also *under* तर्कावष्टम्भ.
अवस्थिति II. ii. 36—durability.
अविकार्य II. i. 6^{37}—unmodifiable.
अविकृत II. i. 21^{8}—in the unmodified form.
अविच्छेद *under* अन्वय्यविच्छेद.
अविद्याकल्पित II. i. 14^{145}—fabricated by nescience.
अविद्याध्यारोपित II. i. 9^{21}—superimposed by nescience.
अविद्यानिवृत्ति II. i. 14^{109}—cessation of nescience.
अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापित II. ii. 2^{28}—set afoot by nescience.
अविद्योपप्लव II. ii. 28^{66}—confounding through nescience.
अव्यक्त II. i. 1^{39}—unevolved; unmanifest.
अव्यतिरेक *under* व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकादिविकल्प.
अव्याकृत II. i. 17^{7}—unevolved.
अष्टका II. i. 3^{18}—kind of Śrāddha: *see* Notes.
असत्कार्यवाद II. i. 10^{5}—doctrine of origination of non-existent; of non-existence of effect prior to origination.

असमञ्जस II. i. 8^{5}—not-standing-to-reason; incoherent.

असमवायिकारण II. ii. 12^{39}—non-inherent or operative cause.

असाधकत्व II. i. 1^{71}—not possessing probatory power.

अस्तिकाय II. ii. 33^{4}—extended-entity.

अहंश्रेयस् II. i. 5^{20}—self-supremacy.

अहंकार II. ii. 42^{12}—" I "-consciousness.

आकाङ्क्षा II. i. 14^{103}—expectancy.

आकाश II ii. 33^{5}—(i) ether; II. ii. 22^{2}—(ii) space.

आकाशघटाकाशन्याय *under* न्याय.

आक्षेप II. i. 4^{1}—objection; also *under* अनाक्षेप.

आगम II. ii. 38^{10}—Scriptures.

आत्मलाभ II. i. 6^{43}—(i) gaining scope for; II. i. 18^{42}—(ii) acquiring concrete-individuality.

आत्मातिशय II. i. 18^{74}—subtle-form of the inner-essence.

आत्यन्तिक II. ii. 10^{48}—absolute.

आध्यात्मिक II. i. 31^{4}—(i) spiritual; II. ii. 1^{30}—(ii) internal.

आनर्थक्य II. i. 1^{20}—purposelessness.

आनुमानिक II. i. 2^{6}—the inferred-entity (Pradhāna).

आयतन *under* करणायतन.

आयतनभाव II. i. 6—aptitude to be the abode of.

आरम्भण *under* वाचारम्भण.

आरम्भकत्व II. ii. 11^{34}—productive-operation.

आराधन II. ii. 42^{19}—propitiation; worship.

आर्ष II. i. 11^{20}—composed by Sages.

आर्षज्ञान II. i. 1^{26}—Sage's intuitive-knowledge.

आलयविज्ञान II. ii. 31^{1}—receptacle-consciousness.

आवरणाभाव II. ii. 24^{8}—absence of covering or delimitation.

आविर्भाव II. ii. 11^{13}—manifestation.

आशय II. ii. 18^{18}—reflective-consciousness.

आश्रय *under* इतरेतराश्रयत्व, प्रवृत्त्याश्रय, वासनाश्रय.

आश्रयाश्रयिभाव II. ii. 38^{4}—relation between the substratum and the superstrata.

आसन II. i. 3^{9}—Yogic posture.

आस्रव II. ii. 33^{2}—(i) inflowing-fluid; II. ii. 19^{16}—(ii) karman-fluid.

इज्या II. ii. 42^{13}—worship.

इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्व II. ii. 19^{11}—mutual relation of cause and effect.

इतरेतरभावापत्ति II. i. 13^{9}—mutual transformation in nature.

इतरेतराधीनत्व II. ii. 17^{8}—dependence upon each other.

इतरेतराश्रयत्व II. i. 35^{4}—mutual interdependence.

इन्द्रियसंनिकर्ष II. ii. 28[34]—perceptive-contact of the senses.
इयत्तापरिच्छिन्न II. ii. 41[6]—limited in dimension, size, quantity.
ईशित्रीशितव्याभाव II. i. 14[137]—absence of world-controller and objects controlled.
ईश्वरप्रणिधान II. ii. 42[20]—devotion to the Lord.
उपकार्योपकारकभाव II. i. 4[27]—relation of auxiliary to principal.
उपक्रम II. i. 17[9]—commencement or earlier part [of a text].
उपक्रमे संदिग्धार्थवाक्यस्य तच्छेषान्निर्णयन्याय *under* न्याय.
उपगम *under* वैषम्योपगमयोग्य.
उपचय II. ii. 12[35]—increase in volume; also *under* सूर्युपचय.
उपचित II. i. 18[66]—having accretion [of parts].
उपजीवन II. ii. 17[1]—substantiating.
उत्पत्तिकारण II. i. 1[1]—cause of origin.
उत्पत्तिहेतु II. ii. 26[16]—cause of origination.
उत्सर्ग II. ii. 31[12]—general rule; current dogma.
उद्भवाभिभव II. ii. 10[50]—rising-up and going-down; dominance and subservience.
उपन्यास II. ii. 1[52]—setting forth.
उपपात्ति II. i. 3[42]—explication; excogitation.
उपप्लव *under* अविद्योपप्लव.
उपमर्द *under* अनुपमर्द, स्वरूपोपमर्द.
उपलम्भ *under* सहोपलम्भनियम.
उपसंहार II. i. 34[8]—(i) destruction; also *under* उपसंहारकारण; II. i. 24—(ii) accumulation [of causal paraphernalia]; also *under* कारकोपसंहार.
उपसंहारकारण II. i. 1[3]—cause of dissolution or absorption.
उपलब्धि II. ii. 28[39]—perceptive-knowledge.
उपादान II. i. 1[50]—(i) material or constituent cause; II. ii. 19[4]—(ii) effort; II. ii. 42[13]—(iii) collecting materials [for worship].
उपाधि II. i. 15[24]—specific-limitation; limiting-adjunct.
उपायोपेयभाव II. ii. 28[56]—relation of the means to the end.
उपासन II. i. 14[179]—meditation.
एकान्त II. i. 6[4]—invariable rule; absolutely valid proposition.
ऐकान्तिक II. ii. 33[23]—unfailing; certain.
ऐतिह्य II. i. 4[10]—tradition; a mere "so-it-was."
ऐदंपर्य II. ii. 1[1]—true or ultimate intention.
ऐश्वर्य II. i. 25[6]—potence; prowess.
औत्सुक्यनिवृत्ति II. ii. 6[12]—dispelling the longing.

करणग्राम II. ii. 40[1]—group of senses.

करणायतन II. ii. 40[10]—[body] endowed with sense-apertures.

कर्मकाण्ड II. i. 14[35]—sphere of works.

कर्मविपाक II. ii. 34[6]—ripening of the karman.

कर्माष्टक II. ii. 35[7]—eightfold karmans.

कल्प II. i. 36[21]—world-creation ; æon.

काय II. i. 1[48]—body ; embodied-existence.

कारक *under* क्रियाकारकफललक्षण.

कारकव्यापार II. i. 18[49]—operation of causal agencies.

कारकोपसंहार II. i. 24[3]—collecting-together of materials-and-instruments.

कारण *under* असमवायिकारण, उत्पत्तिकारण, उपसंहारकारण, कार्यकारणानन्यत्व, निर्णयकारण, स्थितिकारण.

कार्य *under* असत्कार्यवाद, सत्कार्यवादिन्.

कार्यकरणभाव II. i. 4[27]—making-up bodies and organs.

कार्यकरणसंघात II. i. 14[156]—aggregate of body and organs.

कार्यकारणानन्यत्व II. i. 7[12]—non-distinctness of effect from cause.

कार्यवैचित्र्य II. i. 23[7]—diversity or manifoldness of creation.

कुण्डवदरन्याय *under* न्याय.

कूटस्थ II. i. 14[20]—immutable : *see* Notes.

क्रियाकारकफललक्षण II. i. 14[52]—based upon actions, means-to-actions, and fruits-of-actions.

क्षणिकत्व II. ii. 19[29]—momentariness.

क्षेत्रज्ञ II. i. 1[37]—knower of the "field."

गुण II. ii. 4[1]—aspect; quality.

गुणगुणित्वकल्पना II. ii. 45[1]—assuming qualities to be identical with substrates-possessing-qualities.

गुणप्रधानभाव II. i. 4[42]—relation of auxiliary and principal ; nature of subservience and dominance.

गुणवृत्त II. ii. 9[4]—nature or behaviour of the aspects.

गुणवैषम्य II. ii. 8[4]—disturbance in the equilibrium of aspects.

ग्राह्यग्राहकत्व II. ii. 28[63]—nature of perceived and perceiver, or object and agent (of perception).

चतुरणुक II. ii. 11[17]—quaternary-compound [of atoms].

चित्ताभिज्वलन II. ii. 18[15]—flaring-out of [isolated thought-phases into] mind[-agglomerate].

चैत्त II. ii. 26[28]—mental ; "mind"-produced.

चोदना II. i. 1[14]—injunction.

जाति II. ii. 27[12]—generality; class-concept.

ज्ञानवैचित्र्य II. ii. 30—variety in cognitions.

निमित्तकारण II. i. 4^{1}—efficient-cause.

निमित्तनैमित्तिकभाव II. i. 15^{5}–relation of [efficient] cause to its effect.

नियन्तृत्व II. i. 1^{2}—function of controller.

नियमकारण II. i. 8^{6}—restraining cause or regulating principle.

नियमहेतु II ii. 17^{57}—ground for restriction.

नियामक II. ii. 12^{31}—regularising-cause.

निरञ्जनज्ञान II. ii. 42^{8}—stainless knowledge.

निरतिशय II. i. 4^{32}—not liable to accretion or depletion of attributes.

निरन्वय II. ii. 22^{11}—leaving no trace behind.

निरपेक्ष II. i. 1^{97}—not contingent upon anything ; irrespective of consideration for ; also *under* वाक्यनिरपेक्ष.

निरवयव II. i. 26^{6}—partless ; impartite.

निराकरण II. i. 3^{21}—refutation ; way out of a difficulty.

निरात्मिक II. i. 18^{35}—without substantiality.

निरालम्बता II. ii. 29^{15}—devoid of real basis.

निरुपाख्य II. i. 18^{44}—(i) indescribable ; void of characterisation ; II. ii. 22^{12}—(ii) leaving no vestige behind.

निरोध II. ii. 20, 22—sublation ; also *under* अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोध, प्रतिसंख्यानिरोध.

निर्जर II. ii. 33^{2}—drying-up.

निर्गुण II. i. 1^{41}—free-from-qualities.

निर्णयकारण II. i. 1^{63}—determining ground.

निर्धारण II. ii. 33^{18}—determinate-knowledge ; ascertainment.

निर्विशेष II. ii. 26^{12}—void of attributes.

निवृत्तिनिष्ठ II. i. 3^{41}—cultivating renunciatory attitude.

निःश्रेयस II. i. 3^{27}—(i) highest-goal; II. i. 5^{22}—(ii) pre-eminence.

निष्कल II. ii. 6^{13}—partless.

निष्ठा II. i. 15^{18}–ultimate-stay-and-support ; goal, culmination.

नैरात्म्यवाद II. ii. 35^{22}—doctrine of soulless-ness.

न्याय II. i. 1^{6}—(i) logic ; (ii) maxim or rule : namely—

अन्धपङ्गु[न्याय] II. ii. 7$^{1-2}$;

अन्धपरंपरान्याय II. ii. 30^{5} ;

अनागतसंबन्धादतीतसंबन्धो बलवान् [न्याय] II. i. 36^{14} ;

अपवादाभावे उत्सर्गप्रासिद्धि[न्याय] II. ii. 31^{12} ;

आकाशघटाकाशन्याय II. i. 22^{17} ;

उपक्रमे संदिग्धार्थवाक्यस्य तच्छेषान्निश्चय[न्याय] II. i. 17^{9} ;

कार्यकारणानन्यत्वन्याय II. i. 4^{46} ;

कुण्डबदर[न्याय] II. ii. 17^{68} ;

तन्तुपटन्याय II. ii. 12^{15} ;

दृष्टाच्चादृष्टसिद्धि[न्याय] II. ii. 2^{6} ;
प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्याय II. i. 12^{5} ;
फलवत्संनिधौ अफलं तदङ्गम् [न्याय] II. i. 14^{131} ;
बीजाङ्कुरन्याय II. i. 35^{8} ;
संवेष्टितप्रसारितपटन्याय II. i. 19^{7} ;
समुद्रतरङ्गादिन्याय II. i. 13^{26} ;
सिकताकूप[न्याय] II. ii. 32^{2} ;
स्थूणानिखननन्याय II. i. 34^{1} ;
स्रोतःसंताननित्यतान्याय II. ii. 35^{20} ;
स्वामिभृत्यन्याय II. i. 4^{29}.

न्यायविद् II. ii. 37^{24}—expert in Nyāya.

न्यायाभास II. i. 1^{7}—fallacious dialectics.

पञ्चस्कन्धी II. ii. 18^{13}—pentad of agglomerated thought-phases.

पञ्चात्मक II. ii. 11^{51}—possessing a five-fold constituency.

परिग्रह II. i. 1^{53}—(i) acceptance; II. i. 4^{31}—(ii) paraphernalia.

परिच्छिन्न II. i. 8^{1}—finite or limited; also *under* इयत्तापरिच्छिन्न.

परिच्छेद II. i. 14^{159}—limitation, characterisation.

परिच्छेद्य II. ii. 28^{10}—what is signified, denoted or demarcated.

परिणाम II. i. 4^{38}—modification.

परिणामप्रक्रिया II. i. 14^{179}—mode-of-explanation according to modification-theory.

परिनिष्पन्न II. i. 6^{25}—(i) accomplished existential-entity; II. ii. 20^{6}—(ii) having fully-evolved individuality.

परिभाषा II. ii. 13^{15}—technicality.

परिमण्डल II. ii. 11^{21}—infinitesimally-spherical.

परिमितत्व II. ii. 1^{45}—discreteness or finiteness.

परिशुद्धि *under* शास्त्रार्थपरिशुद्धि.

परिहार II. i. 9^{21}—refutation; way out of a contingency.

परिस्पन्दित II. ii. 3^{8}—[smallest] movement.

पर्यायेण II. ii. 10^{23}—(i) alternately; II. ii. 35—(ii *a*) turn-by-turn; (ii *b*) through continuity.

पाञ्चभौतिक II. ii. 11^{54}—constituted out of five elements.

पारिमाण्डल्य II. ii. 11^{10}—infinitesimal-sphericity.

पुद्गल II. ii. 19—body.

पुरुषतन्त्र II. i. 27^{34}—depending upon individual's will.

पुरुषार्थ II. i. 1^{17}—(securing) goals of mankind.

प्रकृति II. i. 4^{1}—(i) constituent cause; also *under* प्रकृतिविकारभाव; II. i. 14^{146}—(ii) cosmic root-cause.

प्रकृतिविकारभाव II. i. 4^{17}—relation of cause and effect.

प्रक्रिया II. ii. 11^{1}—system; mode-of-explanation.

प्रचय II. ii. 11[38]—loose-texture.

प्रणिधान *under* ईश्वरप्रणिधान.

प्रतिघात II. ii. 34[11]—resistance ; also *under* अप्रतिघात.

प्रतिज्ञा II. ii. 21—solemn-assertion ; accepted-dogma.

प्रतिपत्ति II. i. 5[30]—(i) acknowledging ; II. i. 14[89]—(ii) attainment ; II. ii. 63[7]—(iii) understanding ; II. ii. 25—(iv) recognitive-consciousness.

प्रतिबोधन II. i. 21[5]—awakening of consciousness.

प्रतिषेध II. i. 7—negative-statement; also *under* विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्र.

प्रतिसंख्यानिरोध II. ii. 22—conative-sublation.

प्रतिसंधान II. ii. 25—(i) consciousness of identity ; II. ii. 31[4]—(ii) evoking and joining together.

प्रतीति II. i. 18[30]—perception.

प्रतीत्य II. ii. 21[3]—after having been conjointly operated upon.

प्रत्यय II. ii. 28[23]—(i) perception; also *under* प्रत्ययवैचित्र्य ; II. ii. 19[11]—(ii) cause ; also *under* इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्व.

प्रत्ययवैचित्र्य II. ii. 28[23]—variety in perceptions.

प्रत्याख्यान II. i. 3[1]—refutation, repudiation.

प्रत्यायितव्यपक्ष II. ii. 33[32]—dogma deserving credence.

प्रत्यासत्ति II. i. 3[35]—context.

प्रथिमा II. ii. 34[13]—grossness.

प्रधान II. i. 4[42]—(i) principal or dominant ; also *under* गुणप्रधानभाव ; II. ii. 3[2]—(ii) [Sāṁkhya] First Principle.

प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्याय *under* न्याय.

प्रबोध II. i. 9[26]—waking-condition.

प्रभव II. i. 1[46]—soure.

प्रमाण II. i. 1[54]—authoritative ; valid-proof.

प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमातृप्रमितिषु II. ii. 33[21]—in regard to means-of-knowledge, objects-of-knowledge, agent-of-knowledge, and resulting-knowledge.

प्रमाणप्रमेयफललक्षण II. i. 14[71]—falling into categories of means, objects, and fruit of knowledge.

प्रमाणप्रमेयफलव्यवहार II. ii. 27[5]—worldly-experience consisting of means, objects, and result of cognition.

प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वक II. ii. 28[49]—contingent upon operation and non-operation of valid-proofs.

प्रयोजन II. ii. 6[5]—motive.

प्रयोजनवत्त्व II. i. 32—purposiveness.

प्रलय II. i. 1[46]—dissolution.

प्रवर्तक II. ii. 2[46]—causing activity.

प्रवर्तनव्यापार II. ii. 7^{8}—guiding-activity.
प्रवर्तना II. ii. 37^{23}—activity, conation.
प्रवर्त्यप्रवर्तयितृत्व II. ii. 37^{20}—functioning as the motivated and the motivating principle.
प्रवृत्ति II. i. 14^{31}—activity; also *under* प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वक.
प्रवृत्तिविज्ञान II. ii. 31^{2}—operative-phase of consciousness.
प्रवृत्तिशक्ति II. ii. 7^{1}—power of movement.
प्रवृत्तिसातत्य II. ii. 12^{31}—ever-continuousness of movement.
प्रवृत्त्याश्रय II. ii. 2^{11}—substratum of activity.
प्रव्रज्या II. i. 3^{41}—renouncing household.
प्रसङ्ग II. i. 1^{11}—contingency; also *under* अतिप्रसङ्ग.
प्राज्ञ II. i. 23^{7}—(i) Highest-Self; II. ii. 29^{14}—(ii) wise person.
प्राणायाम II. i. 20^{1}—breath-control.
प्राप्तिरहित II. i. 7^{71}—lacking probatory-force.
प्रेक्षा II. ii. 1^{26}—intelligent supervision.
फल II. i. 14^{83}—fruit, reward, result; also *under* प्रमाणप्रमेय-फललक्षण, प्रमाणप्रमेयफलव्यवहार, हेतुफलभाव.
फलवत्संनिधौ अफलं तदङ्गम् [न्याय] *under* न्याय.
बाधकज्ञान II. i. 14^{107}—knowledge negativing [an earlier one].
बीजाङ्कुरन्याय *under* न्याय.
बुद्धान्त II. i. 6^{44}—true-nature of waking-life.
बुद्धिबोध्य II. ii. 22^{1}—cognisable by mind.
बुद्धिसंतान II. ii. 25^{27}—flux of the mind.
ब्रह्मात्मताप्रतिबोध II. i. 14^{73}—awakening of the consciousness of Brahman as one with self.
भव II. ii. 19^{4}—hereditary-momentum.
भाव II. ii. 22^{8}—individual-entity.
भावना II. ii. 1^{42}—emotional-attitude.
भावयाथात्म्य II. i. 11^{28}—actual reality as it is.
भावात्मना II. ii. 26^{18}—in proper existential form.
भूतभौतिकसंहति II. ii. 18^{13}—conglomeration of elements and elemental[-products].
भेद II. ii. 1^{20}—discrete-existence, individual-object.
भेदव्यवहार II. i. 22^{20}—dualistic dealings in phenomena.
भोग II. ii. 6^{8}—pleasure-pain experience.
भौतिक II. ii. 15^{3}—elementals; also *under* भूतभौतिकसंहति.
मन्त्र II. i. 5^{24}—Vedic text, hymn, incantation.
मात्रा II. ii. 6^{11}—form.
माया II. i. 14^{146}—cosmic-illusion.
मायावेश II. ii. 2^{29}—infusion of cosmic-illusion.

मीमांसा II. i. 37[9]—exposition; exegetics.
मूर्त्युपचय II. ii. 15[7]—growth in bulk.
मोक्ष II. ii. 1[18]—liberation.
याथात्म्य *under* अर्थयाथात्म्य, भावयाथात्म्य.
युक्ति II. i. 18—reasoning.
युतसिद्ध II. ii. 17[32]—proved capable of separated existence.
योग II. ii. 42[14]—devout-meditation.
रचना II. ii. 1—design-and-arrangement.
राद्धान्त II. ii. 18[1]—theory.
लिङ्ग II. i. 6[26]—(i) inferential-mark; II. i. 3[23]—(ii) [specific] reference [in scriptures].
लोकयात्रा II. ii. 18[20]—mundane-existence.
लोकव्यवहार II. i. 11[13]—worldly-dealings.
वस्तुतन्त्र II. i. 11[31]—referring to existing-reality.
वस्तुवृत्त II. i. 14[12]—nature of reality.
वाक्यनिरपेक्ष II. ii. 1[18]—without appeal to scriptures.
वाक्यशेष II. i. 17[20]—latter-part or conclusion of a text.
वाचारम्भण II. i. 14[11]—word-initiation.
वासक II. ii. 28[66]—[subliminal-impression] colouring the idea of next moment.
वासना II. ii. 28[27]—latent or subliminal-impression.
वासनाधान II. ii. 31[4]—implanting of subliminal-impressions.
वासनावैचित्र्य II. ii. 30[1]—variety of subliminal-impressions.
वासनाश्रय II. ii. 30[12]—substratum for subliminal-impressions.
वास्य II. ii. 28[66]—[idea of following moment] coloured by the subliminal-impression of the preceding moment.
विकरण II. i. 31[1]—deviod of organs.
विकार II. i. 4[17]—effect, modification; also *under* प्रकृतिविकारभाव.
विक्रिया II. i. 14[120]—modification.
विज्ञान II. ii. 28[67]—idea; also *under* आलयविज्ञान, प्रवृत्तिविज्ञान.
विज्ञानवादिन् II. ii. 28[2]—one maintaining doctrine of Idealism.
विज्ञानसाक्षिन् II. ii. 28[78]—apperceiving agent [of the ideas].
विज्ञानास्तित्वमात्रवादिन् II. ii. 18[5]—one maintaining the reality of only the ideas.
विज्ञानैकस्कन्धवाद II. ii. 28[4]—doctrine of [the reality of] only the phases-of-ideas.
विधान II. i. 1[15]—ritual.
विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्र II. i. 14[66]—science of injunctions and prohibitions; scriptural prescriptions as to what should and what should not be done.

विपर्यय II. ii. 15—reversal [of nature].
विप्रकर्ष II. i. 1^{98}—further-estrangement from; also *under* स्वभाव-विप्रकर्ष.
विप्रतिपत्ति II. i. 1^{53}—conflict; difference-of-views; divergence-of-teaching.
विप्रयोग II. ii. 29^{11}—non-contiguity.
विप्रलम्भकत्व II. i. 6^{48}—deceptive nature.
विभूति II. i. 25^{13}—miraculous-object.
विलक्षणत्व II. i. 4—disparity-in-nature.
विवर्तते II. ii. 1^{25}—evolves diversely.
विवसन II. ii. 33^{1}—the undressed; gymnosophist.
विशेष II. ii. 10^{13}—(i) attributes; II. ii. 17^{4}—(ii) particularity.
विशेषण II. ii. 28^{57}—differentiating-attribute.
विशेष्य II. ii. 28^{57}—subject to which attributes refer.
विषयविषयिभाव II. ii. 10^{29}—relation of object and subject.
विषयसारूप्य II. ii. 27^{15}—assuming same form as the object.
विसंवाद II. ii. 42^{6}—divergence.
विसृष्टि II. i. 6^{32}—creation.
वृत्ति II. i. 11^{15}—denotation; significance.
वैनाशिक II. ii. 18^{2}—nihilist; also *under* अर्धवैनाशिक.
वैनाशिकतन्त्रव्यवहार II. ii. 32^{3}—dealings in nihilistic philosophy.
वैरूप्य II. i. 11^{5}—difference.
वैलक्षण्य II. ii. 2^{13}—difference; distinctness-in-nature.
वैश्वरूप्य II. 1^{65}—extreme-divergence-in-form.
वैषम्य II. i. 34—inequality[-of-dispensation]; also *under* गुणवैषम्य.
वैषम्योपगमयोग्य II. ii. 9^{5}—liable to assume state-of-uneven-poise.
व्यतिरेक II. ii. 4—distinctness; also *under* अन्वयव्यतिरेक.
व्यक्ति II. i. 18^{31}—species; the individual.
व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकादिविकल्प II. ii. 28^{53}—alternatives such as distinctness or non-distinctnes.
व्यपदेश II. i. 31—designation; also under अभिमानिव्यपदेश.
व्यपाश्रय II. i. 1^{61}—depending-upon; subsisting-in; resorting-to.
व्यवहार II. ii. 14^{52}—phenomenal-dealings; also *under* प्रमाणप्रमेयफलव्यवहार, धर्मधर्मिव्यवहार, भेदव्यवहार, लोकव्यवहार, वैनाशिकतन्त्रव्यवहार.
व्याकरण II. i. 14^{138}—unfolding.
व्याकृत II. i. 17—evolved.
व्याघात II. i. 14^{67}—impediment; coming-to-nought.
व्यापार II. i. 18^{26}—function or operation; also *under* कारकव्यापार, प्रवर्तनव्यापार.

व्यावहारिक II. i. 14[1]— ordinary; phenomenal.
व्युदास II. i. 1[83]—refutation or repudiation.
व्यूह II. ii. 42[9]—mode or form.
शब्दकोप II. i 26[15]—vitiation of scriptural-statements.
शारीर(क) II. i. 14[44]—embodied-self; individual soul.
शाश्वतिक II. i. 1[49]—possessing-eternality.
शास्त्रार्थपरिशुद्धि II. i. 26[2]—probing of ascertained-conclusion of the scriptures.
शिष्ट II. i. 1[11]—one of position-and-competence, or one entitled-to-respect.
षडायतन II. ii. 19[4]—sense-sextet.
संवर II. ii. 33[2]—inlet-closing.
संवेष्टितप्रसारितन्याय *under* न्याय.
संश्लेष II. i. 13[16]—(i) contact ; II. ii. 17[64]—(ii) cohesion.
संसर्ग II. ii. 1[43]—cohesion.
संस्कार II. ii. 21[6]—(i) composite-thing; II. ii. 30[10]—(ii) latent-disposition or subliminal-impression.
संस्थान II. ii. 17[11]—(i) posture ; II. ii. 17[70]—(ii) specific state-of-existence.
संहतत्व II. ii. 10[38]—connection.
संहार II. i. 1[44]—sublation or dissolution.
संहति *under* भूतभौतिकसंहति.
संघात II. ii. 33[39]—conglomerate or conglomeration.
सत्कार्यवादिन् II. i. 7[3]—one maintaining [prior-to-production] existence of effect [in the cause].
सत्संपत्ति II. i. 27[11]—merging-back-into the Existent.
संतान II. ii. 22[8]—stream [of momentary-existences]; also *under* बुद्धिसंतान.
संतानिन् II. ii. 22[8]—individual-constituent of the stream.
संनिकर्ष II. i. 18[20]—perceptive-contact ; also *under* इन्द्रियसंनिकर्ष.
संनिधि II. ii. 7[9]—contiguity.
सप्तभङ्गीनय II. ii. 33[7]—Logic of Seven Modes.
समन्वय II. i. 1[5]—concensus.
समय II. ii. 19[6]—convention, tradition, canon.
समवाय II. i. 18[13]—intimate-relation ; inherence.
समवायिन् II. i. 18[13]—intimately-related object.
समाधि II. i. 1[32]—(i) rejoinder ; II. i. 9[35]—(ii) Yogic-trance.
समानन्याय II. i. 3[4]—application of the same reasoning ; parity of reasoning ; analogy or identity in principle.
समावर्तन II. i. 1[16]—return [home after completion of study].

समुदाय II. ii. 18—aggregate.
समुद्रतरङ्गादिन्याय *under* न्याय.
संप्रतिपन्न II. i. 3^{17}—acceptable,
संप्रतिपत्ति II. i. 3^{19}—acceptability.
संप्रतिष्ठा II. i. 36^{20}—stay, support.
संप्रदाय II. i. 9^{29}—traditional-teaching.
संप्रयोग II. ii. 29^{11}—contiguity.
संप्रसाद II. i. 9^{26}—deep-sleep condition ; sound-sleep.
संबन्धसातत्य II. ii. 12^{31}—ever-continuousness of relation.
सम्यग्दर्शन II. i. 1^{19}—right knowledge.
सर्ग II. i. 1^{44}—creation.
सर्गशक्ति II. ii. 6^{14}—power to create or evolve.
सर्वशून्यत्ववादिन् II. ii. 18^{5}—one maintaining that all is void.
सर्वात्मता II. i. 1^{91}—oneness of the self within all.
सर्वास्तित्ववादिन् II. ii. 18–^{4}one maintaining reality of everything.
सहकारि II. ii. 6^{4}—co-operating-cause.
सहोपलम्भनियम II. ii. 28^{17}—invariable [rule] as to simultaneous rising-up.
साक्षिन् *under* विज्ञानसाक्षिन्.
सातत्य *under* प्रवृत्तिसातत्य, संबन्धसातत्य.
सादृश्य II. ii. 25^{17}—similarity.
साधनसामग्री II. i. 24^{13}—aggregation of causal auxiliaries.
साधारणकारण II. i. 34^{15}—common-cause.
साध्यपक्षनिक्षिप्त II. ii. 3^{9}—falling under the category of what-is-yet-to-be-proved.
सापेक्ष II. i. 1^{59}—(i) contingent upon; II. i. 34—(ii) showing [due] consideration for.
सामानाधिकरण्य II. i. 18^{90}—co-ordination or sameness of case-relation.
सामान्य II. i. 23^{1}—(i) common characteristic or essence; II. ii. 17^{4}—(ii) generality or generic-nature.
सामान्यलक्षण II. ii. 28^{65}—generic-knowledge-factor.
सामान्यात्मक II. ii. 15^{31}—possessing generic-nature.
साम्यावस्था II. ii. 2^{1}—state-of-equipoise.
सारूप्य II. i. 6^{11}—similarity or sameness-of-nature; also *under* विषयसारूप्य.
सावकाश II. i. 1^{14}—possessing-a-scope.
सिकताकूप [न्याय] *under* न्याय.
सिद्ध II. i. 6^{33}—(i) one who has attained perfect vision; II. i. 20^{6}—(ii) established; also *under* अयुतसिद्ध, युतसिद्ध.

Errata to Translation

(ignoring broken and faint types)

N. B.—The References are to Page and Line.

Page	*Line*	*Correct*	*Incorrect*
4 —	21	objects involving the exercise	the exercise
6 —	*headline*	°BHĀSHYA	°BHĀSAYA
7 —	14	xii. 360. 1	xii. 360. I
8 —	1	intervention	intervension
12 —	20	organs	instrument
20 —	6	of	fo
33 —	14f.	Brahman as one with the Self [and as the only true Reality]	Brahman as the only true Reality
37 —	23	conform to the aggregate of the bodies	conform to the bodies
40 —	17	effect,	effect
46 —	10	are concealed from our sight),	are) concealed from our sight,
50 —	24	to it may	to it do
51 —	12	all dualistic	all kinds of
53 —	12	aggregation	presence
55 —	18	part-less	impartite
56 —	23	into the Existent.	into Existence.
67 —	23	*Second Chapter, entitled the smṛiti-pāda.*	*Second Chapter.*
72 —	13	finiteness	finitness
74 —	36	Ātman	Atman
75 —	9	world (down to the tiniest tremor).	world down to the tiniest tremor.
75 —	28	the Śāstric	tbe Śāstric

Page	*Line*	*Correct*	*Incorrect*
77 —	33	moreover, under the supposition,	and, as a consequence
77 —	35	if,	;fi,
79 —	33	[in the equilibrium]	in the equilibrium
88 —	7	identity of principle	analogy
88 —	33	and being	end being
92 —	12	unrelated or	unrelated and
93 —	22	System),	System,
95 —	34	the qualities	th equalities
99 —	21	Moreover,	morecover
103 —	36	"I"-consciousness	I-consciousness
105 —	26	each earlier	and earlier
108 —	17	initial	intitial
109 —	24,29	involuntary	voluntary
110 —	34	varieties	varities
115 —	23	(an antecedent)	an antecedent
115 —	24	(of the cause-substance),	of the cause-substance
117 —	6	objects, and (the knowledge which is the result of cognition),	objects which are the result of cognition,
118 —	headline	II. ii. 28—]	II. ii. 27—]
120 —	16	the external	the internal
125 —	21	than specific	than
129 —	11	"Right Knowledge"	"Right Konwledge"
136 —	16	[soul's]	[soul]
138 —	15	liable	ıiable
139 —	35	propitiation	worship
140 —	1	Pradyumna	Pradyuna
140 —	33	all of them,	all of them'

Errata to Text

N. B.—The References are to Adhyāya, Pāda, Sūtra, and Line.

	Correct	*Incorrect*
II. i. 11[34]	प्रसिद्धा	प्रसिद्धा
II. i. 13[23]	स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य	स्रष्टुरेवत्विकृतस्य
II. i. 14[85]	कश्चित् ॥	काश्चित् ।
II. i. 14[86]	वेदितव्यः ॥	वेदितव्यः ।
II. i. 27[42]	नामरूप°	नापरूप°
II. ii. 11[19]	°भ्युपगमात् ।	°भ्युपगमात् ॥
II. ii. 11[21]	योजना ॥	योजना ।
II. ii. 15[7]	रूपादिमद्वस्तु, तत्	रूपादिमद्वस्तु, । तत्
II. ii. 17[83]	°दर्शनात् ॥	°दर्शनात् ।
II. ii. 18[7]	चैत्तं च ।	चैत्तं च,
II. ii. 18[10]	पञ्च स्कन्धाः	पञ्चस्कन्धाः
II. ii. 19[4]	नामरूपं	नाम रूपं
II. ii. 25[21]	तथा सत्येकस्य	तथासत्येकस्य
II. ii. 28[57]	विशेष्यस्य	विशेषस्य
II, ii. 33[18]	वस्तुत्वाविशेषात्	वस्तुत्वाविशेषात्,
II. ii, 34[4]	आत्मेत्यतो	आत्मेत्यता

BRAHMASŪTRAS II. I–II

WITH

THE COMMENT OF ŚANKARA

NOTES

ADHYĀYA SECOND

PĀDA FIRST

—A Sūtra is defined as—

स्वल्पाक्षरमसंदिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।
अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥

" A statement of few words, free from doubt, conveying an important sense, having a universal application, free from padding words (such as we find in certain Vedic litanies) and free from any blemish (grammatical or logical)." The sūtras were concise mnemonic rules originally intended as helps to memory and possibly designed to cover deficiency of writing material. There are Śrauta, Grihya and Dharma sūtras, sūtras of Vyākaraṇa, Chhandas, Nāṭya and Alaṁkāra, and sūtras for the various Darśanas or Systems of Philosophy. In time the sūtras tended to become more and more condensed and even enigmatic, so that the taunt—

अर्धमात्रालाघवेन पुत्रोत्सवं मन्यन्ते वैयाकरणाः ।

was taken as a deserved compliment. Some of the later pseudo-sūtras, however, were written in a diffuse style, thereby defeating their original purpose. The sūtra form of literature as devoted to the codification of religious and secular law and the condensing of various Śāstric subjects must have been fairly established even before the rise of Buddhism and Jainism, seeing that the canonical texts of these religions are designated as "suttas" though their outward form has none of the characteristics of a sūtra proper. The sūtras must have been from the very beginning accompanied by an oral traditional explanation.

— A Bhāshya or comment is defined as—

सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र वाक्यैः सूत्रानुसा(का)रिभिः ।
स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥

The Bhāshya thus shares the dignity and precision of the sūtra. It makes brief statements which it itself proceeds to explain and expand according to the needs of the discussion. An imaginary disputant is the person to whom the Bhāshya is directly addressed.

—One or more continuous sūtras form an Adhikaraṇa or topic. The largest number of sūtras subsumed under one topic in the Vedānta sūtras is, according to Śaṅkarāchārya's Bhāshya, 17. An Adhikaraṇa is thus defined—

विषयो विशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षस्तथोत्तरम् (रः) ।
निर्णयश्चेति पञ्चाङ्गं शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं स्मृतम् ॥

The five members of an Adhikaraṇa are : i, Vishaya or general subject-matter ; ii, Viśaya or Saṁśaya, the specific occasion for doubt; iii, the *prima facie* view taken by the opponent, who is thus called the Pūrvapakhin or Chodaka, the starter of the query ; iv, the Uttaram, rejoinder, or the Uttaraḥ (pakshaḥ), otherwise called the Siddhānta, representing the view maintained by the Siddhāntin in opposition to the view of the Pūrvapaksha ; and v, Nirṇaya or ultimate decision after a weighing of the two views by arguments for and against. This is given by the judge or the chairman or the Madhyastha (non-partisan) arbitrator and it is on the side of the Siddhāntin. In theory every Adhikaraṇa ought to be capable of being presented in this five-fold division, although the best illustrative examples of them occur in the first Adhyāya and in portions of the third and the fourth) where the question is that of mīmāṅsā or exact interpretation of a given Vedic text open to divergent interpretations.

—While it was regarded as the duty of the Bhāshyakāra to fully explain the intention of the Sūtrakāra, he had also full latitude to start new "utsūtra" discussions, *i. e.*, those not actually expressed in the sūtras but capable of being deduced from them, or at any rate not inconsistent with the implications of them. But he could not modify the sūtras. This latter was the function of the so-called Vārttikas, which are defined as—

उक्तानुक्तदुरुक्तानां चिन्ता यत्र प्रवर्तते ।
तं ग्रन्थं वार्त्तिकं प्राहुर्वार्त्तिकज्ञा मनीषिणः ॥

The Vārttikas, in other words, were sūtras intended to correct, modify, and supplement the original sūtras. We have no Vārttikas for the Vedāntasūtras as such, although the sūtrapāṭha as given by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha, and other Bhāshyakāras shows considerable variation and addition.

—The 556 (555) sūtras given by Śaṅkarāchārya are held to have been the work of Bādarāyaṇa (also called Vyāsa). Whether he is the actual author of these aphorisms, or whether the sūtrapāṭha, like a family-book of the Ṛigveda, is made of chronologically disparate units, is a question that we need not take up here for the present. Consult on the point my Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta Philosophy, Lecture IV.

— **Sūtra 1, line 1.** — Śaṅkarāchārya himself reviews (apud I. iv. 1 and I. ii. 1) the contents of the first four pādas of the first chapter in the following words—

> प्रथमे पादे ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां प्रतिज्ञाय ब्रह्मणो लक्षणमुक्तम्—जन्माद्यस्य यतः (१.१.२) इति । तल्लक्षणं प्रधानस्यापि समानमित्याशङ्क्य तदशब्दत्वेन निराकृतम्—ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् (१.१.५) इति ॥ अर्थान्तरप्रसिद्धानां च केषांचिच्छब्दानां ब्रह्मविषयत्वे हेतुप्रतिपादनेन कानिचिद्वाक्यानि स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानि संदिह्यमानानि ब्रह्मपरतया निर्णीतानि । पुनरप्यन्यानि वाक्यान्यस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानि संदिह्यन्ते, किं परं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्त्याहोस्विदर्थान्तरं किंचिदिति । तन्निर्णयाय द्वितीयतृतीयपादौ ॥ चतुर्थे पादे कासुचिच्छाखासु श्रूयमाणानां प्रधानसमर्पणाभासानां शब्दानामन्यपरत्वं प्रतिपादितम् ॥

The title "Samanvaya" or "oneness of purport" given to the first Adhyāya is thus fully justified.

—**Sūtra 1, line 2.** — The mṛit or clay forms the material cause (upādāna) of the jar, while the potter is the agent (nimitta). In the case of the universe the Brahman is both the upādāna and the nimitta (efficient) cause *in one*. Compare Br. Sū. I. iv. 23 and II. i. 4, lines 1f. below.

— **Sūtra 1, line 4.** — The four classes of beings are: jāraja or jarāyuja (viviparous or born of womb), aṇḍaja (oviparous or born of egg), svedaja (born of sweat), and udbhijja (born after

tearing up the soil). The bodies of these, after being separated from the immortal soul that temporarily inhabits them, " return to dust." See Manusmṛiti, i. 43 ff.—

पशवश्च मृगाश्चैव व्यालाश्चोभयतोदतः ।
रक्षांसि च पिशाचाश्च मानुषाश्च जरायुजाः ॥
अण्डजाः पक्षिणः सर्पा नक्रा मत्स्याः सकच्छपाः ।
यानि चैवंप्रकाराणि स्थलजान्यौदकानि च ॥
स्वेदजं दंशमशकं यूकामक्षिकमत्कुणम् ।
उष्मणश्चोपजायन्ते, यच्चान्यत् किंचिदीदृशम् ॥
उद्भिज्जास्तरवः सर्वे बीजकाण्डप्ररोहिणः ।
ओषध्यः फलपाकान्ता बहुपुष्पफलोपगाः ॥

— Sūtra 1, line 6. — Smṛitinyāyavirodhaparihāra is the topic of the first pāda : the smṛitivirodha occupying sūtras 1-3 and perhaps sūtra 12 also, the nyāyavirodha being answered in the rest of the sūtras. Pāda 2 attacks the various Darśanas or Systems of Philosophy on their own grounds. The remaining two pādas of the chapter try to establish a unity of purport in the apparently divergent and inconsistent cosmological and psychological speculations of the several Vedāntic texts. The title " Avirodha " or " absence of contradiction " given to this chapter is thus quite adequate, at any rate for pādas 1, 3 and 4. As to pāda 2, see the introduction of Śaṅkarāchārya to II. ii. 1, and our note thereon. — The word nyāya here denotes argumentations based on grounds of reason alone and not claiming any scriptural or traditional authority. It is almost synonymous with tarka (II. i. 11), yukti (II. i. 18), or upapatti (II. i. 36-37). Compare the similar use of tarka-smaraṇa in II. i. 3[42]. Nyāya does not here denote Nyāyadarśana.

—Sūtra 1, line 11. — Is Śaṅkarāchārya here by the words "Smṛitiś cha Tantrākhyā" referring to an actual Sāṁkhya work? The context makes it clear that by "Paramarshi" he intends Kapila, the founder of the Sāṁkhya system, whose sage-like vision is extolled by the Veda. The earliest extant Sāṁkhya work — the Sāṁkhyakārikās of Īśvarakṛishṇa — speaks of a " Tantra " in the following words (Kārikā 70)—

एतत् पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन बहुलीकृतं तन्त्रम् ॥

"Pañchaśikha expanded (or gave increased vogue) to the 'Tantra'."— This would imply either that the work that reached Pañchaśikha through Kapila and Āsuri was already known as a Tantra, or that it was originally known by some other name, Pañchaśikha's expanded form being for the first time called Tantra. Now, a work known as "Shashṭitantra" or the "Tantra of the Sixty" is mentioned by name in Kārikā 72—

सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चेति ॥

Īśvarakṛishṇa here tells us that his seventy kārikās are an exact epitome of the larger work named the Shashṭitantra. A verse expressly as from the Shashṭitantra, and also as from Bhagavān Vārshagaṇya, is preserved, viz.—

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।
यत् तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायैव सुतुच्छकम् ॥

But a Chinese tradition speaks of Pañchaśikha as being the author of the Shashṭitantra. A number of citations (about 20) from Pañchaśikha have been preserved; but they are all in prose. Since the existence of the Shashṭitantra as an actual Sāṁkhya work is undeniable, we have therefore to fall back upon the supposition either that the ascription of this work to the authorship of Vārshagaṇya (or to that of Pañchaśikha) is false, or else, with Dr. F. Otto Schrader (ZDMG, LXVIII, pp. 101ff.) believe in the existence of two Shashṭitantras, one in prose and the other in verse, one theistic and the other atheistic. This reduplication is however a counsel of despair. It merely proves confusion in tradition. Witness in proof the following verses quoted as from Padmapurāṇa—

कपिलो वासुदेवाख्यः सांख्यं तत्त्वं जगाद ह ।
ब्रह्मादिभ्यश्च देवेभ्यो भृग्वादिभ्यस्तथैव च ॥
तथैवासुरये सर्ववेदार्थैरुपबृंहितम् ।
सर्ववेदविरुद्धं च कपिलोऽन्यो जगाद ह ॥

That Śaṅkarāchārya therefore had access to definite Sāṁkhya works no longer avaible to us has in any case to be admitted, although all his citations invariably come from the Sāṁkhya-kārikās of Īśvarakṛishṇa. In II. i. 1, line 95 below, he appears to have used the word *tantra* in the sense of system.

—Sūtra 1, line 14. — Jaimini (Mīmānsāsūtra I. i. 2) defines Dharma as—

चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः ।

Chodanā or scriptural injunction is thus explained by Śabara in his Bhāshya on the above sūtra—

'चोदना' इति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनमाहुः । चोदना हि भूतं भवन्तं भविष्यन्तं सूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टमित्येवंजातीयकमर्थं शक्नोत्यवगमयितुम् । यत्किंचन लौकिकं वचनं—यथा नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्ति—इति तत् तथ्यमपि भवति, वितथमपि भवति। नच—स्वर्गकामो यजेत—इत्यतो वचनात् संदिग्धमवगम्यते, भवति वा स्वर्गो, न वा भवतीति । विप्लवते हि खल्वपि कश्चित् पुरुषकृताद्वचनात् प्रत्ययः, नतु वेदवचनस्य मिथ्यात्वे किंचन प्रमाणमस्ति । तस्माचोदनालक्षणोऽर्थः श्रेयस्करः ॥

— Sūtra 1, line 17. — The "Purushārthas" are four : Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Moksha. The first three require that *specific acts* be performed in a specific manner by the properly qualified persons : and the detailed instructions concerning these can be had from texts like the Manusmṛiti, which can accordingly have some use at least, and so be sāvakāśa. The fourth "Purushārtha" depends upon our getting correct knowledge, *i.e.*, knowledge corresponding to the Reality, and this is not a matter for action or prescription. The nyāya applied in the present case by the Pūrvapakshin is—

सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशं बलीयः ।

—Sūtra 1, line 21.— The argument from "seeing" takes its stand upon passages like—

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । तत् तेजोऽसृजत । —छान्दोग्य ६.२.१–३;

आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् । नान्यत् किंचन मिषत् । स ईक्षत
लोकान् नु सृजा इति । स इमाँ लोकानसृजत । —ऐतरेय १.१.१.

The passages imply that the Creator was sentient and capable of reflection, and not *inert* like the Sāṁkhya Pradhāna.

—**Sūtra 1, line 27.** — The full stanza from the Śvetāśvatara is—

यो योनिं योनिमधितिष्ठत्येको विश्वानि रूपाणि योनीश्च सर्वाः ।
ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत् ॥

The context makes it clear that the topic in the passage is Īśvara or Lord, the Creator. Kapila (like the *yonis* or receptacles) is mentioned only incidentally. As Śaṅkarāchārya later explains (II. i. 1[71]) the "darśana" or revealed text is "anyārtha" or has another than Kapila as its *principal* topic. The stanza has therefore no "prāpti" or relevancy in connection with the greatness of Kapila. Furthermore, texts like—

यो देवानां प्रभवश्चोद्भवश्च विश्वाधिपो रुद्रो महर्षिः ।
हिरण्यगर्भं जनयामास पूर्वं स नो बुद्ध्या शुभया संयुनक्तु ॥
—श्वेताश्वतर ३.४;

यो देवानां प्रभवश्चोद्भवश्च विश्वाधिपो रुद्रो महर्षिः ।
हिरण्यगर्भं पश्यत जायमानं स नो बुद्ध्या शुभया संयुनक्तु ॥
—श्वेताश्वतर ४.१२;

यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै ।
तं ह देवमात्मबुद्धिप्रकाशं मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये ॥
—श्वेताश्वतर ६.१८;

make it quite clear that the "Kapila" or the tawny-coloured being is to be identified with Hiraṇyagarbha, the Demiurge or the Brahmadeva who, himself the off-spring of the Eternal All-creator, creates the subsequent creation.

Sūtra 1, line 37. — For "Kshetrajña" compare the Bhagavadgītā (xiii. 1ff.)—

इदं शरीरं कौन्तेय क्षेत्रमित्यभिधीयते ।
एतद्यो वेत्ति तं प्राहुः क्षेत्रज्ञ इति तद्विदः ॥
क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत ।

—**Sūtra 1, line 45.** — Śaṅkarāchārya must have derived the passage from some Purāṇa. It also occurs in the Mahābhārata. There are many passages which are common to the Epic and to more than one Purāṇa. Hari Dīkshita in his Brahmasūtravṛitti (Ānand. ed., No. 82) says that it comes from the Vishṇupurāṇa.

—**Sūtra 1, line 54f.** — The third pāda of the first adhyāya of Jaimini's Mīmāṅsāsūtras discusses what we can take as authoritative besides Scriptural injunctions. The first two sūtras—

धर्मस्य शब्दमूलत्वादशब्दमनपेक्ष्यं स्यात् ॥ १.३.१ ॥
अपि वा कर्तृसामान्यात् प्रमाणमनुमानं स्यात् ॥ १.३.२ ॥

answer the Pūrvapaksha view that every statement not coming directly from the Veda is to be discarded (or rather, secondarily interpreted), by arguing that even non-scriptural statements can be authoritative inasmuch as they emanate from sages having similar infallible knowledge ; and we can always infer that, correspounding to the smṛiti in question, there was once a śruti text which happens not to have been preserved. The sūtra quoted in the Bhāshya limits the application of this conclusion. It is not every smṛiti text that we can pronounce authoritative. When a given smṛiti text runs counter to an existing śruti text, the smṛiti text has to be subordinated. It is only where the smṛiti does not go against a definite śruti text that we can accept it as authoritative and *infer* the existence of a lost original as the ground of its ultimate validity. — Jaimini goes on to further limit the scope of this procedure. A smṛiti might not go against the śruti and yet might prescribe a course of worldly prudence or something the motive for which is too obvious. From a text regarded as an authority in the matter of Dharma we expect directions regarding something which ordinary uninspired reason cannot lay down. — And yet again not every smṛiti can be accepted as authority which, without clashing with existing śruits, teaches something apūrva or extraordinary. Certain heretics might promise wonderful things to be enjoyed after death by those who follow their specific practices. But these heretic smṛitis cannot be authoritative, because the followers of Vedic religion and people of approved respectability—the śishṭas—spurn those practices. Practices universally followed by śishṭas we can always

take as our guide, even where not only the śruti but even the smṛiti text prescribing them is absent. From śishṭāchāra we can infer smṛiti, and from smṛiti the corresponding śruti —At the same time, however, we can learn something even from heretics and Mlechchhas, especially where the ordinary sources of knowledge fail us. As Śabara says—

चोदितमशिष्टैरपि शिष्टानवगतं प्रतीयेत । यत् प्रमाणेनाविरुद्धं तदवगम्यमानं न न्याय्यं त्यक्तुम् ।

This shows how logical and broad-minded these ancient Bhāshyakāras were—so different from some of their mediæval successors.

—Sūtra 1, line 59 ff.— We go to scriptures only in matters where ordinary avenues of knowledge fail us; and this is true as much of the prescriptions intended to secure the first three Purushārthas as of the knowledge of the Reality which is to win the moksha, the fourth purushārtha. The Reality, the knowledge of which gives moksha, transcends the ordinary gateways of knowledge, is transphenomenal. In the absence of special merit or divine grace none can attain that knowledge. The special merit that secures unimpeded vision one can accumulate by following specified courses of conduct such as are prescribed in the scriptures. Thus—

Scriptures lay down prescriptions;
Prescriptions lead to merit;
Merit secures transphenomenal knowledge.

Now this transphenomenal knowledge, as being the product of the already existing and authoritative injunctions of the scriptures, cannot go against their teaching. Nor can it claim to be the sole guide in the interpertation of the scriptural prescriptions. This is the gist of the argument. As will be seen, it involes a fallacy. The atīndriyavijñāna or transphenomenal knowledge would not of course be justified in asserting that *the particular prescription* which secured that knowledge was false. But *other* prescriptions can well come under the purview of the adept's unimpeded vision. In fact he would be better placed than the mere layman in interpreting the other scriptures aright. To this it is of course possible to make the rejoinder by urging that there cannot be any "ardhajaratīyatva" or half-hearted attitude as regards

"Śrutiprāmāṇya". To concede the prāmāṇya of one text is to concede the prāmāṇya of all texts. But this is not a very satisfactory attitude to take. Hence perhaps Śaṅkarāchārya, conceding the justice of our seeking the guidance of the perfect sages in interpreting the scriptures, brings in the ultimate argument as to difference amongst the Doctors themselves.

—**Sūtra 1, line 10.** — Compare Mahābhārata (Kumbh. Ed.) iii. 107. 2 ff.—

ततः क्रुद्धो महाराज कपिलो मुनिसत्तमः ।
वासुदेवेति यं प्राहुः कपिलं मुनिपुंगवम् ॥
स चक्षुर्विकृतं कृत्वा तेजस्तेषु समुत्सृजन् ।
ददाह सुमहातेजा मन्दबुद्धीन् स सागरान् ॥

—**Sūtra 1, line 12.** — The scriptural passage extolling Manu has this advantage over the Kapila passage that it is unambiguous and purports *primarily* to praise Manu. Hence its cogency (prāpti) in the argument before us. On the other hand the primary topic in the Kapila passage is the Lord, referred to by the relative pronoun "yaḥ." That the passage, besides its assertion about the main topic, should also be made to convey information about an additional subordinate topic (e. g., wisdom of Kapila) involves what is called Vākya-bheda, or the splitting up of one sentence into two, which is a fault in interpretation.

—**Sūtra 1, line 91.** — That the authoritativeness of the Veda is self-evident, not deducible from extraneous confirmatory proofs, is the well-known "svataḥ-prāmāṇya" theory, which constitutes the corner-stone of the Pūrvamīmāṅsā system. Opposed to that is the "parataḥ-prāmāṇya" Theory, which is willing to concede the correctness of even an ordinary sense-perception of water only after it is tested by a subsequent confirmatory perception, as when the man actually goes to the water and is able to quench his thirst. But this amounts to summoning one sense-perception as witness for the truth of another sense-perception. Why may not both be wrong? And if the second is to be believed in, why not as well believe the first ? In fact, argues the Mīmāṅsist, one's faith is not a thing to be argued about. If that were so, it would have been easy to argue all into, or out of, any faith. All attempts therefore to lend additional support to Scriptures by

ratiocination have everywhere ended by undermining men's faith in the Scriptures themselves. Hence the dictum—

बिभेत्यल्पश्रुताद्वेदो मामयं प्रतरिष्यति ।

—**Sūtra 2, line 2.** — The words of the sūtra are variously interpreted. Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Vallabha agree in taking " itareshām " to mean " itareshām Mahadādīnaṁ tattvānām. " Madhva does the same : only, the smṛiti he particularly alludes to is the Śaiva or Pāśupata smṛiti, and consequently the tattvas are not Mahat and others but incidental statements regarding fruits etc., taught in the Śaiva texts and not warranted by (Vaishṇava) experience. Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, and Śrīkaṇṭha understand " itareshām " to refer to other Smṛitikāras (like Manu), whose prophetic vision (upalabdhi) never once vouchsafes for the correctness of the Sāṁkhya view of creation. But this is saying what was already said in sūtra 1, *viz.*, that the Smṛitis of Kapila and of Manu differ in their teachings. Looking to the wording of sūtras 1 and 2 it is clear that " itareshām " can refer only to the " Smṛitis " or the " doshas. " The first is impossible grammatically, since we read " itareshām " and not "itarāsām." The second can possibly mean : " Other defects urged by the Sāṁkhyas (against the Vedāntic position) are untenable "—an extremely forced interpretation. If the word " Smṛiti " in sūtra 1 is to mean " Pradhāna smṛiti ", Śaṅkara's interpretation would seem most natural. For Rāmānuja's interpretation " smṛiti " will have to be taken to signify " Kapila-smṛiti. " If a word not present in the first sūtra is to be referred to by the " itareshām " of the next sūtra, the fact can possibly become more natural if, following Vallabha, sūtra 2 is taken to constitute a distinct adhikaraṇa, although that does not very much improve matters.

—**Sūtra 2, line 5.**— All systems of Indian Philosophy agree in giving the number of sense-organs as five. If a new system were to assert a sixth sense contrary to all authority and unwarranted by actual experience, there could be no possibility whatsoever of that system gaining a hearing.

—**Sūtra 2, line 6.** —The word *mahat* actually occurs in the following Upanishadic passages—

इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः ।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः ॥
महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः ।
पुरुषान्न परं किंचित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥—कठ१.३.१०-११

इन्द्रियेभ्यः परं मनो मनसः सत्त्वमुत्तमम् ।
सत्त्वादधि महानात्मा महतोऽव्यक्तमुत्तमम् ॥
* अव्यक्तात्तु परः पुरुषो व्यापकोऽलिङ्ग एव च ।
यज्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते जन्तुरमृतत्वं च गच्छति ॥ —कठ २.३.७-८.

Śaṅkarāchārya has attempted to prove that by the word *mahat* we have to understand either the cosmic intellect alias the Demiurge (Hiraṇyagarbha) or the individual soul, but in no case the Mahat of the Sāṁkhya system, i. e., as the first product of the Prakṛiti.

—**Sūtra 2 line 7.**— Śaṅkarāchārya's point is that if the smṛiti teaching creation has gone wrong about the later stages of the creation, it can be presumed to be no more correct as to the initial stage or the starting point of the creation. If the effect, Mahat, is disproved, the cause, Pradhāna, has also to be discarded.

—**Sūtra 3, line 1.** — The specific mention of the Yoga in this sūtra implies that the first adhikaraṇa dealt with the allied system of the Sāṁkhyas, and not that of the Pāśupatas, as Madhva understands. Yoga is called "Seśvara-Sāṁkhya."

—**Sūtra 3, line 2.** — An atideśa or analogical transference of qualities, conditions or arguments is thus defined—

अन्यत्रैव प्रणीतायाः कृत्स्नाया धर्मसंहतेः ।
अन्यत्र कार्यतः प्राप्तिरतिदेशः स उच्यते ॥

—**Sūtra 3, line 5.** — Ignoring their nebulous beginning (according to Hauer : *Die Anfänge der Yoga-praxis*, 1922) in the Vedas, the Yoga ideas first make their appearance, amongst the Upanishads, in the Kaṭha and the Śvetāśvatara, and also here and

*This line might have been an interpolation, the " yat " of the third line referring to " avyakta. " Translators often translate as though they read *yam* for *yaj*. The description of the Purusha as "vyāpaka" and "aliṅga" is reminiscent of Sāṁkhya technicalities : Cp. S. Kārikā 55.

there in the Muṇḍaka. As a recognised method of securing concentration of the mind with a view to God-vision, it is much earlier than the Yogasūtras of Patañjali (150 B. C.): it is even pre-supposed by Buddhism (500 B.C.). The "Yogaśāstra" from which Śaṅkarāchārya is apparently quoting (line 16) the first sūtra is otherwise unknown to us.

—**Sūtra 3, line 18.** — In his German translation of the Brahma-sūtras published in 1887, Deussen took "Ashṭakādi-smṛiti" to mean Pāṇini's Ashṭādhyāyī [Achtwerke des Pāṇini]—an error which we ought to ignore in the case of this pioneer and pre-eminent Vedāntic scholar of Europe. The Ashṭakas are kinds of śrāddhas so called because they were to be performed on three successive kṛishṇa-ashṭamīs following the Agrahāyaṇī or Mārgaśīrshī Paurṇamāsī. Compare Manusmṛiti, IV. 150. There is no extant Vedic prescription about them, but on the strength of the smṛitis the corresponding śruti passages have to be inferred. The Ashṭakā-smṛiti is here adduced as an illustration of its "anapavadanīyatva," and not of its "sampratipannârthaika-deśatva."— The reading abhyadhikā for apyadhikā, given in some Mss., is perhaps to be preferred in view of line 4 above.

—**Sūtra 3, line 23.** — Śabara defines *liṅga* (III. iii. 14) as—

यत् तावच्छब्दस्यार्थमभिधातुं सामर्थ्यं तल्लिङ्गम् ।

Elsewhere it is defined as—

सामर्थ्यं सर्वभावानां लिङ्गमित्यभिधीयते ।

A śrauta liṅga means actual 'usage' of a word in the Veda in the sense of the thing in question. This use of the word liṅga here is to be distinguished from its more usual use in the sense of an "inferential mark" as in II. 1. 6[26], II. 1. 11[29], etc.; and from its Sāṁkhya use in the sense of the transmigratory body (cp. S. Kārikās 40-41).

—**Sūtra 3, line 35.** — The "pratyāsatti," proximity, or passage in immediate context to Śvetāśvatara vi. 13, is—

एको वशी निष्क्रियाणां बहूनामेकं बीजं बहुधा यः करोति ।
तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां सुखं शाश्वतं नेतरेषाम् ॥
—श्वेताश्वेतर ६.१२.

The word "Sāṁkhya" means etymologically—

संख्या बुद्धिः, तन्निर्वृत्तं सांख्यम् ।

—**Sūtra 3, line 39.** — Compare—

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ —सांख्यकारिका १९.

—**Sūtra 3, line 41.** — Vairāgya is defined in Yogasūtra, i. 15—

दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् ।

and thus recommended in Yogasūtra, ii. 15—

परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः ।

Compare also Yogasūtra, ii. 30.

—**Sūtra 4, line 5.** — According to the mīmānsā view the Veda is "kriyārtha" only :—

आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्......।—जै० १.२.१.

It teaches what ought, and what ought not to be, *done* for obtaining certain rewards and averting certain punishments after death; and as to the exact nature of the act in question, Veda is, and can be, the only and the final authority. According to the Vedāntins a part of the Veda at any rate describes the nature of the Brahman, the highest Reality. Now, if Brahman be an eternally existing Reality, and not a process or action which is to be brought into operation, it must be within the reach of pramāṇas like Pratyaksha, or of Anumāna which is based on Pratyaksha, which both concern themselves with the knowledge of the reality. If so, the Veda ought never to describe the reality in a manner opposed to ordinary Pratyaksha and Anumāna. And if certain passages seem to go *prima facie* against the testimony of the senses, we ought to interpret them differently. As Śaṅkarāchārya says elsewhere (Gītābhāshya under xviii. 67)—

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानुपलब्धे हि विषयेऽग्निहोत्रादिसाध्यसाधनसंबन्धे श्रुतेः प्रामाण्यम्, न प्रत्यक्षादिविषये, अदृष्टदर्शनार्थत्वात् प्रामाण्यस्य । न हि श्रुतिशतमपि शीतोऽग्निरप्रकाश इति ब्रुवत् प्रामाण्यमुपैति । यदि ब्रूयाच्छीतोऽग्निरप्रकाशो वेति तथाप्यर्थान्तरं श्रुतेर्विवक्षितं कल्प्यम्, प्रामाण्यान्यथानुपपत्तेः, न तु प्रमाणान्तरविरुद्धं स्ववचनविरुद्धं वा ॥

—Sūtra 4, line 9. — The Pūrvapakshin further maintains that in obtaining the knowledge of an existential reality Śruti and Pratyaksha—and therefore Anumāna as being based on Pratyaksha, and so having a more intimate linkage with reality than is possible for mere Śruti—are not "tulyabala" or of equal value and importance, but the latter is distinctly on a higher plane by its very intimate connection with reality. If the aim of Śruti is to give the direct knowledge of reality, we cannot then ignore these two pramāṇas which have such a vital contact with reality.

—Sūtra 4, line 22f. — The Prakṛiti or Pradhāna of the Sāṁkhyas is constituted of three guṇas,—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,—which are thus described (Sāṁkhyakārikā, 3)—

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥

" Sattva is regarded as buoyant and effulgent, Rajas as stimulating and mobile, Tamas as heavy and overwhelming; like (the wick and oil of) a lamp, their function is for one (common) purpose, *viz.*, giving light, (although they are opposed in nature)." Compare also the Bhagavadgītā (xiv. 6-8)—

तत्र सत्त्वं निर्मलत्वात् प्रकाशकमनामयम् ।
सुखसङ्गेन बध्नाति ज्ञानसङ्गेन चानघ ॥
रजो रागात्मकं विद्धि तृष्णासङ्गसमुद्भवम् ।
तन्निबध्नाति कौन्तेय कर्मसङ्गेन देहिनम् ॥
तमस्त्वज्ञानजं विद्धि मोहनं सर्वदेहिनाम् ।
प्रमादालस्यनिद्राभिस्तन्निबध्नाति भारत ॥

Because everything in the world is capable of itself having—or at any rate capable of exciting in the individual—under differing conditions, the physical qualities of buoyancy and so forth, the ethical qualities of purity and so forth, the intellectual qualities of clearness and so forth, or the hedonistic qualities of happiness and so forth, the Sāṁkhyas argue that everything must be ultimately composed of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. As Vāchaspatimiśra says in his commentary on the Sāṁkhyakārikā above quoted—

तद्यथा एकैव स्त्री रूपयौवनकुलशीलसंपन्ना स्वामिनं सुखाकरोति । तत् कस्य हेतोः । स्वामिनं प्रति तस्याः सुखरूपसमुद्भवात् । सैव स्त्री सपत्नीर्दुःखाकरोति । तत् कस्य हेतोः । ताः प्रति तस्या दुःखरूपसमुद्भवात् । एवं पुरुषान्तरं तामविन्दमानं सैव मोहयति । तत् कस्य हेतोः । तं प्रति तस्या मोहरूपसमुद्भवात् । अनया च स्त्रिया सर्वे भावा व्याख्याताः ॥

—Sūtra 4, line 27 ff.—For "kāryakaraṇa" (not kāraṇa) in the sense of "body and the senses" compare (Śvetāśvatara vi. 8)—

न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते ।
परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ॥

—Sūtra 4, line 31.—It is to be noted that "Buddhi" is regarded by the Śāṁkhyas as "achetana" or non-sentient. Whatever, like the mind and the intellect, serves as a means to an end, viz. as a means to knowledge, and whatever is capable of motion (as the mind) and growth (as the intellect), cannot be self-subsisting entity like the Purusha. Activity involves change, and hence and Sāṁkhyas have denied all activity to the Purusha. Even knowledge through the ordinary gateways of the senses involves an activity which the manas and the buddhi can undertake, but never the Purusha. He can have an intuitive perception—a sort of an illumination by mere presence—of the whole process; and therein alone lies his chetanā or sentient character. In this view of the achetana character of the Budddi the Vedāntin agrees with the Sāṁkhya.

—Sūtra 4, line 35 ff.—The objection on the score of vilakshaṇatva can be removed by taking (i) the achetana Pradhāna as the cause of the achetana world, or (ii) the chetana Brahman as the cause of the chetana world. It is the latter alternative which is now being considered in the rest of this sūtra and the next.

—Sūtra 5, line 16.—The word "viśesha" in the sūtra Śaṅkarāchārya takes in two ways: (i) difference [between bhoktṛi and bhogya and (ii) specific mention, as in the Kaushītaki version of the story concerning the "Dispute of the Faculties."

—Sūtra 5, line 24.—Mantras, defined as—

प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारकाः मन्त्राः ।

are those groups of vocables—not necessarily possessing any meaning, or any meaning connected with the ritual to accompany which they are recited—which invariably remind us, through constant association, of the various entities, objects, or utensils that are employed in the ritual. The majority of the Mantras come from the Vedic Saṁhitās. An Arthavāda is defined as—

प्राशस्त्यनिन्दान्यतरपरं वाक्यमर्थवादः ।

Its function is (i) to praise a given prescription, e. g.—

वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतिकामः । ......वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता ।

where the praise of the Wind as most swift serves as a recommendation for the offering of a white (animal) to that God; (ii) to censure a prohibited conduct, e. g.—

बर्हिषि रजतं न देयम् ।......अश्रुजं हि रजतम् ।

where the gift of silver is prohibited and the prohibition emphasised by telling us that silver sprang from the tears (of Rudra or Agni in the form of lightning); (iii) to describe the doings of another (parakṛitiḥ); and (iv) to narrate the happenings of another time (purākalpaḥ). Arthavāda has three varieties—

विरोधे गुणवादः स्यात्, अनुवादोऽवधारिते ।
भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः ॥

The corresponding illustrations are—

आदित्यो यूपः—गुणवादः,

because the statement contradicts Pratyaksha;

अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजम्—अनुवादः,

because Veda here affirms what is otherwise known;

इन्द्रो वृत्राय वज्रमुदयच्छत्—भूतार्थवादः,

because it neither confirms nor contradicts. — The Arthavāda, be it noted, is not an independent authority. It is always subservient to another injunctive or prohibitive statement. As Jaimini says (I. ii. 7)—

विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः ।

The "Arthavāda" in the present passage would include the majority of the Brāhmaṇas. Itihāsa (iti + ha + āsa = thus it was) includes all collections of stories and legends such as those in the Mahābhārata: while the normal contents of a Purāṇa embrace all topics from Creation to Dissolution:

सर्गश्च प्रतिसर्गश्च वंशो मन्वन्तराणि च ।
वंशा(श्या)नुचरितं चैव पुराणं पञ्चलक्षणम् ॥

—**Sūtra 5, line 31.** — This is not an actual quotation from Bṛih., but the topic is dealt with in the passage referred to.

—**Sūtra 6, line 3** ff.— A somewhat longer list of this type is given by Keśava Kaśmīrin in his com. on the text—

दृश्यते हि विलक्षणयोरपि कार्यकारणभावः । यथा भुक्तादन्नात् केशनखादिरूपस्य विलक्षणस्य, गोमयाच्च वृश्चिकस्य, मक्षिकादिभ्यः कृम्यादेः, द्रव्याद्गुणादेः, शृङ्गाच्छरस्य, दावाग्निदग्धकदलीकाण्डाद्वेत्राङ्कुरस्य, क्षमस्तकोस्तगोधूमयावनालादेः पलाण्डुलशुनाङ्कुरस्य कार्यस्योत्पत्तेरुपलम्भात् ॥

—**Sūtra 6, line 15** f.— World, the product, is alleged to be different in nature from Brahman the cause: Is it intended to assert that not even one attribute of Brahman is to be found in the world (second paksha); or, even though some one attribute like sattā may be common to the two, chetanatva, the most important attribute, is present in the cause and absent in the effect (third paksha); or that each and every attribute of Brahman without exception is not found in its effect the world (first paksha)? The first paksha assumes that cause and effect must agree in every single respect, which is impossible. The second paksha goes against facts. The third paksha can be exhibited thus—

प्रतिज्ञा—जगत् अब्रह्मप्रकृतिकम् ।

हेतुः (लिङ्गम्)—अचेतनत्वात् (चैतन्येनानन्वितत्वात्) ।

दृष्टान्तः—यच्चैतन्येनानन्वितं तदब्रह्मप्रकृतिम्, यथा (?)

No dṛishṭānta, which is defined as—

लौकिकपरीक्षाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः ।

and which has to be acceptable to both the parties, can be given, and so the argument falls down.

—**Sūtra 6 line 43** ff. — The valid reasonings conformable to the Scriptures are : (i) that the conditions and presentations belonging to the dream consciousness and of the waking consciousness, although associated with one and the same soul, do not either of them constitute his real nature, as the soul can do away with each in turn. — This is rather defective. You can say of a wall that is repainted that the old blue colour does not constitute the essence of the wall any more than the new green colour : but *some* sort of a colour the wall must have. Similarly, some kind of a relation there must be between consciousness and the soul, even though it be that of tādātmya or identity, as the Advaita Vedānta avers. Hence we have to supplement argument (i) by argument (ii) which tells us that the real essence of the soul's nature is to abide unruffled by the phenomenal world. This raises the inevitable question as to how the phenomenal appearance does appear at all. Argument (iii) which denies any distinction between the world and the Brahman, the phenomenon and the noumenon, seeks to answer the question, although the answer may not be equally convincing to all.

—**Sūtra 6 line 45**f. — Śaṅkarāchārya has made the Sūtrakāra argue that Brahman has produced a world which seems to exhibit certain attributes absent in the Brahman, and also that Brahman = world. This seems to contain a prima facie inconsistency which we will have to comment upon later. For the present be it noted that he does not speak of — " jagad-brahmaṇor aikyam " nor of "brahmaṇaḥ jagad-avyatirekaḥ" but of " jagataḥ brahmâvyatirekaḥ". As he ultimately wants to raise the world to the level of the Brahman, he thinks it necessary to put in a word for the "eka-deśīya," who, after all, is "sva-yūthya" or belonging to the Āchārya's own persuasion. Whether Śaṅkara has in view here any particular school of thought, or is merely putting forth a possible position that can be maintained, is more than what we know.

—**Sūtra 6 line 53.** — According to the Sāṁkhyas, the world, the product, is " jaḍa," but so also is Pradhāna. What they cannot explain is the bifurcation of the product-world by the Śruti itself into classes like sat and asat, vijñāna, and avijñāna, satya and anṛita. Vijñāna in the bifurcation cannot mean the soul or Purusha who according to the Sāṁkyas is not an entity that can

be produced: but as contrasted with avijñāna, vijñāna must signify a sentient product, and therefore must have a sentient cause from which alone it can spring, and not a non-sentient cause like Pradhāna.

—Sūtra 7, line 3. — The objection raised against the Vedāntins in this sūtra is distinct from that of the last three sūtras, although a corollary from it. Some Bhāshyakāras (e. g., Vallabhāchārya) commence a new adhikaraṇa with sūtra 7; others (e. g., Śrīkaṇṭha) with sūtra 8; Madhvāchārya, however, is most peculiar in making sūtras 4 to 12 into four distinct adhikaraṇas, adding an extra sūtra, "Dṛśyate tu" between our sūtra 4 and sūtra 5, and reading our sūtra 6 with a "cha" instead of the "tu". His interpretation of the various sūtras is also peculiar to him. The other commentators agree as to the general drift of the adhikaraṇa. It is sūtra 7 which has given rise to differences of interpretation. Vallabha makes the sūtra refer to Chhāndogya Upanishad vi. 2. 1-2:—

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्। तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं, तस्मादसतः सदजायत ॥ १ ॥ कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवं स्यादिति होवाच, कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति। सत् त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् ॥ २ ॥

and says that the sūtra rebuts the argument that the "asat" (=Pradhāna) is the cause of the world, because the Śruti passage asserts the "asat" just to deny it forthwith. This interpretation of Vallabha is open to the objection that even the Pūrvapakshin would not be so blind to the words of the Śruti as to rear up on their basis the Pūrvapaksha at all; and further the proper explanation of the passage ought to have been given in the first or the Samanvaya chapter and not here. — Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, and Śrīkaṇṭha make the "pratishedha" refer to that implied in sūtra 6, where the rule "like cause like effect" was denied; but the denial leaves room for the cause and the effect being of one substance—

दृश्यते तु—इति सूत्रमुपादानोपादेययोः सालक्षण्यनियमप्रतिषेधमात्रपरम्, न त्वेकद्रव्यत्वप्रतिषेधपरमपि।

Śaṅkarāchārya takes the " pratishedha " to be that implied in the Pūrvapaksha of this very sūtra, " asad iti." To the objection: " But then the kārya will become ' asat ' prior to creation," the reply is—" Your contingency as to the ' non-existence ' of kārya is like the contingency of the 'non-existence' of the hare-horn or the barren-woman's son, as when somebody takes the trouble to formally deny this in a sentence like—The hare-horn (or the barren-woman's son) does not exist. This cannot be taken to imply that the hare-horn (or the barren-woman's son) once did exist, but now no longer does so. If kārya never truly exists apart from the kāraṇa, both before and after the creation, the objection that kārya will become "asat" is no objection at all. It is the mere verbal denial of the 'existence' of a thing that never really exists by itself. Śaṅkarāchārya's interpretation, subtle as it is, points to the illusory character of the world, while Rāmānuja and others imply the reality of the world and its unity in substance with the Brahman, as well as difference in minor attributes. The following extract from the Bhāmatī brings out the exact point intended by Śāṅkarāchārya—

कार्यं स्वरूपेण सदसत्त्वाभ्यां न निर्वचनीयम्, अपि तु कारणरूपेण शक्यं सत्त्वेन निर्वक्तुम्। एवं कारणसत्तैव कार्यस्य सत्ता, न ततोऽन्या, इति कथं तत् उत्पत्तेः प्राक् सति कारणे भवत्यसत् ॥

—**Sūtra 8, line 5.** — The word "tadvat" in the sūtra is interpreted in five different ways, viz.—

(i) कारणस्य कार्यवत्प्रसङ्गः। (ii) भोक्तृभोग्ययोरन्यतरस्य इतरवत्प्रसङ्गः।
(iii) मुक्तामुक्तयोरन्यतरस्य इतरवत्प्रसङ्गः। (iv) अपीतौ स्थितिवत्प्रसङ्गः।
(v) कार्यस्य कारणवत्प्रसङ्गः।

—**Sūtra 9, line 9.** — Chaturvidho bhūtagrāmaḥ : see our Note on II. i. 1, line 4, above.

—**Sūtra 9, line 11 f.** — The familiar lines from Śaṅkarāchārya's Shaṭpadī-stotra might be recalled—

सत्यपि भेदापगमे नाथ तवाहं न मामकीनस्त्वम्।
सामुद्रो हि तरङ्गः क्वचन समुद्रो न तारङ्गः ॥

The point is that kārya and kāraṇa are not co-terminus. Kāraṇa includes the kārya and transcends it. See below, II. i. 27, lines 3ff.

—Sūtra 9, line 23ff. — The majority of the older Upanishads do not contain the "vivarta" illustrations that Śaṅkarāchārya adds here to the usual "pariṇāma" illustrations that are the current coin of the Upanishadic texts. Hence perhaps the Bhāshyakāra finds it necessary to invoke the aid of Gauḍapāda, who is traditionally known as his "parama" guru or the teacher's teacher (or possibly the founder of the school). Some scholars are inclined to doubt the existence of an actual teacher called "Gauḍapāda" in view of the fact that there is found at times a mention of "Gauḍāchāryāḥ" or "Gauḍāḥ" or "Gauḍīyakārikāḥ," which might signifiy a Gauḍa or Bengal school of Vedāntins, whose tenets are contained in the so-called "Gauḍapāda" kārikās. These kārikās show a strong influence of Buddhism and are frequently quoted in Buddhistic commentators of the Mahāyāna school (e. g. Bhāvaviveka, cir. 600 A.D.) and that too at dates which raise a suspicion as to the traditional ascription of the kārikās to a writer of the early decades of the eighth century, as Śaṅkarāchārya's teacher's teacher must be supposed to be. We will not discuss here this intricate problem in all its bearings, and we will ignore the question as to whether the first prakaraṇa of the Gauḍapādīya kārikās (which is commented upon even by non-Advaita commentators like Kūranārāyaṇa) belongs to an author different from that of the later prakaraṇas. The problem has been dealt with by me in my fifth Basu Mallik Lecture, Poona, 1929. Śaṅkarāchārya is often nicknamed crypto-Buddhist or "prachchhanna-Bauddha" for his Māyāvāda, which has certain affinity to the Śūnyavāda of the Madhyamika school of Nāgārjuna; and now it would seem that this title belongs to Śaṅkarāchārya's spiritual prâchārya, Gauḍapāda,—unless we argue (what is very probable) that Buddhism and Vedānta (and even Sāṁkhya for the matter of that) arose out of a philosophical Anschauung or view-point which oontained in it germs of both the nihilistic and illusionistic philosophies; or, failing this, are content to hold (what is also just possible) that Gauḍapāda purposely used Buddhistic arguments against Buddhism itself, and established a new philosophy, more or less allied to Buddhism, which Śaṅkarāchārya later adopted after him.

—Sūtra 9, line 35. — The word "svābhāvika" or "svābhāvikī" Śaṅkarāchārya uses sometimes in the sense of what is truly real, but sometimes also in the sense of what is natural and normal and therefore *not* truly real. Here of course the first sense is intended. See also II. i. 14, line 46 and line 73.

—Sūtra 9 line 45. — If, as Śaṅkarāchārya argued above (line 20), kārya is non-different from kāraṇa in all the three times alike, wherein does the Pralaya state differ from the Sthiti? We cannot say that there is avidyā in the latter but not in the former; for we have just argued (line 36, 44) that the seeds of avidyā are dormant in the un-liberated soul, and hence there is no confusion between the liberated and the un-liberated souls. We can perhaps say that in the Apīti or Pralaya state the avidyā is in a seed-form and there it no *consciousness* of it, whereas in the Saṁsāra or Sthiti state the avidyā is in its developed condition, putting forth all the false appearances that we know. As Śaṅkara expressly says in his Bhāshya to I. iii. 30—

प्रलीयमानमपि चेदं जगच्छक्त्यवशेषमेव प्रलीयते । शक्तिमूलमेव च प्रभवति । इतरथाकस्मिकत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥

—Sūtra 10, line 12. — The rule is (Ślokavārttika, p. 341)—

यत्रोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोपि वा समः ।
नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे ॥

—Sūtra 11, line 3. — Compare the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛihari (i. 34)—

यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।
अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥

—Sūtra 11, line 8. — Kaṇabhuk, or more usually Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeshika Philosophy, may have obtained his name from the fact that his philosophy deals with atoms or "kaṇas," but more probably from the circumstance of his having belonged to a sect of ascetics who lived on "kaṇas" or grains left in the field after the harvest was gathered and taken home. This mode of life is known as the "uñchhavṛitti." It is supposed that the founder practised this mode of life in order to propitiat

God Maheśvara, who, in the form of an owl or "ulūka," revealed this philosophy to him, hence called the Aulūkya darśana. But this tradition must have been of a secondary origin, as the primitive Vaiśeshika did not recognise God. Another tradition explains the name "Owl Philosophy" from the circumstance that the founder, in the day-time, meditated in a dense forest, secluding himself from wordly affairs, and at night, when people went to rest, he wandered about for food. Young women were frightened at his appearance, and this gave the night-wanderer the opportunity to enter into the granaries and mills and eat the corn found there. None of these traditions have any historical value.

—Sūtra 11, line 13 f.—The same sentiment is well expressed in the Ṛigveda (vii. 58. 3c)—

गतो नाध्वा वि ति॑राति जन्तुम् ।

—Sūtra 11, line 15. — Vṛitti is the denotative power (or Śakti) of a word or a sentence. It is Abhidhā or primary, Lakshaṇā or secondary (figurative), and Vyañjanā or suggestive. Just which of these is to be understood in a given word, or sentence (which is a specific group of words) can only be settled by argumentation or ratiocination. The whole of Pūrvamīmāṁsa is just such a rational science of exegesis.

—Sūtra 11, line 28. — Bhāva-yāthātmya. The corresponding Buddhistic expression is " Dharmatathatā."

—Sūtra 11, line 30. — The word " avimoksha " in the sūtra is interpreted in two ways : (i) non-release from the deficiency inherent in reasoning ; and (ii) non-liberation from the bondage of Saṁsāra.

—Sūtra 11, line 41 ff. — To the expected retort that there is wrangling enough amongst the expositors of the Vedic Philosophy, who thus are not in a better boat than the avowedly Rationalistic Philosophers, the reply given is that the Veda is eternal and not the product of any specific time author or conditions — like the Sāṁkhya Philosophy. Its teaching may reasonably be expected to be true of all times, assuming, of course, that the Veda can convey a meaning (that the Veda is not *nirarthaka*, as Kautsa maintained), and that the meaning is determinable by us. As Ānandagiri says—

स हि स्वसामर्थ्यादिकरूपार्थधीप्रसवहेतुः पुरुषमतिदोषात् तु अन्यथा प्रतिभासत इत्यर्थः ।

—Sūtra 12, line 8. — It is clear that by Vyāsa Śaṅkarāchārya means the author of the Mahābhārata, since under I. iii. 29 and II. iii. 47 he quotes as of Vyāsa or Veda-Vyāsa stanzas which come from the Epic. The Krishṇa-Dvaipāyana referred to in III. iii. 32 seems to be the same as the Author of the Epic. Here however he is spoken of as an incarnation of the "Vedāchārya" named Apāntaratamas. Śaṅkara associates Manu and Vyāsa together under III i. 14 also, and in his comment on Sūtra I. iii. 33, where Bādarāyaṇa is actually named, he tells us—

तथा च व्यासादयो देवादिभिः प्रत्यक्षं व्यवहरन्तीति स्मर्यते ।

Śaṅkarāchārya seems to keep Vyāsa distinct from Bādarāyaṇa whom he regards, in the opening of his Bhāshya on the last Vedānta sūtra, IV. iv. 22, as the Author of the Vedānta Sūtras. It is Vāchaspatimiśra who,—as also Sarvajñātman in his Saṁkshepa-śārīraka i. 6 — identifies Bādarāyaṇa with Vyāsa.

—Sūtra 13, line 1 ff. — The sūtra has called forth considerable differences of opinion amongst the Bhāshyakāras. Śaṅkara, Vallabha, and Bhāskara give one interpretation, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, and Śrīkaṇṭha, another, and Madhva quite a third. Taking the last first, according to Madhva—

भोक्त्रापत्तिः = भोक्तुर्जीवस्य ब्रह्मापत्तिः,

according to the śruti (Muṇḍaka III. ii. 7)—

कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्वं एकीभवन्ति ।

Madhva concludes that the śruti passage is to be taken in the same sense as the statement —

सायं गोष्ठे गाव एकीभवन्ति,

and does not dis-establish the difference between the Lord and the souls. Of course it is easy to see that the goshṭha or cowpen bears to the cows a relation different from that of the Lord to the souls. Rāmānuja and others, who regard the world (achit) and the souls (chit) as forming the "body" of the Lord, understand—

भोक्त्रापत्तिः = ब्रह्मणः (सशरीरत्वेन) भोक्तृत्वापत्तिः,

which means that Brahman would be liable to pain and pleasure according to the Śruti (Chhāndogya, viii. 12. 1)—

न वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति । अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः ।

Rāmānuja meets the Pūrvapaksha by declaring that it is the body brought into existence by merit and demerit that alone can yield pleasure and pain, the instance given being that of the king who, because he has a body, does not necessarily suffer heat etc., these being warded off by his umbrella-bearers. The instance chosen is certainly not very happy. Servants or no servants, the king must feel hungry, and sleep in his own body, and must in any case feel the pleasures to which his retinue contributes. Finally, the interpretation of Śaṅkarāchārya and others, viz.—

भोक्त्रापत्तिः= भोग्यस्य (कार्यस्य कारणानन्यत्वद्वारा) भोक्त्रापत्तिः,
भोक्तुः (कारणस्य कार्यानन्यत्वद्वारा) भोग्यापत्तिः,

is open to the charge that it raises a point already discussed under Sūtras 8–9. Nor do the illustrations chosen, the froth and the wave and the bubble and the ripple, stand to each other in the relation of the Bhoktṛi and the Bhogya. — Another possible interpretation can also be suggested.—

भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागः = भोक्तॄणां ब्रह्मणा सह ऐक्यापत्तेः एको भोक्ता भोक्त्रन्तरादविभक्तः स्यात् । तेन च कृतप्रणाशाकृताभ्यागमौ प्रसज्येताम् ।

The "ordinary" illustration to rebut the objection can be that of a king and his various officers, who are individually portions of the king, as deriving their authority from him; and yet we can keep one officer distinct from the other for practical purposes.

—**Sūtra 13, line 2.**—Anyaparā, which we have translated as 'conforming to another means-of-knowledge' can also be rendered as 'possessing a secondary significance, i. e., a significance other than the primary. Ratnaprabhā renders the word by " gauṇārthaka," Ānandagiri by " Upacharitārtha ," and Vāchaspati by—

मुख्यार्थात् प्रच्याव्य जघन्यवृत्तितां नीयते ।

Compare on the point the passage from Śaṅkara's Gītābhāshya quoted at the end of our Note on Sūtra II. i. 4, line 5, above.

—Sūtra 13, line 3.—For the nature of Mantra and Arthavāda see our Note on II. i. 5, line 24. When the words of a Mantra do not fit the ritual in which they are prescribed, the words have to be secondarily interpreted. Compare the Mantra prescribed for dadhi-snāna.

—Sūtra 13, line 21 ff.—The Advaita system of Śaṅkara is peculiar in this that while it is prepared to regard the world as a creation by the Lord it is at pains to exclude the individual soul from the Lord's creation—"Jīvo Brahmaiva nāparaḥ." The point is fully discussed in Brahmasūtra II. iii. 17. Compare also II. i. 21, lines 3 ff.—Other Vedāntins, following the Bṛihadāraṇyaka (II. i. 20) and Muṇḍakā (II. i. 1) Upanishads, conceive of Jīvas as real emanations from the Lord, like sparks from the fire. As Śaṅkarāchārya himself says at the beginning of the next sūtra, this answer to the Pūrvapakshin is from the vyavahāra point of view. As the Ratnaprabhā says—

एवं प्राप्ते परिणामदृष्टान्तेनापाततः सिद्धान्तमाह—स्याल्लोकवदिति ।

In addition to the strictly "Pariṇāma" illustration of the ocean and its waves Śaṅkara however thinks it fit to add the "vivarta" illustration of space-in-the-jar. Cp. below, II. i. 14, line 27-30.

—Sūtra 14, line 11.—An apter example would be that of a piece of timber which you call a 'pillar' when erect and a 'beam' when transverse, the piece being just the same, the name alone constituting the difference. In the process of acquiring knowledge, it is an important event for the child to know the name of a new object, say, an animal. Before you named it a 'hare' it might have been a cat, and so not distinguishable from the specimens of that class. The name introduces the difference and the child thereafter begins to note differences rather than resemblances. It is the name that transforms One into the Many. "What is in a name?"—The whole universe is in the name!

—Sūtra 14, line 26ff.—It will be noted that the Āchārya starts with "pariṇāma" illustrations of the clay and the jar, and con-

cludes with "vivarta" illustrations beginning with ghaṭākāśa, which is a "vivarta" illustration inasmuch as space is not really divided.

—Sūtra 14, line 31ff.—The "Bhedâbheda" Pūrvapaksha view which Śaṅkara here raises seems to have been an ancient doctrine not unknown to the Sūtrakāra, who ushers in Āśmarathya (I. iv. 20) as an ancient champion of the same. Bhartṛiprapañcha, who seems to have preceded Śaṅkara by a couple of centuries, seems to have accepted the same view, several of Śaṅkara's arguments here and elsewhere being specifically directed against this renowned Vedāntin. See for Bhartṛiprañcha Professor Hiriyanna's papers in the Ind. Ant., vol. LIII, 1924, pp. 77-86, and Report of the Madras Oriental Conference, pp. 439-450.

—Sūtra 14, line 44.—By declaring the identity between the soul and Brahman as "svayam-prasiddha" Śāṅkarāchārya alludes to the view, discussed by him at length under I. i. 4, that the Moksha state of oneness with the Absolute is neither "utpādya" or capable of production, like a jar from clay; nor "vikārya" or capable of being brought about through modification, like curds from milk; nor "āpya" or capable of being reached, like his own house by a traveller; nor, finally, "saṁskārya" or capable of being attained by internal purification, like cleanliness by a dust-soiled mirror. As the Bṛihadāraṇyaka (iv. 4. 6) says—

न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति। ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति।

—Sūtra 14, lines 46, 48.—For the different uses of the word "svābhāvika" see Note to sūtra 9 line 35 above; compare also the use of the same word in II. i. 14[73] below. In Gītā, v. 15 where the word occurs Śaṅkarāchārya explains it as—

स्वो भावः स्वभावः, अविद्यालक्षणा प्रकृतिः, माया।

—Sūtra 14, line 66ff.—As Śaṅkarāchārya remarks under I. i. 4, the true function of the Śāstra is negative only—

किमर्थानि तर्हि—आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः—इत्यादीनि विधिच्छायानि वचनानि। स्वाभाविकप्रवृत्तिविषयविमुखीकरणार्थानीति ब्रूमः। यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः—इष्टं मे भूयादनिष्टं मा भूदिति, नच तत्रात्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तमात्यन्तिकपुरुषार्थवाञ्छिनं स्वाभाविककार्यकरण-

संघातप्रवृत्तिगोचराद्विमुखीकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतस्तया प्रवर्तयन्ति—आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः—इत्यादीनि।

Of a like purport is the parable in the Aitareyopanishadbhāshya, on II. i.—

अत्राख्यायिकामाचक्षते। कश्चित् किल मनुष्यो मुग्धः। कैश्चिदुक्तः कस्मिंश्चिदपराधे सति—धिक् त्वाम्। नासि मनुष्यः। इति। स मुग्धतयात्मनो मनुष्यत्वं प्रत्याययितुं कंचिदुपेत्याह—ब्रवीतु भगवान् कोहमस्मीति। स तस्य मुग्धतां ज्ञात्वाह—क्रमेण बोधयिष्यामीति। स्थावराद्यात्मभावमपोह्य नं त्वममनुष्यः, इत्युक्त्वोपरराम।

And if the foolish fellow yet wants to know who he is, one has to confess one's inability to teach; for, the man has to find it out for himself. In the same way Brahman cannot be made known by the Śāstra: and it need not be; for it is self-revealing. Bhāmatī is most explicit on the point—

श्रवणाद्युपाय आत्मसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तो वेदान्तसमुत्थोऽपि ज्ञाननिचयोऽसत्यः। यस्तु ब्रह्मस्वभावसाक्षात्कारोऽसौ न कार्यः। तस्मादचोद्यमेतत्-कथमसत्यात् सत्योत्पाद इति। यत् खलु सत्यं न तदुत्पद्यते, यच्चोत्पद्यते, तत् सर्वमसत्यमेव॥

Compare also Śaṅkara's Bhāshya on Br. Sū, III. ii. 21—

द्रष्टव्यादिशब्दा अपि परविद्याधिकारपठितास्तत्त्वाभिमुखीकरणप्रधाना, न तत्त्वावबोधविधिप्रधाना भवन्ति। लोकेऽपीदं पश्येदमाकर्णयेति चैवंजातीयकेषु निर्देशेषु प्रणिधानमात्रं कुर्वित्युच्यते, न साक्षाज्ज्ञानमेव कुर्विति। ....। ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यं यथाभूतविषयं च। न तन्नियोगशतेनापि कारयितुं शक्यते, नच प्रतिषेधशतेनापि वारयितुं शक्यते। नहि तत् पुरुषतन्त्रं, वस्तुतन्त्रमेव हि तत्॥

—Sūtra 14, line 77ff. — Professor Hiriyanna refers me on the point to Bhartṛihari's Vākyapadīya (II. 240)—

उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामपलापनाः।
असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते॥

—Sūtra 14, line 85. — This is a refutation in passing of the Materialists (cp. II. i. 18[70], II. i. 29[12ff], II. ii. 2[14ff], [20ff]. etc.); the words "Tathā cha Śrutiḥ" continue the main thread of the argument, ignoring the parenthetical interruption. — The Materialist for whom the soul is just the body will find it impossible to explain how, when the external organs of sense are inactive, in dream-condition, a knowledge of the dream at all takes place, unless he posits an internal organ of knowledge, the mind. But even so, as the mind in turn is inactive in deep-sleep, the fact of the persistence of the dream-impression, and of the memory of it carried over across the gulf of the deep-sleep necessarily demands the existence of some entity enduring through all the three states which, in deep-sleep, swoon, and similar states acts as the unconscious retainer of the subliminal memory-impressions, revivable at call. As the Ratnaprabhā on the passage puts it—

> स्वप्नस्थावगतेः स्वप्नदेहधर्मत्व उत्थितस्य मया तादृशः स्वप्नोऽवगत इत्यबाधितावगतिप्रतिसंधानं न स्यात् । अतो देहभेदेऽप्यनुसंधानदर्शनादन्योऽनुसंधातेत्यर्थः ॥

Cp. above, II. i. 6, lines 43ff, and our Note thereon.

—Sūtra 14, line 98.—The true "अ" is the sound "अ"; the letter "अ" is a mere symbol which varies in different scripts and which in the same script might by convention have been otherwise—to say nothing of its palæograhic modification.

—Sūtra 14, line 98ff. — "Nātaḥ param" etc. does not mean that this is the very last argument and nothing further should thereafter be demanded by way of an argument. What is meant is that the knowledge conveyed by a statement like "That thou art," the moment its truth is realised, becomes self-convincing and leaves no unfulfilled ākāṅkshās or expectations, as in an ordinary injunction. The following extract from the Arthasaṁgraha will explain the technique of a Scriptural injunction—

> यजेत स्वर्गकामः—इत्यादिवाक्येन स्वर्गमुद्दिश्य पुरुषं प्रति विधीयते । तथाहि । यजेत—इत्यत्रास्त्यंशद्वयम् । यजिधातुः, तत्प्रत्ययश्च । प्रत्ययेप्यस्त्यंशद्वयम् । आख्यातत्वं लिङ्त्वं च । उभाभ्यामप्यंशाभ्यां भावनैवोच्यते । भावना नाम भवितुर्भवनानुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः । स च व्यापार-

विशेषो लौकिकवाक्ये पुरुषनिष्ठोऽभिप्रायविशेषः। वैदिकवाक्ये तु पुरुषाभावात् लिङादिशब्दनिष्ठ एव। अत एव शाब्दी भावनेति व्यवह्रियते। सा च भावना अंशत्रयमपेक्षते, साध्यं साधनमितिकर्तव्यतां च—किं भावयेत्, केन भावयेत्, कथं भावयेदिति। किं भावयेदिति कर्माकाङ्क्षायां स्वर्गो भाव्यत्वेनान्वेति। ततः केनेति करणाकाङ्क्षायां यागः करणत्वेनान्वेति। ततः कथंभावाकाङ्क्षायामग्नयन्वाधानावहनादिजन्यदृष्टोपकारेण प्रयाजादिजनितादृष्टोपकारसहितेन यागेन स्वर्गं भावयेदिति अग्नयन्वाधानप्रयाजादिकमङ्गजातमितिकर्तव्यतयान्वेति ॥

As the Bhāmatī puts it—

तत्त्वमसीत्यैकात्म्यावगतिः समस्तप्रमाणतत्फलतद्व्यवहारान् अपबाधमानैवोदीयते। नैतस्याः परस्तात् किंचिदनुकूलं प्रतिकूलं चास्ति यदपेक्षेत येन चेयं प्रतिक्षिप्येत। तत्रानुकूलप्रतिकूलनिवारणान्नातः परं किंचिदाकाङ्क्ष्यमिति ॥

—**Sūtra 14, line 112.** — Compare Śaṅkarāchārya's statement at the very opening of the Brahmasūtrabhāshya—

युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोस्तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरितरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम्...अप्यन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्मांश्चाध्यस्य...मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य अहमिदं ममेदमिति नैसर्गिकोयं लोकव्यवहारः ॥

—**Sūtra 14, line 120.** — The word "Kūṭastha" is unknown to the major Upanishads. The Gītā uses the word thrice, the most important passage being xii. 3—

सर्वत्रगमचिन्त्यं च कूटस्थमचलं ध्रुवम्।

"Kūṭa" signifies both a riddle or deception, and the bone of the forehead, and a mountain-peak; in the latter sense the word is spelt as "kuṭa" also. Vedānta may have borrowed the word from Buddhism. "Kūṭaṭṭho" occurs frequently in the Buddhist Canon and is explained by— "pabbatakūṭaṁ viya ṭhito." Kūṭa in the sense of māyā as in kūṭapraśna or kūṭasākshin, and kūṭa in the sense of top or summit as in Gṛidhrakūṭa, Chitrakūṭa etc. may have been two distinct words later fused together in sense.

—**Sūtra 14, line 134.** — The fourth pāda of the fourth adhyāya of Jaimini's Mimāṃsāsūtras gives several illustrations of the application of this maxim. Thus sūtra IV. iv. 7 says—

फलवत्...इतरस्य प्रधानं स्यात् ।

while part of sūtra IV. iv. 34 is—

तत् पुनर्मुख्यलक्षणं यत् फलवत्त्वम्, तत्संनिधावसंयुक्तं तदङ्गं स्यात् ।

The actual wording of the maxim quoted by Śaṅkarāchārya occurs in Śabarasvāmin's Bhāshya under IV. iv. 19. A śrauta illustration of the maxim is furnished by the following Brāhmaṇa passage—

राजसूयेन स्वाराज्यकामो यजेत ।......प्रष्ठौहीं दीव्यति, राजन्यं जिनाति, शौनःशेपमाख्यापयति, अभिषिच्यते ।

The question is, Do the various requirements such as gambling away a young cow, vanquishing princes in a tournament, recital of the story of Śunaḥśepa, ablution, and so forth, constitute a subordinate ritual to the Rājasūya, or have they an independent status? The conclusion is that, as no special reward is declared in connection with them, and as, in close proximity to them, occurs the royal sacrifice for which "svārājya" is assigned as a reward, that which has no reward becomes subordinate to that which has it.

—**Sūtra 14, line 135 ff.** — In the Bālāki-Ajātaśatru dialogue in Bṛih. ii. 1 and Kaush. iv, several upāsanas of Brahman as "Atishṭhāḥ," "Tejasvin," "Pūrṇam," "Vishāsahi," "Pratirūpa," "Rochishṇu," "Anapaga," "Ātmanvi," etc. are mentioned, and in each case the corresponding fruit of the upāsana makes the upāsaka himself endowed with the above attributes:

तेजस्वीति वा अहमेतमुपासे...स य एतमेवमुपास्ते तेजस्वीह भवति ।

The principles which the Pūrvapakshin here introduces as regards pariṇāmitva knowledge resulting in the Ātman's being made liable to pariṇāma is accordingly a recognised Upanishadic principle which has been here turned to an absurd use. — In the Vedāntic system, "Saguṇa-upāsanas" or meditations on certain qualified aspects of Brahman are prescribed as means or steps leading to the upāsana of the Nirguṇa or quality-less Brahman.

—Sūtra 14, line 143. — A definition, according to the Advaita philosophy, is of two kinds : "svarūpa-lakshaṇa" and "taṭastha-lakshaṇa." The first describes the real essence of a thing, *e. g.*, when Brahman is defined as "sat, chit, and ānanda ;" the second is defined as—

यावल्लक्ष्यकालमनवस्थितत्वे सति व्यावर्तकम् ।

Thus, it is only when the Brahman is "Māyāśabala" or viewed as obscured by cosmic illusion that it produces, controls, and re-absorbs the universe : the "śuddha" Brahman is absolutely un-related in any way to the universe. Thus the definition in Brahmasūtra I. i. 2 is not true of the "śuddha" Brahman ; but as no other cause to the world is possible, the definition serves to distinguish Brahman from other alleged first principles like the Pradhāna.

—Sūtra 15, line 5 ff. — Although smoke is the kārya or effect of fire, as we ordinarily understand the relation—so that it is only when fire is there that smoke can arise — fire is not the material or upādāna out of which smoke is evolved, just as clay is the material out of which the jar is formed. Fire, at the most, becomes one of the essential conditions for the production of smoke and does not therefore differ from other conditions like air or ākāśa, in the absence of which also smoke cannot arise.

—Sūtra 15, line 8. — The special qualifications, viz., avichchhina-mūla-dīrgharekhāvastha, or bahalordhvāgratva, are suggested by the circumstance that the smoke in the cow-boy's pipe is cold, not copious, and not steadily rising upwards in a thick column.

—Sūtra 15, line 9. — To have a "kāryakāraṇa" relation leading to identity between two things, it is not enough that one of them should exist only when the other exists ; it should be so much infused or interpenetrated with the characteristic attributes of the other as to raise a vivid mental picture of it, so that one could equate the two as when it is said : the jar is clay. We cannot however say : the smoke is fire. Smoke can possibly suggest humid fuel, but never the heat and brightness of fire.

—Sūtra 15, line 11. — The alternative reading of the text of the sūtra might have been suggested by the Sāṁkhyakārikā 9—

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥

"Because non-existence can never be brought into existence; because people use (definite) materials (for definite ends); because everything does not spring from everything; because a capable cause must produce what it is capable to produce; and because (the effect) is of the nature of the cause; *therefore* the effect pre-exists (in the cause)." Śaṅkarāchārya's interpretation of the word is, however, different. — Vallabhāchārya, who interprets the sūtra as preaching the reality of the world (the world, the effect, is perceived by us because it exists, bhāve), roundly accuses Śaṅkarāchārya of wilful perversion—

इदं सूत्रं मिथ्यावादिना न ज्ञातमेव । अत एव पाठान्तरकल्पनम् ।

—Sūtra 16, line 6. — For the idea compare Māṭhara's explanation under the Sāṁkhyakārikā quoted in the preceding note—

इह लोके यद्यस्मिन् विद्यते तस्मादेव तदुत्पद्यते । यथा तिलेभ्यस्तैलं दध्नो घृतम् । यदि वा असत् कार्यं स्यात् तत् सर्वं सर्वत्र संभवेत् ।

—Sūtra 16, line 8 ff. — The argument is rather subtle. We might recall the instance of a reasoning conformable to scripture which Śaṅkarāchārya gave under II. i. 6[44,45], which implies that the essence of a thing is what never leaves it under all circumstances. What in a jar is this essence that endures? Not its colour or shape; for these might wear away. Not even its jar-ness; for it was not there before production, and will vanish away after its destruction. Only earth or clay remains. Working backwards to the cause of clay and to the First Cause of the world, the only thing that endures in the world and therefore forms the essence of the totality of effects is *mere* existence, and not *particularised* existence. And we know that the kāraṇa or Brahman is existence, intelligence and bliss. Now a *mere* existence cannot be further discriminated. It is, and can be, only "akhaṇḍaikarūpa." Hence the essence of a kārya is kāraṇa, and of the totality of the kāryas, *the* Kāraṇa, *viz.*, Brahman.

—Sūtra 17 line 10. — This maxim of interpretation is given in Mīmāṃsasūtra I. iv. 29—

संदिग्धेषु वाक्यशेषात् ।

Śabara's comment on it runs thus—

अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति। तेजो वै घृतम्—इति श्रूयते। तत्र संदेहः—
किं घृततैलवसानामन्यतमेन द्रव्येणाञ्जनीयाः शर्कराः उत घृतेनैव—इति।
कथं संदेहः। अञ्जनसामान्येन वाक्यस्योपक्रमः। घृतेन विशेषेण निगमनम्।
यथोपक्रमं निगमयितव्यमेकस्मिन् वाक्ये।......। संदिग्धेष्वेवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—
सामान्यवचनेन विशेषापेक्षिणा उपक्रमो वाक्यस्य, विशेषे निगमनवशेन।
तस्माद्घृतविधानम्॥

The same rule is to be applied to statements like—

वासः परिधत्ते। एतद्वै सर्वदेवत्यं वासो यत् क्षौमम्।

—**Sūtra 17, line 15**— See below, II. i. 18, lines 44 ff.

—**Sūtra 18, line 2.** — The " yukti " used in the next few lines is the same that we have in Sāṁkhyakārikā 9, above quoted, *viz.*, " Upādānagrahaṇāt." — The assumption of an " atiśaya " or a subtle-form of the effect in the cause practically amounts to " satkāryavāda." The assumption of some " śakti " or potency avoids, it is true, a direct reference to the effect, as it is a something inherent in the cause. But that something must have at least existence. If it be a *non-existent* something, you cannot say that it is peculiar to clay or milk or any specific cause. The śakti therefore must be an existing something; and we now inquire if it is distinct from (i) cause, and from (ii) effect. If it be altogether distinct from cause, how can you say that it is peculiar to cause and always inheres in it? Also if it is altogether distinct from the effect, why should such a *tertium quid* entirely unrelated to the jar be taken to be the determinant of the jar any more than that of cloth or of curds, seeing that the quality of "anyatva" or distinctness is possessed by the śakti with reference to all these effects ? Hence the conclusion.

—**Sūtra 18, line 13.** — The doctrine of Samavāya is peculiar to the Vaiśeshika Philosophy, which regards it as an independent category. Samavāya is a " padārtha " which is defined as—

नित्यसंबन्धः समवायः।

and which is said to exist between the following five " ayutasiddha " pairs—

ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकमविनश्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ यथा— अवयवावयविनौ, गुणगुणिनौ, क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ, जातिव्यक्ती, विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये च ॥

It is the first pair in particular that comes into discussion in the ordinary causal relation. The threads are the parts or "avayavas" out of which cloth, the " avayavin " is produced. The Vaiśeshikas hold that threads are distinct from the cloth and that the cloth is a new something which is generated in consequence of the " kārakavyāpāra " or causal operation. The threads have merged their independent existence as threads into the cloth which is generated: but in course of time, when the cloth is destroyed, the threads are what remain behind. Hence we cannot say that the threads are really non-existent in the cloth. They are there, but in an inseparable condition. The moment you try to separate them the cloth vanishes. That two distinct things like threads and cloth should remain so inseparably united together calls, according to the Vaiśeshikas, for a special explanation; and this they attempted to furnish by imagining a special link or relation between the two in the form of what they call Samavāya, which is like glue holding two pieces of paper tightly together. The glue is by nature adhesive and nothing more is needed to keep the paper on either side and the glue together. Śaṅkarāchārya is about to discuss the inadequacy of the explanation: but, such as it was, it has served to give a common-sense, realistic turn to the Vaiśeshika Philosophy, both in its explanation of the causal relation and of the relation between substance and its qualities. A much fuller refutation of the Samavāya is given under II.ii. 13.

—Sūtra 18, line 17.— Saṁyoga or conjunction is one of the twenty-four qualities or guṇas enumerated in the Vaiśeshika Philosophy—

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्काराश्चतुर्विंशतिर्गुणाः ।

Every guṇa exists upon the dravya or guṇin by a samavāya relation. If samavāya as well as saṁyoga is a sambandha or a relation of connection, Śaṅkarāchārya rightly protests against the unlike treatment given to each. Compare II. ii. 13, lines 11–15.

—**Sūtra 18, line 19 ff.** — We can at any time see only parts of a jar : the side of the jar turned away from us, its inside, bottom, etc.—as the case may be—remain invisible in any single act of seeing. If, therefore, jar, the avayavin, resides in all the avayavas *taken together*, we can never visualise the jar because we can never take in all the avayavas together in one effort of vision [case i. a]. If the avayavin jar (which means a totality of avayavas) is to reside in such a manner that each of its own avayavas comes seriatim into contact with the corresponding avayava of its cause the clay (as does the thread with the flowers woven into a garland), so that in one glance we can take in the whole avayavin, although only a few of its avayavas are in contact with the eye (as we can lift up the whole garland by grasping only a few of its flowers), we in that case get rid of the earlier difficulty but fall into another, inasmuch as we are arguing as if the avayavas which go to make up the totality of the jar are different from the avayavas in which that totality is to reside as a whole. And the same hypothesis and the same difficulty will have to be repeated about this *new* totality and *its* constituent avayavas [case i. b]. If, finally, the whole jar is to reside in each single constituent avayava, turn by turn, the difficulty just alluded to, viz., positing a double series of avayavas, remains just the same, and there arises another new difficulty that, while the bottom of the jar is having the jar-ness on it so that water does not leak downwards, its sides will have no jar-ness on them and will therefore—as mere particles of clay—fall asunder [Case ii].

—**Sūtra 18, line 28.** — Śaṅkarāchārya mentions the two cities of Srughna and Pāṭaliputra once more under IV. ii. 5—

> योपि स्रुघ्नान्मथुरां गत्वा मथुरायाः पाटलिपुत्रं व्रजति सोपि स्रुघ्नात् पाटलिपुत्रं यातीति शक्यते वक्तुम् ।

The late Justice Telang argued that this offhand allusion to these cities must be taken to imply that both these cities were in existence in Śaṅkarāchārya's days. Now we know that Pāṭaliputra, once the capital of India, and mentioned by Patañjali (B. C. 150) and several Greek and Chinese writers, was washed away about the year A. D. 750 by excessive floods. The city formerly stood

on the tongue of land formed by the confluence of the Śoṇa and the Ganges, on the southern bank of the latter, the modern city of Patna dating only from the time of Śher Śhah (A. D. 1514). Srughna also is a very ancient city situated near Thaneshwar on the Jumna and identified with modern Sugh, which barely contains a few hundred houses. This latter city was in ruins at the time of the visit of Hiuen Tsang. " It possessed five monasteries containing one thousand monks who discussed clearly and ably the most profound and abstract questions; it also possessed one hundred temples of Brahmins, whose followers were extremely numerous." Both these cities must have been in a flourishing condition in the days of Śaṅkara, whose date can therefore be not later than about 750 A. D.—argued Telang. But why must the cities be in a *flourishing* condition ? And might not these examples have been used by others before Śaṅkara ? As a matter of fact Patañjali, commenting upon Vārttika 12 to Pāṇini I. i. 1 and Vārttika 48 to I. ii. 64 uses an allied illustration, viz.—

न ह्येको देवदत्तो युगपत् स्रुघ्ने भवति, मथुरायां च ।

The Sāṁkhyasūtra I. 28 names the same two cities as our text—

न बाह्याभ्यन्तरयोरुपरज्योपरञ्जकभावोऽपि देशव्यवधानात् स्रुघ्नस्थपाटलि-
पुत्रस्थयोरिव ।

—**Sūtra 18, line 30.** — The Jāti or Sāmānya (genus or generality) is defined as —

नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यम् ।

It is believed to have a real existence independent of the species, herein resembling the Ideas of Platonic Philosphy. A Jāti is one, and is found existing at one and the same time on all the species. Hence the point of the illustration.

—**Sūtra 18, line 34.** — A thing is what it is because it functions in a particular manner. The hand cut off from the body is no longer the hand, as Artistotle said long ago. The avayavin therefore must act as a full-fledged avayavin before we are prepared to assume that every one of its constituent particles contains the whole avayavin. This of course is impossible.

—Sūtra 18, line 35. — A verb or an ākhyāta implies a process of happening, with a beginning, a middle, and an end, and a definite sequence : As Yāska says (Nirukta i. 1)—

पूर्वापरीभूतं भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे—व्रजति, पचतीति—उपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तम् ।

Now, the verbal action implied in the statement, "the jar is produced," involves a "kāraka-vpāyāra," that is to say, a series of complicated movements to which the product-in-the-making is being subjected by a definite agent working with the help of specific instruments and accessories. And Śaṅkarāchārya pertinently asks, who or what is being subjected to this "kārakavyāpāra," which begins much prior to the exact moment of the "production" of the jar as popularly understood ? The production of the jar is an assemblage of activities such as refining, kneading, moulding, whirling on the wheel, drying, baking and what not. If the clay is to undergo these processes, as the sum-total of the processes is equal to production, we will have to say that clay is being produced and not the jar. If the jar is declared as being produced, it must exist throughout the whole process, in which case there cannot be any antecedent non-existence of the effect. If neither clay nor jar nor anything else is to be the subject of the action, the action becomes "soul-less."

—Sūtra 18, line 43. — The Pūrvapakshin tries to get over the difficulty by declaring that the multiform kāraka-vyāpāra is nothing but a process of establishing the relation (of samavāya) between the cause clay, and the effect jar; or—as an alternative supposition—between the jar and its own existence. The latter supposition, although apparently maintained by certain older Vaiśeshikas, is hardly convincing. Śaṅkarāchārya, however, objects to it by pointing out that since the causal operation is a process occupying several moments, and commencing much prior to the moment of the so-called production of the jar, this would amount to an attempt to connect existence with non-existence.

—Sūtra 18, line 45.—Abhāva or non-existence as a padārtha is divided by the Vaiśeshikas into four varieties :

अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः, उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य । सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः, उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य । त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽत्यन्ताभावः, यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽन्योन्याभावः, यथा घटः पटो न भवतीति ॥

Now, the point of Śaṅkarāchārya's contention is that if jar is to be produced, let us say, to-morrow, to say that there is its non-existence to-day, and that this non-existence is to end after 24 hours is an abuse of language. "To-day" is not any the poorer or the richer for the non-existence of the jar or for a host of other non-existences. The non-existences being mere voids, how can you distinguish the non-existence of to-morrow's would-be jar from the non-existence of the day-after-to-morrow's would-be jar or plate or piece-of-cloth ?

—Sūtra 18, line 47. — The king Pūrṇavarman is also alluded to by Śaṅkarāchārya in his Bhāshya on the Chhāndogya Upanishad, i. 23 (Ānandāśrama ed., page 115)—

यथा पूर्णवर्मणः सेवा भक्तपरिधानमात्रफला, राजवर्मणस्तु सेवा राज्यतुल्यफलेति ।

Are we justified in regarding Pūrṇavarman and Rājavarman as names of actual kings ; and even if they are the names of actual kings, must we regard them as more or less contemporaries of Śaṅkarāchārya ? There are also names of other kings mentioned by Śaṅkarāchārya. Thus under II. iv. 1 he says—

यथा सिंहस्तथा बलवर्मेति ।

and under IV. iii. 5—

गच्छ त्वमितो बलवर्माणं ततो जयसिंहं ततः कृष्णगुप्तमिति ।

One of these, Balavarman, has been with great probability identified with a Chālukya prince of that name who can be assigned to the period, cir. 767 to 785 A.D. (see Indian Antiquary for 1912, p. 200). Jayasiṁha and Kṛishṇagupta are more dubious figures. We know of no names that would exactly fit the time. The late Justice Telang tried to identify Pūrṇavarman with a Magadha prince of that name belonging to cir. 600 A.D. But as a considerable mass of recent evidence marks the end of the eighth

century as the *floruit* of the Āchārya, we have to leave the attempt to more precisely locate Jayasiṁha, Kṛishṇagupta Pūrṇavarman, Rājavarman, and the rest as impracticable in the present state of our knowledge. The identification of Balavarman with the Chālukya prince we might accept, because it harmonises with other facts independently ascertained.

—Sūtra 18, lines 53 to 58. —The Brahmavidyābharaṇakāra thus clearly explains the point at issue—

तार्किकेण हि उपादानात् कपालद्वयादतिरिक्तमेव घटाख्यं द्रव्यं जायते, तस्य च कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वं संस्थानं धर्म इत्युच्यते।......। तथा सति कपालपरिमाणं घटपरिमाणं चेति परिमाणद्वयं तथैव रूपद्वयं गुरुत्वद्वयं चोपलभ्येत। न चोपलभ्यते। अतो न द्रव्यद्वयं तत्र। अपितु एकस्यैव मृद्द्रव्यस्य पूर्वं पिण्डावस्था, तदनन्तरं कपालाकारः, तदाच्छादनेन घटाकारः। तथाच आकारविशेषसिध्द्यर्थं कारकव्यापार उपपद्यते॥ नच सत्कार्यवादे आकारविशेषस्यापि प्राक्सत्त्वात् न तदर्थमपि कारकव्यापार इति वाच्यम्। आकारविशेषाणां प्रागसत्त्वोपपत्तेः। नच तथा सति सत्कार्यवादहानिः। कार्यानुस्यूतकारणस्य प्राक्सत्त्वेनैव सत्कार्यवादोपपत्तेः॥ यदितु प्रागसतः कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वाकारस्योत्पात्तिर्न संभवति, असत उत्पत्तेर्निराकृतत्वात्, तर्हि सतोऽप्युत्पत्तिर्न संभवतीति सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां प्राङ्ग निरूपयितुमशक्त्या आकारा अनिर्वचनीया एव भवन्तु। का नः क्षतिरिति। अतो दुर्निरूपत्वादपि प्रपञ्चस्वरूपस्य स्वप्नादिवन्मिथ्यात्वमिति सिद्धम्॥

The ultimate view that is endorsed by Śaṅkarāchārya is not "sat*kārya*vāda" but "sat*kāraṇa*vāda"—if we may coin the term to denote the antecedent existence of the kārya not as kārya but as kāraṇa. As the Bhāmatīkāra has declared with his usual lucidity—

यथा भुजङ्गतत्त्वं न रज्जोर्भिद्यते, रज्जुरेव हि तत्, काल्पनिकस्तु भेदः, एवं वस्तुतः कार्यतत्त्वं न कारणाद्भिद्यते, कारणस्वरूपमेव हि तत्, अनिर्वाच्यं तु कार्यरूपं भिन्नमिवाभिन्नमिव चावभासत इति॥

Production, in other words, is no *physical* happening of any kind; it is a *mental* or *intellectual* fact comparable to the imaginings of the dream-world. Cause = Effect, *minus* Time; Effect = Cause,

plus Time ; and for an absolute intellect Time does not exist. Hence, Cause = Effect. This takes us as near the Kantian view-point as one can ever wish.

—Sūtra 18, line 7 i.— For detailed refutation of the Buddhistic doctrine of the momentariness of things see II. ii. 18-27. Since there endures a permanent substance or Vastu amidst modifications in form, size, and so forth, we cannot say that all things are momentary only.

—Sūtra 18, line 12.—There is not much appreciable difference between the earlier argument that production will be "akartṛika" and the present argument that the causal-operation will be "nir-vishaya," seeing that "ghaṭa" is both the (grammatical) kartṛi of the verb "utpadyate" and the vishaya of the "utpatti." They are merely two ways of looking at the same fact.

—Sūtra 19, line 7. — All Bhāshyakāras understand the simile in this and in the next sūtra in the same manner as Śaṅkarāchārya. Rāmānuja, however, takes sūtra 19 to mean—

> यथा तन्तव एव व्यतिषङ्गविशेषभाजः पट इति नामरूपकार्यान्तरादिकं भजन्ते तद्वत् ।

Madhvāchārya's mode of interpretation is peculiar to himself—

> पटवच्च = पटसृष्टिवद्विश्वसृष्टिरपि कर्तृभिन्नसाधनान्तरसाध्या ।
> यथा प्राणादि = यथा प्राणदेहेन्द्रियादिकं न स्वतन्त्रम्, एवं प्रकृत्यादि-साधनान्तरमपि ।

This only shows how ingenious writers could make the sūtras mean any and everything to suit their own theory.

—Sūtra 20, line 1.—As regards the five breaths—Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna, and Samāna—they are regarded as different names given, according to location and function, to one and the same Vital-principle. The locations are given in the familiar stanza—

> हृदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिसंस्थितः ।
> उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः ॥

Prāṇāyāma, as a process of controlling breath, has three stages—

रेचनम् = कौष्ठ्यवायोर्विरेच्य बहिर्धारणम् = प्रश्वासः ।
पूरणम् = बाह्यवायोराचम्यान्तर्धारणम् = श्वासः ।
कुम्भनम् = श्वासप्रश्वासयोः सकृत्प्रयत्नात् स्तम्भनम् ।

In the last process the wind, Vāchaspati tells us,--

बलवद्विधारकप्रयत्ननिरुद्धक्रियः शरीर एव सूक्ष्मीभूतोऽवतिष्ठते ।

--The " Ārambhaṇa " adhikaraṇa as a whole has evoked considerable differences of opinion amongst the Bhāshyakāras, and quite naturally. First as to the extent of the adhikaraṇa, while Bhāskara and Vallabha agree with Śaṅkara in making it consist of seven sūtras (14-20), Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, and Śrīkaṇṭha read our sūtras 17 and 18 as one continuous sūtra, Śrīkaṇṭha further including in the topic of this adhikaraṇa sūtras 21, 22 and 23. The Upanishadic passage intended by sūtra 14 is given identically by all Bhāshyakāras except Madhva, who makes the " ārambhaṇa " passage refer to Ṛigveda x. 81. 2--

किं स्विदासीदधिष्ठानमारम्भणं कतमत्स्वित् कथासीत् ।
यतो भूमिं जनयन् विश्वकर्मा वि द्यामौर्णोन्महिना विश्वचक्षाः ॥

And in accordance with that passage makes the sūtra raise the question as to whether the material out of which God fashioned the world--distinct from him as it was--was independent of him or subservient to him.—Nimbārka in the same sūtra makes the word " an-anyatva " to mean " an-*atyanta*-bhinnatva, " *i. e.*, not *absolute* distinction between cause and effect, but only partial distinction from certain points of view only. Nimbārka, it will be noted, champions what is called the " Bhedâbheda " view, which Śaṅkarāchārya finds it fit to introduce as a pūrvapaksha in II. i. 14[31-37]. The interpretation, as we saw, had been current even before the days of Śaṅkarāchārya; but it seems to be rather forced. Against Śaṅkarāchārya's interpretation we would say this much that while professedly essaying to answer all the logical objections against the Advaita position, he is compelled to throw logic overboard and take his stand indubiously upon pure Scriptural authority. Śaṅkarāchārya could point to the wording of sūtra 27 in defence. He, however, is forced to keep continually shifting from the " vyāvahārika " to the " pāramārthika " view in his interpre-

tation of the sūtras. This was inevitable from his own philosophical position, although one is inclined to raise at times the question as to whether the Sūtrakāra himself really intended all that. Rāmānuja and Vallabha, having Śaṅkara's interpretation before them, make it a point to deliver a studied attack against him, Rāmānuja introducing the discussion with the words—

तदेतदविदिताद्वैतयाथात्म्यानां भेदवादश्रद्धालुजनसबहुमानावलोकनलि-
प्साविजृम्भितम्।

Vallabha is even more unrestrained—

ये पुनर्मिथ्यात्वं तामसबुद्धयः प्रतिपादयन्ति तैर्ब्रह्मवादाः सूत्रश्रुतिनाशनेन
तिलापःकृता वेदितव्याः। अन्तःप्रविष्टचोरवधार्थमेवैष आरम्भः।

On the whole one is inclined to agree with Bhāskara's cogent remarks against the Māyāvādin—

कार्यकारणयोरनित्यत्वादित्यनेन हेतुनात्मैकत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते भवता। स
चायमसिद्धो हेतुः, सर्गानभ्युपगमे वियदादि सर्वं नित्यं मीमांसकानामिव
प्रसज्यते।.........। कथमिदं मायामात्रं प्रमाणमन्तरेण प्रतिज्ञातुं
शक्यम्, त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेकैकं करवाणीति बहुद्धिपूर्वं परदेवताप्रवृत्तेः। तदभि-
प्रायमज्ञात्वा को नामादृष्टनिर्भयः सर्वं मिथ्येति कल्पयितुमर्हेत्।.........।
का चेयमविद्या सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीया।

यस्याः कार्यमिदं कृत्स्नं व्यवहाराय कल्पते।
निर्वक्तुं सा न शक्येति वचनं वञ्चनार्थकम्॥

Noteworthy also are the words of Keśava Kāśmīrin—

किंच ईश्वरस्यातात्त्विकत्वे निरीश्वरसांख्यादिभ्योऽवैदिकेभ्यस्तव सिद्धा-
न्तस्य परवञ्चनं विना को वा विशेषः।.........। यदि प्रपञ्चमिथ्या-
वादः श्रौतः स्यात् तर्हि शुक्तिरजतादिदृष्टान्ता वेद उपन्यस्ता स्युः।

If sūtra 13, giving a popular drishṭānta, be conceived from the "vyavahāra" point of view, sūtra 14 at least must give the "pāramārthika" view. But inasmuch as, in Śaṅkarāchārya's interpretation, the creation as such is a fiction, the sūtra need not have taken the trouble to declare the effect to be non-different from the cause.

—Sūtra 21 line 3. — The first word in the sūtra has been variously interpreted:

इतरस्य शारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वव्यपदेशात्
इतरस्य ब्रह्मणः शारीरात्मत्वव्यपदेशात् } शंकर ;

इतरस्य जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावव्यपदेशात् } रामानुज, श्रीकण्ठ, वल्लभ, निम्बार्क, भास्कर ;

इतरस्य जीवकर्तृत्वस्य [श्रुतौ] निर्देशात् — मध्व.

The " śruti " passage on which Madhva bases his peculiar interpretation, viz.—

जीवाद्भवन्ति भूतानि जीवे तिष्ठन्त्यचञ्चलाः ।
जीवे प्रलयमृच्छन्ति न जीवात् कारणं परम् ॥

I have been unable to trace to its " śruti " source.

—Sūtra 22, line 22.—In spite of Śaṅkarāchārya's attempt to dub the whole Saṁsāra and the distinction between the souls and the Brahman as a fiction or illusion, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the wording of the present sūtra clearly contemplates the distinction by pronouncing the Lord-and-Creator as superior. There are several other sūtras that equally assert this distinction. For instance—

३. ४. ८—अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात् ।
१. १. १६—नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ।
१. ३. १८—इतरपरामर्शात् स इति चेन्न, असंभवात् ।
२. ३. २१—नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्न, इतराधिकारात् ।
१. १. १७—भेदव्यपदेशाच्च ।
२. ३. ४१—परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः ।
१. २. ११—गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् ।
४. ४. १७—जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च ।

Are all these sūtras, and many others of an allied nature, merely meant to be true from the " vyāvahārika " point of view, and no more ? When cornered, the Āchārya would say that he is prepared

to recognise the distinction between the soul and the Creator (=aparabrahman), but not that between the soul and the Para or the Kūṭastha Brahman.

—Sūtra 23, line, 8.—Śaṅkara, Nimbārka and Bhāskara take the word "tat" in this sūtra to refer to "para-parikalpita-dosha" or "parokta," which presumably means "hitākaraṇādi-dosha" alleged in sūtra 21. In an expanded form the sūtra would read—

अश्मादौ इव ब्रह्मणि हिताकरणादिदोषाप्रसक्तिः ।
अश्मादीनामिव जीवानां हिताकरणादिदोषाप्रसक्तिः ।

But the way in which the above Bhāshyakāras understand the simile does not bring out clearly how "hitākaraṇa" is at all applicable to the stones or to the earth. The same remark applies to the explanation of Vallabha. The point is not to prove that different effects can arise out of the same cause (this was the topic of sūtra II. i. 6), but to bring in the "hitākaraṇa" in the explanation of the simile. The Ratnaprabhā, accordingly, misses the mark when it introduces sūtra 23 thus—

नन्वखण्डैकरूपे ब्रह्मणि कथं जीवेश्वरवैचित्र्यमित्यनुपपत्तिं दृष्टान्तैः परिहरति सूत्रकारः ।

With this explanation, the first illustration of Śaṅkarāchārya explains *svarūpa*-vaichitrya; the second, *dharma*-vaichitrya; the third, *arthakriyā*-vaichitrya. Brahmānandasarasvati has probably perceived the difficulty and so offers an explanation of his own, which is, however, a little forced.

यथाश्मादिरूपमण्यादिगतस्य मुखादिप्रतिबिम्बस्य तद्गतश्यामत्वप्रतीतिर्न तु मुखादेः, तथाविद्यानिमित्तकहिताहितादिप्रतीतिर्जीव एव, न तु ब्रह्मणीत्यतस्तस्या उक्तप्रसक्तेरनुपपत्तिः ।

The other commentators seem to understand the simile somewhat differently—

१. यथा अश्मादिषु (अचिद्विकारेषु) ब्रह्मैक्यव्यपदेशानुपपत्तिः तथा (चिद्विकारेषु) जीवेषु सर्वथा ब्रह्मैक्यव्यपदेशानुपपत्तिः—श्रीकण्ठरामानुजौ;

२. अश्मादेरिव जीवस्य (चेतनत्वेऽप्यस्वातन्त्र्यात्) स्वतःकर्तृत्वानुपपत्तिः —मध्व.

In explanation (2) " tat " = " itaravyapadeśa;" but " itara " curiously enough is taken to denote not jīva but "jīvakartṛitva." As to Rāmānuja's explanation, it has the weak-point of (indirectly, it may be) denying the very fact of "itaravyapadeśa" which was the starting point of the Pūrvapaksha. Can the point of the simile be this ? — We hammer and chisel stones in order to shape them into images of gods. The process of hammering is extremely painful ; but it elevates the stone to a superior position. Similarly the so-called miseries and restrictions of life are meant for the elevation of the soul, and he need not chafe at them. Sorrow is the necessary condition, the complement, the other side, of happiness ; and we cannot have the one without the other, any more than we can have light without darkness. Hence the " hitākaraṇadosha " does not hold good because there is no "ahita" in the world at all, our world being the best of all possible worlds. We can accordingly, on the analogy of the hammering of the stone and the transforming of it into an image, explain each pain or misery as the inevitable harbinger of good or happiness, and so absolve God from the fault alleged.

—Sūtra 24,line 6. — It will be noted that Śaṅkarāchārya here declares world-creation as forming the very nature of Brahman; and yet the world he has declared as being unreal ! — According to Madhvāchārya's dvaitavāda, Brahman can have "upasaṁhāra" and so the objection cannot be raised at all. As a consequence he makes sūtra 24 and 25 continue the preceding discussion as to the possibility of the soul having created the world. Sūtra 24 according to him would mean : If a man can gather material to create home, why cannot he do the same and create the universe ? The reply is that what man thinks he does unaided, he does only with the help and the approval of the Lord. It is not the cow who unaided produces milk ; it is the Lord who created her digestive organism, who is ultimately the author of the milk. And this Lord, the next sūtra according to Madhvāchārya avers, can work unseen, as gods and ghosts are known to do, in daily experience. The boldness of the Pūrvapakshin who maintains the soul to be the creator of the Universe is certainly very remarkable, and would easily put to shame the vauntings of modern science !
—Sūtra 24, line 8.— " As milk by nature, and without other accessories, becomes curds, so Brahman by nature produces the

world without any external material or means." This illustration —Śaṅkarāchārya is going to tell us later (II. ii. 3^{12}) —is to be taken not as declaring any inherent power in the milk, unaided by a sentient controller, to produce curds. The sentient controller is there; only he does not add anything to milk (we can dispense, with buttermilk that it is usual to add to the milk to make it curdle), whereas in normal causal operations a number of extraneous materials and instruments are required. This introjection of a sentient-creator almost takes away the very point of the illustration. It is clearly an after-thought which goes to prove that Śaṅkarāchārya at times uses against his opponents arguments that tell against his own position. It is to be noted in this connection that it is Śaṅkarāchārya himself who notices the deficiency and seeks to explain it away : he would not give the opponent the first chance.

—**Sūtra 25, line 4.** — Śaṅkarāchāryā takes the word "loke" in the sūtra in three different senses—

१—लोके = व्यवहारे ;

२—लोके = शास्त्रे वृद्धव्यवहारे च (लोक्यते ज्ञायतेऽर्थोऽनेनेति);

३—लोके = स्वयंप्रकाशे ब्रह्मणि.

—**Sūtra 25, line 15ff.**—The folk-lore concerning the female crane conceiving at the mere hearing of the sound of thunder does not seem to be a biological fact. And as to the explanation for the fact of a lake full of lotuses making an adjoining lake (that had no lotuses before) in time full of similar lotuses, we have to remember the part played by wind and by birds in transplanting seeds.

—**Sūtra 26, line 14.**— If Brahman is wholly used up in the totality of the products, whenever we see products we see the Brahman. Of course we may not see *all* the products at a time and consequently not obtain a full-orbed vision of Brahman; but provided it is a vision, the extent covered by it is immaterial : thus apparently the gist of the argument.

—**Sūtra 27, line 10f.**—The " Sat-sampatti " passsge is quoted in the next line. The " Hṛidayāyatana " passage is Chhāndogya viii. 3. 3—

स वा एष आत्मा हृदि। तस्यैतदेव निरुक्तम्—हृदि-अयमिति। तस्मा-
द्धृदयम्।

As a "hṛidaya" is a "vikāra" of Brahman, as being created by it, and as Brahman is to abide in one of its creations, the Creator and the creation must be conceived as distinct; otherwise they would not have the "ādhārâdheya" relation.

—**Sūtra 27, line 24.**—Having once conceded that the Veda is authoritative, especially in transcendent matters, the maxim "credo quia impossible" seems to be a logical deduction from the premises. Surely we cannot presume to expect that the mystery of the Universe was planned by the Creator in such a manner that it might be readily intelligible to the finite and vacillating intellect of man, who is verily the tiniest atom in the whole universe. Man is ceaselessly trying to know and his knowledge is steadily increasing. He discards old hypotheses and invents new ones, merely to have them supplanted by still newer ones. Although in this way man's knowledge, one might imagine, has its own limitations, he at least has a right to expect that the added knowledge will merely exhibit a difference in degree, not in kind; that it will not compel him to unlearn the "eternal" truths, for instance, the law of contradiction. But Śaṅkarāchārya is not willing to concede even that. Human reason has its own inherent contradictions, what Kant styled the "antinomies." In the words of Hegel, "Reason returns upon itself," and even śruti cannot help man with any better solution than Śaṅkarāchārya's "aghaṭitaghaṭanāpaṭīyasī" or "sattvāsattvābhyām anirvachanīyā" māyā. Śaṅkarāchārya, however, does not stop with this negative, despondent, almost sceptical attitude. There are regions which are inaccessible to human reason, but which *faith* can penetrate and *realise.* Although man's reason is admittedly weak, his *faith* is immense, is infinite. With that faith he can aspire to transcend the bonds of the flesh and *be* the Divinity itself. There is valid testimony to the reality of this experience, which is not beyond anybody's reach,—given sustained patience and an earnestness of endeavour.

—**Sūtra 27, line 33.**— The point is discussed by Jaimini in his Mīmāṃsāsūtra X. viii. 6. When we have two contradictory

statements with reference to the same ritual, what are we to do? To quote Śabara—

> ननु परस्परं विरुद्धौ विधिप्रतिषेधौ न संभवतः। उच्यते। वचनप्रामाण्यात् प्रतिषेधो विधिं बाधित्वा भविष्यति, विधिरपि प्रतिषेधम्।...... । तदा विधिर्यदा न प्रतिषेधः, तदा प्रतिषेधो यदा न विधिरिति।...... । एकं कल्पं गृहीत्वा न द्वितीयमपि गृह्णातीति। तस्मादन्यतरेण कल्पेन सिध्यतीति ॥

—**Sūtra 27, line 45.** — See note to sūtra II. i. 14, line 134, above.

—**Sūtra 28, line 2.** — Most Bhāshyakāras understand Ātman = Jīva. If the individual soul contains within himself so many strange and contradictory powers, why should one object to God's having them? Others who take Ātman = Brahman practically intend to convey the same idea. As Vallabha says—

> अर्वाचीनविकल्पविचारकुतर्कप्रमाणाभासशास्त्रकलिलान्तःकरणदुरवग्रहवादिनां वादानवसरे सर्वभवनसमर्थे ब्रह्मणि विरोधाभावात्।

Madhva includes our sūtra 26 under the "Jīvakartṛitva" adhikaraṇa and discusses "Īśvarakartṛitva" only with sūtra 27.

—**Sūtra 29, line 1.**—Under II. ii.11, 13 Śaṅkarāchārya has urged the objection in question against the Sāṁkhya and the Vaiśeshika systems.—While in the case of the Vedāntins śrutis declared both "niravayavatva" and "pariṇāmitva," the Sāṁkhyas *assume* "sāvayavatva" of the Pradhāna and hope thereby to escape the fault of "kṛitsnaprasakti." And our argument against the assumed "sāvayavatya" they brush aside as not valid, being based on *mere* reason (line 9f). But this lands them into further troubles.

—**Sūtra 29, line 13.** — The Vaiśeshikas explain that when two atoms are united to produce a dvyaṇuka or binary-atom, there arises in the binary a magnitude or dimension distinct from that of the atom. But this is not due to the addition of the dimension of one atom to that of the other. The new dimension is due to the fact that there are *two* atoms: to the 'saṁkhyā' of the atoms. These are mere words, and Śaṅkarāchārya has not lost the opportunity to expose their vacuity.

—Sūtra 29, line 16.—With sūtra 29 Śaṅkara fittingly brings the adhikaraṇa to a close, thereby disposing of the dilemma or the ubhayataḥpāśā rajjuḥ (the double-noosed rope) involved in sūtra 26. Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇtha, Bhāskara, Nimbārka and Madhva regard the next two sūtras also as a part of this adhikaraṇa.—Apart from this, the Viśishṭādvaita school must find it somewhat hard to declare for the "niravayavatva" of the Lord when his body consists of chit and achit as its constituents. Rāmānuja's theory is—

सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कारणम्, स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कार्यम् ।

Creation in other words is the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in a subtle and imperceptible form. If creation is sāvayava, the sāvayavatva must also be supposed to be immanent in the Creator. Hence ultimately all Bhāshyakāras have to appeal to śruti. It is *not* correct to say that the theory of Rāmānuja appeals to reason while that of Śaṅkara negates it altogether. On this point all are in the same boat.

—Sūtra 30, line 4.—It is somewhat strange that the sūtra should use the feminine word "sarvopetā." The "Parā Devatā" referred to in Chhāndogya (vi. 8. 6) and elsewhere is naturally suggested as the viśeshya. Madhva, however, has discovered a śruti, viz.—

सर्वैर्युक्ता शक्तिभिर्देवता सा ।

which it is perhaps vain to try to trace in any extant Saṁhitā. The Śvetāśvatara passage (vi. 8)—

परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते ।

is the one pointedly referred to by most Bhāshyakāras. Advantage has also been taken of the use of the feminine epithet in the sūtra, which is declared to teach the doctrine which assigns a *real* śakti (and not merely the power of illusion) to the Lord.

—Sūtra 31, line 5.—The objection beginning with "kathaṁ cha" (line 5) is a characteristic insertion designed to introduce the Māyāvāda (see line 11 below). While sūtra 24 answers the objection on the score of the absence of any *external* means and instruments, the present sūtra considers the objection based upon the absence of all limbs and sense-organs belonging to God's own body.

—**Sūtra 32, line 6.** — This seems to be the *popular* explanation of the śruti passage. It has also a deeper mataphysical significance: The love that you show to others is a reflex of your love for your own Self. In loving others you feel that you are more fully and more truly realising your own Self.

—**Sūtra 32, line 1.** — While the argument from design is popularly put forward to suggest an intelligent Author to the world, the same argument, it must not be forgotton, reduces the Creator to the level of the ordinary man who is immersed in a ceaseless chase after ends and after means to those ends.

—**Sūtra 33, line 11.** — Apravṛittiḥ: this may imply a total disinclination to create, or passivity; or even the occasionalness or kādāchitkatva of the Pravṛitti, seeing that there is no Prayojana or motive either for the God's creating or for his not-creating.

—**Sūtra 33 line 12.** — Like sūtra 24 this sūtra asserts creative activity as being the "svabhāva" of the Lord. This implies not unconscious or involuntary action, but action which involves no effort and no hesitation whatsoever. Our breathing becomes naturally heavy and short as we climb a hill; so the "svabhāva" can show natural adaptation to circumstances. What God does in the normal course of things appears to us as his most carefully balanced activity undertaken after the fullest deliberation. As in the case of the truly wise man, so in the case of the Lord—

यास्त्वेषां स्वैरकथास्ता एव भवन्ति शास्त्राणि ।

Śaṅkarāchārya, however, characteristically brings in his Māyāvāda and declares the whole creation as not a physical fact but an intellectual perception: see above, II. i. 18, lines 53–58, Notes.

—**Sūtra 34, line 1.** — In sūtra 21 the point under discussion was the Lord's treatment unto himself; in the present sūtra, it is his treatment of the other souls.

—**Sūtra 34, line 15.** — The analogy of the rain fails us, because while the characteristic differences of the seeds can exist independently of the rain, in the case of God there can be no diversity in the world for which he is not himself responsible.

—**Sūtra 34, line 21.** — The Kaushītaki passage, which seems at first sight to go against Śaṅkarāchārya, is to be so interpreted as

to conform with the Bṛihadāraṇyaka passage next quoted, inasmuch as the Veda can never teach contradictory things. Understand *kārayati* to mean, therefore,—

पूर्वकर्मानुरोधेन कारयति ।

Nor is the Lord's independence in any way endangered by his paying attention to the karman of men. As the Bhāmatīkāra says—

नच कर्मापेक्षायामीश्वरस्यैश्वर्यव्याघातः । नहि सेवादिकर्मभेदापेक्षः फलभेदप्रदः प्रभुरप्रभुर्भवति ।

—Sūtra 35, line 7.—Even in Śaṅkara's Māyāvāda the following six objects are regarded as without a beginning—

जीव ईशो विशुद्धा चित् तथा जीवेशयोर्भिदा ।
अविद्या तच्चितोर्योगः षडस्माकमनादयः ॥

The last of these, the relation of Chit and Avidyā, is responsible for the Saṁsāra, which as a consequence is without a beginning.

—Sūtra 36, line 1. — Rāmānuja and Nimbārka read sūtras 35 and 36 as one sūtra, while they seem to have been both ignored by Śrīkaṇṭha.

—Sūtra 36, line 5. — Kevalā-avidyā is like the Sāṁkhya Pradhāna in a state of equipoise of its constitutent guṇas: is incapable of occasioning any karman or bhoga, the offspring of inequality leading to a disturbance of the balanced pose. In the condition of sushupti (deep-sleep) or of Pralaya (cosmic " involution ") the Avidyā is " kevalā " and occasions no continuance of activity for the time.

—Sūtra 36, line 8. — Any inquiry started as to the ultimate origins of the Saṁsāra, it must not be forgotten, is bound to be started by one who himself is already in the Saṁsāra, floating with the stream. He cannot possibly review the stream from a detached position any more than can the denizen of the earth step outside the earth so as to weigh it or to move it with a fulcrum. The Mīmāṃsā position—Na kadāchid anīdṛiśaṁ jagat—can in some sense be regarded as a confession to the same point of view.

—Sūtra 36, line 14.—An anticipatory reference to a future fact one should resort to only when there is no other way out. Thus, to take a śrauta example, we are told in one context—

पुरोडाशकपालेन तुषान् उपवपति ।

" That the husks are to be rubbed off or removed by means of the 'Puroḍāśa' plate." This is a direction to be observed soon after the grains are pounded in order to separate the husks. The puroḍāśa cakes are to be prepared out of this very grain. How can we therefore speak of a 'puroḍāśa' plate before the puroḍāśa is cooked? But as there is no way out, we have to suppose that the plate is called 'puroḍāśa' in anticipation of its being used to cook the grain after the husk is removed and the grain turned into flour. Similar is the case with the injunction—

गृहस्थः सदृशीं भार्यामुपेयात् ।

In those cases however, where, a relation with what has gone before and what is to come is *equally* possible, the former has necessarily to be preferred.

—Sūtra 37, line 5.—That Brahman has certain " dharmas" or " śaktis " is unhesitatingly declared in this sūtra again, as in sūtra 30 before. And yet the commentary Brahmāmṛitavarshiṇī remarks—

तस्मान्निर्गुणत्वे ब्रह्मणो विवर्तजगदुपादानत्वमविरुद्धमिति ।

ADHYĀYA SECOND

PĀDA SECOND

—Sūtra 1, line 1. — As there seems to be a *prima facie* inconsistency, diversity and even contradiction in the various statements about facts and practices that are scattered all over the "Veda," (i. e., Mantras and Brāhmaṇas,) the necessity of harmonising them in the interest of orthodoxy was very early felt. The "Śrauta-sūtras" of the the various Vedic schools undertook, each for its own specific charaṇa or for the śākhā, the task of evolving order and unity from out of the manifold *obiter dicta* of the Brāhmaṇic texts concerning sacrifices and sacrificial matters. The "Gṛihya-sūtras" did the same for the Domestic ritual, while Jaimini's (Pūrva-)mīmāṃsā-sūtras, assuming the standpoint of detachment from specific schools, and without going in too much for the minutiæ of the ritual, endeavoured to build up a "science of exegesis," which could be and has been applied even to texts other than the Veda. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtras had confined their attention mainly to the Brāhmaṇic texts. The Āraṇyakas, and particularly the Upanishads—though technically forming a part of the Brāhmaṇas—were, if not actually ignored by Jaimini, at any rate relegated to the position of an "Arthavāda" (see note to II. i. 5[23]). The Uttara-mīmāṃsā (=Vedānta) śāstra, differing from Jaimini as to the value and the purpose of the Upanishadic texts, essayed to harmonise the apparently divergent teachings of these texts on points such as the author and the nature of the creation, the nature of the Ātman or individual soul and his ultimate destiny, etc., by applying the very same canons of interpretation that Jaimini had evolved—only premising that the knowledge of the Reality vouched for by these texts secured emancipation in a way that the ritualistic practices of the Karmakāṇḍa (which was another name for the Pūrvamīmāṃsā) were unable to effect. The main purpose of the Vedāntaśāstra was thus primarily exegetic. The establishment of any specific metaphysical conclusion by independent ratiocination, or the overthrowing of any given theory by means of mere logical

argumentations, was admittedly foreign to its original purpose. Should this be taken to mean that the present so-called "Tarka-" pāda was felt to be an interloper into the treatise ? See lines 6ff. below, and see also my paper on the "Multiple Authorship of the Vedāntasūtras," in *The Indian Philosophical Review*, II. 2, pages 141-154.

—Sūtra 1, line 8ff. — See *ante* ii. 1. 1[23-31].

—Sūtra 1, line 12ff. — For Brahmasūtra I. i. 5 see our Note on II. i. 1[20] before. Brahmasūtra I. i. 18 takes its stand on passages like Tait. Up., II. 6—

सोऽकामयत । बहु स्यां प्रजायेय । स तपोऽतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वा ।
इदꣳ सर्वमसृजत । यदिदं किंच ॥

where the conceiving of the desire to be manifold or to procreate presupposes a sentient Creator. Brahmasūtra I. iv. 28, coming at the very end of the "Samanvaya" chapter, intends to assert that Vedāntic passages other than those actually dealt with in the chapter—in case they be interpreted in a way antagonistic to the Advaita theory—might be analogically explained in conformity with the Brahman theory.

—Sūtra 1, line 18. — This probably explains the name "Tarkapāda." The more usual title generally given in the colophons is—"Sāṁkhyādi-matānāṁ dushṭatvapradarśanam." The more convenient name adopted in this edition is familiar enough to Pandits and Commentators. See, for instance, Raṅgarāmānuja's Prakāśikā on the Kaṭhopanishad, I. ii. 19.

—Sūtra 1, line 20ff. — The starting point of the Classical Sāṁkhya Philosophy here controverted is an absolute opposition between the subject and the object. Man is the victim of this opposition from the very first breath he draws in this world, and his earliest cry is a forlorn endeavour to get out of the range of this opposition. The opposition grows in volume as the man advances in years, and with that grows also his persistent endeavour to overcome it, bringing in its train far more grief and suffering than what it succeeds in allaying. If only the subject could remain entirely dissociated from the object, there would be an end for once and for all to all hankering, all movement,

all suffering in fact. In his true nature Purusha, the subject, is the unconcerned "witness," who is capable of seeing but incapable of action; unchangeable in nature, but, through absence of real discrimination, imagining himself as being susceptible to change and consequent suffering; eternally and intrinsically free, although on account of foolishly identifying himself with the exhibitions of sense and outward things, he is weltering in the bondage of Saṁsāra, from which discriminating knowledge or Viveka alone can bring him salvation. As the "object" is real so likewise is this bondage and the consequent suffering of the Purusha; and as a corollary from this, it becomes necessary to believe in the existence of an infinite number of Purushas to account for the grades and varieties of human experience.

—What then is the nature of the Object, the root-cause of all this ado? The Object is the direct contrast to the Subject. The Subject, like the lame man of the favourite metaphor, sees but cannot move: the Object, like the blind man, moves but cannot see. The one is discerning, self-subsistent, and immobile: the other non-sentient, dependent, and variable: as Īśvarakṛishṇa has put it (Kārikā 11)—

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥

The object, however, like the dancing-girl, spreads itself out to the gaze of the Purusha and shows him all this phantasmagoria only as long as he is immersed in an ignorance about his real nature. Once the Purusha realises his distinctness, the world vanishes from his sight utterly. Compare Kārikā 59, 66—

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥
दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।
सति संयोगेपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥

And as there is an infinite number of Purushas, the object or the Prakṛiti can stand in different relations to them at one and the same time, To this effect runs the well-known "Ajā-mantra" (Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, iv. 5)—

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥

—But in this very conception of the possibility of a coming-into-relation that is believed to obtain between two absolute contradictories like the Purusha and the Pradhāna lies both the strength and the weakness of the system. The relation is a real relation, not a figment of imagination, a māyā. — And since, according to hypothesis, the Purusha is incapable of doing anything with a view to come into relation, it is the Pradhāna or Prakṛiti that has to be thought of as having a two-fold existence : that which it puts forth when under relation, and that which belongs to it intrinsically: or, to speak in the terms of the system, an Avyakta or non-manifest and a Vyakta of a manifest form. Īśvarakṛishṇa thus differentiates the two (Kārikā 10)—

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥

—The Vyakta, Avyakta, and Jña (=Purusha) thus form the three ground-principles of the system. The Vyakta is the universe as we see it; the Avyakta is the primitive "protoplasmic" condition of the same ; and the evolution of this into the other is assumed to be a process taking place—under the "seeing," it is true of the Purusha—but nevertheless as a something inevitable, self-impelled, and inwardly-regulated. The Sāṁkhyas thus seem to have superadded a personalistic factor to the generally understood conception of "evolution"— and this is by no means inconsistent with their dualistic starting point.

—The starting-point of the present-day Theory of Evolution is neither Matter alone, nor Energy alone, but rather a deft welding of the two into one ; and the progress of the evolution is declared to consist in a separation of the two, and a subsequent continuous change "from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to definite, coherent heterogeneity of structure and function, through successive differentiations and integrations." In a somewhat analogous fashion the Śāṁkhyas also assume, besides the initial dualism of Prakṛiti and Purusha, a bifurcation of the Prakṛiti into aspects which are directly opposed to each other. One they style the Sattva which is described as light,

luminous, fine, subtle, buoyant, joyous and so forth ; the other is Tamas which is heavy, dark, gross, coarse, stupid and joyless. And just as the "Vyakta" was the *via media* between the "Avyakta" and the Purusha, so the Sāṁkhyas have found it necessary to assume a third aspect, the Rajas, which represents the process of transition from Sattva to Tamas or Tamas to Sattva. Rajas accordingly is the principle of effort, inspiration, activity, passion, and emotion. These three Qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas —they are more appropriately called Constituents, or Aspects— are in a state of "equipoise" in the Avyakta. The 'seeing' by the Purusha under the influence of non-discrimination disturbs the balance and then the whole process of evolution or Pariṇāma explodes itself away altogether automatically.

—Two opposites at each of the two extremities, with a *tertium quid* by way of a bridge in between, has been the formula that the Sāṁkhyas have worked out in all departments of philosophy. They recognise three means of knowledge or pramāṇas : Perception and Authority standing at the two extremities, while Inference comes between the two as possessing an element of each. The smoke, for instance, has to be seen, the smoke-fire relation to be taken for granted. — Again, there are the three kinds of senses, mind, the middle one, partaking of the nature of the five organs of sense on the one hand, and the five organs of action on the other. — Between the percipient Self and the gross elemental world outside, once more, it is the psychological organism of man (technically called the liṅgam) that forms the connecting link ; and in order that it should be the proper *via media*, the Sāṁkhyas have made it consist of not only the eleven Indriyas above enumerated, but also of the five Tanmātras (Aviśeshas) or subtle-forms of the elemental world (Viśeshas) outside.

—A peculiarity of the Sāṁkhya psychology that deserves to be noted is the position that is therein assigned to Buddhi (intellect) and Ahaṁkāra ("I"-notion). Mahat or Buddhi is the very first product of the Prakṛiti following directly upon the first 'seeing' of the Purusha, when the equipoise of the three guṇas is just disturbed. It is, so to say, the Prakṛiti illuminated or intellectualised ; awakened from its dull torpor and presenting to the sentient Purusha cosmic forms in a way that he can apprehend. As we have seen (II. i. 4[31], Note), Buddhi is, according to the

Sāṁkhyas, non-sentient; but it is not exactly dull, inert, matter. It comes midway. It consists of the finer, subtler forms of matter so transmuted as to become objects of *immediate* perception to the Purusha.—When the Purusha thereafter comes to establish, through the Buddhi, a relation with the outward, world, there grows in him a sense of ownership or of self-consciousness (a product of aviveka) which is represented by the next step in the Sāṁkhya cosmology, namely, Ahaṁkāra. We must not make the mistake, however, of regarding these stages as happening in time. They are rather ideal. This circumstance as well as the fact that the Sāṁkhyas have introduced idealistic terms in the midst of their cosmological theory suggest a possibility of the system having been originally idealistic in the sense of having recognised only one Purusha (see the Note to Sūtra 10, line 2, below). The admission of a multiplicity of knowing Subjects is, in fact, inconsistent with the true notion of the Subject. But we cannot go out of our way to discuss that large question here in all its bearings.—Other details of the system will come up for discussion in the course of the text itself.

—Sūtra 1, line 21.— The Bāhya-bhedas include the whole universe of physical existences: the conditions or environments within which the individual is placed and which produce the pleasure-pain-infatuation experience of Saṁsāra. The Ādhyātmika-bhedas include the physical body within which the individual functions, including the psychical-apparatus of the mind, intellect, etc. The "body" also is the abode of all kinds of pleasure-pain-infatuation experiences.

—Sūtra 1, line 22.—See Note to II. i. 4, line 22f.

—Sūtra 1, line 25.— The use of the verb *vivartate* for *pariṇamate* by the Bhāshyakāra is somewhat strange, and has to be understood as vividhaṁ vartate. The Sāṁkhyakārikā (15 f.) referred to by Śaṅkarāchārya runs thus—

भेदानां परिमाणात्, समन्वयात्, शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च, ।
कारणकार्यविभागाद्, अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥
कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्.................. ।

The five arguments establishing the existence of the Pradhāna or the Avyakta are : (i) The discrete and finite existences in the world have the Avyakta or Pradhāna as their cause, inasmuch as they necessarily presuppose a formless, and infinite something as their source and back-ground. (ii) In spite of the apparent diversity, the various objects in the world seem to exhibit a basic homogeneity (samanvaya) which points to their common origin. (iii) All wordly happenings proceed from, and are regulated by a power or energy which presupposes a common exhaustless source of this power. (iv) The universality of the Law of Causation, which enables us—working backwards from the effects—to reach a First uncaused Cause. And (v) the merging of all the cosmic phenomena, subsequent to their destruction, into their respective cause, which leads inevitably to the postulate of an ultimate something into which the whole universe is funded back after Dissolution. Śaṅkarāchārya is shortly going to criticise most of these arguments. No. 1 in line 43–45 ; No. 2 in lines 39–43 ; No. 3 in Sūtra 2 ; and No. 4 (and by implication No. 5) in lines 45–47.

—Sūtra 1, line 35 ff.—Śaṅkarāchārya means to say that even if we grant the rule of " Like cause like effect," still, seeing that when the cause is two-fold—constituent and efficient—why not make the effect, in a few cases at any rate, resemble the *efficient* cause ? Rather than arguing from the non-sentient constituent cause of effects back to the first non-sentient constituent cause, namely the Pradhāna, what is there to prevent us arguing from the efficient and sentient causes of products (e. g. the potter of the earthen-pot) back to the first efficient cause, which must be a sentient Person or God ? The argument becomes yet stronger if the sentient first cause is both the constituent and the efficient causes in one.

—Sūtra 1, line 39. —" Anumātavyam bhavati " is the paraphrase for the word " anumānam " in the sūtra. The inference establishing Pradhāna as the first cause—namely, that in Kārikā 15, above quoted—is not valid, says the sūtra. The word " Anumāna " is used in the sense of " inference " by the Sūtrakāra in two other places : I. ii. 25 and I. iii. 28, in both of which the anumāna is not the Sāṁkhya anumāna. In I. i. 18 and I. iii. 3, however, the word "Anumāna" is used, in the interpetation of the majority

of the Bhāshyakāras, almost as equivalent to Pradhāna. Elsewhere the Sūtrakāra has used the word "Ānumānika," i. e., what is established by inference, as a synonym for Pradhāna; see, for instance, sūtra I. iv. 1.—

आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न, शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेर्दर्शयति च।

The Sāṁkhya Pradhāna seems to have been thus nick-named by way of a ridicule; and the word "Aśabdam" in sūtra I. i. 5 might have been used as a by-word for Pradhāna for the same reason. Compare also the use of the word "Smārta" in I. ii. 9 in the sense of Pradhāna. In accordance with the maxim—

सति प्रसङ्गे प्रतिषेधो भागी भवति।

the present nick-name must have attained vogue after the demonstrated failure of the Sāṁkhya attempt to find Vedic backing to their theory.—The word "cha" in the sūtra is taken to be equal to "tu" by some; but it is perhaps better to bring it in relation with the "cha" of the next sūtra.

—Sūtra 1, line 40.—"Anvaya" stands for the "Samanvaya" of the Kārikā above quoted. See Note on I. ii. 4, line 22f.

—Sūtra 1, line 42.—The following extract from the Bhāmatī brings out the exact point of the argument—

यदि पुनरेते (बाह्या) एव सुखदुःखादिस्वभावा भवेयुस्ततः स्वरूपत्वाद्धेमन्तेऽपि चन्दनः सुखः स्यात्। नहि चन्दनः कदाचिदचन्दनः। तथा निदाघेष्वपि कुङ्कुमपङ्कः सुखो भवेत्। नह्यसौ कदाचिदकुङ्कुमपङ्क इति। एवं कण्टकः क्रमेलकस्य सुख इति मनुष्यादीनामपि प्राणभृतां सुखः स्यात्। नह्यसौ कांश्चित् प्रत्येव कण्टक इति। तस्मादसुखादिस्वभावा अपि चन्दनकुङ्कुमादयो जातिकालावस्थाद्यपेक्षया सुखदुःखादिहेतवो, न तु स्वयं सुखादिस्वभावा इति रमणीयम्॥

The Sāṁkhyas could have met this argument in Śaṅkarāchārya's own words; see (II. i. 24, lines 11-12)—

यदि च स्वयं दधिभावशीलता न स्यात्, नैवौष्ण्यादिनापि बलाद्दधिभावमापद्येत।

although the two cases are not exactly on a par.

—Sūtra 1, line 43.—Saṁsarga has been defined in the Kalpataru as—

नानात्वेन सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतः संसर्गः ।

and by Ānandagiri as—

अविभक्तमेकमनुगतं वस्तु संसर्गशब्देन लक्ष्यते ।

The argument is the same as that implied in the Spencerian formula of Evolution above quoted (Notes p. 60). The interaction of the manifold and the heterogeneous (which leads to individualisation) presuposes some homogeneous entity as their starting point. All things in the world are "parimita," that is to say, manifold and heterogeneous; and therefore the Prakṛiti must be one and uniform. This is how Vāchaspati in his Tattvakaumudī seems to understand the argument. Saṅkarāchārya understands it somewhat differently. Saṁsarga according to him does not mean "continuity of a pervading characteristic," but rather "the coming together into causal contact or cohesion" of entities which are going to produce effects that are limited (parimita) in space, time or nature. The three qualities have *parimitatva* at least in the last sense. Hence they must be regarded as effects presupposing a causal saṁsarga of *other* entities, and so on.

—Sūtra 1, line 45.—"Parimitatva" can signify either (*a*) definiteness in dimensions, or (*b*) limitation of duration, or (*c*) differentiation in characteristics. The first is a case of deśato parimitatva and is not applicable to the Ākāśa which, being a product, ought to be parimita and saṁsargapūrvaka. The second is a case of kālato parimitatva; but, as before observed, the Sāṁkhyas do not recognise time as a distinct entity (cp. Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī on Kārikā 33; "kṛitam atra antargaḍunā Kālena"), causation being for them more or less an ideal process. As to the third case of vastutaḥ parimitatva, that holds true in the case of the three aspects of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, each of which possesses a nature distinct from that of the others; and yet the Sāṁkhyas regard these three aspects as infinite and eternal, and as making up the composition of the Prakṛiti. Compare the following description of these guṇas—

अन्योन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे सर्वे सर्वत्र गामिनः ।
नैषामादिः संप्रयोगो वियोगो वोपलभ्यते ॥

The same remark can apply also to the Chit-śakti of the Purusha.

—Sūtra 1, line 47. — The argument from design and from the natural adaptation that is perceptible in Nature, which Śaṅkarāchārya here uses to rebut a non-sentient first cause, is familiar enough to students of Philosophy. The question to determine is whether this design or adaptation is actually present in the world, or whether man has projected it there from his own knowledge of the working of his own mind. We all have heard of the pious missionary who, when he saw the cork-tree for the first time, reverentially ejaculated: "How benign is Providence that He should have so plentifully supplied stoppers to our bottles!" The poor divine forgot that the same Providence has also, and more plentifully, supplied stones for breaking our bottles! Then as to natural adaptation, of which modern Biology seems to offer such convincing examples, does not there exist also considerable waste in Nature? "Of fifty seeds, She often brings but one to bear" — as Tennyson observes. The stern logic of facts like these might turn a man to sheer pessimism. Only, as Tennyson says,—

Oh yet we trust that somehow good
  Will be the final goal of ill;
  To pangs of nature, sins of will,
Defects of doubt, and taints of blood;

That nothing walks with aimless feet;
  That not one life shall be destroy'd,
  Or cast as rubbish to the void,
When God hath made the pile complete;

That not a worm is cloven in vain;
  That not a moth with vain desire
  Is shrivell'd in a fruitless fire,
Or but subserves another's gain.

Behold, we know not anything;
  I can but trust that good shall fall
  At last—far off—at last, to all,
And every winter change to spring.

We cannot, in other words, reach finality by the path of mere reason. The argument from design or Rachanā can convince only those that do not need to be convinced. To others it is a *petitio principii.*

—Sūtra 2, line 1. — The Sāṁkhyas, as we have seen, had argued that as there is a good deal of expenditure of energy—a ceaseless action and reaction between all manner of forces—it must all originate from a First Cause which is capable of activity, viz., the Prakṛiti, and not from a sentient Creator who is admittedly nirguṇa and nishkriya. Śaṅkarāchārya is now going to show the flaws in their line of reasoning. — The three Guṇas which, prior to creation, had balanced each other have their equipoise disturbed by one of the three being more dominant (aṅgin), the other two being for the time its aṅgas or subsidiaries.

—Sūtra 2, line 6. — We supply the word " anupapatteḥ " from the first sūtra. The sūtras 1 and 2 are given as one continuous sūtra by both Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha. Rāmānuja, moreover, does not take " Pravṛitteḥ " as a genitive, but as an ablative. He paraphrases this part of the sūtra by—

तज्ज्ञाधिष्ठितस्य कार्यारम्भप्रवृत्तेर्दर्शनात् ।

But whether we say that the Pravṛitti of the Pradhānā is inexplicable, or that only the sentient can properly have the Pravṛitti, there is no difference in the essential argument. Vallabha restricts the application of the present sūtra. In the first sūtra it was urged that the Sāṁkhya Pradhāna could not have produced houses, temples and other inanimate parts of the creation. Here it is intended to assert that the same Pradhāna could not have produced bodies of animals that ensue from a mixture of parental semen and blood. But what is the ground for this restriction ?

—Sūtra 2, line 9 ff. — The words " na tvachetana-saṁyuktasya chetanasya pravṛittir dṛishṭā " can be assigned to the Siddhāntin who argues that the one from whose contact movement results is the one to whom Pravṛitti must be attributed. Such an one is the Chetana whose contact produces the Pravṛitti in inert matter, and not the Prakṛiti whose contact can be alleged to have produced Pravṛitti in the Chetana. As an alternative, the words can be assigned even to the Pūrvapakshin, who lays stress upon

the fact of the Pravṛitti being observed in the Prakṛiti, and never in the Chetana who, in fact, is not an object of perception at all. The matter is eventually referred to the Madhyastha for arbitration. — We see the chariot moving: we know that it can move only when joined to the sentient horse. The motion therefore belongs to the chariot, but its *source* is the horse. The fact of the matter seems to be that the motion is neither from the chariot, not from the horse, but *from their combination*. And if this combination is, like the dream-world, a merely false fabrication, the Chetana remains in reality unaffected by the Pravṛitti. If that be so, the question arises why, in the phenomenal world at any rate, Śaṅkarāchārya should have objected to the Pravṛitti being assigned to the Prakṛiti. But here Śaṅkarāchārya's reply is clear. Because Pravṛitti is phenomenal, that is no reason why even in the phenomenal point of view, it should have been assigned to the wrong source, to where even the commonsense point of view is loath to assign it. The Chārvākas, who can be selected as the typical champions of the common-sense point of view, assign Pravṛitti to the driving body of the charioteer, the body being actuated by chaitanya which, according to them, is not a new substance like the Ātman, that effects a lodgment into the body from without, but rather a result of the combination of the four elemental constituents of the body. Chemical combinations are always known to produce in bodies properties that did not exist there previously. The Pūrvapakshin evokes the help of the Lokāyatikas, who, he says, not only assign Pravṛitti to the body but even endow it with Chaitanya, the Ātman as a separate entity not being admitted by them at all. The Siddhāntin on the other hand points out that before assigning Pravṛitti to the body the Lokāyatikas had to endow it with Chaitanya, thus proving that Pravṛitti is the consequence of the Chaitanya.

—**Sūtra 2, line 11.** — "Ubhayoḥ," explained by the commentators as "Pravṛitti-tadāśrayayoḥ" and accordingly translated by us, can also mean "unto both the parties to the disputation." The sentence beginning with "Na tu pravṛittyāśrayatvena" is a paraphrase of the sentence "Na tvachetana-saṁyuktasya" etc., in line 8 above.

—**Sūtra 2, line 21 ff.** — Although according to Śaṅkarāchārya's ultimate point of view there is no such thing in reality as Pra-

vṛitti, he has to explain how, even from the phenomenal point of view, the Ātman who is of the nature of mere intelligence can possibly be said to be the source of any activity. Śaṅkarāchārya does it by adducing two analogies which, as being frequently requisitioned by the Sāṁkhyas themselves, he readily persuades his opponents to accept (see below sūtra 7, line 3ff.).

—Sūtra 2, line 25. — As the Bhāmatī explains—

सांख्यानां हि स्वदेशस्था रूपादय इन्द्रियं विकुर्वते, तेन तदिन्द्रियमर्थं प्राप्तमर्थाकारेण परिणमते ।

Modern science conceives of the external objects—i. e., light-rays or sound-waves from them,—as coming up to our senses. Indian psychology generally conceived of the senses as going out to meet the objects. The doctrine is known as "indriyāṇām prāpya-kāritā," and the discussion centres particularly about the eye and the ear, the remaining senses being admittedly " Prāpyakārin. "

—Sūtra 2, line 27. — Śaṅkarāchārya endows God with some śakti or power (see sūtra II. i. 33) with a view to explain his "pravartakatva." But if the pravartakatva be itself phenomenal, the śakti becomes equally so, and cannot, accordingly, vitiate the God's unique purity and absoluteness. Commentators like Bhāskara frankly accept this śakti as the real characteristic of the Brahman.

—Sūtra 3, line 3. — The Sāṁkhyas have themselves used both these similes. In kārikā 16 the Pradhāna is said to assume modifications like water ; while kārikā 57 brings in the milk-simile as follows—

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥

The simile of the water has been explained in the Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī in the following words—

यथाहि वारिदविमुक्तमुदकमेकरसमपि तत्तद्भूविकारान् आसाद्य नारिकेलतालतालीबिल्वचिरबिल्वतिन्दुकामलकप्राचीनामलककपित्थफलरसतया परिणमन् मधुराम्ललवणतिक्तकषायकटुतया विकल्प्यते, एवमेकैकगुणसमुद्भवात् प्रधानगुणाः परिणामभेदान् प्रवर्तयन्ति ।

It will be seen that Śaṅkarāchārya understands the second simile

somewhat differently. Rāmānuja agrees with Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī in his interpretation of the second simile, but understands the first as referring to the change of milk automatically into curds. Vallabha agrees with Śaṅkara in the interpretation of the second simile but refers the first to the formation of cream etc, on the milk. Madhva interprets the two similes in the same way as Vallabha, only adding a Śruti (?) passage—

एतेन ह वा पयो मण्डं भवति ।

in support of his interpretation of the first simile. Bhāskara agrees with Śaṅkara as regards both the similes. The most thoughtful and thorough-going interpretation, however, is that of Nimbārka who makes each of the Upamānas explain both the "Rachanā" and the " Pravṛitti "—

पयो यथाचेतनमेव दध्यात्मना स्वतः परिणमते वत्सविवृद्धये स्वयं प्रवर्तते च, यथाचाम्बु पार्जन्यं विविधभौमरसरूपेण हिमबुद्बुदादिरूपेण च परिणमते वृक्षादिविवृद्धये स्वयं प्रवर्तते स्यन्दते च तथैव चेतनानपेक्षं प्रधानमपि ।

Vijñānabhikshu's interpretation is exactly analogous, the word " Rachanā " being explicitly used by him in place of the " Pariṇāma " in the above extract.

—Sūtra 3, line 10.— Having asserted that there is a chetana who is responsible for the gushing out of the milk from the cow's udder, Śaṅkarāchārya goes on to say that this chetana source of pravṛitti is the cow whose affection sets the flow, and perhaps also the calf whose sucking helps the same (see line 8–9, " vatsachoshaṇena " etc.). Or the choshaṇa may be understood as additional proof for the existence of affection on the part of the cow who permits the calf's sucking. Should some hypercritical objector urge againt this that the cow whose calf is dead still continues to yield milk and that it can therefore be neither the affection for the calf, nor the calf's sucking, the reply is given by Śrīnivāsa as follows—

ननु च मृतेपि वत्से पयसो भावो दृश्यते, वत्सस्नेहात् पयः प्रवर्तयन्तीत्युक्तमिति चेन्न, तदा वत्सानुस्मृतेः । अथवा स्वामिस्नेहात् तथात्वोपपत्तेः ।

—Sūtra 3, line 15.— See note to II. i. 24, line 8, before. Śaṅkarāchārya is here hardly convincing. We may perhaps grant that

milk of itself becoming curds is a "lokadṛishṭi" as the example itself is taken from daily life. But the necessity of God as the inward controller of everything is hardly a "śāstradṛishṭi" in the real sense of the term. For, has not the Āchārya himself declared (II. i. 14 [157-160]) that there is no such thing as the controlling Lord and the controlled creation from the point of view of ultimate truth? Or have we to distinguish the "śāstradṛshṭi" from the "paramārthadṛishṭi"?

—**Sūtra 4, line 1 ff.** — The words of the sūtra have been variously interpreted —

श्रीकण्ठ, निम्बार्क	[प्रधान] व्यतिरेकेण [कस्यापि प्रवर्तकस्य] अनवस्थितेः [=अविद्यमानत्वात्], [तस्य प्रधानस्य च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योः] अनपेक्षत्वात् [=निरङ्कुशत्वात्] [अनवस्थादोषः] ।
वल्लभ, रामानुज	[प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योः] अनपेक्षत्वात्, [तस्य] [प्रवृत्ति]व्यतिरेकेण अनवस्थितेः [=सदैव प्रवृत्तिशालित्वेन अवस्थितेः], [प्रलयाभावप्रसङ्गः] ।
विज्ञानभिक्षु	[प्रधान]व्यतिरिक्त[कारणस्य] अनवस्थितेः [=अनभ्युपगमात्], [कारणान्तरस्य] अनपेक्षतया [प्रधानं न जगदुत्पत्तिसमर्थम्] ।
मध्व	[ईश्वर]व्यतिरेकेण [क्रियामात्रस्य] अनवस्थितेः [=असंभवात्], [प्रधानस्य] अनपेक्षा ।

If we ignore the last two interpreters, it is clear that there is not much vital difference of opinion amongst the rest. It has to be admitted, however, that Śaṅkarāchārya is not quite fair to the Sāṁkhyas when he says that Śāṁkhyas admit no principle beyond the triguṇātmaka-Pradhāna to regulate the course of creation. Even if we agree to ignore the Purusha (the possibility of his being the cause of Pravṛitti is discussed in sūtra 7 below) yet there are the karmavāsanās that might very well serve as the motive for Pradhāna's Pravṛitti. Bhāmatī, alive to this deficiency in the Śāṅkarabhāshya, endeavours to meet it as follows—

यद्यपि सांख्यानामपि विचित्रकर्मवासनावासितं प्रधानं साम्यावस्थायामपि, तथापि न कर्मवासनाः सर्गस्येशते ।.........प्रतिबन्धकापनयनसाधने [हि] धर्माधर्मवासने.........। [यथाहि क्षेत्रकारी केदारादपां

पूर्णात् केदारान्तरं समं निम्नं वा पिप्लावयिषुरपो न पाणिनापकर्षति, किंतु वरणं तासां भिनत्ति, भिन्ने तस्मिन् स्वयमेवापः केदारान्तरं प्लावयन्ति तद्वत्] स्वयमेव प्रधानमनपेक्ष्य सृष्टौ प्रवर्तते । [अतः] आगन्तोरपेक्षणीयस्याभावात् [प्रधानं] सदैव साम्येन परिणमेत, वैषम्येण वा, न त्वयं कादाचित्कः परिणामभेद उपपद्यते ॥

It follows therefore that karmavāsanās or dharmādharmau (vide sūtra II. i. 34^{13-18}ff.) are mere external conditions for the manifestation of Pravṛitti; the impulse to Pravṛitti—like the tendency to flow down to a lower level in the case of the field-water—must be from within. And if it is to be a Pravṛitti that is to appear at specific times, there must be an intelligent principle like God to determine when Pravṛitti should or should not appear. Mere non-sentient Pradhāna cannot possess such discriminating power.

—Sūtra 5, line 1. — Vallabha remarks that while the earlier sūtras pointed out the impossibility of the Pradhāna being the active agent (kartṛitvam), the present and the following sūtras challenge the pariṇāma of the Pradhāna. Madhva commences a new adhikaraṇa with this sūtra directed against the Seśvara Sāṁkhya view which admits a God, but regards him only as the efficient or nimitta-kāraṇa of the world. The other Bhāshyakāras generally agree as to the interpretation of this sūtra.

अन्यत्र = धेनोरन्यत्र—शंकर, श्रीकण्ठ, रामानुज, भास्कर, निम्बार्क, विज्ञानभिक्षु;

अन्यत्र = शृङ्गादौ—वल्लभ ;

अन्यत्र = ईश्वरादन्यत्र (तत्प्रेरणां विना)—मध्व ;

अभावात् = क्षीराकारपरिणामाभावात्—मध्वेतरभाष्यकाराः ;

अभावात् = जगदुत्पत्त्यभावात्—मध्व.

—Sūtra 6, line 1ff. — The sūtra is read by Rāmānuja and by Śrīkaṇṭha after our sūtra 9, but their interpretation is the same practically as that of Śaṅkara. Madhva is most peculiar in making a new Adhikaraṇa of this sūtra, which he directs against the Chārvāka or Lokāyatika system. As that system does not believe in dharma, adharma, god, heaven, soul, rebirth,

etc., and as, in fact, it admits the Pratyaksha as the only valid means of knowledge, its own Śāstra, believed in by the followers, cannot be a valid means of knowledge, since it is not of the nature of Pratyaksha. So the system goes against itself (arthābhāva = svavyāghāta), and we need no more discuss it here.

—Sūtra 6, line 6. — The " pratijñā " is expressed in the following Sāṁkhyakārikās (57, 58 and 60)—

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥
औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥
नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकं चरति ॥

—Sūtra 6, line 8ff. — The Sāṁkhyas may urge that in the Vedāntic position also no better motive for wolrd-creation can be shown. The Ātman, being pure and stainless by nature, need not have at all fallen into the vortex of Saṁsāra, but might have for ever remained in his absolute oneness with Brahman: and Brahman itself need not have evinced a desire for creation. The solution of the problem given in II. i. 32, 33, 35 might have been adopted even by the Sāṁkhyas. The Advaitin's *ultima ratio* would be of course the "ajātivāda." The world does not really exist, and so all the problems in the world—solved or unsolved—are no problems at all. As the Sāṁkhya is a realist, and his Pradhāna, an entity different from the Vedāntic Māyā, such a cutting away of the Gordian knot—whatever its value—is unavailable to the Sāṁkhya.

—Sūtra 6, line 9. — For the first anirmokshaprasaṅga (line 9) compare the Bhāmatī—

येनहि प्रयोजनेन प्रधानं प्रवर्तितं तदनेन कर्तव्यम् । भोगेन चेत् प्रवर्तितमिति तमेव कुर्यान्न मोक्षम्, तेनाप्रवर्तितत्वात् ।

For the second anirmoksha (line 11) compare—

भोगस्य च सकृच्छब्दाद्युपलब्धिमात्रादेव समाप्तत्वान्न तदर्थं पुनः

प्रधानं प्रवर्तेत, इत्ययत्नसाध्यो मोक्षः स्यात् । निःशेषशब्दाद्युपभोगस्य चानन्त्येन समाप्तेरनुपपत्तेरनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः ।

And for the third (line 15)—

पुरुषो हि दृक्शक्तिः...........प्रधानं च सर्गशक्तिः । यथाहि प्रधानस्य सर्गशक्तिरेकं पुरुषं प्रति चरितार्थापि पुरुषान्तरं प्रति प्रवर्तते, अनुच्छेदात्, एवं दृक्शक्तिरपि तं पुरुषं प्रत्यर्थवत्त्वाय, अनुच्छेदात्, सर्वदा प्रवर्तेतेत्यनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः ।

—Sūtra 7, line 1ff. — Except Madhva and Vijñānabhikshu, all Bhāshyakāras are unanimous in referring this sūtra to the theory contained in Sāṁkhyakārikā 21—

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥

Madhva refers the sūtra to a section of the Seśvara-Sāṁkhyas who, although admitting a god, assign to him a very secondary position in the creation. Madhva, like Vijñānabhikshu, makes it only one drishṭānta, viz., the stone-carrier carrying stones on his head, or on the back of the camel. Madhva refutes the objection by merely quoting a Śruti—a very questionable procedure in what is designated as "Tarkapāda." Bhikshu says that the camel does not carry the load of his own free will and for the sake of his master : nay, he has to be cudgelled to do it.

—Sūtra 7, line 15f.—The objections which Śaṅkarāchārya here urges against the Sāṁkhya are just the objections which Keith (The Sāṁkhya System, p 76) also reiterates against the system. The apology which Śaṅkarāchārya offers in favour of some of his own similes (e. g., under II. i. 25, lines 19ff.), the Sāṁkhyas could possibly have offered even for their own similes; but as the Sāṁkhyas take their stand on ratiocination alone, they have o find out other similes that would exactly meet the case. None such are available. The Advaita system on the other hand takes its ultimate stand on the Śruti, and can afford to ignore even the most universal Laws of Reason, to say nothing of its final appeal to the "Māyā" doctrine.

—Sūtra 8, line 1ff.—Madhva and Vallabha regard the "aṅga-aṅgin" relation intended as that between the Purusha and the Prakṛiti, Vallabha adding further—

पुरुषस्याङ्गित्वे ब्रह्मवादप्रवेशो मतहानिश्च । प्रकृतेराङ्गित्वे त्वनिर्मोक्षः ।
अनेन परिहृतोपिमायावादो निर्लज्जानां हृदये भासते ।

But on the Śāṁkhya premises of Dvaita, the question of a relation of the principal and the subordinate between the Prakṛiti and the Purusha cannot arise at all.

—Sūtra 8, line 4.—Sāṁkhyasūtra i. 61 reads—

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः ।

and the question at issue is to find out an adequate cause that might disturb the original equipoise of the guṇas. It must be something outside the Prakṛiti and something that can be periodic or kādāchitka. The "seeing" by the Purusha is continuous and unending, and will not serve the purpose.

—Sūtra 9, line 1ff.—According to Madhva, sūtras 7 and 8 refute the "Purushopasarjana-Prakṛitikartṛitva" theory of a section of the Seśvara-Sāṁkhyas, while sūtras 9 and 10 refute another section of the same, maintaining the "Prakṛityupasarjana-Purushakartṛitva" theory. It is clear that as sūtra 10 seems to be the final flourish of the attack we cannot distribute sūtras II. ii. 1-10 into more than one Adhikaraṇa.

—Sūtra 9, line 4.—"Vastu triguṇaṁ chalaṁ cha guṇavṛittam" is a line frequently quoted, particularly the latter part of it, as for example in the Yogasūtrabhāshya to ii. 15, iii. 13, iv. 15, etc., and it is ascribed to Pañchaśikha.

—Sūtra 9, line 6.—The "anyathānumāna" takes its stand upon the inherent nature of the guṇas to be constantly changing. Just as a number of continually moving and clashing balls might, by a fortuitous equalisation of opposing forces, be thrown into a momentary and even a periodic equilibrium, so might it happen in the case of the three constituents of the Prakṛiti. Or, we might even assume that the nature of the guṇas is such that they automatically and at stated periods lend themselves to being thrown

into an equilibrium. The objection against such a view is that we will have to assume that the course of the Universe, like the hands of a clock, will keep on continually repeating its circuit æon after æon in an exactly identical manner. This will do away with every variety and every freedom of the will. But if we want variety and if we want to assume freedom for the Purushas there must be a sentient power to regulate the course of creation.

—Sūtra 10, line 1ff.—Madhva, Vijñānabhikshu, Nimbārka, and others interpret the "vipratishedha" to be that between the Sāṁkhya and the Vedāntic texts, rather than the internal contradictions of the system. This is hardly correct.

—Sūtra 10, line 1.—Seven indriyas are made up by the reduction of all sense perceptions obtained from the five sense-organs to the most primitive of them all : *viz.*, the sense of touch. The doctrine is interesting. Modern evolutionary psychology would readily subscribe to it. But it is not known from what Sāṁkhya text Śaṅkarāchārya has derived this information. The extant texts give no indication of it, and it is quite likely that Śaṅkarāchārya is here referring to texts now no longer available. Compare in this connection the following extract from Śrīdhara's Nyāyakandalī, page 45—

त्वचा सर्वेन्द्रियाधिष्ठानानि व्याप्तानि । सत्यां त्वचि रूपादिग्रहणमसत्यामग्रहणमिति त्वगिन्द्रियं सर्वार्थं नतु स्पर्शमात्रग्राहकमिति केचित् । तदयुक्तम् । अन्धाद्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । तत्तदधिष्ठानभेदेन शक्तिभेदाभ्युपगमे प्रकारान्तरेणेन्द्रियभेदाभ्युपगमः ॥

The Sāṁkhya doctrine is immediately connected with the doctrine of "Prāpya-kāritā," for which see our Note to II. ii. 2, line 25, above.

—Sūtra 10, line 2.—The Sāṁkhya account of cosmogenesis is given in the following Kārikās—

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो, न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥३॥
प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहंकारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

It can be thus exhibited in a tabular form :—

प्रकृतिः
|
महान् = बुद्धिः
|
अहंकार
|

एकादशको गणः
५ बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि
५ कर्मेन्द्रियाणि
१ मनः

पञ्च तन्मात्राणि = अविशेषः
|
आकाशः (शब्दत०) | वायुः (स्पर्शत०) | तेजः (तेजस्त०) | आपः (रसत०) | पृथिवी (गन्धत०)

It is to be noted in this connection that Mahat, Ahaṁkāra and the eleven indriyas can each of them be Sāttvika, Rājasa, or Tāmasa according to the guṇa that happens to be predominent. Just what specific guṇa is to be predominent in any particular case will depend upon the Karmavāsanās or subliminal impressions of the individual Purusha for whom Prakṛiti is displaying her modifications. This means that these modifications are different for different Purushas. They would accordingly hardly fit in as so many steps in the process of world-creation, unless that world-creation be *for one Purusha only*. The text-books of the system regard Mahat, Ahaṁkāra and the rest as cosmic entities, that is, as functions of the Virāṭ-Purusha or Hiraṇyagarbha. Herein we see a realistic superstructure built upon an original idealistic foundation.

—Sūtra 10, line 3.—What Sāṁkhya texts Śaṅkarachārya actually has in his mind we have no means of ascertaining. None of the extant texts drop the intermediate step of Ahaṁkāra between Mahat and the Tanmātras. We can however see the reasonableness of the omission. Ahāṁkāra, is psychologically speaking, a function of the mind, and is therefore best regarded as an aspect of it. On this point compare the Vedāntaparibhāshā—

एवंविधवृत्तिभेदेन एकमप्यन्तःकरणं मन इति, बुद्धिरिति, अहंकार इति चित्तमिति व्याख्यायते । तदुक्तम्—

मनोबुद्धिरहंकारश्चित्तं करणमान्तरम् ।
संशयो निश्चयो गर्वः स्मरणं विषया अमी ॥

The three antaḥkaraṇas are the Buddhi, the Ahaṁkāra, and the Manas proper.

—Sūtra 10, line 4. — Rāmānuja has brought out another contradiction in the Sāṁkhya theory, The Sāṁkhyas in one breath say that the Pradhāna is active with a view to secure the release of the Purusha (Kārikā 58)—

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥

and in another breath--and the more to establish the utter indifference and actionlessness of the Purusha—declare (Kārikā 63)—

तस्मान्न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥

Further, Rāmānuja says that one who is absolutely beyond the possibility of any modification cannot be able even to be the unconcerned seer and the passive experiencer, as the theorists claim him to be. For, to " see " and to " enjoy " are themselves activities of a sort, and to *seem to* see or to *seem to* experience through non-discrimination is also a species of modification. Compare—

अध्यासभ्रमयोरपि विकारत्वात् ।........... । अध्यासो हि नाम चेतनस्यान्यस्मिन्नन्यधर्मानुसंधानम् । स च चेतनधर्मो विकारश्च ।

Rāmānuja goes on to add that this same defect is applicable even to the Māyāvāda —

येपि कूटस्थनित्यनिर्विशेषस्वप्रकाशचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्म अविद्यासाक्षित्वेनापरमार्थिकबन्धमोक्षभागिति वदन्ति, तेषामप्युक्तनीत्या अविद्यासाक्षित्वाध्यासाद्यसंभवादसामञ्जस्यमेव । इयांस्तु विशेषः । सांख्या जननमरणप्रतिनियमादिव्यवस्थासिद्ध्यर्थं पुरुषबहुत्वमिच्छन्ति । ते तु तदपि नेच्छन्तीति सुतरामसामञ्जस्यम् ।

—Sūtra 10, line 6 ff.— The present discussion as to the nature of the *tapti* and its two correlates the *tapya* and the *tāpaka* is

merely an ethical aspect of the discussion, in the field of cosmology, as to the nature of *pravritti* and its two correlates the *pravartya* and the *pravartaka*, which we had in II. ii. 2 $^{7-30}$. The line of attack and the line of defence are analogous in both the passages. When cornered, Śaṅkarāchārya in both places makes his ultimate appeal to the Māyāvāda and also shows that his opponent is in no better boat than himself.

—**Sūtra 10, line 26.**—The Bhāmatī explains the Sāṁkhya view on the point as follows—

दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योः किल संयोगस्तापनिदानम् । तस्य हेतुरविवेकदर्शनसंस्कारोऽविद्या । सा च विवेकख्यात्या विद्यया विरोधित्वाद्विनिवर्त्यते । तन्निवृत्तौ च तत्कार्यस्तापो निवर्तते । तदुक्तं पञ्चशिखाचार्येण—तत्संयोगहेतुविवर्जनात् स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः ॥

—**Sūtra 10, line 44.**—Bhāmatī thus sums up the position—

सांख्यो हि भेदाश्रयं तप्यतापकं ब्रुवाणो न पुरुषस्य तप्तिकर्मतामाख्यातुमर्हति, तस्यापरिणामितया तपिक्रियाजनितफलशालित्वानुपपत्तेः । केवलमनेन सत्त्वं तप्यमभ्युपेयं तापकं च रजः । दर्शितविषयत्वात् तु बुद्धिसत्त्वे तप्ये तदविभागापत्त्या पुरुषोऽप्यनुतप्यत इव, नतु तप्यते, अपरिणामित्वादित्युक्तम् । तदविभागापत्तिश्चाविद्या । तथाचाविद्याकृतस्तप्यतापकभावस्त्वयाभ्युपेयः । सोऽयमस्माभिरुच्यमानः किमिति भवतः परुष इवाभाति ॥

—**Sūtra 10, line 44.**—Bhāmatī thus brings out the untenability of the Sāṁkhya position—

न तावत् पुरुषस्य तप्तिरित्युक्तम् । केवलमियं बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य तापकरजोजनिता । तस्य च बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य तामसविपर्यासादात्मनः पुरुषाद्भेदमपश्यतः पुरुषस्तप्यत इत्यभिमानः । नतु पुरुषो विपर्यासतुषेणापि युज्यते । तस्य च बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य सात्त्विकया विवेकख्यात्या तामसीयमविवेकख्यातिर्निवर्तनीया । नच सति तमसि मूले शक्यात्यन्तमुच्छेत्तुम् । तथा विच्छिन्नमपि च्छिन्नबदरीव पुनस्तमसोद्भूतेन सत्त्वमभिभूय विवेकख्यातिमपोद्य शतशिखरा अविद्याविर्भाव्येतेति बतेयमपवर्गकथा तपस्विनी दत्तजलाञ्जलिः प्रसज्येत ।

—**Sūtra 10, line 52 ff.**—Compare the following illuminating remarks of Vāchaspatimiśra in the Bhāmatī—

यथाहि मुखमवदातमपि मलिनादर्शतलोपाधिकल्पितप्रतिबिम्बभेदं मलिनतामुपैति । नच तद्वस्तुतो मलिनम्, नच बिम्बात् प्रतिबिम्बं वस्तुतो भिद्यते, अथ तस्मिन् प्रतिबिम्बे मलिनादर्शोपधानान्मलिनता पदं लभते । तथाचात्मनो मलिनं मुखं पश्यन् देवदत्तस्तप्यते । यदातूपाध्यपनयनाद्बिम्बमेव कल्पनावशात् प्रतिबिम्बं, तच्चावदातमिति तत्त्वमवगच्छति तदास्य तापः प्रशाम्यति, नच मलिनं मे मुखमिति । एवमविद्योपधानकल्पितावच्छेदो जीवः परमात्मप्रतिबिम्बकल्पः कल्पितैरेव शब्दादिभिः संपर्कात् तप्यते, नतु तत्त्वतः परमात्मनोऽस्ति तापः । यदातु तत्त्वमसीतिवाक्यश्रवणमननध्यानाभ्यासपरिपाकप्रकर्षपर्यन्तजोऽस्य साक्षात्कारउपजायते, तदा जीवः शुद्धबुद्धतत्त्वस्वभावमात्मनोऽनुभवन् निर्मृष्टनिखिलसवासनक्लेशजालः केवलः स्वस्थो भवति, न चास्य पुनः संसारभयमस्ति, तद्धेतोरवास्तवत्वेन समूलकाषं कषितत्वात् । सांख्यस्य तु सतस्तमसोऽशक्यसमवच्छेदत्वात् ॥

—Sūtra 10, line 56.— To take a general review of Śaṅkarāchārya's refutation of the Sāṁkhya theory, it is evident that the main burden of Śaṅkarāchārya's (and the Sūtrakāra's) attack falls upon the impossibility of a non-sentient first principle exhibiting the highly intelligent and complicated and self-motivated and purposive activity that is essentially presupposed in the creation, maintenance and dissolution of the world. The Pradhāna is incapable of puttting forth such an activity because, being non-sentient, it has not the power, and the Purusha is incapable of doing it because, being merely the unconcerned seer, he has not the will. And no amount of analogies can help in making possible what is inherently impossible. Śaṅkarāchārya's refutation on this point is quite adequate and convincing.—In the second place, Śaṅkarāchārya rightly objects to the Sāṁkhya attempt to sunder the world as with a hatchet into two contradictory halves—the Prakṛiti and the Purusha—and then setting out thinking of ways and means to bring these incompatible halves together. This cannot be achieved as long as the halves persist in maintaining intact their own absolute, touch-me-not quality—unless you can have a recourse to the Vedāntic explanation of the utter unreality of the contact. The Sāṁkhyas have come very near doing this, especially when we consider the self-inconsistency to which they are otherwise

driven according to Rāmānuja's showing. And once this is conceded the very necessity of the dual principle of Prakriti and Purusha disappears. — Other deficiencies pointed out by Śaṅkarāchārya are relatively of little consequence. And we have already commented upon the Sāṁkhya doctrine of many Purushas, which goes against the inherent idealistic trend of the system. — In other parts of the Bhāshya Śaṅkarāchārya has tried to demonstrate, and successfully demonstrate, the failure of the Sāṁkhya attempts to quote the Scriptures in support of their theory. That to the Vedāntasūtrakāra the Sāṁkhya was the main opponent in the field is evident everywhere. Compare in this connection the following extract from the Śāṅkarabhāshya on I. iv. 28—

> प्रधानकारणवादः सूत्रैरेव पुनःपुनराशङ्क्य निराकृतः, तस्यहि पक्षस्योपोद्बलकानि कानिचिल्लिङ्गाभासानि वेदान्तेष्वापातेन मन्दमतीन् प्रति भान्तीति । स च कार्यकारणानन्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् प्रत्यासन्नो वेदान्तवाक्यस्य, देवलप्रभृतिभिश्च कैश्चिद्धर्मसूत्रकारैः स्वग्रन्थेष्वाश्रितः । तेन तत्प्रतिषेधे यत्नोऽतीव कृतः ।

Compare also II. i. $3^{21\text{-}26}$.

—But while Śaṅkarāchārya's refutation of the Sāṁkhya theory has been generally successful, we must not ignore the fact that the line of arguments adopted by Śaṅkarāchārya against his opponent can be directed with equal force against his own theory inasmuch as the points in the system that have been called into question are ultimate problems in regard to which every system of philosophy has to offer, if at all, only a make-shift defence. Śaṅkarāchārya's Māyāvāda, which had to be appealed to more than once in the course of his refutation of the Sāṁkhyas, is not very much beyond this, as also his appeal, once in a while, to the beginninglessness of the Saṁsāra and, in the same breath, to what is known as the "Ajātivāda." But it is only fair to point out that Śaṅkarāchārya uses his ultimate weapon only when there remains to him no other escape possible. For the most part he is creditably anxious to confine the warfare within the realm of reason. And for all practical purposes he accepts most of the Sāṁkhya positions, as will be apparent from his refutation of

the Vaiseshika theory to which we will shortly direct our attention.

—A short note on the history of the Sāṁkhya System and its bibliography might fittingly conclude our discussion of the theory. The oldest extant text-book of the school is the Sāṁkhya Kārikās by Īśvarkrishṇa, which purports to be a brief summary of the "Shashṭitantra" (see our Note to II. i. 1, line 11). The date of Īśvarkrishṇa is a subject of dispute, but he probably belongs to about A. D. 150. The oldest commentary on the Kārikās is the Vṛitti of Māṭhara* which was translated into Chinese by A. D. 450. There are also the so-called "Sāṁkhya-sūtras" in six Adhyāyas, which are however a modern compilation, possibly incorporating some scraps of an ancient text. The "Sāṁkhya-sūtras" are unknown either to Śaṅkārāchārya or to Sāyaṇa-Mādhava, the author of the "Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha" (14th century A. D.). What is more, the Sūtras are based upon the Kārikās to a large extent, and actually run into tho Āryā metre now and then. Whether the Sāṁkhya school had at all any ancient Sūtras like the other schools is a moot point. In a little text called "Tattvasamāsa" about 25 short aphorisms are given ; and these "Samāsa-sūtras," it is sometimes claimed, are the original sūtras; but the claim has not been generally allowed. From the very start the Sāṁkhya was opposed to Vedic tradition and it is doubtful whether the school at all cared to imitate the practice of the orthodox Charaṇas by compiling "Sūtras." The oldest definite text of the system that is often mentioned and quoted from, but not now extant save for a short summary of its contents in the Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā, chapter xii, stanzas 18-30, is the Shashṭitantra, and that is believed to be a voluminous work in 60,000 ślokas.—The Sāṁkhya-tattvakaumudī of Vāchaspati-miśra as also the Sāṁkhya-pravachanabhāshya of Vijnānabhikshu (the first of them being a commentary on the Kārikās,

* I am not convinced, by the arguments of Keith and others, of the necessity of summoning up an unknown original, supposed to have been utilised by both Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda. That the present text of the Māṭhara contains large and unblushing interpolations, I have myself shown in the *Annals* of the BORI, vol. V, No. 2, pp. 133–168. But the large residuum of agreement between Māṭhara and the Chinese translation of A. D. 450 continues to stare us in the face; and postulating an unknown Ur-commentary is not less questionable a procedure than believing in text-tampering, for which India has been known to be the classical country.

and the second that on the Sūtras are the only other important texts belonging to the school. The school consequently presents very little of historical development after A. D. 150. It is the origins of the system that offer an interesting field for speculation. The Gītā and the Upanishads (especially, Kaṭha Muṇḍaka, and Śvetāśvatara) already use " Sāṁkhya " terms, while Buddhistic tradition makes Ārāḍa Kālāma, the Buddha's earliest teacher, a Sāṁkhya philosopher. Aśvaghosha (first century A. D.) gives in his Buddha-charita details of this teacher's views, which closely resemble the Sāṁkhya, but with the theory of the three "guṇas" omitted. It is believed that the guṇa theory is an illogical after-growth on the system, and attempts are made (cp. Jacobi, " Ursprung des Buddhismus aus dem Śāṁkhya-Yoga ", NGGW., 1896, pp. 43 ff.; also ZDMG, Vol. LII, pp. 1–15) to show the logical relation between the Sāṁkhya theory of world-creation and the Buddhistic theory of "Pratītya-samutpāda." The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya (300 B. C.) enumerates the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga as amongst the regular philosophical systems existing in its days. The Mahābhārata in several passages of the Śāntiparvan and elsewhere gives details of the Sāṁkhya system which differ in some respects from those of the orthodox Sāṁkhya—the most important point of difference being the admission of an Īśvara or Lord. A formula that would take account of all these facts and explain the genesis and the early evolution of the system by a series of definite stages is a desideratum not very easily to be fulfilled. The relation of the Sāṁkhya to the Yoga (sometimes designated Seśvara-Sāṁkhya) forms another interesting problem, which we have to pass over by a mere reference. For a discussion of both these problems see History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2, The Creative Period, pp. 412–427. — That the Sāṁkhya is one of the most important philosophical systems produced in India, and one the influence of which is felt even in the camps that tried their utmost to attack and annihilate it, is a fact universally conceded. Our Purāṇas are permeated throughout by Sāṁkhya ideas Compare in this connection the passage from the Padmapurāṇa quoted by us in our Note to II. i. 1, line 11. More light on the early history of the school may be expected when more Buddhistic texts, preserved so far only in Chinese and Tibetan translations, are available.

—Sūtra 11, line 2.— It is obvious that the proper place for considering objections against the Vedāntic position urged by the opposing systems would have been the Smṛiti-pāda (II. i). Why was not the present objection urged there by the Sūtrakāra and replied to on the ground of "svapakshadosha"? It comes here as an after-thought. The objection itself is no other than the "vilakshaṇatva" or disparity in nature between the cause and the effect which, as we saw, the Sāṁkhyas had already urged in II. i. 4-11, where "svapakshadosha" was one of the armours of defence employed by the Sūtrakāra. We are consequently driven to assume either that Śaṅkarāchārya is not correct in his interpretation of the present Sūtra as a Vedāntic defence against the Vaiśeshika attack, rather than forming part of the Vedāntic attack against the Vaiśeshika theory, which is the topic of the following Adhikaraṇa ; or else, that the present Sūtra is a later addition. If, as pointed out by us in the opening Note of this Pāda, independent grounds exist for regarding the whole of the present Pāda (II. ii) as a later addition, it is conceivable that the author of that addition, besides finding out the several weak points in the different Darśanas that came up for discussion one after another in the present Pāda, was also interested to find, in one of the systems attacked, a definite subversion of the "sālakshaṇya" rule, which as a Vedāntin, he found it convenient to note down, although that might disturb the context a bit. Of course, if the sūtra had come after II i. 6, nobody need have raised any objection. But apparently the author of the Tarkapāda, on other grounds, preferred to prefix the present sūtra to his own section of the refutation of the Vaiśeshika system. — Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha make sūtra 11 an integral part of the Vaiśeshika refutation, Rāmānuja objecting to Śaṅkara's method of interpretation in the following words—

यत् तु परैर्ब्रह्मकारणवाददूषणपरिहारपरमिदं सूत्रं व्याख्यातं तदसंगतं पुनरुक्तं च। ब्रह्मकारणवादे परोक्तान् दोषान् पूर्वस्मिन् पादे परिहृत्य परपक्षप्रतिषेधो ह्यस्मिन् पादे क्रियते। चेतनाद्ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्तिसंभवश्च— न विलक्षणत्वात् (ब्र० सू० २।१।४) इत्यत्रैव प्रपञ्चितः। अतो ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्यां महद्दीर्घाणुह्रस्वोत्पत्तिवदन्यच्च तदभ्युपगतं सर्वमसमञ्जसमित्येव सूत्रार्थः॥

Rāmānuja forgets that there are certain weak points in his own interpretation. He gives to the word "vā" the meaning of "cha," and what is more, he has to bring over the word "asamañjasam" from the preceding sūtra, falling under a distinct Adhikaraṇa, on to the present sūtra in order to give to it the character of a negation. Moreover, Bhāskara, who follows Śaṅkara in the interpretation of the sūtra thus, as-it-were answers Rāmānuja—

> न विलक्षणत्वादिति तत्रैवोक्तत्वात् पुनरुक्तमिदं प्राप्नोतीत्येवं वर्णयद्भिः सूत्रकारस्य श्रोत्रियत्वमपोदितम् ।

In other words, if "Na Mantrāṇāṁ jāmitāsti,"—Vedic texts do not mind repetition,—be a valid canon of interpretation, and if Rāmānuja himself does not mind such repetitions in other places, why should he make too much of a trifle in this case? The Sūtrakāra is after all a 'śrotriya.' — Vallabha realises the questionable character of Rāmānuja's procedure when he supplies in this sūtra a word belonging to a sūtra falling in an independent Adhikaraṇa. He gets over the difficulty by supposing that although there be no refutatory word in the sūtra, the sūtra intends to ridicule the Vaiśeshika theorists by repeating one of their glaringly absurd positions—" Upahāsārthaṁ tasya matasyānuvādaḥ." More ingenious still is Vijñānabhikshu who tacks on the present sūtra to the preceding Adhikaraṇa, thereby establishing a legitimate claim to the word " asamañjasam." The Sāṁkhya is incoherent because of contradiction, the preceding sūtra had said. The present sūtra gives two illustrations and says that, in the matter of incoherence, the Sāṁkhyas can console themselves with the reflection that they can share it with the Buddhists who hold that " mahat," that is, the atomic " triad," results from a combination of the smaller (hrasva) binaries ; as also that from the smallest atom (parimaṇḍala) all the larger (dīrgha) combinations take place. Bhikshu goes on to say—

> अनेन सूत्रेण दृष्टान्तमुद्रया स्वतन्त्राणुवादेऽपि बौद्धानां वैलक्षण्यदोषः समान इत्युक्तम् ।

And he introduces the next sūtra by the words—

> दृष्टान्तविधयोत्थापितं स्वतन्त्राणुकारणवादं तर्कान्तरविरोधेनापि परिहरति ।

According to Vijñāna, then, the whole Adhikaraṇa is directed against a section of Buddhists who maintain a variety of the atomic theory. That there was such a class of Buddhists is true, but it is questionable whether they are here intended. — Among the Advaitic commentaries, the Vedāntakalpataru alone goes into the question raised by this Note, and the solution offered is that, introducing in this manner " svapakshavyavasthāpana " in the midst of " parapakshanirākaraṇa " merely shows that the latter is not to be regarded as an end in itself for a text designed to convey instruction and secure salvation. — It seems to us that Śaṅkarāchārya's interpretation, being the earliest now extant, is likely to have hit the real purpose of the sūtra, but that its presence in the present Pāda has to be explained on other independent grounds.

—Sūtra 11, line 4. — The Vaiśeshikas always think of causation in terms of ghaṭa and paṭa, and hence the causal operation comes to be regarded as no more than a mere mechanical combination and arrangement of parts. This is a crude conception of causation which requires that no new qualities can be produced in the effect. But chemical combinations—or to take an illustration which could not have been unknown even to the founder of the theory of Atomism—the different ingredients of the " Tāmbūla "—produce in their combination the new quality of redness absent in the ingredients severally. And if the Vaiśeshika were to argue that the redness* was before *dormant* in some of the ingredients, that would be a defence more properly available to the Vedāntins.

—Sūtra 11, line 9. — During the period of Pralaya the Universe consists of the following all-pervading and eternal substances—Ākāśa, Time, Space, infinite number of Individual Souls, the atomic minds of these Souls, and God who is the Supreme Soul—together with certain qualities inherent in each of them (which also must be eternal). Also there are the infinite number of atoms belonging to the substances Earth, Water, Light, and Air, possessing certain peculiar (and eternal) qualities, besides certain distinctive marks (technically known as the Viśeshas) which dis-

* This redness can possibly be explained as pākaja or due to heat, as in a baked jar. But this explanation will not suffice to explain the origin of the madaśakti or intoxicating power from " kiṇva " or fermenting articles.

tinguish one atom of the same element from another. We must also assume, during this state of Dissolution, the existence of the category of Sāmānya or Generality, as well as Samavāya or Inherence which connects qualities with substances, Viśeshas with atoms, and the species with the genus or generality that comprises them. And if Negation or Abhāva is to be regarded as a separate category, there will have to be found in the state of Pralaya room for certain abhāvas such the Prāgabhāva of the world that is to be created, the Pradhvaṁsābhāva of the world that has come to an end, the Anyonyābhāva which enables the formulation of a proposition like ' this atom is not that atom ' as also the Atyantābhāva of certain absolutely impossible things like the hare-horn.—This Pralaya condition endures for a period which is sufficient for the ripening of the karman belonging to the Individual Souls that are to be re-created; and during this state the atoms of the four substances remain intact and immobile, each apart from the other and possessing certain qualities common to all atoms as such, viz., a minute dimension (technically called the Pārimāṇḍalya or Infinitesimal Sphericity), certain specific qualities which they share with others of their own class, *e. g.* some of the earth-atoms will have anudbhūta-gandha or undeveloped odour, the light-atoms, anudbhūta-rūpa, and so on, besides their own distinctive Viśeshas which enable God to assign certain atoms to certain Souls (for the composition of their body) and certain others to certain other Souls, according to the merit or demerit of each. When at the proper time God desires to recreate the Universe, he creates motion in the atoms, which then clash against each other, thereby causing specific combinations. In this last respect this theory differs from the Atomic theory of Leucippus and Democritus, which starts with an infinite number of atoms of divergent shapes falling down perpendicularly through infinite space, God, Creator, or some such unexplained cause effecting only a slight initial variation in the rectilinear direction of the fall, which results in all sorts and degrees of impacts and combinations in strict accordance with the laws of Dynamics. The classical description of the creation and dissolution of the world according to the Vaiśeshika theory is to be found in the Praśastapādabhāshya (Vizianagram ed. pp. 48-49)—

इहेदानीं चतुर्णां महाभूतानां सृष्टिसंहारविधिरुच्यते । ब्राह्मेण मानेन

वर्षशतान्ते......संसारखिन्नानां निशि विश्रामार्थं सकलभुवनपतेर्महेश्वरस्य संजिहीर्षासमकालं शरीरेन्द्रियमहाभूतोपनिबन्धकानां सर्वात्मगतानामदृष्टानां वृत्तिनिरोधे सति......... शरीरेन्द्रियकारणाणुविभागेभ्यस्तत्संयोगनिवृत्तौ तेषामापरमाण्वन्तो विनाशः । तथा पृथिव्युदकज्वलनपवनानामपि महाभूतानामनेनैव क्रमेण.........विनाशः । ततः प्रविभक्ताः परमाणवोऽवतिष्ठन्ते ॥.........ततः पुनः प्राणिनां भोगभूतये महेश्वरसिसृक्षानन्तरं सर्वात्मगतवृत्तिलब्धादृष्टापेक्षेभ्यस्तत्संयोगेभ्यः पवनपरमाणुषु कर्मोत्पत्तौ तेषां परस्परसंयोगेभ्यो द्व्यणुकादिप्रक्रमेण महान् वायुः समुत्पन्नो नभसि दोधूयमानस्तिष्ठति । तदनन्तरं......आप्येभ्यः परमाणुभ्यस्तेनैव क्रमेण महान् सलिलनिधिरुत्पन्नः पोप्लूयमानस्ति ति । तदनन्तरं......पार्थिवेभ्यः परमाणुभ्यो महापृथिवी संहतावतिष्ठते । तदनन्तरं......तैजसेभ्योऽणुभ्यो द्व्यणुकादिप्रक्रमेणोत्पन्नो महांस्तेजोराशिः केनचिदनभिभूतत्वाद्देदीप्यमानस्तिष्ठति । एवं समुत्पन्नेषु चतुर्षु महाभूतेषु महेश्वरस्याभिध्यानमात्रात् तैजसेभ्योऽणुभ्यः पार्थिवपरमाणुसहितेभ्यो महदण्डमारभ्यते । तस्मिंश्चतुर्वदनकमलं सर्वलोकपितामहं ब्रह्माणं सकलभुवनसहितमुत्पाद्य प्रजासर्गे विनियुङ्क्ते । स च महेश्वरेण विनियुक्तो ब्रह्मा...प्राणिनां कर्मविपाकं विदित्वा ......प्रजापतीत् मानसात् मनुदेवर्षिपितृगणात्......चतुरो वर्णानन्यानि चोच्चावचानि च सृष्ट्वा आशयानुरूपैर्धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यैः संयोजयतीति ॥

It may be added in this connection that the Vaiśeshika sūtras proper do not contain any direct passage bearing on the creation and destruction of the world.

—Sūtra 11, line 11.—The table of ratios is—

2 atoms = 1 Dvyaṇuka or binary :

2* Dvyaṇukas = 1 Chaturaṇuka or quaternary atom ;

3 Dvyaṇukas = 1 Tryaṇuka, Trasareṇu, Truṭi, or tertiary atom.

The Trasareṇu is the smallest particle of matter that is visible, *e. g.*, the smallest mote that we can see dancing in the sunbeam. After the Trasareṇu, the compounds exhibit no fixity of ratio, being more or less arbitrary. The atoms have "anudbhūta-§ viśesha-guṇas" *plus* pārimāṇḍalya dimension. The binaries

* The newer view makes the quaternary to consist of *four* binaries.

§ This view is challenged by some writers.

also agree in having "anudbhūta*-viśesha-guṇas" but they have not the pārimāṇḍalya dimension, any longer but a different dimension, namely, *viz.* aṇutva (minuteness) in one direction and hrasvatva (smallness) in another. We cannot assert that the dimension of one binary, must equal the dimensions of two atoms because as the dimension of an atom is always absolutely incommensurable, $2 \times 0 = 0$. Two binaries produce the quaternary which, presumably, yet retains the anudbhūta-viśesha-guṇas, but has mahattva (greatness) and dīrghatva (length) in place of the aṇutva and hrasvatva of the binary. The addition of one more binary to the quaternary, it would seem, changes anudbhūta-viśesha-guṇas to udbhūta-viśesha-guṇas so that the trasareṇu becomes visible to the senses. In other words, the atom has *one* parimāṇa and is incommensurable. The binary (where the two atoms form a line) is a compound of *two* parimāṇas one of them being incommensurable (aṇu), the other being very small (hrasva). If two binaries are placed in such a way that the atoms form the four corners of a square plane (: :) we have a compound of *two* parimāṇas only, but both the parimāṇas are commensurable (call one of them mahat and the other dīrgha). The addition of one more binary can make it a trasareṇu (so probably we should understand Śaṅkarāchārya), which is the *minimum sensibile.* It will thus be seen that each of the three combinations leading to the production of the tryaṇuka was marked by the effect dropping off some one characteristic of the cause and taking on a new one entirely unknown to the cause. Compounds subsequent to the tertiary exhibit a difference only in degree, but not in kind.

—Sūtra 11, line 16.—Commentators of Śaṅkarāchāya are unanimous in declaring that the text of the Bhāshya should have been "dve dve" instead of "dve." According to the more modern view a chaturaṇuka is made up of four (twice two, dve dve) dvyaṇukas. And since it is impossible to suppose that Śaṅkarāchārya could have made a mistake, attempts are made to make 'two' equal to 'four'. Thus Ānandagiri proposes to regard the word dvyaṇuke in the phrase to mean two 'aṇukas,' an 'aṇuka' being what is generally called a binary. Thus dve dvyaṇuke means 'two *pairs*-of-aṇukas or binaries', *i. e.*, *four* binaries.

* This view is challenged by some writers.

Vāchaspatimiśra has a more round-about method. A paramāṇu has 'ekatva' for its saṁkhyā; a dvyaṇuka has 'dvittva', and there are two such dvittvas belonging to the constituent atoms, each of which is 'number two' with reference to the other. The phrase 'dve dvyaṇuke' is to be understood as equal to 'dvyaṇuke' (locative) [vartamāne] dve (= dvittve)' *i. e.*, the 'two-nesses' inhereing in the binary-atoms. This way of interpretation gets over the main difficulty in the same way in which in the sentence—

नेत्राभ्यां पश्यन्ति चत्वारः पुरुषाः ।

the use of the dual is justified, notwithstanding the fact that the total number of eyes is eight. Both these methods are attempts to follow the maxim—

स्थितस्य गतिश्चिन्तनीया ।

Some editors have gone so far as to actually emend the text. But as the oldest commentators know the so-called faulty reading, that is a questionable procedure. The Ratnaprabhā is nearer the mark when it says that Śaṅkarāchārya is here following the older Vāiśeshika view as propounded in the Rāvaṇabhāshya on the Vaiśeshikasūtras, which is no longer extant—

प्रकटार्थकारास्तु यद्वाभ्यां द्व्यणुकाभ्यामारब्धं कार्ये महत्त्वं दृश्यते तस्य हेतुः प्रचयो नाम प्रशिथिलावयवसंयोग इति रावणप्रणीते भाष्ये दृश्यत इति चिरंतनवैशेषिकदृष्टयेदं भाष्यमित्याहुः ॥

—Sūtra 11, line 20.— As Śaṅkarāchārya admits the possibility of even three atoms producing a combination (this is not permitted in the modern theory) it is clear that he is following an exposition of the Vaiśeshika view (the commentators designate it as the "avyavasthita" or irregular Vaiśeshika theory) that has not come down to us. Compare also II. ii. 15, lines 23 and following. The following chart would exhibit the possible variations in dimensions due to different combination—

One atom—Sphericity in all directions.

Two atom—'Hrasvatva' in the direction of combination and 'Aṇutva' in the other direction.

Three atoms—(i) If in one line, 'Mahattva' in the direction of combination and 'Aṇutva' in the other direction; (ii) if in two directions (*e. g.*, ∴), there would result 'Hrasvatva' in both directions.

Four atoms—In a combination of the square form (: :) the result would be, 'Mahattva' and 'Dīrghatva'; (ii) in a combination of the form (····) the result would be Aṇutva and Mahattva.

Modern atomic theory explains increase in dimension by postulating vacant inter-spaces between atoms and atoms and the Buddhist school of the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāshikas seem to have done the same.

—Sūtra 11, line 23.—It is somewhat awkward that Śaṅkarāchārya should have started (line 17) with a "Chaturaṇuka" which is mahat and dīrgha and concluded (line 23) with a "Tryaṇuka" which is mahat and dīrgha. The text is not however wrong, and so we need not entertain the suspicion of a conscious or unconscious tampering with it.

—Sūtra 11, line 25 ff.—According to the Vaiśeshika theory of causation known as the "Asatkāryavāda," the Prāgabhāva of the effect terminates the very same moment that the effect comes into being. In less technical language this means that the cloth is a *new* something brought into existence by causal apparatus working upon the threads, which latter remain thereafter in the intimate relation of inherence with the cloth. And the same is true also of the qualities such as whiteness inhering in the threads, which produce *new* but analogous qualities inhering in the effect, the cloth. Now at any given place and in any given moment of time only that thing can originate of which the "kāraṇasāmagrī" is complete in every respect. And inasmuch as the cloth and its qualities are two distinct padārthas, when through the completion of the kāraṇasāmagrī there is going to be the origination of the cloth, there cannot be *in that same moment* the origination of the qualities, which depend upon a distinctive set of kāraṇas. Hence the Vaiśeshika assumption referred to in line 34, below, to the effect—

उत्पन्नं द्रव्यं क्षणमगुणवत् तिष्ठति ।

Hence also the Pūrvapaksha supposition (line 25) that the effect, in the very moment of its existence and prior therefore to the development of its qualities, may come to be placed in a condition tending to inhibit the origination of the *expected* new qualities (Pārimāṇḍalya) and encourage instead the origination

of certain *other* new qualities (aṇutva-hrasvatve) not warranted by the normal kāraṇasāmagrī. Against such a supposition it is rightly urged that the Pārimāṇḍalya was in full possession of the field not only prior to the origination of the dvyaṇuka but also at the moment of its origination. It was moreover at no greater distance than the kāraṇasāmagrī of the rival qualities like aṇutva or hrasvatva that were to supplant it. It ought not therefore to have allowed an intruder to oust the owner ; and it is absurd to credit the Pārimāṇḍalya with an anxiety, at the cost of utter self-effacement, to facilitate the origination of such utterly dissimilar qualities as those that the dvyaṇuka is supposed to possess. Things can produce, or assist in the production of, other things which are like to them. The Pūrvapaksha supposition furthermore contradicts the statement of its own Śāstra.

—Sūtra 11, line 28f. — Śaṅkarāchārya passes over in silence the Pūrvapaksha-statement that Achetanā is a mere negation of Chetanā, and none of the commentators feels himself called upon to challenge the same. Chetanā and Achetanā is the same as Vidyā and Avidyā, and the second member of these pairs of opposites is *not*, in the orthodox Vedānta view, a mere negation of the first. The Vedāntasāra, for instance, says—

अज्ञानं तु सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनीयं त्रिगुणात्मकं ज्ञानविरोधि भावरूपं यत्किंचिदिति वदन्ति ।

To the same effect also is the Vyāsabhāshya on Yogasūtra ii. 5—

तस्याश्चामित्रागोष्पदवद्वस्तुसतत्त्वं विज्ञेयम् । यथा नामित्रो मित्रभावो, न मित्रमात्रं, किंतु तद्विरुद्धः सपत्नः, यथा चागोष्पदं न गोष्पदाभावो, न गोष्पदमात्रं, किंतु देश एव ताभ्यामन्यद्वस्त्वन्तरम् , एवमविद्या न प्रमाणं, न प्रमाणाभावः, किंतु विद्याविपरीतं ज्ञानान्तरमविद्येति ॥

The siddhāntin merely observes, in the words of the Ratnaprabhā,—

कारणगता गुणा न कार्ये गुणान्तरमारभन्त इत्येतावतैवेष्टसिद्धौ न तद्धेत्वनुसरणे खेदनीयं मन इति ॥

—Sūtra 11, line 38. — The Vaiśeshikasūtra vii. 1. 9 (which in the Sūtrapāṭha merely reads " Kāraṇabahutvāchcha ") explains how *mahat* dimension is produced. It can be produced in three

different ways. The mahattva or the bigness of a jar is due to the mahattva of its constituent clay (kāraṇamahattvāt). The mahattva of an expanded cotton ball (as compared with the same ball when compressed) is due to the looseness of the cotton-fibres (prachayaḥ=piṇḍayoḥ praśithilaḥ saṁyogaḥ). But the mahattva of the tryaṇuka is due not to the dimension of its causes the dvyaṇukas (which possess aṇutva and hrasvatva only), or to that of its ultimate causes the paramāṇus (which have sphericity only), but to a third cause ; namely, the quality of number (in the present case the bahutva or 'many-ness') belonging to the three dvyaṇukas that have originated it. The question naturally arises, how could one guṇa (viz, saṁkhyā) produce another guṇa (dimension)? And whence did the dvyaṇukas come to have their bahutva-saṁkhyā or many-ness, seeing that the causes of the dvyaṇukas themselves possessed not bahutva but ekatva only [each atom being a self-sufficient unit]? The latter question is easily answered. All numbers from two onwards are, according to the Vaiśeshikas, 'apekshābuddhijanya' or the result of an expectancy produced in the mind of someone (in the present instance the Creator) who is going to count them. Thus the dvyaṇuka can have bahutva even though it is absent in its causes the paramāṇus. And as to how one quality can produce another and a distinct quality, the Vaiśeshikas have no answer to give. The rule of like producing like (which is a Sāṁkhya postulate) is not as such recognised by the Vaiśeshikas and, as we notice, it is violated here even in the production of bahutva from the apekshābuddhi, which is a distinct guṇa.

—Sūtra 11, line 39. — Ānandagiri explains the sūtra thus—

यत् कारणबहुत्वादिभ्यो महत्त्वं त्र्यणुकादौ जातं ततो विपरीतं द्व्यणुक-
गतमणुत्वमीश्वरापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यपरमाणुनिष्ठद्वित्वासमवायिकारणादुत्पद्यते ॥

—Sūtra 11, line 45f. — While the threads are the inherent or samavāyi-kāraṇa of the cloth, the joining together (saṁyoga) of the threads is its asamavāyi-kāraṇa. Now the asamavāyi-kāraṇa is the most important cause as leading directly to the production of the effect. But here the law of like producing like (which is nomally appealed to where one substance produces another substance) is vitiated, inasmuch as saṁyoga, a guṇa, is held to produce paṭa, a dravya.

—**Sūtra 11, line 49ff.**—How many elements go to the making of the human body is a point that has evoked considerable difference of opinion. The usual phrase "pañchatvaṁ gataḥ" suggests the idea that the body is made up of *five* elements; to this effect is the view attributed to Pañchaśikha (Mahābhārata, xii. 222. 7f.)—

धावतः पञ्च तेषां तु खं वायुर्ज्योतिरम्बु भूः ।
ते स्वभावेन तिष्ठन्ति वियुज्यन्ते स्वभावतः ॥
आकाशो वायुरुष्मा च स्नेहो यश्चापि पार्थिवः ।
एष पञ्चसमाहारः शरीरमपि नैकधा ॥

This is also the ordinary Vedānta view. Compare Vedāntasāra, section 16—

एतेभ्यः पञ्चीकृतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः.. ...चतुर्विधस्थूलशरीराणां तुदुचितानामन्नपानादीनां चोत्पत्तिर्भवति ।

The ultimate Vedāntic source for the view is perhaps the oft-quoted Bṛihadāraṇyaka passage (ii. 2. 13)—

यत्रास्य पुरुषस्य मृतस्याग्निं वागप्येति, वातं प्राणः, चक्षुरादित्यं, मनश्चन्द्रं, दिशः श्रोत्रं, पृथिवीं शरीरम् , आकाशमात्मा, ओषधीर्लोमानि, वनस्पतीन् केशाः, अप्सु लोहितं च रेतश्च निधीयते, क्वायं तदा पुरुषो भवति ॥

But the view has not remained unchallenged. The subtle and transmigratory body is of course admitted to be made up of the five subtile bhūtas or "Tanmātras." With reference to the gross body some (Mīmāṃsists of the Prābhākara school) object to the inclusion of the Ākāśa amongst the constituents of the body, because ether is eternal and all-pervading, and no portion of it can go to make up a destructible object like the body. Others object to both Ākāśa and Vāyu because they are invisible, and a saṁyoga of the other visible bhūtas with the invisible is bound to be invisible. On the strengh of the "Trivṛitkaraṇa" passage in Chhāndogya vi. 2ff. the body is by some regarded as made up of just three elements: earth, water, light; while some others omit "light" from the list. The ultimate Nyāya-Vaiśeshika view is to regard the body as composed of only *one* element, *viz.* earth in this world, water in Varuṇa-loka light in Āditya-loka, and air in Vāyu-loka, the reason being that a given body exhibits only

one distinguishing quality, e. g., odour in the case of terrestrial bodies. The other elements may come into *external* contact and may help to sustain erect the pārthiva body, but such an external contact is different from the saṁyoga implied in the constitution of a well-knit or *organic aggregate.* Compare the Sāṁkhya-pravachana-bhāshya on iii. 19—

ऐकभौतिकमित्यपरे । पार्थिवमेव शरीरमन्यानि च भूतान्युपष्टम्भकमात्राणीति भावः । ...... इतरच्च भूतचतुष्टयमवष्टम्भकमित्याशयेन पाञ्चभौतिकव्यवहारः ॥

Compare also Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāshya on iii. 1. 28—

तत्र मानुषं शरीरं पार्थिवम् । कस्मात् । गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः । गन्धवती पृथिवी गन्धवच्च शरीरम् । अबादीनामगन्धत्वात् तत्प्रकृत्यगन्धं स्यात् ... 'पार्थिवाप्यतैजसमतद्गुणोपलब्धेः'—'निश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेश्चातुर्भौतिकम्'— 'गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः पाञ्चभौतिकम्'— त इमे संदिग्धा हेतव इत्युपेक्षितवान् सूत्रकारः ।

—**Sūtra 12, line 5.**—The Vaiśeshikas argue that the process of division and subdivision must stop somewhere. Otherwise the mountain Meru and the mustard seed would be of equal dimension, both containing (not a given number of indivisible atoms but) an infinite number of infinitely-divisible atoms. The validity of the argument is discussed under sūtra II. ii. 15 below.

—**Sūtra 12, line 8ff.**—Compare the extract from the Praśastapādabhāshya given by us under our Note to II. ii. II. line 9.

—**Sūtra 12, line 17.**— Śaṅkarāchārya suggests a number of ways of interpreting the words of the Sūtra—

उभयथापि = (i) विभागावस्थानामणूनां संयोगार्थस्य कर्मणो निमित्ताभ्युपगमेऽनभ्युपगमे वा ।

= (ii) तत्कर्मनिमित्तस्य प्रयत्नाभिघातादिदृष्टस्वरूपत्वेऽदृष्टस्वरूपत्वे वा ।

= (iii) तददृष्टस्वरूपस्य कर्मनिमित्तस्य आत्मसमवायित्वेऽणुसमवायित्वे वा ।

= (iv) परमाणोः परमाण्वन्तरेण कात्स्न्येन संयोगार्थमेकदेशेन संयोगार्थं वा ।

= (v) परमाणूनां सृष्टौ संयोगोत्पत्त्यर्थं प्रलये विभागोत्पत्त्यर्थं वा ।

= (vi) ईश्वरेच्छाया नित्यत्वेऽनित्यत्वे वा । -- this is Madhva's interpretation.

न कर्म = परमाणुष्वाद्यं कर्म न संभवति ।

अतस्तदभावः = अतः सृष्ट्याद्यभावः । अथवा द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण सर्गादेरभावः ॥

—Sutra 12, line 20. — The line is differently read—

(i) प्रयत्नोऽभिघातादिर्वा यथादृष्टं......अभ्युपगम्येत । This states only one alternative, the second being given only in line 25 below.

(ii) The reading adopted by us, where *three* alternatives are distinctly given, the effort or blow being the 'dṛishṭa' cause.

By the word 'ādi' *nodana* or propelling is to be included. The distinction between *abhighāta* and *nodana* is thus formulated—

स्थिरस्य वेगवद्द्रव्यसंयोगविशेषोऽभिघातः, स एव चलस्य नोदनमिति भेदः ।

—Sūtra 12, line 23.—In accordance with to the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika theory the Ātman (which term comprises both the individual and the Supreme soul) has the following qualities—

बुद्ध्यादिषट्कं* संख्यादिपञ्चकं† भावना तथा ।
धर्माधर्मौ गुणा एत आत्मनः स्युश्चतुर्दश ॥
संख्यादयः पञ्च बुद्धिरिच्छा यत्नोऽपि चेश्वरे ।

In the case of the individual souls at any rate all these qualities (with the exception of the five beginning with 'number') are adventitious, the Ātman in his real nature being without not

* बुद्धि, सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, द्वेष, प्रयत्न.

† संख्या, परिमाण, पृथक्त्व, संयोग, विभाग.

only pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, effort and impression, but also without intellection, merit and demerit ; and it is such a quality-less state which it is the function of the Moksha to achieve. Rightly enough, such a non-sentient stone-like condition of the liberated soul is made a butt of ridicule by all the opponents of the theory.

—Sūtra 12, line 27.— Adṛishṭa or 'merit and demerit' has the property of developing its fruit at a specific period only. If the beginning of the process of creation is to be dependent upon adṛishṭa, it is unlikely that the adṛishṭas of all the Ātmans would ripen simultaneously at the commencement of the creation. As Rāmānuja points out—

> नन्वदृष्टं विपाकापेक्षं फलायालम् । कानिचिददृष्टानि तदानीमेव विपच्यन्ते, कानिचिज्जन्मान्तरे, कानिचित् कल्पान्तरे । अतो विपाकापेक्षत्वान्न सर्वदोत्पादकत्वप्रसङ्ग इति नैतत् । अनन्तैरात्मभिरसंकेतपूर्वकायुगपदनुष्ठितानेकविविधकर्मजनितानामदृष्टानामेकस्मिन् काल एकरूपविपाकस्याप्रामाणिकत्वात् । अत एव युगपत् सर्गसंहारो द्विपरार्धकालमविपाकेनावस्थानं च न संगच्छते ॥

—Sūtra 12, line 31.— It is evident that although the Creator or God is an Ātman whose knowledge, power, and will is eternal, he is not presupposed in the argument at issue. Otherwise Śaṅkarāchārya would not have said that there was no other possible Controller or Regulator of the creation. In fact it is well-known that the Nyāya* and particularly the Vaiśeshika sūtras contain no mention of a God. It is the Bhāshyas of Vātsyāyana and of Praśastapāda that introduce the idea for the first time, Śrīdhara and Udayana later developing and systematising the same. The negative attitude of these systems with reference to God is explicable probably by the close affinity of Nyāya with the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and to a somewhat less degree that of the Vaiśeshika with the Sāṁkhya. The oft-quoted anecdote about Kaṇāda who refused even on his death-bed to call upon the name of God, but only proclaimed "Pīlavaḥ-pīlavaḥ-pīlavaḥ" falls in a line with the same view. But the atomism of the Vaiśeshika school was

* In Nyāyasūtra IV. i. 19, Is'vara or the Lord is mentioned, but as a Pūrvapaksha assumption only.

not capable of standing on its own legs. Somebody was wanted to start the first motion in the atoms, and early critics of the system must have brought this defect glaringly to the fore. The Vaiśeshika-sūtras make frequent references to the infallible charater of the Veda, which might have been regarded by them also as self-subsistent. In any case, both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeshika sūtras are so very much lacking in systematic arrangement of the contents, that scope is left as much to put down particular sūtras as interpolations as to believe that specific topics and specific sūtras, although once present in the sūtra-pāṭha, have been dropped or missing.

—Sūtra 12, line 34ff. — If what is infinitely small can be called zero, one infinitely small substance added to another infinitely small substance cannot lead to any increase in the dimension inasmuch as zero + zero = zero. The Brahmavidyābharaṇa on II. i. 29, lines 12-15, where this same argument is introduced observes—

द्वयोः परमाण्वोः संयोगः किं व्याप्यवृत्तिरव्याप्यवृत्तिर्वा।...। व्याप्यवृत्तिता हि संयोगस्य तदा स्यात्, यावति देशे एकः परमाणुः संमितस्तावत्येव देशे यद्यपरोऽपि संमितो भवेत्। तथाच न प्रथिमा संभवति। सति प्रथिम्नि परमाणुदेशापेक्षया द्व्यणुकस्याधिकदेशव्याप्तेरावश्यकत्वात्। अथाव्याप्यवृत्तिरण्वोः संयोगः, तथा सति द्वयोर्मृत्पिण्डयोरेकैकपार्श्वसंयोगेन महतो मृत्पिण्डस्येवाण्वोरप्येकैकपार्श्वयोगेन द्व्यणुकारम्भे प्रथिमा संभवति परं त्वव्याप्यवृत्तित्वे संयोगस्य तत्रैवाभावो वक्तव्यः। तयोश्च संयोगतदभावयोर्विरोधपरिहाराय वृक्षादिषु शाखादिमूलादिरूपावयवा इव नेहावयवभेदा अवच्छेदकाः संभवन्ति, परमाणोर्निरवयवत्वात्॥

Modern Physics has maintained the impenetrability of matter because according to it two atoms never occupy the same space and so cannot coalesce together by interpenetration; there exists always a space between atom and atom. Such is not the Vaiśeshika view. Compare, however, our Note to II, ii. 11. line 11; and see also sūtra II. ii. 17, lines 70 ff.

—Sūtra 12, line 39. — Of a piece of cloth—

समवायिकारणम् = Threads;

असमवायिकारणम् = Their conjunction;

निमित्तकारणानि = तुरी (shuttle), वेम (loom), etc.

सामान्यकारणानि = ईश्वरतदिच्छाज्ञानकृतयः, आकाश, काल, दिक्, कार्यप्रागभाव, प्रतिबन्धकाभाव, etc.—

The Sāmānyakāraṇas are the conditions indespensable for the production of each and every effect; while an Asamavāyi-kāraṇa is thus defined—

कार्येण कारणेन वा सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति यत् कारणं तद-समवायिकारणम् ।

Thus tantusaṁyoga (being a quality) has a samavāya relation with the tantus or threads and resides, in the same samavāya relation, just where the paṭa (the kārya) resides, and it is a necessary factor producing the cloth. Hence tantusaṁyoga is the asamavāyi-kāraṇa of the paṭa. So also, tanturūpa (being a quality) has samavāya relation with the tantus and resides just where the tantus (the kāraṇa) reside, and it is a necessary determinant of the colour of the cloth. Hence tanturūpa is the asamavāyikāraṇa of paṭarūpa. Asamavāyi-kāraṇa 'comes nearest to what might be styled the operative cause.

—Sūtra 13, line 8. — The problem was already discussed from a slightly different point of view in II. i. 18, lines 13 to 34. See our Notes to that passage. . See also II. ii. 17, lines 18 to 53, below.

—Sūtra 13, line 8 ff. — The Nyāya-Vaiśeshika maxim as to the perception of the categories of Sāmānya, Abhāva, and Samavāya is thus expressed—

येनेन्द्रियेण या व्यक्तिर्गृह्यते तेनैवेन्द्रियेण तन्निष्ठा जातिस्तदभावश्च गृह्येते ।

The Naiyāyikas extend the scope of this maxim to the Samavāya also; but the Vaiśeshikas regard it as inferable only. At the same time it must be remembered that this is the more modern doctrine, which makes its first appearance in Praśastapāda, who declares it to be 'atīndriya' and 'Iha-buddhy-anumeya.' The last characterisation has reference to the Vaiśeshika-sūtra vii. 2. 26—

इहेदमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः ।

which is thus explained—

यथेह कुण्डे दधीतिप्रत्ययः संबन्धे सति दृष्टस्तथेह तन्तुषु पटः, इह वीरणेषु (वीरण = a kind of grass) कटः, इह द्रव्ये गुणकर्मणी, इह द्रव्य-गुणकर्मसु सत्ता, इह द्रव्ये द्रव्यत्वम्, इह गुणे गुणत्वम्, इह कर्मणि कर्मत्वम्, इह नित्यद्रव्येऽन्त्या विशेषा, इति प्रत्ययदर्शनादस्त्येषां संबन्ध इति ज्ञायते ॥

This should imply that where the two correlates of the Samavāya are themselves perceptible, the Samavāya itself should be perceptible. That at any rate might have been the original formulation of the theory, in accordance with which Śaṅkarāchārya declares the Samavāya to be 'iha-pratyaya-grāhyaḥ.' When it was perceived that the correlates (*i. e.*, the 'ayutasiddha' padārthas) might themselves be imperceptible to sense, the Samavāya came to be regarded as partly perceptible and partly imperceptible; or, for the sake of uniformity, everywhere imperceptible and so inferable.

—**Sūtra 14, line 2.**—The argument is analogous to the one urged against the Sāṁkhya, who could not explain the Pravṛitti of non-sentient matter in the absence of a sentient regulator. —The student will note here an attempt to introduce what may be called the "proof by exhaustion." All possible alternative suppositions are summoned up and disproved seriatim. Four koṭis or possibilities are put up. The mode of argumentation is often described as the "Prasaṅga" dialectics, and the Bauddhas (if not some of the pre-Buddhistic "heretics" referred to in Buddhist texts like the Brahmajāla or the Sāmaññaphala suttas seem to have developed it with crushing effect in facing their opponents' theories.

—**Sūtra 15, line 3.**—Atoms, according to the Vaiśeshikas, do not only possess the mathematical qualities of size, position, movement etc.—herein the theory agrees with that of Democritus—but also colour and other viśesha-guṇas. Since these last are physical qualities, whether an atom contains only one of them, or two and more, should make a difference in its character as an atom, just as, in modern Chemistry, the fact that an atom of Hydrogen and another of Mercury should weigh differently can be held to prove that the atoms are not real atoms. If the atom, in other words, is to be regarded as the smallest possible division of any

substance, it ought to be absolutely equal in weight with the smallest possible division of any other substance, and the two atoms should have, if not the same properties, at least an exactly equal number of them. This seems to be Śaṅkarāchārya's line of argument, and it is clearly based upon a confusion between what is *smallest* and what is *simplest*. See in this connection the Bhāshya on II. ii. 16, lines 6 to 14.

—**Sūtra 15, line 7.** — That the rūpa and other qualities in some of the paramāṇus are latent or anudbhūta, and not manifest or udbhūta, as in the piece of cloth, is a qualification that need not vitiate the force of the above argument. Moreover, the Vaiśesbikas admit the possibility of some of the atoms (*e. g.*, those of earth) changing their qualities through application of heat. A raw and black earthernware, when thrown into the kiln, gets red by being baked. The redness is communicated not only to the outer surface but has gone deep right upto the atoms. There is in other words the 'pīlupāka' or baking of atoms, and not the 'piṭhara-pāka' or baking of mere potsherds (as held by the Nāiyāyikas). That an atom should thus be capable of giving up one quality and taking up another implies in its case an extended dimension and not a mere infinitesimality.

—**Sūtra 15, line 15.** — The Sūtra is read differently in the regular Sūtrapāṭha, viz.—

अनित्य इति विशेषतः प्रतिषेधभावः ।

And its interpretation is also not very satisfactorily given. The interpretations in the field are —

(i) अनित्य इति नित्यस्य (= विशेषतः) प्रतिषेधः विद्यते ।

or (ii) अनित्य इति प्रतिषेधस्य वस्तुविशेषमाश्रित्यैव भवनम् ।

Śaṅkarāchārya reads the sūtra as we have it, and offers the interpretation—

[नित्यमात्रस्याभावे] अनित्यमिति विशिष्य प्रतिषेधः नैव विद्येत ।

In other words—

नित्यत्वनिषेधस्तत्प्रतियोगिवस्तुपूर्वको निषेधत्वाद्घटवदित्यनुमानेन परमाणुनित्यत्वसिद्धिः ।

The third Vaiśeshika sūtra which is quoted by Śaṅkarāchārya has been the despair of commentators. One commentator combines Sūtras 4 and 5 into one, and declares that the negative-statement in the form that everything whatsoever is impermanent is a mistake (=avidyā). Another asserts that all arguments adduced to prove the non-eternality of atoms are an avidyā, are fallacious. Śaṅkarāchārya contemplates two possible interpretations — whether actually offered by Vaiśeshika writers known to him we have no means of judging. In the Vaiśeshika sūtrapāṭha the sūtra is given as "Avidyā" without the following "cha;" while there is another Vaiśeshikasūtra (vii. i. 21) —

अविद्या च विद्यालिङ्गम् ।

which however does not seem to have any clear bearing upon the point at issue.

—Sūtra 15, line 23ff. — Śaṅkarāchārya's first interpretation of the sūtra can itself be understood in two ways, according as the words "satāṁ kāraṇānām" are rendered as " of existent causes," (taking *satām* as adjective), or as "of the causes of what are existent-entities" (namely, of the atoms: taking *satām* as a noun). In the former rendering the specific cause for permanence of atoms put forth can only be their non-perceptibility; while with the latter rendering (which is accepted in the Translation), the cause of the permanence of atoms is the circumstance that of the atoms themselves no cause exists, or is cognisable by the senses. The way in which the statement is worded, especially the epithet " paridṛiśyamānakāryāṇām", makes it however open to objection, seeing that even the Dvyaṇukas or binary-atoms fall within the scope of the statement. For, the dvyaṇukas are existing entities (and not non-existences like the Prāgabhāva, which is sought to be excluded by the qualification " satām ") and we see tryaṇukas and other effects of these dvyaṇukas, but not the causes of the dvyaṇukas, namely, the paramāṇus which are imperceptible to the sense. So, for parity of reasons, the dvyaṇukas will have to be proclaimed eternal. There is also this further objection that the atoms are not always " paridṛiśyamānakārya " inasmuch as the binaries, the immediate effects of atoms, are not visible to sense. This last objection is quite fatal. And as to the *ativyāpti* on the binaries, if to exclude them

we introduce the qualification— 'provided there be no dravya *as its cause* ' (*adravyatve* being understood as *adravyakāraṇatve*), " it will meet the case, seeing that binaries do have dravyas (atoms) as cause, but it is practically saying what was already said in sūtra IV. i. 1, above.

—**Sūtra 15, line 27.**—A dvyaṇuka is destroyed by the severance of the conjunction of the atoms : tryaṇuka and subsequent products are destroyed by the outright destruction of the constituents, such as dvyaṇukas. These are the only two ways in which, according to the older school of Vaiśeshikas, *substances* perish. The newer school uniformly recognises the first, i. e., the asamavāyikāraṇā-nāśa, as the only cause of destruction. Qualities like pleasure may disappear by being supplanted by their contradictories like pain; but their case does not come in here for consideration.— [t will be noted *en passant* that the older school of the Vaiśeshikas contemplates the possibility of the destruction proceeding—like creation—from cause to effect. When the Paramāṇus are separated, the binaries are destroyed, and consequent upon the destruction of the binaries the tertiaries and subsequent products meet their end in succession, the final products being accordingly destroyed the very last. The Vedāntic view is just the opposite of this. As Śaṅkarāchārya says in his Bhāshya to II. iii. 14.—

विपर्ययेण तु प्रलयक्रमोऽत उत्पत्तिक्रमाद्भवितुमर्हति ॥ तथाहि लोके दृश्यते, येन क्रमेण सोपानमारूढस्ततो विपरीतेन क्रमेणावरोहति। ...... नहि कार्ये ध्रियमाणे कारणस्याप्ययो युक्तः, कारणाप्यये कार्यस्यावस्थानानुपपत्तेः ॥

The view that seems in this fashion to go against common sense was probably held by the Vaiśeshikas because thereby the Creator and the Destroyer of the world was required to deal only with the atoms, and not with their ultimate products. The doctrine is passingly referred to also under II. ii. 17, lines 75–80.

—**Sūtra 15, line 31.** —This is the view of the Pariṇāma theory of causation, and its illustrations are the clay and the pots, or the gold and the ornaments, detailed in the Chhāndogya IV. i. 4–6.

—**Sūtra 16, line 5.** — It is possible to argue that because there is

an increase in the *number* of *qualities*, that should be no reason why the *size* of the thing should grow. As the Bhāmatī puts it—

न गन्धादिसंघातः परमाणुरपि तु गन्धाद्याश्रयो द्रव्यम्। नच गन्धादीनामपचयेऽपि द्रव्यस्यापचयो भवितुमर्हति, अन्यत्वात्।

The reply to the argument is the syllogism—

पार्थिवोऽणुः आप्यात् स्थूलः, अधिकगुणत्वात्, घटवत्—

which however is not quite convincing. A better illustration in any case would be the growth in the soul's power of will and intellection following upon the growth in the size of the human body.

—Sūtra 17, line 4 ff. — Bhāmatī introduces the rest of this discussion by—

संप्रत्युत्सूत्रं भाष्यकृद्वैशेषिकतन्त्रं दूषयति।

Sūtras 10, 17, 32, 45 form, so to say, a final flourish of the attack against the serveral systems.

—Sūtra 17, line 4. — The Vaiśeshik-sūtra I. i. 4 (which is generally suspected as being an interpolation) enumerates only six padārthas, Abhāva or Negation being excluded; and Udayana in fact says—

एते च पदार्थाः प्रधानतयोद्दिष्टाः। अभावस्तु स्वरूपवानपि नोद्दिष्टः, प्रतियोगिनिरूपणाधीननिरूपणत्वात्, नतु तुच्छत्वात्।

The followers of the school, however, taking advantage of the occurrence of the word abhāva in other sūtras, declare that Kaṇāda always intended to reckon it as a distinct category, and even recognise its four-fold division. Compare in this connection the following sūtras—

क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावात् प्रागसत् [IX. i. 1]।

सदसत् [IX. i. 2]।

असतः क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावादर्थान्तरम् [IX. i. 3]।

सच्चासत् [IX. i. 4]।

यच्चान्यदसदतस्तदसत् [IX. i. 5]।

Later on, with some theorists (compare Yogabhāshya on ii. 5) Abhāva, acquired a positive character, as being a regular knowable category. Śaṅkarāchārya has already attacked such a position in his Bhāshya to II. i. 18, lines 45ff. See our Note to II. ii. 11, line 28f.

—Sūtra 17, line 13.—Compare the identical illustration brought up under II. i. 15, lines 5ff.

—Sūtra 17, line 19. — The Tarkasaṁgraha has the following section (79) about the Ayutasiddha pairs—

ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकमविनश्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ । यथा, अवयवावयविनौ, गुणगुणिनौ, क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ, जातिव्यक्ती, विशेषानित्यद्रव्ये चेति ॥

The word 'Ayuta-siddha' can mean things proved not to have been ever joined together (yu=to join), or things proved not to have been ever torn apart (yu=to separate).

—Sūtra 17 line 22ff. —When threads produce the cloth, the cloth is the avayavin that must have the same location as the avayavas, the threads, and be intimately associated with them. But when the colour of the threads produces the colour of the cloth, the latter is not an avayavin made of the sum of the former. When, for instance, threads of different colours are joined together to produce a variegated piece of cloth, the colour of the cloth is not a mere sum of the colours of the former. It is a *new* colour called 'chitra' or variegated, the total impression of which *as a unit* is so different from the isolated impressions of the coloured patches. Moreover, if the colour of a paṭa with alternate patches of, say, red-yellow-black be regarded merely as $= r+y+b$, and not a new distinctive colour called chitra, r would be$=\frac{1}{3}$rd of the colour of the paṭa, and so also y and b; but there would be no *one* colour pervading the *whole* paṭa. This means that the paṭa as a whole, having no colour belonging to it, would be invisible; for, it is only coloured substances that our eyes can see. This explains why the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika theorists reckon "chitra" as a separate colour. Hence, the colour of the cloth must have a distinct location from the colour of the threads. It is assumed, accordingly, that the Paṭarūpa resides upon the Paṭa,

and not upon the Tantus. But the Paṭa itself has the same location as the Tantus. This is introducing a distinction without a difference, particularly after the present further assumption of the dravya and the guṇas, or the avayavin and the avayavas, being "apṛithag-deśa." So the assumption becomes gratuitous.

—Sūtra 17, line 32ff. — A conjunction is defined as—

अप्राप्तयोस्तु या प्राप्तिः स संयोग उदीरितः ।

It is a "dvishṭha" property, or one residing on two members, one or both of which have to move before they can be brought into conjunction. It is therefore "anyatarakarmaja" or "ubhayakarmaja." Śaṅkarāchārya is going to prove that on the admission of the Vaiśeshikas themselves these three characteristics of Saṁyoga are true in the case of Samavāya, and hence the hypothesis of Samavāya is a needless multiplication of entities. The Vaiśeshikas define the Kārya as—

कारणनियतपश्चाद्भावित्वं कार्यत्वम् ।

and the Kāraṇa as—

कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्तित्वं कारणत्वम् ।

On their own admission then the Kāraṇa can exist independently of the Kārya that is yet to be. And if the Vaiśeshikas argue that this case is in a sense covered by their very definition of "ayutasiddhi," viz.—*ekam avinaśyat* etc., seeing that the kārya is still in the womb of the future and so non-existing at the present moment, the objection can still be urged that thereby they are postulating a relation between non-existence (Kārya) and existence (Kāraṇa), which, as we already pointed out (II. i. 18, lines 45ff.), is an untenable position, inasmuch as every relation demands two *positive* terms as its correlates. And if to obviate this it is replied that the Kārya first comes into being and then effects the (samavāya) relation with the Kāraṇa—so that the relation becomes between two existing entities, we can still urge that in that very first moment of its existence the Kārya in any case remains without a connection with Kāraṇa, which, if admitted, would give the go to the painfully formulated distinction between "yutasiddhayoḥ saṁyogaḥ" and "ayutasiddhayoḥ samavāyaḥ."

—Sūtra 17, line 39. — If saṁyoga necessarily requires movement on the part of at least one of the two objects brought into

conjunction, how is such a movement possible in the saṁyoga between ether (which, being all-pervading, cannot move) and the kārya in the first moment of its origination, when, as is assumed, no qualities and no movements of any kind are developed in it, it then possessing a mere jāti ? Compare II. ii. 11, line 34.

—Sūtra 17, line 48.—Śaṅkarāchārya obviously implies that a line stands for the numeral one. Now, a horizontal line represents the numeral one in older pre-Gupta inscriptions. The Gupta inscriptions give a slight curvature to the line, and the post-Gupta inscriptions make it slanting. Some North-Indian scripts make it also a perpendicular line. Since all these numeral notations can equally serve the purpose of the illustration in the text, we cannot determine to what particular system of notation Śaṅkarāchārya is here referring. An identical illustration occurs also in the Yogabhāshya under iii. 13. The Decimal system of notation presupposed in these illustrations was in vogue long before the days of Śaṅkarāchārya. The oldest epigraphic instance of its use so far discovered is the Gurjara inscription of A. D. 595 The system is known to Varāhamihira (6th century A. D.).

—Sūtra 17, line 51.—Śaṅkarāchārya wants to prove that neither saṁyoga nor samavāya exists as an entity beyond the two objects that are in relation. It is the proving of an abhāva or negation ; and for this, according to Vedānta, a different proof, viz., ' Anupalabdhi " is to be employed. To quote the Vedāntaparibhāshā—

तथाहि स्फीतालोकवति भूतले यदि घटः स्यात् तदा घटोपलम्भः स्यादित्यापादनसंभवात् तादृशभूतले घटाभावोऽनुपलब्धिगम्यः । अन्धकारे तु तादृशापादनासंभवान्नानुपलब्धिगम्यता ॥

Similarly, here the āpādana or prasañjana, *i. e.*, argument by *reductio ad absurdum*, takes the form : If samavāya had been a real independent object, there is no reason why it should not have been perceived as such : it accordingly is " upalabdhilakshaṇaprāpta " or meets all the conditions for its perception, *if* it had existed ; but we do not perceive it ; *ergo*, it does not exist.

—Sūtra 17, line 51.—Against the Siddhānta view that words designating relations (such as saṁyoga, samavāya, etc.) do not denote an entity distinct from the two objects that are in relation, but that they point simply to a specific way of looking at

the objects in question, the Pūrvapakshin argues that if saṁyoga, samavāya, etc. are mere designations of the objects-in-relation, they ought to be, like any other synonyms of the objects, always predicable of them—which means that the things must be always conjoined and never disjoined. But the reply is simple enough. Even the so-called ordinary synonyms are not invariably interchangeable. From certain points of view one synonym is preferred to another. So can it also be here. When one says that the monkey is on the tree, he does not posit the existence of a *new* entity like saṁyoga being in relation with the two objects viz., the tree and the monkey. He intends to imply nothing more than a way of looking at the tree and the monkey. When the monkey has left the tree, the point of view changes: that is all. It is wrong to imagine that there takes place in that case an actual destruction of the hypostatised new entity of saṁyoga.

—**Sūtra 17, line 53.** — Reverting to the statement that saṁyoga can be at times "anyatarakarmaja," it would be difficult to explain, even so, the saṁyoga between atoms and the Ātman (*i. e.*, the supreme Ātman) who is to deal with them at the time of the creation and dissolution of the world; or, for the matter of that, between the individual soul and his mind, which is atomic in size. The atom can move, but never move out of the range of the Ātman who is all-pervading. It must therefore be always in contact. And since an all-pervading object is incapable of any division by parts, it is impossible at any time to say that the atom is in contact with, say, the upper part, the centre, or any of the sides of the Ātman. This means, that we will have to imagine parts where none exist or can exist. In the case of the mind and the individual soul the Vaiśeshikas carry their imagination a step farther. They not only imagine the Ātman's possibility of coming into contact with the mind but they even imagine that when the mind enters (during sleep) a particular nāḍī (tube) called Purītat, it shoots beyond the reach of the all-pervading Ātman, so that, there being no conjunction between the mind and the soul, sound dreamless sleep becomes possible. To such straits may an initially invalid hypothesis lead us!

—**Sūtra 17, line 63.** — The Nyāyakandalī thus expounds the conception of a samavāya—

इहेदमिति बुद्धिर्यतः कारणाद्भवति,यतश्चासर्वगतानां नियतदेशावस्थिता-

नामधिगतान्यत्वानामधिगतस्वरूपभेदानामविष्वग्भावोऽपृथग्भावोऽस्वातन्त्र्यं स समवायः, भिन्नयोः परस्परोपश्लेषस्य संबन्धकृतत्वोपलम्भात् ।

" Saṁślesha " or " Upaślesha " is defined ss—

यत एकाकर्षणेनापराकर्षणं जायते ।

Samavāya requires that things, at first clearly and admittedly distinct, should be brought into such close union that it should be impossible thereafter to tear away any one of the two. There should be an absolute interpenetration between the two, such as there is between the trunk of a resinous tree and the exudation of lac that is to issue from it. Such penetrative union cannot exist between objects one of which is partless (either because it is, like the atom, infinitely small, or, is like the ether, infinitely large), for the simple reason that you cannot prove by pulling one of the conjoint objects (ether and earth, or ether and atom, or binary and atoms) that the other is pulled likewise, Ether being all-pervading is incapable of being dragged to a place where it does not already exist ; and the very notion of pulling off the atom suggests the adhesion of the atom by one of its sides, which would ascribe avayavas to it, which *ex hypothesi* it cannot have.— If therefore there can exist no 'saṁślesha' between the binary and its constituent atoms, when the gusts of winds at the time of creation carry away the binary from place to place we cannot guarantee that the constituent atoms of the binary will always suffer themselves to be pulled and wafted away along with the binary, with the result that the process of creation as described above, will not come to pass.

—**Sūtra 17, line 68.**—Kuṇḍa-badara-nyāya or the maxim of the earthern-pot and the badara-tree is the maxim where a person, having forgotten his kuṇḍa near the badara, and being questioned as to the whereabouts of the kuṇḍa replies : I placed the kuṇḍa just near the badara. " But where is the badara ?"—Oh ! Just near the kuṇḍa !" Deussen explains the maxim differently, but on what authority it does not appear. "Knṇḍa " he translates by "Radwaelbung," the periphery of a wheel, and "badara" by "Speichen," or spokes. The periphery supports the spokes and the spokes support the wheel. Another current explanation of the maxim understands kuṇḍa as the pot or basin wherein the

badara tree has grown. Kuṇḍa is the substrate of the badara and therefore is necessarily different from it. According to the last explanation the maxim is used merely to establish the bheda or distinctness of things, while according to the first explanation it serves as an illustration of mutual interdependence.

—**Sūtra 17, line 79.**—The reference is to II. ii. 15, line 29.

—**Sūtra 17, line 86.**—To take a general review of Śaṅkarāchārya's refutation of the Vaiśeshika theory, it is evident that the Āchārya does not touch any part of that theory, beyond the atomic Cosmology. He does not touch their Epistemology or theory of knowledge, including their Logic and Psychology. These, probably, the Vaiśeshikas might have borrowed from the sister school of Nyāya, and, in any case, as regards the doctrine of inference and the exposition of logical fallacies, there was nothing very controversial there from Śaṅkarāchārya's point of view. The theology of the school and its doctrine of release was plainly a later excrescence, and could be met by the arguments used against the theistic schools in sūtra II. ii. 37-41.

—The attack, such as it is, is delivered in the following passages from the Brahmasūtrabhāshya—

II. i, 12, II, ii. 17 — "Śishṭāparigraha;"

II. ii. 37—" Īśvara as nimittakāraṇa ;"

II. iii. 7-Against some presuppositions of atomic cosmology ;

II. iii. 18—" Chitanya as a *quality* of the Soul ;"

II. iii. 50—"Doctrine of many Souls ;"

II. ii. 11-17—The two Vaiśeshika adhikaraṇas proper, as also the " yukti" in II. i. 18.

—Confining ourselves to the present adhikaraṇas, the points discussed therein are the following—

1. Inconsistency of the school in admitting exception to the doctrine of like producing like, while blaming the Brahmavādin for doing the same (II. ii. $11^{30\text{-}55}$);
2. Impossibility of first motion in atoms at creation or dissolution (II. ii. $12^{17\text{-}34}$, II. ii. $12^{41\text{-}46}$). Impossibility of a change from motion to non-motion in the atoms (II. ii. 14);
3. Impossibility of one atom coming into conjunction with another (II. ii. $12^{34\text{-}40}$, II. ii. $17^{53\text{-}62}$, II. ii. $17^{70\text{-}77}$);

Impossibility of any "saṁślesha" between a binary and its constituent atoms (II. ii. 17^{63-69});

4. Untenability of the doctrine of Samavāya—
   (a) "Anavasthā" (II. ii. 13^{1-10}, II. i. 18^{13-18}),
   (b) Why distinguish the Saṁyoga from Samavāya? (II. ii. 13^{11-15}, II. ii. 17^{42-53}, II. i. 18^{16-18});
   (c) How does the Avayavin reside on the Avayavas with which it is samaveta? (II. i. 18^{19-34});
5. Divergence of qualities in atoms inconsistent with their character as atoms (II. ii. 15^{1-11}, II. ii. 16);
6. The so-called proofs for the existence of atoms are no proofs (II. ii. 15^{11-35});
7. Saṁyoga not the only method of creation, and Vibhāga not the only method of destruction (II. ii. 15^{27-35}, II. ii. 17^{77-83}, II. iii. 7, *passim*);
8. Impossibility of the doctrine of six independent and yet related categories (II. ii. 17^{4-18});
9. Untenability of the doctrine of "Ayutasiddhi" on any of its three possible interpretations (II. ii. 17^{18-41});
10. Untenability of the doctrine of "asat-kāryavāda"—
   (a) Scriptures declare "ananyatva" (II. i. 14, 16),
   (b) Why definite effects from definite causes only? (II. i. 18^{2-12}),
   (c) No relation possible between "existing" cause and "non-existing" effect (II. i. 18^{36-52}), and nothing exists on which causal apparatus can operate (II. i. 18^{71-79}).

Most of the arguments of Śaṅkarāchārya are valid and convincing. The weakest is argument No. 5. The Vaiśeshika Realism, their distinctions between Substance, Qualities and the like, have a glamour of common-sense about them, but acuter philosophical analysis such as has been attempted by the Āchārya is bound to point out the contradictions and inconsistencies of the system. Not that there are no inconsistencies in the Vedānta itself; but apart from the backing of the Scriptures which the Vedānta can boast of, the system is undoubtedly pitched to a much higher philosophical level than is the Vaiśeshika.

—The origins of the Vaiśeshika are lost in obscurity. Although the word 'aṇu' occurs several times in the Upanishads, nobody has claimed that anything like the doctrine of Atomism is there fore-shadowed. There are obscure allusions to it in the Mahābhārata; in the Milindapañha, in the Āvaśyakasūtra, and in the Charakasaṁhitā; and it would seem that the Jainas and the school of Hīnayāna Buddhists did subscribe to a belief in atoms, somewhat more crudely conceived than the full-fledged Vaiśeshika system. As fore-runners of the Vaiśeshika theory may be mentioned the doctrine of Pakudha Kachchāyana, a teacher mentioned by Buddha, who held that the four elements—earth, water, fire, air—pleasure and pain, and the soul are the seven uncreated substances; or the "Pudgala" theory of the Jains, the Pudgala or matter being in the two states of gross (sthūla), or subtle (sūkshma), and consisting of atoms or paramāṇus occupying specific units of space (pradeśa). That a school of Buddhists did formulate a sort of an atomic theory follows from what Śaṅkarāchārya has said in his introduction to Sūtra II. ii. 18. Interesting from this point of view are the following extracts furnished by Wassilijew, Buddhismus, p. 279 —"The Śrāvakas furthermore assume Monads that have no parts, and according to the opinion of the teacher Saṁgharakshita these Monads do not remain adhering the one to the other, but they leave interspaces between them. They rotate round one another now this side and now that, so as to build up an aggregate. ... Moreover all the Buddhistic systems uniformly assume that there is nothing smaller than these Monads, which can neither be split open nor partitioned. They differ from one another only in the belief as to whether some of the Monads possess sides. But even when it is said in the first instance that Monads are built out of eight factors, *i. e.*, have eight sides, still none ever maintains that they make up a mere concatination (and not an organic unit)." And once more, Ibid. p. 308—" As regards [the Atom] the Yogāchāras assert that when a person conceives (as do the Sautrāntikas) the Monad as a compound of six sides, that invariably means that it is composed of parts; when however a person holds (as do the Vaibhāshikas) that these six sides constitute an (organic) unit, then it would be necessary that he should concede even a ball to be a Monad."—There are however some essential differences between Buddhistic atomism and the atomism of the Vaiśeshikas. Dharmottara, a Buddhist writer belonging to

perhaps the first century B.C., speaks of atoms not only of earth, water, fire, and wind, but also of colour, smell, taste, touch and the like. There are also non-material atoms like those of the sense-organs and the mind. The Vaiśeshikas have improved upon this theory by the formulation of the distinction between Substances and Qualities. It is also possible that the Sautrāntika doctrine of Time as divisible into infinitesimal portions called ' kshaṇas ' or instants has a great logical affinity, and probably also some historical relation, with the Vaiśeshika doctrine of the physical world similarly divided into infinitesimal physical parts. As the Vaiśeshikas are not mentioned by Kauṭilya (B.C. 300), but are named as such and the doctrines peculiar to them criticised by writers like Aśvaghosha and Vasumitra (1st century A.D.), Nāgārjuna (cir. 200 A.D.), Āryadeva (cir. 225 A.D.), and others, the origins of the System may safely be assigned towards the beginning of the Christian era. And the Sūtrapāṭha—barring possible additions to it here and there—may likewise be assigned to the same period.

—After the Sūtras the earliest extant Vaiśeshika text is the Bhāshya of Praśastapāda; but some other earlier texts (*e. g.* the Rāvaṇabhāshya) seem to have been known to, and diligently studied by, Śaṅkarāchārya. The Bhāshya of Praśastapāda is not exactly a verbatim commentary. It omits altogether quite a large number of the sūtras and has altered the order of the sūtras quite deliberately. Vaiśeshika writers of consequence subsequent to Praśastapāda are—(1) Uddyotakara (7th century A.D.), author of Nyāyavārttika; (2) Vāchaspati-miśra author of Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (circa 850); (3) Udayana author of Nyāyakusumāñjali and Kiraṇāvali and Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi (circa 984); (4) Śrīdhara author of the Nyāyakandalī (circa 991); Śaṅkara-miśra, author of the Vaiśeshikasūtropaskāra, and others. This age of commentaries and sub-commentaries had a full sway right upto the middle of the second millenium, especially as the writers had to face learned Buddhist opponents like Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti and others. Before long however the need of easy manuals was felt, and as a result we have texts like the Nyāyasāra, Tarkabhāshā, Tarkakaumudī, Tarkasaṁgraha, and the like, which themselves have given rise to a very large mass of further commentaries and sub-commentaries. There are also indepen-

dent compilatory works like the Bhāshāparichchheda with the Muktāvalī and its further commentaries. In Bengal there arose, towards the middle of the 13th century, a modern school of Logicians whose "hair-splitting niceties and shallow profundities" have been the terror of young learners and the glory of the experts. Since the days of the great commentators ending with Vāchaspati-miśra and his immediate followers, however, there has been no significant doctrinal development in the school. — One characteristic of the school may here be briefly indicated. Although starting its career as a doctrine of Atomism, the Vaiśeshika very soon found the necessity of effecting an alliance with the sister school of the Nyāya, from which it borrowed its psychology, its epistemology, and the logic. The manual-writers and the followers of the "Navya-Nyāya" or Newer Logic are largely syncretic in their character. And this fact combined with the common-sense realism inherent in the system has given to most of the writings of the school a large vogue as being propaedeutic to the more advanced philosphical treatises of the other schools. The problem of the relation between Greek and Indian Atomism, as between Greek and Indian Logic, is part of a larger problem, which it is unnecessary to discuss here in any detail.

—Sūtra 18, line 1,— "Rāddhānta" is used in the same sense as "Siddhānta." An attempt is sometimes made to distinguish the two, a rāddhānta being regarded as the siddhānta of the opposed school; but the distinction is not everywhere maintained.

—Sūtra 18, line 2.—The Vaiśeshikas are called "Semi-nihilists" because, as the Bhāmatī observes—

तेहि परमाण्वाकाशदिक्कालात्ममनसां च, सामान्यविशेषसमवायानां च,
गुणानां च केषांचिन्नित्यत्वमभ्युपेत्य शेषाणां निरन्वयविनाशमुपयन्ति ॥

Also in their "Asatkārya" theory of causation they admit the reduction of existence to non-existence and non-existence to existence, permitting the duration of existences like the body etc. only for "three moments" (that of utpatti, sthiti, and pralaya). The Buddhists go one step further in reducing everything to existence and momentariness. Hence the comparison and the contrast. Compare Ānandagiri on the passage.—

वैशेषिका देहादेस्त्रिक्षणस्थायित्वमाश्रिताः । तन्मते निरस्ते, तन्मात्रमपि
यैर्नेष्टं तन्मतमतिशयेन नापेक्षितव्यम् ।

—Sūtra 18, line 3. — As Śaṅkarāchārya has himself opened the topic, it would be convenient to find room here for a historical and bibliographical Note on Buddhism and its main schools. The date of Gautama (Pāli, Gotama), the Buddha (or Enlightened One), is determined by a reference in Buddhaghosha's introduction to his commentary called the Samantapāsādikā on the Vinaya-piṭaka, as also in the Ceylonese Chronicles called the Mahāvaṁsa and the Dīpavaṁsa, to the effect that the Emperor Aśoka was anointed to sovereignty 288 years after the death of the Buddha. The general concensus of opinion places the death of the Buddha in B. C. 477 or circa 480, and his birth eighty years previously. The story of his miraculous birth; his early training for a prince's career; his meeting the "four signs" of age, disease, death and recluse, which wean him from the passing pleasures of the world; his great Renunciation or "abhinishkramaṇa" at the age of 28; his search for Truth for seven years; the Temptation; the Englightenment under the "Bodhi" tree at the age of 35; the Preaching of the Law for nearly 45 years; the establishment of the Saṁgha or Mendicant Order; and his end or "Parinirvāṇa;" is told in many popular books, and we need not repeat it here. Years after the death of the Buddha, and in a special Council of Elders convenced for the purpose, the Canon embodying, if not the Buddha's *ipsissima verba*, at least the principal tenets and the well-remembered sayings and anecdotes of the Master, was collected together in what is styled the "Tipiṭaka" or the Three Baskets written in what is known as the Pāli language, which must have differed, and in fact does differ, in some respects from the language in which the doctrine was originally preached. The contents of the "Tipiṭaka" are as follows—

I—VINAYA-PIṬAKA OR DOCTRINES OF THE CHURCH—

(i) Suttavibhaṅga (register of sins);
- (*a*) Pārājika (causing excommunication)
- (*b*) Pāchittiya (liable to expiation)

(ii) Khandhakas (special treatises);
- (*a*) Mahāvagga (main rules for the order)
- (*b*) Chullavagga (minor regulations)

(iii) Parivāra-pāṭha (supplement and index)

II—SUTTA-PIṬAKA OR COLLECTION OF DISCOURSES—

(i) Dīghanikāya (52 longer discourses);
(ii) Majjhimanikāya (152 discourses of middle length);
(iii) Saṁyuttanikāya (50 discourses in groups);
(iv) Aṅguttaraṅikāya (over 2300 enumerations of principles in ascending numerical groups);
(v) Khuddakanikāya (miscellaneous collections);

(a) Khuddakapāṭha (short anthology)
(b) Dhammapada (423 pithy stanzas)
(c) Udāna (inspired utterances)
(d) Iti-vuttaka (terse sayings)
(e) Suttanipāta (additional discourses and questions)
(f) Vimānavatthu (tales of heavenly palaces)
* (g) Petavatthu (tales of goblins)
* (h) Theragāthā (107 songs of monks)
* (i) Therigāthā (73 songs of nuns)
* (j) Jātaka-verses (concluding Gāthās of the 547 legends of the Buddha in his earlier births)
(k) Niddesa (commentary on (e) above)
(l) Paṭisambhidāmagga (pathway of the Arhat)
* (m) Apādāna (exploits and miracles)
* (n) Buddhavaṁsa (twenty-four Buddhas)
* (o) Chariyāpiṭaka (twenty-five Jātaka tales)
‡ (p) Milindapañha (questions of Menander)
‡ (q) Nettippakaraṇa (observations on the right-path)
‡ (r) Peṭakopadesa (introduction to Piṭakas)
‡ (s) Suttasaṁgaha (another anthology).

III—ABHIDHAMMA-PIṬAKA OR SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY—

(i) Dhammasaṁgaṇi (psychological categories);
(ii) Vibhaṅga (exposition and continuation of the above);
(iii) Kathāvatthu (refutation of heretical views);
(iv) Puggalapaññatti (types of persons and characters);
(v) Dhātukathā (physical categories);
(vi) Yamaka (questions in pairs with alternating positive and negative answers);
(vii) Paṭṭhānappakaraṇa (abstruse metaphysical discourses).

* Not found in Siamese Tipiṭaka.
‡ Recognised only in Burmese Tipiṭaka.

The contents of these vary in age, authenticity and importance; but in their *ensemble* they formed the Sacred Canon of what is called the Southern, the Pāli, the Orthodox, the "Mahāsaṁghika" or the "Sthavira" school of Buddhism, which came to formulate within it 18 smaller sub-schools or sects. These schools belong to a very early period of the history of Buddhism, and there do not seem to have been in existence amongst them any radical differences of opinion on the essential points. They in fact agreed more than they differed; acknowledged, with a variation in emphasis, practically the same Sacred Canon; and, compared with the later schools whose Canon was written in Sanskrit, these are generally known as schools of the Hīnayāna or the Lower Vehicle. The schools designated by Śaṅkarāchārya as "Sarvāstitvavādins" and further sub-divided into the "Sautrāntikas" and the "Vaibhāshikas belong to this so-called "Hīnayāna." The Hīnayāna was, speaking broadly, content to regard the Buddha as a simple mortal, exceptionally endowed, who lived a righteous life on earth and taught men the true path of salvation, which need not be beyond the reach of ordinary men if they are willing to lead a life of self-discipline and mystic, supramundane contemplation. The Hīnayāna thus retains several features of the primitive or historical Buddhism, and it has not developed any special aptitude for metaphysical theories and logical subtleties. As contrasted with the Hīnayāna, the Mahāyāna or the "Greater Vehicle" transformed the Buddha, or rather the Bodhisattvas (future Buddhas, being in fact the Buddhistic analogues of many Hindu divinities), into great mythological figures with hosts of attendant divinities, who had to be worshipped by elaborate symbols, ceremonials, and devotion. The Mahāyāna developed special philosophical doctrines, such as the "Śūnyavāda" or Negativism and the "Vijñānavāda" or Idealism, and they brought into existence, by way of comments and independent treatises based on some Buddhist "Suttas," a large mass of canonical literature written in Sanskrit of a somewhat debased type. Sir Charles Eliot (*Hinduism and Buddhism*, II, p. 4) gives the following very fair characterisation of the true spirit of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna schisms: "But in general the Mahāyāna was more popular, not in the sense of being simpler, for parts of its teachings were exceedingly abstruse, but in the sense of striving to invent or include doctrines agreeable to the

masses. It was less monastic than the older Buddhism, and more emotional; warmer in charity, more personal in devotion, more ornate in art, literature, and ritual, more disposed to evolution and development, whereas the Hīnayāna was conservative and rigid, secluded in its cloisters, and open to the plausible, if unjust acusation of, selfishness." The Hīnayāna phase of Buddhism may be said to begin from about B. C. 300, and it continued—so far as India was concerned—upto about A. D. 500. In Ceylon, Burma and Siam it is still a living school. The Mahāyāna phase dates from about A.D. 100, and in Northern India it continued to be active almost upto A. D. 800. In China and Japan and Tibet it is even now the national religion, having developed therein further innumerable schisms, and sects, and sub-sects. Some of the recent discoveries in Central Asia, and a more penetrating study of the texts and translations from Tibetan and Chinese sources have made it probable that there has been a gradual transformation of the Hīnayāna into the Mahāyāna, so that we have to recognise not only a later and an earlier Hīnayāna, but likewise a later and an earlier Mahāyāna, the earlier dating from a period prior to the commencement of the Christian era, and the later associated in particular with the names of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Accordingly, Yamakami speaks in his *Systems of Buddhist Thought* (p. 173) of the Śūnyavāda of the Hīnayāna as developed by Harivarman, and of the Śūnyavāda of the Mahāyāna, designating Harivarman's doctrine as a stage of transition coming between Hīnayānism and Mahāyānism.

—**Sūtra 18, line 4.**—The arguments of the Buddha—and of the majority of successful teachers for the matter of that—have been *ad hominem*, and no wonder if they had to use different starting points for arguing with differently endowed disciples. Bhāmatī quotes Nāgārjuna's Bodhichittavivaraṇa to the same effect—

देशना लोकनाथानां सत्त्वाशयवशानुगाः ।
भिद्यन्ते बहुधा लोक उपायैर्बहुभिः पुनः ॥
गम्भीरोत्तानभेदेन क्वचिच्चोभयलक्षणा ।
भिन्नापि देशनाभिन्ना शून्यताद्वयलक्षणा ॥

—Sūtra 18, line 5.—It is usual to divide the Sarvāstivādins into Mūla-Sarvāstivādins and the Sarvāstivādins proper. The latter seem to have possessed a part of their canon in Sanskrit, and fragments of their Saṁyutta and Aṅguttara, and of the Dhammapada and of Suttanipāta and Pātimokkha have been in recent years discovered in Eastern Turkestan in original Sanskrit, and even in translations into some of the old languages current in that region, such as, Tocharian, Uiguric, Soghdian, etc. The Sarvāstivādins are further divided into Sautrāntikas, who stopped short of the Suttapiṭaka, and refused to recognise the canonicity of the Abhidhammapiṭaka, alleging that the Buddha had taught independent "Sūtras" on the subject; and the Vaibhāshikas, who not only insisted upon the recognition of all the three Piṭakas but even compiled a " Vibhāshā " or commentary on the Abhidhamma, for which in particular they wanted to claim absolute authoritativeness. What according to the tradition is known as the Fourth Council of the Buddhist Saṁgha (but what in sober history was probably the Second) under the leadership of King Kanishka (circa 100 A.D.) fixed the canon of the Sarvāstivāda school, which is even believed to have been, by the king's order, engraved on copper-plates and buried under some stūpa. The first authoritative text of the Sarvāstivādins is the Abhidharmajñānaprasthāpanaśāstra ascribed to the venerable Kātyāyanīputra. There are also a few other texts ascribed to Śāriputra, Maudgalāyana, Devaśarman and Vasumitra. These texts can now be recovered only from Chinese and Tibetan translations, which are likely to contain not a few distortions and perversions of the translators, who worked at a much later stage of religious and philosophical development.

—Sūtra 18, line 6.—The main internal difference between the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāshikas is that the Vaibhāshikas believed that the external world was *both* perceptible as well as inferable, whereas the Sautrāntikas regarded it as only inferable from the diversity with which our ideas are imbued. "The diversity of cognitions in an observer, himself remaining the same, is explicable only by the operation on him of external things." The Vaibhāshikas argue that the Sautrāntika inference to prove the reality of the object is invalid, because all knowledge being reduced to inferability no dṛishṭānta and no invari-

able concomitance can be established. Hence they ought to concede the perceivability of the world. Another important though somewhat abstruse point of difference between the Vaibhāshikas and the Sautrāntikas relates to their conception of Time. The former hold that Time past, present and future is a real existence being perceptible as regards present and future, but only inferable as regards the past—the difference between these three states of past, present, and future itself depending, upon a difference of efficiency. The Sautrāntikas object to this theory on the ground that it implies as a corollary the existence of a permanent substance persisting throughout time. The Sautrāntikas also object to distinguishing between the past, the present, and the future on the ground of efficiency. " The entity is itself the efficiency, and is synonymous with its duration period, or the time of its appearance." A third essential point of difference between the two schools was that the Vaibhāshikas regarded the Buddha as essentially human, while the Sautrāntikas seem to have already recognised a large number of Buddhas, as well as the doctrine of the "Dhārmakāya" belonging to each of them. We need not here detail the other minor differences obtaining between the two schools.

—Sūtrā 18, line 7.—The Sarvāstivādins have divided the whole Reality into seventy-five " Dharmas " or kinds of existences. The complete classification can be exhibited in the following tabular form :—

Reality

- 72 संस्कृत or compound धर्मs liable to production and dissolution
  - 11 रूपधर्मs (रूप = matter)
    - 5 इन्द्रियायतनs
    - 5 विषयायतनs
    - 1 अविज्ञप्ति or latent impression.
  - 1 चित्तधर्म, dealing with generalities
  - 46 चैत्त or चित्तसंप्रयुक्तधर्मs dealing with particularities
  - 14 चित्तविप्रयुक्तधर्मs
- 3 असंस्कृतधर्मs, *viz.*, आकाश and the two निरोधs (see Sūtra II. ii. 22, 23)

The above is the "Bāhya" or objective classification of Reality The "Āntara" or subjective classification is made up of the five "Skandhas" (see line 10 of the text), twelve "Āyatanas," namely, Mana-āyatana added to the five Indriyâyatanas, and Dharmâyatana added to the five Vishayâyatanas, and eighteen "dhātus" made up of the six Indriya-dhātus (including the manas), six corresponding Indriyavijñāna-dhātus, and six Indriyavishaya-dhātus (that of the manas being a "dharmadhātu"). These 75 dharmas are believed to be permanent in their noumenal form, but impermanent or transitory as phenomena. This elaborate classification is given in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa-śāstra in the form in which it exists in Hiuen Tsang's Chinese translation of cir. A. D. 650, and it is quite probable that the classification has undergone considerable elaboration. The classification given by Śaṅkarāchārya is much more likely to represent the views as they were originally formulated by Sarvâstivāda writers, as it seems evident on the very face of it that Śaṅkarāchārya's knowledge of the tenets of the school was derived from accurate first-hand information. Moreover, there was the Sūtrakāra before the Bhāshyakāra, and as all the Bhāshyakāras agree in their interpretation of the sūtras comprised under the present adhikaraṇa, we need entertain no doubts as to the veracity of the account of the Sarvâstivāda philosophy as here presented. Yamakami Sōgen in his *Systems of Buddhist Thought* is therefore not at all convincing when he accuses Śaṅkarāchārya of misunderstanding, and even of deliberately misrepresenting, the views of the system he is attacking. Śaṅkarāchārya never does this. Even A. B. Keith has conceded the practical accuracy of the Āchārya's representation of the views of his opponent.

—Sūtra 18, line 8. — The Sarvâstivādins hold a kind of atomic doctrine. According to them the Paramāṇu is the minutest form of "rūpa" which is said to be "indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable, and intangible." A group of six such Paramāṇus around a central Paramāṇu goes to form an Aṇu, which is the *minimum sensibile*, all the larger material things in the universe being aggregated of Paramāṇus. Now what makes the Paramāṇus conglomerate into an Aṇu is a quality of adhesiveness (sneha), what makes them capable of

motion is a quality of propulsion (Irana), what makes them produce warmth of life and even fire by friction or clashing is a quality of heat (ushṇa), and what makes them non-interpenetrable is a quality of resistance or hardness (khara), which all the Paramāṇus are believed to possess alike. The presence of these four qualities in the Paramāṇus leads to the constitution of Aṇus and larger aggregates, and eventually the four Elements of water, air, fire and earth. But since these Elements as we actually know them possess only one of the four qualities of their constituent Paramāṇus in a pre-eminent degree, the Sarvâstivādins take recourse to the supposition that only one of the four qualities is active in an element, the other three being for the time latent or dormant.

—Sūtra 18, line 8f. — In view of the exposition given in the preceding Note it is clear that "kharasnehôshṇêraṇasvabhāva" belongs to *all* the Paramāṇus of *all* the Bhūtas and not "kharasvabhāva" to earth Paramāṇus, "snehasvabhāva" to water Paramāṇus, etc., as the Bhāmatīkāra and the other commentators of Śaṅkarāchārya interpret the passage. The words of the Bhāshya are capable of both the interpretations, and since, on the admission of the Sarvâstivādins themselves, the several elements contain only one of the four qualities in a pre-eminently active condition, there is an explanation for the mistake (if mistake it be) into which the commentators have fallen.

—Sūtra 18, line 10. — Just as in the outer world there are the Paramāṇus eventually constituting the four elements, the five indriyas or sense-organs (which are probably specific refined Paramāṇus), and the five qualities of colour, sound, smell, taste, and touch which these indriyas perceive,—all presupposing a grouping or aggregation of the external Reality on the basis of the division into the four elements, each of which accentuates only one of the four inherent dispositions (svabhāvas) of the Paramāṇus,—so also in the inner world there are (1) the mental images produced by the working of the indriyas upon the objects ; (2) the latent impressions produced by these mental images, which mix up in the texture of the subsequent mental-images, as well as certain innate ethical predispositions; (3) the specific concepts or ideas formulated by the working of the mind upon the data of sense ; (4) the pleasure-pain sensations

consequent upon these functionings of the mind; and (5) the consciousness of the knowing subject as the presupposition of all these activities. And these types of internal cognitions also lend themselves to a classification by five thought-phases (Skandhas) of (in the above order of their presentation) rūpa, saṁskāra, saṁjñā, vedanā, and vijñāna. Compare on this point the remarks of the Ratnaprabhā—

सविषयेद्रियाणि रूपस्कन्धः, विषयाणां बाह्यत्वेपि देहस्थेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वादाध्यात्मिकत्वम् । अहमहमित्यालयविज्ञानप्रवाहो विज्ञानस्कन्धः । सुखाद्यनुभवो वेदनास्कन्धः । गौरश्व इत्येवं नामविशिष्टसविकल्पकप्रत्ययः संज्ञास्कन्धः । संस्कारस्कन्धो रागादयः क्लेशाः, उपक्लेशाश्च मदमानादयः, धर्माधर्मौ चेति ॥

And just as the external aggregates originate from the Paramāṇus that have a fourfold primitive nature, so also it might be conceivable that the internal thought-phases proceed from combinations of certain "units of mind-stuff" of specific but uniform disposition. It is not certain whether the Sarvâstivādins posited such units of mind-stuff, but it is in any case clear that they wanted these units as also the Paramāṇus—all originally uniform in nature—to give rise to compounds wherein only one of the original common dispositions would become accentuated, while the others remain latent and allow themselves to be subordinated,—these compounds in fact constituting, and accounting for, the variety of all the physical and mental phenomena in the world.

—**Sūtra 18, line 12f.** — Mr. Yamakami Sögen makes too much of a trifle when he objects to Śaṅkarāchārya's expression "aṇuhetuka" in line 12. It is true that the Bhūtas are produced out of Parmāṇus and the formation of Aṇus out of Paramāṇus is possible only because the Paramāṇus have the elemental qualities of sneha, īraṇa, etc. inherent in them, which cause the Paramāṇus to hold together. In a sense therefore the Bhūtas (more accurately their qualities) are the cause of Aṇus, and not the Aṇus the cause of Bhūtas. But surely since Śaṅkarāchārya had said above (line 8f.) "pṛithivyādiparamāṇavaḥ......saṁhanyante" his present expression "aṇuhetuka......saṁhati......" must be taken in the light of

the earlier assertion. The distinction between Paramāṇus and Aṇus need not have so much obsessed the mind of Śaṅkarāchārya, as it was not much involved in the main point of the argument. And when futhermore the same Japanese scholar objects to the term "pañchaskandhīrūpa" because it is not a Buddhist technical term, it is doubtful if he has realised that the word "rūpa" in that compound is not—any more than the word "rūpa" in the expression "Bhūtabhautikasaṁhatirūpa"—the same as the technical "rūpa" of the Sarvâstivāda philosophy; or that "pañchaskandhī" is a Dvigu compound.

—Sūtra 18, line 15. — We are told that the Sarvâstivādins thought of the Paramāṇus as 'living.' They can accordingly enter into combinations with one another under the influence of given causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya); but being admittedly devoid of intelligence, how is it that there should result an unfailing uniformity in their movements and functions, and whence comes it that the causes and conditions, under the influence of which they function, tend uniformly to produce the same or similar results? Not only this, but the results are known to adapt themselves to changing requirements as though directed by an intelligent controller. The atoms of earth, for instance, agree uniformly to subordinate their other three dispositions to the prevailing disposition of hardness (kharatva), the atoms of water to that of adhesiveness (sneha), and so on; and the elemental (bhautika) products likewise continue to preserve the characteristics and dispositions of the elements. As the Bhāmatī puts it—

चेतनो हि कुलालादिः सर्वं मृद्दण्डाद्युपसंहृत्य समुदायात्मकं घटमारचयदृष्टः। नह्यसति मृद्दण्डादिव्यापारिणि विदुषि कुलाले स्वयमचेतना मृद्दण्डादयो व्यापृत्य जातु घटमारचयन्ति। न चासति कुविन्दे तन्तुवेमादयः पटं वयन्ते। तस्मात् कार्योत्पादस्तदनुगुणकारणसमवधानाधीनस्तदभावे न भवति। कार्योत्पादानुगुणं च कारणसमवधानं चेतनप्रेक्षाधीनमसत्यां चेतनप्रेक्षायां न भवितुमुत्सहत इति कार्योत्पत्तिश्चेतनप्रेक्षाधीनत्वव्याप्ता व्यापकविरुद्धोपलब्ध्या चेतनानधिष्ठितेभ्यः कारणेभ्यो व्यावर्तमाना चेतनाधिष्ठितत्व एवावतिष्ठते॥

—Sūtra 18, line 15f. — The case of the Chitta and the Chaitta samudāya is not much different from that of the Bhūta and the Bhautika samudāya. Mental ideas and impressions as well as

feelings of pleasure and pain follow a regularity in sequence which is in them even more marked than in the happenings of the physical world outside. Who regulates the process? It cannot be the Chitta or the mind, because the mind is the resultant of the five Skandhas, whereas we are in search of a regulating principle which is outside and prior to the aggregate of the five Skandhas (that is to say, independent of the sentient individual with his body and his mind) and which yet regulates them. Moreover the Chitta can function only upon the data of the senses, and these senses and the whole body, although the *sine qua non* for the functioning of the mind, have yet to exist. To quote from the Bhāmatī, once more,—

यद्युच्येत, अद्धा चेतनाधीनैव कार्योत्पत्तिः, अस्ति तु चित्तं चेतनम्। तद्धि इन्द्रियादिविषयस्पर्शे सत्यभिज्वलत् तत्कारणचक्रं यथायथा कार्याय पर्याप्तं तथातथा प्रकाशयदचेतनानि कारणान्यधिष्ठाय कार्यमभिनिर्वर्तयतीति, तत्राह– न खलु बाह्याभ्यन्तरसमुदायसिद्धिमन्तरेण चित्ताभिज्वलनं, ततस्तु तामिच्छन् दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयमाविशेदिति। नच प्राग्भवीया चित्ताभिदीप्तिरुत्तरसमुदायं घटयति, घटनसमये तस्याश्चिरातीतत्वेन सामर्थ्यविरहात्॥

—Sūtra 18, line 17.—The cessation of activity leads to the annihilation of all kleśas or passions, and thus paves the way to the *summum bonum* of Nirvāṇa. Now this Nirvāṇa was, to some Buddhist thinkers at any rate, an absolute cessation of all pravṛitti or activity; but even if one were to argue that the extirpation of passions really meant to the Buddhists their transmutation under the influence of knowledge, hate being turned into love, etc., still that involves at least a voluntary reversal in the direction of the pravṛitti, which is impossible in the absence of a deliberate and intelligent exercise of the will.

—Sūtra 18, line 18.—The term "Āśaya." is explained as—

आशेरतेऽस्मिन् कर्मानुभववासना इत्याशयः।

and Ānandagiri gives "Saṁtāna" as its synonym, while Bhāmatī and Ratnaprabhā render it by "Ālayavijñāna." The latter term is thus defined—

तत् स्यादालयविज्ञानं यद्भवेदहमास्पदम्।
तत् स्यात् प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं यन्नीलादिकमुल्लिखेत्॥

It is the realisation of the self as the conscious subject underlying all individual cognitions, and is therefore a continuous stream of consciousness. It is not exactly what is called the "Ahaṁkāra," which means the identification of the self of this moment with the self of a past moment, but it comes closer to the "anuvyavasāya" of Nyāya philosophy (which is a state of consciousness in which one feels oneself perceiving, willing, etc.)—only it is an ever-present consciousness that is running and changing, but never entirely inhibited except, may be, in swoon and sound sleep. This conception was elaborated by the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism, but traces of it may be seen even in the Mahāsaṅghika doctrine of a root-consciousness and in one or two other Hīnayāna positions. Śaṅkarāchārya in any case is careful to use a distinct term (āśaya) in place of the Ālayavijñāna; and as he could not have invented the term, he must have derived it from some Hīnayāna text no longer available to us. The conception is an attempt to explain the self or the personality as a continuum or saṁtāna. This saṁtāna, the Sautrāntikas declared, could not only be self-conscious but was even endowed with something like the freedom of the will, although in the same breath they asserted that "Karman" directed the course of the saṁtāna. The theory (which even some of the Hīnayāna schools themselves rejected) was an attempt to find a substitute for the Ātman which would not involve the admission of its eternality. The Ātman of ordinary knowledge is a mere convention. Every time that one looks within oneself one finds some psychic phenomenon happening, but one never sees the mere self or Ātman in his nudity, for the simple reason that such a thing, say the Buddhists, does not exist at all. And the false notion of an abiding individuality beneath the transient flux of consciousness is a mere fiction explicable on the analogy of the false notion of an abiding flame of a specific size which we imagine the lamp to possess, whereas in reality there is merely a succession of latent, predisposing forces (*e. g.*, the air-pressure conditions) which give us the false appearance of the abiding individuality of the flame. Śaṅkarāchārya's point of criticism is that if this āśaya or saṁtāna is to give a stamp of individuality to the whole series, it cannot be any given member of the series, but must be distinct from the series. And if distinct and if also

eternal, it is tantamount to the Ātman of the Vedāntins, who would not then quarrel about mere name.

—Sūtra 18, line, 19. — If the Āśaya be merely momentary, during the one moment which is all the life that is given to it, it cannot be able to achieve anything but its mere existence. As the Bhāmatī says—

अपिच प्रवृत्तिः समुदायिनां व्यापारः । नच क्षणिकानां व्यापारो युज्यते । व्यापारो हि व्यापारवदाश्रयस्तत्कारणकश्च लोके प्रसिद्धः । तेन व्यापारवता व्यापारात् पूर्वं व्यापारसमये च भवितव्यम्, अन्यथा कारणत्वाश्रयत्वयोगात् । नच समसमययोरस्ति कार्यकारणभावः । नापि भिन्नकालयोराधाराधेयभावः । तथाच क्षणिकत्वहानिः ॥

Ratnaprabhā also argues in the same way—

क्षणिकस्य जन्मातिरिक्तव्यापारो नास्ति । तस्मात् तस्य परमाण्वादिमेलनार्थं प्रवृत्तिरनुपपन्ना क्षणिकत्वव्याघातादित्यर्थः ॥

—Sūtra 19, line 2. — The Buddhistic doctrine of causation is quite peculiar and needs to be very carefully studied. The Sarvâstivādins classify the causal phenomena into "bāhya" or external and "āntara" or "ādhyātmika" or internal. The Vijñānavādins naturally make all causation an ideal phenomenon. The causes are divided into direct causes or causes proper (*hetu*), and general contributory causes or conditions (*pratyaya*): "Pratyayo hetūnāṁ samavāyaḥ ; hetuṁ hetum praty ayante hetvantarāṇīti teshām ayamānānām bhāvaḥ pratyayaḥ ; samavāya iti yāvat." The doctrine is known as "Pratītyasamutpāda (Pāli, Paṭichchasamuppāda)" or "Origination by an interdependent causal chain." Vāchaspati-miśra in his Bhāmatī gives a very lucid explanation of the theory, which he must have derived from some Buddhist source like the "Śālistamba-sūtra," and which we freely quote—

तत्र बाह्यस्य प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य हेतूपनिबन्धः—यदिदं बीजादङ्कुरः अङ्कुरात् पत्रं, पत्रात् काण्डं, काण्डान्नालो, नालाद्गर्भो, गर्भाच्छूकः (awn, Marāṭhī कूस, कुसळ), शूकात् पुष्पं, पुष्पात् फलमिति । असति बीजेऽङ्कुरो

न भवति......असति पुष्पे फलं न भवति। सति तु बीजेऽङ्कुरो भवति ....सति पुष्पे फलं भवति । तत्र बीजस्य नैवं भवति ज्ञानमहमङ्कुरं निर्वर्तयामीति, अङ्कुरस्यापि नैवं भवति ज्ञानमहं बीजेन निर्वर्तित इति...... पुष्पस्य नैवं भवति ज्ञानमहं फलं निर्वर्तयामीति, फलस्यापि नैवं भवति ज्ञानमहं पुष्पेणाभिनिर्वर्तितमिति । तस्मादसत्यपि चैतन्ये बीजादीनामसत्यपि चान्यस्मिन्नधिष्ठातरि कार्यकारणभावनियमो दृश्यते । उक्तो हेतूपनिबन्धः ॥ प्रत्ययोपनिबन्धः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्योच्यते —षण्णां धातूनां समवायाद्बीजहेतुरङ्कुरो जायते । तत्र च पृथिवीधातुर्बीजस्य संग्रहकृत्यं करोति यतोऽङ्कुरः कठिनो भवति । अब्धातुर्बीजं स्नेहयति । तेजोधातुर्बीजं परिपाचयति । वायुधातुर्बीजं निर्हरति यतोऽङ्कुरो बीजान्निर्गच्छति । आकाशधातुर्बीजस्यानावरणकृत्यं करोति । ऋतुरपि बीजस्य परिणामं करोति । तदेतेषामविकलानां धातूनां समवाये बीजे रोहत्यङ्कुरो जायते, नान्यथा । तत्र पृथिवीधातोर्नैवं भवत्यहं बीजस्य संग्रहकृत्यं करोमीति.........ऋतोर्नैवं भवत्यहं बीजस्य परिणामं करोमीति । अङ्कुरस्यापि नैवं भवत्यहमेभिः प्रत्ययैर्निर्वर्तित इति ॥

The two varieties of the "ādhyātmika-pratītyasamutpāda" will be explained presently. The point of this theory may be thus brought out. It is enough, the Buddhists would say, that we are able to assign, for a given effect, a specific number of causes and conditions, and for each of these specific number of causes and conditions a specific number of other causes and conditions which brought each of them into operation at the time when and in the manner in which each of them operated to produce their joint result. Further, if in a given instance a result other than the normal ensues, we can explain what other causes beyond the ordinary were functioning, or what ordinary causes had ceased to function, and we can give reasons for this excess or deficiency. What more need we ask for? The reply is obvious and convincing. We know that under given circumstances fire will always burn and water will always drown. Whence this uniformity in Nature, which enables us to deduce what we call Laws of Nature? Unless the process of causation is

assumed to be under the direction of some wise Intelligence who is detached from and independent of the world, life which is based upon intelligent anticipations of events would be impossible even for a single moment. See the Bhāshya, lines 21-25 below.

—**Sūtra 19, line 3ff.** — Vāchaspatimiśra explains the "Avidyā" series of causation as follows—

आध्यात्मिकः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादो द्वाभ्यां कारणाभ्यां भवति, हेतूपनिबन्धतः प्रत्ययोपनिबन्धतश्च । तत्रास्य हेतूपनिबन्धो—यदिदमविद्याप्रत्ययाः संस्काराः . ...जातिप्रत्ययं जरामरणादीति । अविद्या चेन्नाभविष्यन्नैव संस्कारा अजनिष्यन्त............जातिश्चेन्नाभविष्यन्नैव जरामरणाद्य उदपत्स्यन्त । तत्राविद्याया नैवं भवत्यहं संस्कारानभिनिर्वर्तयामीति, संस्काराणामपि नैवं भवति वयमविद्ययाभिनिर्वर्तिता इति...........जात्या अपि नैवं भवत्यहं जरामरणाद्यभिनिर्वर्तयामीति, जरामरणादीनामपि नैवं भवति वयं जात्यादिभिर्निर्वर्तिता इति । अथच सत्स्वविद्यादिषु स्वयमचेतनेषु चेतनान्तरानधिष्ठितेष्वपि संस्कारादीनामुत्पत्तिः, इदं प्रतीत्य प्राप्येदमुत्पद्यत इत्येतावन्मात्रस्य दृष्टत्वाच्चेतनाधिष्ठानस्यानुपलब्धेः । सोऽयमाध्यात्मिकस्य प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य हेतूपनिबन्धः ॥ अथ प्रत्ययोपनिबन्धः—पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशविज्ञानधातूनां समवायाद्भवति कायः । तत्र कायस्य पृथिवीधातुः काठिन्यं निर्वर्तयति । अब्धातुः स्नेहयति कायम् । तेजोधातुः कायस्याशितपिशिते परिपाचयति । वायुधातुः कायस्य श्वासादि करोति । आकाशधातुः कायस्यान्तःसुषिरभावं करोति । यस्तु नामरूपाङ्कुरमभिनिर्वर्तयात, पञ्चविज्ञानकार्यसंयुक्तं सास्रवं च मनोविज्ञानं, सोयमुच्यते विज्ञानधातुः । यदा त्वाध्यात्मिकाः पृथिव्यादिधातवो भवन्त्यविकलास्तदा सर्वेषां समवायाद्भवति कायस्योत्पत्तिः । तत्र पृथिव्यादिधातूनां नैवं भवति वयं कायस्य काठिन्यादि निर्वर्तयाम इति, कायस्यापि नैवं भवति ज्ञानमहमेभिः प्रत्ययैरभिनिर्वर्तित इति । अथच पृथिव्यादिधातुभ्योऽचेतनेभ्यश्चेतनान्तरानधिष्ठितेभ्यः कायस्योत्पत्तिः । सोयं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादो दृष्टत्वान्नान्यथयितव्यः ॥

The principle underlying the working of this series is just the same, only the terms of the series are different. The terms are twelve in number and are frequently styled "the twelve nidānas (root-causes)," viz.—

- Past—
  1. अविद्या, ignorance (blind camel);
  2. संस्कार, latent dispositions (pot-maker);
- Present—
  - Upapatti-bhava or Receptive side of life
    3. विज्ञान, rebirth-consciousness (ape);
    4. नामरूप, name and form (ferryman);
    5. षडायतन, six organs of knowledge (mask with holes);
    6. स्पर्श, contact (arrow entering the eye);
    7. वेदना, feeling (*mithuna*);
  - Karma-bhava or Potential side of life
    8. तृष्णा, craving (drinking man);
    9. उपादान, rooted ideas (gathering flowers);
    10. भव, action or character (pregnant woman);
- Future—
  11. जाति, birth (child-birth);
  12. जरामरणशोकपरिवेदनादुःखदुर्मनस्तता, decay-death-sorrow-lament-suffering-despair.

Any one term of this chain is inevitably caused by the term preceding it, and becomes itself the cause of the term that follows it, No. 12 giving rise to No. 1 and so causing the "Wheel of Law" to go round and round in endless succession. The "Wheel of Law" is an ancient and orthodox idea which has even been preserved in a pictorial form on the Asokan pillars, and at Ajantā and elsewhere (see, Rhys Davids: American Lectures pp. 153 ff; the picture-forms are given in brackets above). The chain falls into a three-fold temporal division: Nos. 1, 2 belong to the Past, Nos. 11, 12 to the Future, the intermediate eight to the Present Life, five of these eight representing the passive or receptive side of our life, and the other three the active side of life, or rather that side which is pregnant with the potentiality to produce future results. The chain accordingly is intended to explain the genesis of any one life from out of a series of lives through which one has to

transmigrate. The ignorance of man produces in him certain evil tendencies and dispositions which occasion the false consciousness in the individual that he, a given permanent entity, has now assumed a birth. Other consciousnesses follow, as also other forms of knowledge through the gateways of sense, producing feelings of pleasure or of pain. These leave behind certain tendencies, cravings and dispositions as also certain rooted ideas and bents of character which shape the kind of birth that has to be taken in the succeeding life; and that birth brings in its train all the attendant sorrows and sufferings, escape from which is possible only by following the teaching of the Lord Buddha, which snaps asunder the root-cause of it all, viz. avidyā. — In the Bodhicharyāvatārapañjikā, Parichcheda ix, the following explanation of the terms of the Avidyā-chain is offered—

तत्त्वेऽप्रतिपत्तिर्मिथ्याप्रतिपत्तिरज्ञानमविद्या (१) । एवमविद्यायां सत्यां त्रिविधाः संस्कारा अभिनिर्वर्तन्ते—पुण्योपगा, अपुण्योपगा, आनञ्ज्योपगाश्च* । इम उच्यन्ते अविद्याप्रत्ययाः संस्कारा (२) इति । पुण्योपगानां संस्काराणां पुण्योपगमेव विज्ञानं भवति, अपुण्योपगानां संस्काराणामपुण्योपगमेव विज्ञानं भवति, आनञ्ज्योपगानां संस्काराणामानञ्ज्योपगमेव विज्ञानं भवति । इदमुच्यते संस्कारप्रत्ययं विज्ञान(३)मिति । तदेव विज्ञानप्रत्ययं नामरूपम् (४) । नामरूपविवृध्द्या षड्भिरायतनद्वारैः कृत्यक्रियाः प्रवर्तन्ते । तन्नामरूपप्रत्ययं षडायतन(५)मुच्यते । षड्भ्य आयतनेभ्यः षट् स्पर्शकायाः प्रवर्तन्ते । अयं षडायतनप्रत्ययः स्पर्श (६) इत्युच्यते । यज्जातीयः स्पर्शो भवति तज्जातीया वेदना प्रवर्तते । इयं स्पर्शप्रत्यया वेदने(७)त्युच्यते । यस्तां वेदयति, विशेषेणास्वादयति, अभिनन्दयति, अध्यवस्यति, आधितिष्ठति सा वेदनाप्रत्यया तृष्णे(८)त्युच्यते । आस्वदना, अभिनन्दना, अध्यवसानं—आत्मप्रियरूपसा(शा)तरूपैर्वियोगो मा [मे] भवत्विति । अपरित्यागो भूयोभूयश्च प्रार्थना । इदं तृष्णाप्रत्ययमुपादान(९)मित्युच्यते । एवं प्रार्थयमानः पुनर्भवजनकं कर्म समुत्थापयति, कायेन वाचा मनसा । स उपादानप्रत्ययो भव (१०) इत्युच्यते । तत्कर्मनिर्जातानां पञ्चस्कन्धानामभिनिर्वृत्तिर्या सा भवप्रत्यया जाति(११)रित्युच्यते । यज्जात्यभिनिर्वृत्तानां स्कन्धानामपचयपरिपाकाद्वि-

* आनञ्ज्य or आनिञ्ज्य or आनेञ्ज्य, derived from root निञ्ज् to cleanse or निन्द् to censure, denotes शुभ in the technical sense of निर्वाण.

नाशो भवति, तदिदं जातिप्रत्ययं जरामरण(१२)मित्युच्यते। ....। तत्र विज्ञानं बीजस्वभावत्वेन हेतुः। कर्म क्षेत्रस्वभावत्वेन हेतुः। अविद्या तृष्णा च क्लेशस्वभावत्वेन हेतुः। कर्मक्लेशा विज्ञानबीजं संजनयन्ति। तत्र कर्म विज्ञानबीजस्य क्षेत्रकार्यं करोति। तृष्णा विज्ञानबीजं स्नेहयति। अविद्या विज्ञानबीजमवकिरति। ....विज्ञानबीजं कर्मक्षेत्रप्रतिष्ठितं तृष्णास्नेहाभिस्यन्दितमविद्यावकीर्णं विरोहति, नामरूपाङ्कुरस्याभिनिर्वृत्तिर्भवति। स च नामरूपाङ्कुरो न स्वयंकृतो, न परकृतो, नोभयकृतो, नेश्वरनिर्मितो, न कालपरिणामितो, न चैककारणाधीनो, नाप्यहेतुसमुत्पन्नः॥

Vāchaspatimiśra has a somewhat different explanation to give of these terms. He says—

तत्रैतेष्वेष षट्सु धातुषु या एकसंज्ञा, पिण्डसंज्ञा, नित्यसंज्ञा, सुखसंज्ञा, सत्त्वसंज्ञा, पुद्गलसंज्ञा, मनुष्यसंज्ञा, मातृदुहितृसंज्ञा, अहंकारममकारसंज्ञा, सेयमविद्या (१) संसारानर्थसंभारस्य मूलकारणम्। तस्यामविद्यायां सत्यां संस्काराः (२) रागद्वेषमोहा विषयेषु प्रवर्तन्ते। वस्तुविषया विज्ञप्तिर्विज्ञानम् (३)। विज्ञानाच्चत्वारो रूपिण उपादानस्कन्धास्तन्नाम, तान्युपादाय रूपमभिनिर्वर्तते, तदैकध्यमभिसंक्षिप्य नामरूपं (४) निरुच्यते, शरीरस्यैव कललबुद्बुदाद्यवस्था। नामरूपसंमिश्रितानीन्द्रियाणि षडायतनम् (५)। नामरूपेन्द्रियाणां त्रयाणां संनिपातः स्पर्शः (६)। स्पर्शाद्वेदना (७) सुखादिका। वेदनायां सत्यां कर्तव्यमेतत् सुखं पुनर्मयेत्यध्यवसानं तृष्णा (८) भवति। तत उपादानं (९) वाक्कायचेष्टा भवति। ततो भवो (१०), भवत्यस्माज्जन्मेति भवो, धर्माधर्मौ। तद्धेतुकः स्कन्धप्रादुर्भावो जातिः (११) जन्म। जन्महेतुका उत्तरे जरामरणादयः (१२) —जातानां स्कन्धानां परिपाको जरा, स्कन्धानां नाशो मरणम्, म्रियमाणस्य मूढस्य साभिषङ्गस्य पुत्रकलत्रादावन्तर्दाहः शोकः, तदुत्थं प्रलपनं हा मातः, हा तात, हा च मे पुत्रकलत्रादीति परिदेवना, पञ्चविज्ञानकार्यसंयुक्तमसाध्वनुभवनं दुःखम्, मानसं च दुःखं दौर्मनस्यम्॥

The Brahmāmṛitavarshiṇī, as also the Brahmavidyābharaṇa, have a still somewhat divergent explanation of the Pratītyasamutpāda chain, which brings the chain within the compass of just one life—

अविद्यादीनामयमर्थः। क्षणिकेषु स्थिरत्वनित्यत्वादिभ्रान्तिरविद्या। सा च विषयेषु रागाद्यात्मकसंस्कारहेतुः। स च संस्कारो गर्भस्याद्यं गर्भगतशुक्र-

शोणितसमुदाये अहमित्याकारकं विज्ञानं जनयति । तस्माच्चालयविज्ञानात् पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयं शरीरस्य समुदायस्य कारणभूतं जायते । तदेव नामाश्रयत्वान्नामेत्युच्यते । तच्च नाम सितासितादिरूपं तच्छरीरं जनयति । गर्भभूतस्य देहस्य कललबुद्बुदाद्यवस्था नामरूपशब्दार्थ इति पर्यवसन्नम् । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयं नाम रूपं च शरीरं विज्ञानधातुश्चेति षडायतनानि यस्येन्द्रियजातस्य तत् षडायतनम् । षडायतनरूपशरीराकारेण गर्भगतस्यैव परिणाम इत्यर्थः । गर्भगतस्यैव शरीरिणः शीतोष्णाद्यनुभवः स्पर्शः । ततः सुखादिका वेदना । सुखप्रेप्सा दुःखजिहासा च तृष्णा । तदनुकूलो व्यापार उपादानम् । गर्भान्निर्गमनं भवः । तथोत्पन्नस्य जनकगतजात्यनुसारेण मनुष्यत्वादिकं जातिः । ततो जरामरणम् । मुमूर्षोरिच्छोपहतिः शोकः । प्रतिहतेच्छस्य प्रलापः परिदेवनम् । बाह्येन्द्रियकृतविषयानुभवजनितं दुःखं दुःखम् । मानसविषयानुभवजनितं दुःखं दुर्मनस्तता । ततः पुनरविद्यादय इति ॥

It may be added that it is not impossible to exhibit considerable points of contact between this twelve-fold series and the sixteen Padārthas enumerated in the first Nyāyasūtra, which gives a group of dialectical categories mixed up with another group of cosmological categories, and the knowledge of which is believed to conduce to the acquisition of the *summum bonum*. The theory has certain inevitable drawbacks. Its interpretation does not seem to have been definitely fixed by tradition; and the fact that for expressing one and the same concept two separate words like saṁskāra and bhava should have been used suggests that the whole theory has been the result of a secondary working over of an original nucleus. Nor are the terms of the chain always and invariably related as cause and effect to one another. Several terms might be shown to be simultaneous in origination (e. g., vedanā and tṛishṇā) and the series might at times work backwards (e. g., tṛishṇā and upādāna might lead to sparśa and that to increased tṛishṇā, and so on). Nevertheless, once formulated, the theory has been expounded and defended with a tenacity truly remarkable.

—Sūtra 19, line 7. — Jacobi (NGGW, 1896, pp. 43 ff; ZDMG, Vol. LII, pp. 1–15; and elsewhere) has tried to prove that this chain of twelve nidānas as enunciated by the Buddha is, on ultimate analysis, based upon the Sāṁkhya enumeration of 25 categories. According to the Sāṁkhya, the Purusha

is by nature "kevala" or in a state of absolute detachment or isolation from all the workings of the saṁsāra, and in the Yogic condition of the "asaṁprajñāta" or object-less samādhi he tries to regain his real nature. If the samādhi does not always succeed, it is due to the vāsanās of the Yogin, to the latent impressions of his past karman, which disturb the stillness of his samādhi and give scope to the Prakṛiti to resume its fluctuations in which the Purusha is readily ensnared. And on the same analogy it might be said that the origination of the manifold processes of the world is also due to the vāsanās or saṁskāras of the Purusha. This gives the following parallelism between the Buddhist nidānas and the Sāṁkhya categories—

Nidāna 1, Avidyā—Corresponds to Sāṁkhya Prakṛiti ;

——— 2, Saṁskāra—Corresponds to Sāṁkhya Mahat, which is the starting point of the series of *phenomenal* fluctuations ;

——— 3, Vijñāna—Corresponds to Sāṁkhya Buddhi, the starting point of the series of *mental* fluctuations ;

——— 4, Nāma-rūpa—Corresponds to Sāṁkhya Ahaṁkāra, the principle of subjectivation or individualisation ;

——— 5, Shaḍāyatana (i. e., six indriyâyatanas working upon six vishayâyatanas)—Corresponds to Sāṁkhya elevenfold indriyas + pentad of Tanmātras ; the karmendriyas are not counted in the Buddhistic system ; the Tanmātras correspond to the vishayas, especially when it is remembered that the older* enumeration substituted viśeshas for the Tanmātras ;

——— 6, Sparśa—Corresponds probably to the Karmendriyas ;

——— 7 to 12—Contain nothing that need be objected to by any system of philosophy.

* That is, according to Jacobi, belonging to a time when the Sāṁkhya had yet to develop (or assimilate) the "Guṇa" theory. Guṇas correspond to the "dharmas" of the Buddhist theory.

Jacobi does not of course wish to suggest that the Buddhist "pratītyasamutpāda" is a slavish copy of the Sāṁkhya theory of cosmic evolution. But there appears to be sufficient conceptual parallelism between the two. There is thus some point in the remark that the terms of the Pratītyasamutpāda series contain no factor not already recognised by most systems. It is the mode of relation between the terms that differs from system to system.

—**Sūtra 19, line 9.** — The words "utpattimātranimittatvāt" of the sūtrapāṭha are changed to "saṁghātabhāvānimittatvāt" by Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha. The changed reading makes explicit what was implicit. It is thus a simpler reading and is likely to have been a deliberate change from the original *lectio difficilior* as Śaṅkarāchārya gives it.

—**Sūtra 19, line 12.** — See Sūtra 20, line 1-2. Śaṅkarāchārya's point here is that even though one of the terms of this series be credited with the power of producing the next term, how did the series *as a whole* and in a given fixed sequence come to be fashioned? Moreover the causal phenomenon as conceived by the Buddhists requires a number of "pratyayas" to simultaneously co-operate to produce a given result. Who calls these pratyayas to be present punctually at the time of origination; and if their simultaneous presence at a given place and in a given moment be a mere undesigned accident why should they, being accidently thrown together, necessarily help in the production of the joint result? Cannot one of the causal factors be permitted to say, after all I came here by chance: I see others working: I need not necessarily co-operate? And if it be said that, being present, they cannot but co-operate, that being their inborn nature, what are we in all soberness to think of a series of agents not one of whom really cares for his predecessor or his successor, and yet they all, as a series and almost in spite of themselves, seem to be uniting, as if ordained by Providence or pre-established harmony, to produce a joint and complicated artifact? Bhāmatī lays the finger accurately on the weakest spot in the argument when it says—

यत् खलु हेतूपनिबद्धं कार्यं तदन्यानपेक्षं हेतुमात्राधीनोत्पादत्वादुत्पद्यतां नाम। पञ्चस्कन्धसमुदायस्तु प्रत्ययोपनिबद्धो न हेतुमात्राधीनोत्पत्तिः, अपितु

नानाहेतुसमवधानजन्मा । नच चेतनमन्तरेणान्यः संनिधापयितास्ति कारणानामित्युक्तम् ॥ ...... । स्यादेतत् । अनपेक्षा एवान्त्यक्षणप्राप्ताः क्षित्यादयोऽङ्कुरमारभन्ते, तेषां तूपसर्पणप्रत्ययवशात् परस्परसमवधानम् । न चैकस्मादेव कारणात् कार्यसिद्धेः किमन्यैः कारणैरिति वाच्यम् । कारणचक्रानन्तरं कार्योत्पादात् सिद्धमित्येव नास्ति । न चैकोपि तत्कारणसमर्थ इत्यन्य उदासत इति युक्तम् । नहि ते प्रेक्षावन्तो येनैवमालोचयेयुरस्मासु समर्थ एकोपि कार्य इति कृतं नः संनिधिनेति । .... ॥ तन्न । यद्यन्तक्षणप्राप्ता अनपेक्षा स्वकार्योपजनने, हन्तानेन क्रमेण ततः पूर्वे ततः पूर्वे सर्व एवानपेक्षास्तत्तत्स्वकार्योपजनन इति...... .....कुसूल (granary) निहितबीज एव स्यात् कृती कृषीवलः, कृतमस्य दुःखबहुलेन कृषिकर्मणा । तस्मात् परस्परापेक्षा एवान्त्या वा मध्या वा पूर्वे वा क्षणाः कार्योपजनन इति वक्तव्यम् ॥

—**Sūtra 19, line 13.** — The point of the Buddhist opponent is this: We see the series actually in operation, one member of it originating another in succession; and we do not know of a someone or a something independent of the series that works the wheel of the series. Because *we* cannot understand how the series can go on working without the presence of an independent operator, that does not mean that the series does not work at all; for, "Na hi dṛishṭe 'nupapanaṁ nāma." We must necessarily assume that the series does function although there be no assignable *deus ex machina*. To this argument on the ground of "ākshepa" Vāchaspati-miśra makes the following reply—

किमाक्षेप उत्पादनम् आहो ज्ञापनम् । तत्र न तावत् कारणमन्यथानुपपद्यमानं कार्यमुत्पादयति, किंतु स्वसामर्थ्येन । तस्माज्ज्ञापनं व्यक्तव्यम् । तथाच ज्ञापितस्यान्यदुत्पादकं वक्तव्यम् । तच्च स्थिरपक्षेऽपि सत्यापि च भोक्तर्यधिष्ठातारं चेतनमन्तरेण न संभवति, किमङ्ग पुनः क्षणिकेषु भावेषु । भोक्तुर्भोगेनापि कदाचिदाक्षिप्येत संघातः, स तु भोक्तापि नास्तीति दूरोत्सारितत्वं दर्शयति—भोक्तृरहितेष्विति ।

—**Sūtra 19, line 16.** — The reference is to II. ii. 12, lines 25-34. There is involved here a rather difficult question of fixing the text of the bhāshya and its probable interpretation. In the text as printed in all the editions, the epithet "āśrayāśrayibhūteshu" can agree with "bhoktṛishu," while its converse in the next

line "āśrayāśrayiśūnyeshu" must go with "aṇushu." This seems a *prima facie* inconsistency, and to avoid it the Brahmavidyābharaṇa, Advaitānanda's commentary on the Śāṅkarabhāshya, says—

नित्येष्वाश्रयाश्रयिभूतेष्वणुष्वभ्युपगम्यमानेषु, भोक्तृषु च सत्स्वित्यन्वयः ।

The construction is not natural: the position of the conjunction "cha" practically rules it out. Assuming then that the first epithet qualifies "bhoktṛishu," as the Ratnaprabhā and Ānandagiri in fact definitely assert, what meaning can we give to it? The commentators render the term by "adṛishṭāśrayeshu," probably taking "āśraya" = "adṛishṭa," the bhoktṛi being regarded as the "āśrayin" with reference to it. This way of interpretation is questionable. The bhoktṛi or soul is the āśraya or ādhāra of the adṛishṭa, which is the āśrayin. If, ignoring the "dūrānvaya," we construe the passage with the Brahmavidyābharaṇa, the aṇus could properly be called the āśrayins of the soul who is the āśraya; but āśraya of what? Not of the atoms, but of the adṛishṭa which, in that mode of construing the passage, has to be supplied. The term "āśrayāśrayibhūteshu" is also rendered by "upakāryôpakārakabhūteshu." As the Brahmavidyābharaṇa explains—

यदन्वये परमाणूनां संघातोत्पत्तिर्यद्व्यतिरेके च न, तदुपकारकम्, उपकार्याः परमाणवः ।

The upakārakas would in this case be the bhoktṛis in so far as they are under the influence of adṛishṭa. But even this interpretation is not quite satisfactory, because "upakāryôpakārakabhāva" has to be predicated, in the first half of the sentence, of the souls, and is to be denied, in the latter half, of the atoms. As all the editions gave the same reading, it was necessary to consult Mss. Only three out of the nearly 15 Mss. consulted gave a variant for "āśrayāśrayibhūteshu." The Ms. No. 197 of the Viśrāmabāg collection read, for the word "āśrayāśrayibhūteshu" the suggestive reading of "āś*a*yâśra*ya*bhūteshu." This reading was confirmed by another Ānandāśrama Ms., while a third Ms. from the same library reads "āśrayâśra*ya*bhūteshu" which, although in itself meaningless, points to an even better reading. Now āśaya is, as explained in our note to II. ii. 18, line 18, a Buddhist technical term for "stream of conscious-

ness," and there is a point in Śaṅkarāchārya's using a technical term of the Buddhistic philosophy while expounding the Vaiśeshika system *to a Buddhist opponent.* See below (p. 145), Note to II. ii. 25[27ff.]. "Āśaya" is synonymous with "antaḥkaraṇa" or the mind; but what we expect in the present context is a Buddhistic synonym for "adṛishṭa." Such a synonym is *āsrava*: compare line 15 of the extract from the Bhāmatī quoted by us on page 129 before: sāsravaṁ cha manovijñānam. Vasubandhu divides "dharmas" into "sāsrava" and "anāsrava," the first group being explained in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (p. 13) as—

अथास्रवाणां य आश्रयास्ते सास्रवाः ।

Especially in view of the senseless reading "āśrayâśrayabhūteshu" we are justified in concluding that the original reading was "āsravāśrayabhūteshu" which gives an excellent sense, while changing "sra" to "śra" and substituting "yâ" for "vâ" under the influence of the following "āśrayâśrayi" (line 17-18) are by no means unusual scribal errors.

—Sūtra 19, line 17. — Ratnaprabhā and Ānandagiri say that "āśrayâśrayiśūnyeshu" is a variant reading—

आश्रयाश्रयिशून्येष्विति पाठे उपकार्योपकारकत्वशून्येष्वित्यर्थः ।

From this one would expect that editors of these commentaries would give in the bhāshya the reading which the commentators accept as original and explain. The editors fail us here, all alike adopting the reading "āśrayāśrayiśūnyeshu." Ratnaprabhā explains the original reading by—

आश्रयाश्रयः संघातकर्ता तच्छून्येष्वित्यर्थः ।

Probably the true reading here too should be—

आस्रवाश्रयः संघातकर्ता तच्छून्येष्वित्यर्थः ।

and careful Mss. of Ratnaprabhā would, probably, confirm it. At the same time, however, the reading mentioned as a pāṭhāntara by the commentators is likely to be the original reading in line 17-18. Bhāmatī knows only the reading "āśrayâśrayiśūnyeshu," explaining it by "upakāryôpakārakabhāvaśūnyeshu," and as an attribute to the atoms it gives a good sense. The con-

fusion between "āsravâśrayabhūteshu" and "āśrayâśrayiśūnyeshu" in two contiguous clauses of opposed tenor is very easily explicable.

—**Sūtra 19, line 23.** — The term "pudgala" is thus explained—

पूर्यते गलति चेति पुद्गलो देहः ।

It means any mass of matter which is capable of an accretion and a depletion of parts.

—**Sūtra 19, line 25.** — The Buddhists accepted wholesale the doctrine of karman and of the transmigration of the individual. They speak of the anterior births of the Buddha (compare the "Jātaka" stories), and have developed the doctrine of the Bodhisattvas, who are to be Buddhas in a subsequent life. These assumptions of theirs would be meaningless if there be no identical personality enduring through the successive lives and passing through a variety of experiences consistently with its karman. And of course mind or Āśaya or Ālayavijñāna cannot take the place of that enduring personality, because, according to the hypothesis, mind itself is changing every moment. And to argue that though a new mind arises every moment, each succeeding mind preserves the main features of its predecessor intact, is practically to concede the existence of something that does endure; and then it would be only "nāmamātre vivādaḥ" or a fight for mere words.

—**Sūtra 19, line 28ff.** — The following dialogue between a Buddhist Bhikshu and a Jain Kshapaṇaka as given in the Prabodhachandrodaya (Act III) will be found to have precisely hit the point of Śaṅkarāchārya's contention—

क्षपणकः । भण दाव क्खणविण्णासिणा तुए कस्स किदे वदं धालिअदि ।

भिक्षुः । अरे श्रूयताम् । अस्मत्संततौ पतितः कश्चिद्विज्ञानलक्षणः समुच्छिन्नवासनो मोक्ष्यते ।

क्षपणकः । अले मुक्ख । जइ कस्सिं वि मण्णन्तले कोवि मुक्को भविस्सादि तद्दा दे संपदं पणट्ठस्स किदे केलिसं उवआलं कलिस्सदि ।

—**Sūtra 20, line 1ff.** — Ratnaprabhā brings out the relation between the present and the preceding sūtra as follows—

द्विविधो हि कार्यसमुत्पादः सुगतसंमतो, हेत्वधीनः कारणसमुदायाधीनश्च। तत्राविद्यातः संस्कारस्ततो विज्ञानमित्येवंरूपः प्रथमः, पृथिव्यादिसमुदायात् काय इत्येवं द्वितीयः। तत्राद्यमङ्गीकृत्य द्वितीयः संघातकर्त्रभावेन दूषितः। संप्रत्याद्यं दूषयति सूत्रकारः—उत्तरेति॥

—Sūtra 20, line 5. — If the "Nirodha," the Buddhist technical term for "vināśa" or destruction, were a process occupying an appreciable time, then "Nirudhyamānatā" would imply the beginning of the process while "Niruddhatā" would denote its conclusion. Since, however, the process is a mere momentary event, we cannot distinguish between its beginning and end, both being alike evanescent. This exact distinction between 'Nirudhyamāna" and "Niruddha," is thus brought out by the Brahmavidyābharaṇa—

उत्तरक्षणोत्पत्तिकाल एव यस्याव्यवहितपूर्वक्षणस्य नाशः स निरुध्यमानः। पूर्वमेव नष्टो निरुद्धः।

—Sūtra 20, line 9. — A thing comes into existence as a kārya of its predecessor in the series, and it passes out of existence as the kāraṇa of its successor. Now, the "kārya" nature of a thing must be distinguished from its "kāraṇa" nature : the one must be transformed into the other, such transformation being regarded as the life-purpose of the thing. Thus there result the three instants in the life of a thing : its origination as kārya, its transformation into the kāraṇa, and its passing away after causing the origination of the next member of the series. This implies duration for *three* moments or "trikshaṇasthāyitva" at the very least, which it is the Vaiśeshikas and not the Buddhists who admit. We, however, know from other sources that the Sarvâstivādins actually believed in this doctrine of limited permanence. "The substratum of everything" they asserted, "is eternal and permanent. What changes every moment is merely the phase of the thing." But it seems evident nevertheless that the Brahmasūtras did not know of this doctrine, which makes the position a close approach to the Jain view of the matter. It must therefore have been a subsequent development. Besides, we have to remember that the Sarvâstivādins were divided into a number of schools with varying shades of opinions; and it is not unlikely that the

school from which the author of the Brahmasūtras derived his information was different from the one the tenets of which are generally accepted as the orthodox Sarvâstivāda philosophy. It is quite unbelievable that, Bādarāyaṇa or Śaṅkara should have deliberately perverted the doctrine on such vital issues. It may also be noted in passing that in accepting the doctrine of "pariṇāminityatva" or the noumenal permanence, the Sarvâstivādins have departed from the original teaching of the Buddha, which, in this respect, would seem to have been more faithfully preserved by the Vijñāna- and the Śūnya-vādins.

—**Sūtra 21, line 3.**—The four pratyayas are thus enunciated by Nāgārjuna (Madhyamaka-Kārikās, i. 2)—

चत्वारः प्रत्यया हेतुश्चालम्बनमनन्तरम् ।
तथैवाधिपतेयं च प्रत्ययो नास्ति पञ्चमः ॥

and are explained by the commentators as follows :—

आलम्बनप्रत्ययः, समनन्तरप्रत्ययः, अधिपतिप्रत्ययः, सहकारिप्रत्ययश्चेति चतुर्विधा हेतवः । तत्रालम्बनप्रत्ययो विषयः, यथा नीलविज्ञानस्य नीलवस्तु । समनन्तरप्रत्ययः पूर्वज्ञानम्, बौद्धमते हि क्षणिकज्ञानसंततौ पूर्वज्ञानमुत्तरज्ञानस्य कारणम्, तदेव च मन इत्युच्यते । अधिपतिरिन्द्रियं चक्षुरादिरूपम् । सहकारिप्रत्ययश्चालोकः ॥ तत्रालम्बनप्रत्ययस्य ज्ञानसमकालत्वमपेक्षितम्, हेतुतया च तत्पूर्ववर्तित्वम् । समनन्तरप्रत्ययेन संस्काररूपेण ज्ञानस्य बोधरूपता जायते । अधिपतिप्रत्ययो ज्ञानस्य रूपादिविषयतां नियच्छति । सहकारिप्रत्ययाच्च ज्ञानस्य स्पष्टता जायते ॥

This theory lays down that, for any intellectual or emotional event, the simultaneous co-operation of a number of factors is required. The object has to endure throughout the process of cognition and even prior to it if not also subsequent to it; and the same holds true of the sense-organ and of the light, if not also of the past impressions, which enter so largely into the constitution of any present cognition. If, therefore, it were to be urged that the hetu (niruddha-kshaṇa) need not exist at the same time as the effect (asati hetau, kāryakāle iti śeshaḥ—Brahmavidyābharaṇa) that would not be consistent with the doctrine of the four-fold pratyayas as giving rise to all the varied phenomena of our mental and emotional life. Chittam = jñānam; Chaittāḥ = sukhādayaḥ.

—**Sūtra 21, line 6.** — The word "saṁskāra" (Pāli, saṁkhāra =composite things) is the Buddhist synonym for Padārtha or Bhāva or Dharma. "Sarvaṁ kshaṇikam" is one of the three cardinal tenets of Buddhism, and the last words of Gotama Buddha—"Vayadhammā saṁkhārā : appamādena sampādethā ti (All composite or 'confected' things are liable to mutation. Achieve it then with heedfulness)" revert to the same dogma. Compare—

आद्यन्तवन्तो भावाः संस्काराः, संस्क्रियन्ते समुत्पद्यन्ते इति व्युत्पत्त्या ।

An attempt to escape from the evident intention of these words is to lay particular stress upon 'saṁkhārā.' It is saṁskṛita things, which arise out of the compounding or mingling together of constituents, that alone are transitory. The "asaṁskṛita" things are permanent. And then the question arises as to whether there are any positive asaṁskṛita things that can be named. This leaves the door open for later theorists who, as we shall presently see, made even the "Śūnya" of the Mādhyamika philosophers a real positive existence. But whether the Buddha intended to teach the doctrine of noumenal permanence may seriously be doubted. He was at any rate most cautious in his expression, and certain direct questions about transphenomenal problems he straightway refused to answer (avyākṛita).

—**Sūtra 22, line 1ff.** — The words "buddhibodhyam" etc. look like a quotation, but it cannot be traced. The Abhidharmakośa gives a Kārikā which agrees in sense, viz.—

अनास्रवा मार्गसत्यं त्रिविधं चाप्यसंस्कृतम् ।

The implication is that the three are not buddhi-bodhya, saṁskṛita, and kshaṇika, *i. e.*, they are permanent self-subsistent entities the nature of which passes our comprehension. The Pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha is thus explained—

संख्या बुद्धिः, प्रतिकूला संख्या प्रतिसंख्या, घटं नाशयामीति बुद्ध्या दण्डाद्युद्यम्य क्रियमाणो घटनाशः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः ।

The deliberate sublation not only of one or more objects but, through Right Knowledge, of the entire saṁsāra, with all its

attendant kleśas, is, as Śaṅkarāchārya says, a case of this Nirodha. The Apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha is thus explained—

स्वरसभङ्गुराणां स्तम्भादीनां प्रतिक्षणं जायमानः सूक्ष्मः अकुशलैरवगन्तु-मशक्यो विनाशः अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः ।

Examples of this are the day-to-day friction with the wind etc. which causes new and rough surfaces of stone or wood to become smooth, and all such gradual though imperceptible operations of natural forces. A case of such an Apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha would be the disappearance into the limbo of the Past of all those moments or momentary phenomena which we might have observed but did not observe through reasons such as absent-mindedness. "Such an unrealised possibility of the perception of the dharmas, passing from the future stage of 'will be perceived' into the past stage of 'were not perceived', without touching the present stage of 'being perceived' by one whose attention was otherwise engrossed, is an example of Apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha." What are in reality only two special cases of Pratisaṁkhyā and Apratisaṁkhyā Nirodhas have often been regarded as the only possible cases of them, as when Vasubandhu tells us that "the true characteristic of Pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha is deliverance from bondage. It is the *dharma* par excellence amongst all the *dharmas* the supreme goal amongst goals, the highest of all things, the noblest of all reasons, the greatest of all achievements." It is, in other words, synonymous with Nirvāṇa, being the extirpation of the kleśas by means of knowledge, or more precisely speaking, their transmutation into Bodhi. Compare the well-known, but ungrammatically expressed, dictum—

यः क्लेशः तद्बोधि, यत् संसारं तन्निर्वाणम् ।

Śaṅkarāchārya seems, on this point, to be truer—or at any rate nearer—the original form of the doctrine of the Nirodhas than some of the later writers of the Sarvâstivāda school.

—**Sūtra 22, line 3.** — That the three are "avastu" or immaterial (not however unreal) follows from the fact that according to the Buddhist philosophy, "saṁkhāras" alone are material, while these three are classed as "asaṁskṛita-dharmas." See the table on page 120, before. That they are "abhāvamātra"

probably implies that they are incapable of giving birth to other evanescent dharmas, as is the case with all other momentary existences. By the epithet "nirupākhya" Śaṅkarāchārya probably refers to their indescribability. Ratnaprabhā renders the word by 'nissvarūpa.' Yamakami Sōgen suggests that Śaṅkara's 'nirupākhya' is a mistake for 'nīrūpākhya,' rūpa being the Sarvāstivāda synonym for matter. But then, what is the distinction between avastu and nīrūpākhya? In view of the fact that one of the Nirodhas can be identified with Nirvāṇa, the undefined and undefinable *summum bonum* of the Buddhists, we think that Śaṅkarāchārya is correct in his use and interpretation of the epithet in question.

—**Sūtra 22, line 8** ff.—Śaṅkarāchārya's point is this. If, according to the doctrine of the momentariness of things, everything is coming into existence and at once passing out of existence, ushering in, as it disappears, another thing which is to repeat the same process, what is the need and purpose of a special "nirodha" with its two sub-divisions? This nirodha must achieve a destruction other than what overtakes the things every moment. If the whole pillar, for instance, is being destroyed and re-created moment after moment, what is the point in telling us that the edges of the pillar are slowly becoming smooth and glossy? The new series of pillars with smoothened edges, *ex hypothesi*, have nothing to do with the old series, and so it is immaterial whether one of these pillars happens to be more smooth than the other, assuming for the moment that we can make such a comparison. Let us then imagine that the function of the nirodha consists in inhibiting the production of a new momentary existence from the preceding momentary existence. If now the preceding momentary existence is in this way unable to originate the following momentary existence, it is as good as non-existence, because existence to the Buddhists means functioning. Compare the stanza ascribed in the Bodhicharyāvatārapañjikā (ix. 6) to the Buddha himself—

क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्कारा अस्थिराणां कुतः क्रिया ।
भूतिर्येषां क्रिया सैव कारकं सैव चोच्यते ॥

And if the preceding momentary existence is non-existing, that argues for the non-existence of all the preceding series of

momentary existences, so that with the snapping away of the last link in the chain of "saṁtāna" the whole chain falls to pieces, which however must be regarded as an untoward contingency. Compare the Ratnaprabhā—

संतानो नाम भावानां हेतुफलभावेन प्रवाहः । तस्मिन् संताने चरमक्षणः क्षणान्तरं करोति वा न वा । आद्ये चरमत्वव्याघातः, संतानाविच्छेदात् । द्वितीये चरमस्यासत्त्वप्रसङ्गः, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं सत्त्वमिति त्वत्सिद्धान्तात् । चरमस्यासत्त्वे पूर्वेषामप्यसत्त्वप्रसङ्गः, अर्थक्रियाशून्यत्वात् । अनेन क्रमेणासन्तः सर्व एव संतानिन इति कस्य निरोधः ॥

Consequently the "nirodha" can neither be applicable to the series viewed as a whole, nor as producing its sublative effect upon a given solitary member in the series.— And even ignoring the doctrine of the series of momentary existences, the question remains whether anything (whether momentary or ortherwise) can at all disappear leaving absolutely no trace of it behind, as the doctrine of "Nirodha" requires us to assume. As the Gītā says (ii. 16)—

नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।

Finally, the special case of Apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha, as Vasubandhu explains it, can also be refuted by the same argument as above. For, even if we do not raise the ultimate issues such as "who or what it is that can ignore the things before it, and remain engrossed by something else," it is still pertinent to ask—If things are to pass away whether anyone looks at them or not, why make a special case of things that translate themselves from the Future into the Past without touching the border of the conscious Present? The special case of the Pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha, viz. nirvāṇa, is taken up in the next sūtra.

—**Sūtra 22, line 12f.**—Compare the Bhāmatī—

स्यादेतत् । तप्तोपलतलपतितनष्टस्य तूदबिन्दोः किमस्ति रूपमन्वायि प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानं येनास्य न निरन्वयो नाशः स्यादिति चेत्, शक्यं तत्र वक्तुम् —

उदबिन्दौ च सिन्धौ च तोयभावो न भिद्यते ।
विनष्टेऽपि ततो बिन्दावस्ति तस्यान्वयोऽम्बुधौ ॥

[तत्रोभयत्र तोयत्वसामान्यं न भिद्यत इत्यर्थः ।

—Sūtra 22, line 13.—The word "avichchhedāt" from the sūtra is interpreted in two different ways in the Bhāshya: (i) because of the non-interruption of the Series; (ii) because of the absence of absolute distinctness (vichchheda) between what goes away (ghaṭa) and what takes its place (mṛittikā).

—Sūtra 23, line 1.—Bhāskarāchārya apparently did not read our sūtra 23. An identically worded sūtra occurs (no. 16) in the Vaiśeshika refutation. The Bhāshyakāras who do read it, interpret it very differently—

शंकर, वल्लभ, श्रीनिवास — सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्वा, स्वयमेव वा, जायमाने प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधे दोषप्रसङ्गः।

रामानुज, श्रीकण्ठ —तुच्छाज्जगदुत्पत्तौ, जगतश्च तुच्छतापत्तौ, दोषप्रसङ्गः।

निम्बार्क—संतानस्य संतानिव्यतिरिक्तवस्तुत्वाभावात्, संतानिनां च क्षणिकत्वात्, प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाख्यो मोक्षोऽनुपपन्नः।

विज्ञानभिक्षु—निरोधद्वयानङ्गीकारे मोक्षानुपपत्तिः, अङ्गीकारे कार्यकारणप्रवाहभङ्गः, इत्युभयथापि दोषः।

मध्व—कारणे सति कार्यं भवत्येवेति नियमपक्षे, तदभावपक्षे च दोषः।

Most of the commentators are either too brief or very unsatisfactory in their explanation of the "ubhayathā-dosha." In connection with this it is to be noted that certain editions (particularly the one on which Deussen's German translation is based) read in line one—

प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधान्तःपाती

in place of—

प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधान्तःपाती

which is probably a dittography under the influence of the wording of sūtra 22. The reading is clearly wrong.

—Sūtra 23, line 2f.—Śaṅkarāchārya's words leave no doubt that he attributes to his opponents the view that things perish automatically and without a cause. It is difficult to understand what exactly Śaṅkarāchārya has in his mind. The doctrine of Momentariness implies that things originate and perish

in one moment, or at any rate originate in one moment and perish in the next moment. Compare Nyāyamañjarī, p. 447—

सर्वदा कार्यानुत्पादात् कारकावस्था नूनमेकक्षणस्थायिनी भावानामभ्युपगन्तव्या ।

But this destruction of things moment after moment cannot be the "nirhetuka-vināśa-abhyupagma" that Śaṅkarāchārya here alludes to. For, according to the doctrine, just as the preceding moment in the series is regarded as the cause of the origin of the succeeding moment, even so, the succeeding moment can well be regarded as the cause of the destruction of the preceding moment, so that there is no *Nirhetuka* vināśa. To quote the Nyāyamañjarī again—

तस्मात् सिद्धं यत् कारकं यच्च सत् तत् क्षणिकमिति । अतश्च क्षणभङ्गिनो भावाः प्रलयं प्रति हेतुनिरपेक्षत्वात् ।

As another explanation, we might begin by distinguishing between the normal destruction of momentary existences within the chain of causation and the destruction of the chain as a whole, which last takes place only at the time of Nirvāṇa. Now, the "Pratisaṁkhyā" or the True Knowledge which is to effect the cessation of the Avidyā chain must be supposed to be outside the chain; otherwise it cannot destroy the chain. But according to the Buddhist hypothesis all existing things are comprised within the chain. The "Pratisaṁkhyā" must therefore be out of the sphere of existence or, in other words, non-existent. Destruction by a mere non-existence is not possible; for, as Vallabha observes—

नहि वन्ध्यापुत्रेण रज्जुसर्पो नाश्यते ।

But this does not explain how the Buddhists would be compelled to give up their *assumption*, as Śaṅkarāchārya asserts. It may be noted that Vallabhāchārya does not refer to any Buddhist assumption of the kind at all. — The Brahmavidyābharaṇa has another way of explaining the difficulty. It seems to say that although there may not be an actual abhyupagama of the kind on the part of the Sarvâstivādins, they ought to have, consistently with their theory, made that abhyupagama. And assuming that they do make the abhyupagama to which they are logically driven, Śaṅkarāchārya, we are assured, shows that they will be compelled to abandon that abhyupagama. One

should have thought that an abhyupagama to which they were driven they would most gladly surrender, if need be. The words of the Brahmavidyābharaṇa are—

> यद्यप्यप्रतिसंख्यानिरोध एव निर्हेतुकः परेणोपेयते, प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधस्तु तत्तत्कारणविशेषायत्त एव, तथापि मुमुक्षोः साधकस्य क्षणिकतया मोक्षकालेऽवस्थानासंभवेन साधने प्रवृत्त्ययोगात् परेणाविद्यायाः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधोपि निर्हेतुक एवोपेय इत्यापाद्य इदं दूषणं द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

The explanation given is not accordingly quite satisfactory.— The other commentators are all tantalisingly silent on the point. Sōgen therefore asserts, "Śāṅkara is here guilty of a grave misrepresentation," inasmuch as the doctrine of "nirhetukavināśa" or causeless destruction is absolutely unknown in Buddhism, which has always maintained that nothing can ever happen without adequate causes and conditions. We rather think that Śaṅkarāchārya has here in mind some Buddhist doctrine which holds that the Nirvāṇa or cessation of kleśas is something which everyone is going to achieve one day or the other. We have fallen into the stream and are sure one day to reach the ocean. Every man is potentially the Buddha. The *primitive* Buddhist view regarded the Nirvāṇa as a thing to be attained by deliberate and sustained effort in a particular direction. The *later* view, which cannot have been unknown to Aśvaghosha, and which is implied in the following quotation from the Milindapañha (p. 268-69) makes the Nirvāṇa the inevitable birth-right of all; it is not born of karman, and can therefore be called nirhetuka--

> निब्बानं महाराज अकम्मजं अहेतुजं अनुतुजं ॥ .... । मा भन्ते नागसेन जिनवचनं मक्खेहि, मा अजानित्वा पञ्हं व्याकरोहीति ! .... । अनेकसतेहि पन भन्ते नागसेन कारणेहि भगवता सावकानं निब्बानस्स सच्छिकिरियाय मग्गो अक्खातो, अथ च पन त्वं एवं वदेसि—अहेतुजं निब्बाणं ति ॥ .... । एवमेव खो महाराज, सक्का निब्बानस्स सच्छिकिरियाय मग्गो अक्खातुं, न सक्का निब्बानस्स उप्पादाय हेतु दस्सेतुं । .... । असंखतं निब्बानं, न केहिचि कतं । निब्बानं महाराज न वत्तब्बं उप्पन्नं ति वा, अनुप्पन्नं ति वा, उप्पादनियं ति वा, अतीतं ति वा,

अनागतं ति वा, पच्चुप्पन्नं ति वा, चक्खुविञ्ञेय्यं ति वा, सोतविञ्ञेय्यं ति वा, ... कायविञ्ञेय्यं ति वा ॥

This is inconsistent; and Śaṅkarāchārya is bringing home to the Buddhist, in the very words of King Milinda or Menander, this inherent incompatibility of the doctrine of Nirvāṇa by following the Noble Eight-fold Path with the doctrine that the Nirvāṇa is *nirhetuka.* This doctrine, it may be noted in passing, is analogous to the Vedāntic doctrine that the moksha is neither utpādya, nor vikārya, nor prāpya, nor saṁskārya (see Śāṅkarabhāshya on I. i. 4). There is thus no "grave misrepresentation" on the part of Śaṅkara, but grave ignorance on the part of those who accuse him of it in this particular case.

—**Sūtra 23, line 4.** — The "mārga" is the "Noble Eight-fold Path," or "Ariyo Aṭṭhaṅgiko Maggo." It consists of (1) Samyag-drishṭi, (2) Samyak-saṁkalpa, (3) Samyag-vāch; (4) Samyak-karmânta, (5) Samyag-ājīva, (6) Samyag-vyāyāma, (7) Samyak-smṛiti, and (8) Samyak-samādhi. Of these eight, Samyag-dṛishṭi consists in mastering the four Noble Truths or "ariyasachchāni," *viz.*, dukkham, dukkhasamudayo, dukkhanirodho, and dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā. For details of the other terms see Dīghanikāya, xxii. 18–21.

—**Sūtra 24, line 2.** — In the two preceding sūtras Śaṅkara has indeed not proved that the two nirodhas are not "nirupākhya," that is, that they are "sopākhya;" all that he has proved is that the nirodhas are as such impossible: they are not avastu, abhāvarūpa, etc., as postulated; but what they are he has not exactly said, although perhaps we can say that they are, if anything, just the opposites of these in nature. He now wants to prove that the "ākāśa" is also a bhāvarūpa-vastu.

—**Sūtra 24, line 7.** — The syllogism to prove the existence of the ākāśa as a distinct dravya is thus stated—

(i) शब्दो विशेषगुणः, चक्षुर्ग्रहणायोग्यबहिरिन्द्रियग्राह्यजातिमत्त्वात्, स्पर्शवत् ।

This proves that śabda is a guṇa.

(ii) शब्दो द्रव्यसमवेतः, गुणत्वात्, संयोगवत् ।

This proves that śabda must reside upon some dravya.

(iii) शब्दः पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रितः अष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति समवायकारणवत्त्वात् । यन्नैवम् तन्नैवम्, यथा रूपम् ॥

This proof by the method of exhaustion establishes the existence of the ākāśa as a distinct dravya.

—Sūtra 24, line 8. —The Abhidharmakośa-śāstra of Vasubandhu has the following description of ākāśa—

> " Freedom from obstruction is the sole characteristic of ākāśa and it is owing to this characteristic that the activity of material things is rendered possible."

The bird in the cage has its flight obstructed and so it cannot soar into the open ākāśa. The nature of ākāśa is, not to obstruct the flight in any direction whatsoever. This gives the ākāśa the character of an infinite all-pervading entity. And it is avastu because it is immaterial. It obstructs nothing and cannot itself be obstructed by anything.

—Sūtra 24, line 11. —Śaṅkara's argument is subtle, but quite cogent. The absence of a ghaṭa in the room comes to an end by somebody bringing in the ghaṭa. The absence of a white crow in the world can similarly be destroyed by the chance discovery of such a species, say, in the polar region. Howsoever widespread the absence might be, it is liable to be destroyed by one contrary instance. Now ākāśa is "āvaraṇābhāvamātram," and if one āvaraṇa exists anywhere, *e. g.*, the cage of the bird, or even the presence of one flying bird overhead, āvaraṇābhāva must come to an end. In the case of the ghaṭa in the room destroying the ghāṭābhāva in that room (but not in any other room), we distinguish betwen the abhāvas according to their "anuyogins," but that is so because space is a reality capable of division into parts. The abhāva *qua* abhāva is not affected by the size of its anuyogin. Hence Śaṅkarāchārya's argument that when one bird is flying into the ākāśa, the ākāśa which alone makes the flight possible being destroyed, another bird cannot fly, unless we imagine that the ākāśa itself (or some other entity like space) is Vastusvarūpa and so capable of division into parts.

—**Sūtra 24, line 12.** — The passage which Śaṅkarāchārya means is given in Yaśomitra's Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā as follows —

उक्तं हि भगवता । पृथिवी भो गौतम कुत्र प्रतिष्ठिता । पृथिवी ब्राह्मण अब्मण्डले प्रतिष्ठिता । अब्मण्डलं भो गौतम क्व प्रतिष्ठितम्। वायुप्रतिष्ठितम् । वायुर्भो गौतम क्व प्रतिष्ठितः । आकाशे प्रतिष्ठितः । आकाशं भो गौतम कुत्र प्रतिष्ठितम् । अतिसरसि महाब्राह्मण, अतिसरसि महाब्राह्मण । आकाशं ब्राह्मण अप्रतिष्ठितम् ॥

For a similar situation, of which this may have been possibly an echo, compare the Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishad, III. vi and viii. —Bhāskarāchārya quotes a stanza, purporting to be the words of the Buddha, where the existence of the ākāśa as an existing entity is clearly admitted—

आकाशस्य स्थितिर्यावद्यावच्च जगतः स्थितिः ।
तावन्मम स्थितिर्भूयाज्जगद्दुःखानि निघ्नतः ॥

The stanza is quoted in the Bodhicharyāvatārapañjikā under i. 33.

—**Sūtra 24, line 22.** — The argument is analogous to that given in II. i. 18^{44-58}.

—**Sūtra 25, line 1ff.** — The orthodox Sarvâstivādins seem not to have ascribed momentariness to the things themselves but only to their phases. "The cause never perishes but only changes its name when it becomes an effect, having changed its state. For example, clay becomes jar having changed its state ; and in this case the *name* clay is lost and the *name* jar arises." Mr. Sōgen even suggests that Śaṅkara's doctrine of causality is here anticipated and may even have been borrowed from the Sarvâstivādins. He conveniently ignores that Śaṅkara is merely expounding the Brahmasūtras, and that the Chhāndogya Upanishad had certainly preceded all the disputants in the field. It must therefore be assumed that the doctrine that "the phase of a thing or person changes every moment while its substratum is eternal and permanent," is a later development within the Buddhist school, and not the original doctrine of Buddhism as known to the author of the Brahmasūtras.

—**Sūtra 25, line 17ff.** — The usual illustrations given to prove the illusion of identity and permanence while in reality there is a momentary succession of similarities are: (i) the flowing river-stream, (ii) the burning flame of the lamp, and (iii) the *jaladharapaṭalam* or a patch of clouds (perching on the hill-top).

—**Sūtra 25, line 23ff.** — There seems to be a confusion here between what is transient and what is simple. Because a thing or a sensation or an idea is to last only for a moment, that is no reason why its content must be simple. A very complex idea and even a succession of such complex ideas might in one moment flit across the mind. Compare the usual illustration of "śatapatra-patraśata-vedha" by just one prick of the needle. In fact none of our ideas—however short their duration—are so simple as to comprise just one datum of sense and no more although neither the Buddhists, nor their opponents for the matter of that, seem to have recognised this fact. The whole argument hence is vitiated by this misconception. Bergson, the modern champion of the Doctrine of Momentariness, has, it may be added, secured considerable plausibility for his view by recognising the manifold and highly complex nature of the contents of the transient and successive mind-phases.

—**Sūtra 25, line 27ff.** — In arguing with his opponent Śaṅkarāchārya uses the technical terms of the other school with an easy familiarity. Hence the use of the expression "buddhi-saṁtāna." Compare II. ii. 19^{16}.

—**Sūtra 26, line 1ff.** — Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha assert that the objection in this sūtra has a special application only to the Sautrāntika. Madhva is peculiar in referring sūtras 26 and 27 to the Śūnyavādins. Other Bhāshyakāras generally agree with Śaṅkara's interpretation. With Śaṅkara's interpretation the question arises, what new objection and new argumentation does the present sūtra urge that has not already been urged in passages like II. ii. 20^{5-12}? Having opened the discussion of the internal or subjective phenomena with sūtra 25 (line 1 f.) it is awkward that there should be a return to the discussion of external things in sūtra 26, especially when there is no new point to be brought forward. It is also necessary that, having disposed of the Vaibhāshika view concerning the reality of the external world,

Śaṅkarāchārya (and the Sūtrakāra) should have something to say against the Sautrāntika view of the inferability of the external world. Hence Rāmānuja's application of the present sūtra for that purpose seems fairly justified.—Rāmānuja begins by observing—

एवं तावद्वैभाषिकसौत्रान्तिकयोर्बाह्यार्थास्तित्ववादिनोः साधारणानि दूषणान्युक्तानि । तत्र यदुक्तं—संप्रयुक्तस्यार्थस्य ज्ञानोत्पत्तिकालेऽनवस्थितत्वान्न कस्यचिदर्थस्य ज्ञानविषयत्वं संभवतीति, तत्र सौत्रान्तिकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥

Rāmānuja states the Sautrāntike view as follows—

ज्ञाने स्वाकारं समर्प्य विनष्टोऽप्यर्थो ज्ञानगतेन नीलाद्याकारेणानुमीयते ।

And his refutation takes the line that the *bimba* of the past moment cannot give rise to a *pratibimba* in the present moment. At the same time it so happens that the line of argumentation followed against the Sautrāntikas can be made to have a wider application, such as is given to it in Śaṅkara's interpretation. The Brahmavidyābharaṇa has perceived the drift clearly, when, after explaining the interpretation of Śaṅkarāchārya, it says—

एतेन सौत्रान्तिकपक्षोऽपि निराकृतः । तेहीत्थं कल्पयन्ति—अयं घट इति चाक्षुषज्ञाने न वर्तमानो घटो विषयः, अपि तु संनिकर्षाश्रयः स्वहेतुः पूर्वक्षणः स्वप्रतिबिम्बं ज्ञानाकारमर्पयति । स एवायं घट इति । ज्ञानविषयो बाह्यस्तु प्रतिबिम्बस्य बिम्बपूर्वकत्वानियमादनुमेय इति । तन्निराकरणं तु—यथा असतो नोपादानत्वमेवमसतः पूर्वक्षणस्य न प्रतिबिम्बार्पकता । लोके प्रतिबिम्बसमकालानामेव मुखादीनां बिम्बत्वदर्शनात् ॥

—**Sūtra 26, line 3.** —The words "Nānupamṛidya prādurbhāvāt" are also quoted in Nyāyasūtra iv. i. 14 as a pūrvapaksha view. I have not been able to trace its ultimate source.

—**Sūtra 26, line 28f.** —For the abhyupagama in line 28 see II. ii. 21, line 3, and our Note on the same. For the abhyupagama in line 29, see II. ii. 18, lines 6–11 and Notes thereon.

—**Sūtra 27, line 1.** —The interpreters (e. g., Rāmānuja) who limit the application of sūtra II. ii. 26 to the Sautrāntikas only, want to extend the application of the present sūtra to both the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāshikas. The wording of the sūtra suggests, however, a direct reference to the preceding sūtra; and

it was this circumstance that probably led Śaṅkarāchārya to interpret sūtra 26 in the way he does. The wording of sūtras II. ii. 26, 27 contains nothing that would justify Madhva's interpretation of them as a refutation of the Śūnyavāda.

—**Sūtra 27, line 7.** — The following is a brief summary of the arguments which Śaṅkarāchārya has used, in what is known as the "Samudāya" adhikaraṇa (sūtras II. ii. 18–27), against the two Buddhist schools of Sarvâstivāda philosophy—

1. Multiplicity of schools and divergence of views, II. ii. 18^{3-6}, II. ii. 25^{27-29}, II. ii. 32 ;
2. Physical and psychical aggregates in the absence of some sentient cause of aggregation not possible, II. ii. 18^{15-20};
3. The cycle of twelve Nidānas can possibly explain solitary individual events, but their ordered symmetry and succession remains unexplained, II. ii. 19^{9-25}, and can have no assignable purpose even if we somehow succeed in explaining it, II. ii. 19^{25-29};
4. Even the individual events cannot however be explained by reason of the acceptance of the doctrine of the momentariness of things, II. ii. 20^{2-22}, which, on no possible hypothesis, can ever be successfully defended, II. ii. 21 ;
5. The untenability of the two Nirodhas, II. ii. 22 ;
6. The unsound and inconsistent view about "nirhetuka-vināśa" and "pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha" as exemplified in the attainment of the Nirvāṇa; also about "Ākāśa," II. ii. 24 ;
7. The doctrine of momentariness, when applied to facts of inward experience (*e. g.*, memory), becomes absolutely untenable, II. ii. 25, as leading to all sorts of inconvenient consequences ;
8. The doctrine assumes the production of what is called "sat" from what is admitted to be "asat," which is impossible, II. ii. 26^{1-20}, II. ii. 27. Change implies permanence as its basis; otherwise it would not be felt as change, II. ii. 26^{21-25}.

—**Sūtra 28, line 1ff.** —For the distinction between the Hīnayāna which developed what Śaṅkarāchārya here calls the Bāhyārthavāda" and the Mahāyāna which gave rise to the two systems of thought known as the "Vijñānavāda" and the "Śūnyavāda" compare our Note on page 118 before. Historically the Śūnyavāda is earlier than the Vijñānavāda, because Nāgārjuna the reputed founder of the first is placed circa 170–200 after Christ, while Asaṅga the reputed founder of the last is assigned to about A. D. 350. The so-called "founders" of these philosophies, it is now generally recognised, are, however, no more than their most successful expounders or systematisers, since germs of these doctrines have been traced in works produced towards the beginning of the Christian era. There is, therefore, some justification here for abandoning the purely historical, in preference to the more or less logical, method of presentation which seems to have been followed by the Bhāshyakāra. Whether the Sūtrakāra intended to direct this Adhikaraṇa against the Vijñānavāda, or against the Śūnyavāda (as is contended by Jacobi), is a point to which we will revert towards the end of this Adhikaraṇa.

—**Sūtra 28, line 4.** —The Vijñānavādins recognise only one (the Vijñāna) out of the five Skandhas or agglomerates which are recognised by the Sarvâstivādins: see Note to II. ii. 18, line 10. They refute the other four aggregates (which presuppose the external world) by arguments involving the "Prasaṅga" (=parasya anishṭâpādanam) or the *Reductio ad absurdum* method of attack. A good example of this method is to be found in lines 8–12 below. As a destructive weapon it could be rendered almost irresistible, and in fact the Brahmasūtrakāra (to say nothing of Śaṅkarāchārya) has himself adopted it in several places (see II. iii. 32; the word *prasaṅga* is used five times in the sūtras, and *prasakti* twice). The mode of argumentation labours under the serious drawback of not requiring any positive thesis or a definite point of view to maintain, and it could accordingly come under the class of Vitaṇḍā, which is defined as "Pratipakshasthāpanāhīno jalpaḥ." The Vijñānavādin has, as we will presently notice, employed certain independent positive arguments also in support of his position.

—Sūtra 28, lines 6ff.—On behalf of the Pūrvapakshin the Āchārya puts forward six arguments which he refutes *seriatim*, besides using four additional arguments to silence the opponent. These are shown below—

Arguments		*Answers*
(1) II. ii. 28, lines 6-7	—	II. ii. 28, lines 30-47 ;
(2) II. ii. 28, lines 8-12	—	II. ii. 28, lines 48-53 ;
(3) II. ii. 28, lines 12-16	—	II. ii. 28, lines 54-55, 57-63 ;
(4) II. ii. 28, lines 17-19	—	II. ii. 28, lines 55-56 ;
(5) II. ii. 28, lines 19-22	—	II. ii. 29 ;
(6) II. ii. 28, lines 23-29	—	II. ii. 30.

Extra arguments

(1) II. ii. 28, lines 63-66 ;
(2) II. ii. 28, lines 67-81 ;
(3) II. ii. 28, lines 82-91 ;
(4) II. ii. 31, 32.

—Sūtra 28, line 6. — The argument in question is the starting point and the stock-in-trade of all idealistic theories. The world without can reach us only through the gate-ways of sense. Our primary and direct contact is with our own pictures (sensations, ideas, or by whatever other names we might call them) of the external world, and we have no right to assume that there is any world at all to correspond to *our* ideas about it. As in the well-known palace of the Pāṇḍavas built by the Asura Maya, so in what we call the world, a malicious Providence may be amusing himself by creating in us ideas of earth and water where the opposites of these, or in fact where nothing at all, might be really existing. Śaṅkarāchārya's answer amounts to saying that a mere possibility is no argument. In the absence of valid and adequate grounds we have no right to reject the *prima facie* view, especially when it is the view of everybody around us. Moreover, when the idealist argues, "I am sure of my own ideas, but I do not know if there be a world without corresponding to my ideas," is he not surreptitously imposing the language of space on the "ideas" which, he seems to say, exist somewhere *inside* the four corners of his body ?

—**Sūtra 28, line 10.** — The variant reading "paramāṇvâbhāsajñānânutpatteḥ" (because [with reference to the pillar] there does not arise in us a perception of their atomic appearance) gives a more straightforward meaning perhaps than the reading "paramāṇvâbhāsajñānānupapatteḥ" given by us, following most of the editions.

—**Sūtra 28, lines 11ff.** — Ānandagiri thus explains the point—

स्तम्भाद्यवयविनां परमाणुभ्यो भेदे गवाश्ववदत्यन्तवैलक्षण्यम्, अभेदे परमाणुमात्रतया स्थूलरूपेणावभासासिद्धिः ।

And if it is argued that the pillar is different from its parts and yet permanently connected with them by "Samavāya," that is ruled out by the refutation of the Samavāya theory already made.

—**Sūtra 28, line 12.** — The Advaitabrahmasiddhi (pages 96f.) gives the following refutation of Jāti—

जात्यादीनां व्यक्त्यादीनां चात्यन्तभिन्नत्वे स्वातन्त्र्यप्रसङ्गः । अत्यन्ताभिन्नत्वे तु तद्वदेवातद्भावः । भिन्नाभिन्नत्वस्य च विरुद्धत्वम् ।

The Brahmavidyābharaṇa puts it slightly differently—

जातिः किं कात्स्न्र्येन व्यक्तिषु वर्तत उतैकदेशेन । नाद्यः, घटान्तरे जात्यनुपलम्भप्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः, जातेर्निरवयवत्वात् ।

There is, it will be seen, much cheap and irresponsible logic in these so-called "prasaṅga" arguments.

—**Sūtra 28, line 12ff.** — Our ideas of ghaṭa, and the like possess the one common characteristic of being *our ideas.* And just as, if our idea of one and the same object were to be now faint and now clear, we attribute this variation in impression not to anything that has happened to the outward object, but rather to some modification in our own perceptive organism, even so the ghaṭatva, paṭatva, and the other viśeshaṇas of our idea, which is the viśeshya, must be held to proceed from something that belongs to the idea itself. A concrete physical object outside the idea cannot certainly be joined to the idea as its viśeshaṇa as if it were its tail or pendant. Because the ghaṭa, for instance, is five inches in diameter our idea has not that physical dimension or size or shape or colour or the like. The "ghaṭatva" must

therefore be of the very same nature, form and character as the "idea" itself. And once this is conceded, why should we seek an outside something to do duty as the "bimba" in relation to the "pratibimba" of the "jar-ness" in our idea ? The obvious reply of course is, why should we not ?

—**Sūtra 28, line 17ff.** — Bhāmatī explains the argument as follows—

यद्येन सह नियतसहोपलम्भनं तत् ततो न भिद्यते, यथैकस्माच्चन्द्रमसो द्वितीयश्चन्द्रमाः । नियतसहोपलम्भश्चार्थो ज्ञानेनेति व्यापकविरुद्धोपलब्धिः । निषेध्यो हि भेदः सहोपलम्भानियमेन व्याप्तो, यथा भिन्नावश्विनौ नावश्यं सहोपलभ्येते, कदाचिदभ्रापिधानेऽन्यतरस्यैकस्योपलब्धेः । सोयमिह भेदव्यापकानियमविरुद्धो नियम उपलभ्यमानस्तद्व्याप्यं भेदं निवर्तयति । यदुक्तं [धर्मकीर्तिना]—

सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नील-तद्धियोः ।
भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैर्दृश्येतेन्दाविवाद्वये ॥

—**Sūtra 28, line 22ff.** — Bhāmatī says that the objector who raises this question against the Vijñānavāda position is the Sautrāntika who regarded the external objects as inferable from the diversity of our cognition. The point of the argument on the basis of the vāsanās or subliminal impressions is this. In any act of adult cognition at least 90 p.c. of the factors that go to make up the contents of the cognition in the form 'this is a jar' are supplied by the mind. The contribution of the external physical stimulus is so slight as to be almost negligible. Sometimes indeed, as in hallucinations, it need not at all exist, while, at other times, we are so much obsessed by our own subliminal impressions that although an object x is actually present before us we think that we have not x but y before us. If our vāsanās are so very potent, why not make them masters of the whole field and altogether dispense with the outer world, along with all its puzzling problems ?

—**Sūtra 28, line 41f.** — The full stanza runs thus—

यदन्तर्ज्ञेयरूपं तद्बहिर्वदवभासते ।
सोऽर्थो विज्ञानरूपत्वात् तत्प्रत्ययतयापि च ॥

It originally comes from Diṅnāga's Ālambana-parīkshā. Compare the Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā (Gaek. Or. Series), p. 582.

—**Sūtra 28, line 45ff.** — The māyāvāda advocated by Śaṅkarāchārya denies reality to the phenomenal world, but that is only in the extreme instance, and from the point of view of the Highest Truth such as it is determined, not by any process of human reasoning but by intuitive realisation, and pending that, by the Vedic texts. The Buddhists however claim to appeal to the common-sense of mankind, and they have no right to so flagrantly contradict the same. — In this connection it is worth noting that the Vijñānavādins also differentiate between the absolute (parinishpanna), the relative (paratantra), and the imaginary (parikalpita) points of view. The same is also the case with the Śūnyavādins. As Nāgārjuna explicitly states (Madhyamaka Sūtra, xxiv. 8f.)—

द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।
लोकसंवृतिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥
येऽनयोर्न विजानन्ति विभागं सत्ययोर्द्वयोः ।
ते तत्त्वं न विजानन्ति गम्भीरं बुद्धशासने ॥

It accordingly becomes a question of determining whose absolute is the real absolute, a question in the proper solution of which one's *credo* is as much liable to lead the judgment as one's reason.

—**Sūtra 28, line 53.** — The "Prasaṅga" dialectic alluded to here is stated before in II. ii. 28, lines 8–12, and it brings in a fourfold alternative *asti, nāsti, ubhayam, anubhayam.* Compare the mode of reasoning followed in the Bhāshya under II. ii, 14 and elsewhere.

—**Sūtra 28, line 56.** — Compare the Bhāmatī—

किमेकत्वेनोपलम्भः सहोपलम्भः, आहो एक उपलम्भ ज्ञानार्थयोः । न तावदेकत्वेनोपलम्भो, बहिरुपलब्धेर्विषयस्य । अथ एकोपलम्भः , तत्रापि यथा सर्वं चाक्षुषं प्रभारूपानुविद्धं बुद्धिबोध्यं नियमेन मनुजैरुपलभ्यते, न चैतावता घटादिरूपं प्रभात्मकं भवति, किंतु प्रभोपायत्वान्नियमः, एवमिहात्मसाक्षिकानुभवोपायत्वादर्थस्यैकोपलम्भानियम इति ॥

The point is that as all cognition is for the soul (sākshin), and as the soul can reach the world without only through the gate-

ways of sense, it becomes a necessary condition of the soul's perception that the data of our senses be presented to him translated in terms of the mind. The soul cannot witness the physical colour of the cloth as we can purchase it in tins, but can witness the mind's picture of that colour. This means that the mind and its object, the mental picture, are simultaneously presented to the soul, the one being the means (upāya) of the cognition of the other, which accordingly becomes the upeya. But this is no ground for making absolutely no distinction between the pratyaya or cognition and the vishaya, or its object.

—Sūtra 28, line 57ff. — Ghaṭajñāna and paṭajñāna agree in so far as they are jñānas; the real difference between the two must therefore be due to the viśeshaṇas which must necessarily be supposed to exist independently of the viśeshya. The same applies to the ghaṭajñāna and ghaṭasmaraṇa where two distinct cognitions (direct and remembered) concerning the same object establish the difference between the object and its ideas. — In connection with this argument it is however worth noting in passing that Śaṅkarāchārya is herein deliberately surrendering a position that he had taken up against the Vaiśeshikas in II. ii. 17[17], where the qualities which are the Viśeshaṇas he wanted to actually identify with their Viśeshyas, the substances.

—Sūtra 28, line 63. — While the Vijñānavādins are peculiar in their idealistic view of the world, they nevertheless agree with the other schools of Buddhism in accepting the doctrine of momentariness, which they apply to the ideas. Our ideas constitute a continuous stream of transitory phases of consciousness, with no permanent or abiding principle as their substratum. There exists, in other words, no Ātman, no one abiding individual percipient. Yet, somehow or other, the totality of the successive consciousness-phases in a given life form an individual group or aggregate, which is designated the Ālaya-vijñāna. Compare our Note to II. ii. 18, line 18 before. Ālaya-vijñāna or "Receptacle-consciousness" is so called because it is the receptacle, the 'granary' into which all a man's ideas and impressions, actual as well as potential, are stored up together in a well-arranged embryonic form. In any present act of cognition only one of these germinal ideas springs up above the threshold of consciousness, the others being either subliminal

or below the threshold, or at the "fringe" of the present consciousness. And since each vanishing momentary consciousness transmits onwards to the consciousness of the succeeding moment all the contents of the granary, a sort of continuity or individuality in a man's consciousness appears to be maintained, not only within the limits of the present life but throughout a given transmigratory period. — Against such a position all the objections urged by the Vedāntins in Sūtras II. ii. 20, 21, 25 and 26 must be held to apply with equal force. A permanent substratum as the noumenal background and basis for the play of the fleeting phenomenal appearances must therefore be assumed; and we may then make that basal principle (as in the Vaiśeshika and to some extent in the Sāṁkhya theory) subject to being really affected by the vanishing show of the senses, or make it, like the moon reflected in a sheet of moving water, merely the unconcerned and unaffected seer, as in the Vedāntic theory. See below, II. ii. 31, lines 3-5.

—Sūtra 28, line 64ff. — To differentiate between "pūrvakshaṇa-vijñāna" and "uttarakshaṇa-vijñāna" and posit a causal relation between them; or between the "ālaya-vijñāna" and the "pravṛitti-vijñāna;" or again, between the "parinishpanna," "paratantra" and "parikalpita-vijñāna;" to assert the momentariness of all Vijñānas; to speak (as does Diṅnāga and after him Dharmakīrti) of some common factor persisting in all the Vijñānas as Vijñānas—

अनेकानुगतं सामान्यं यथा ज्ञानं बोधरूपमित्यादि ।

and of another undefinable factor peculiar to each Vijñāna, which gives it its characteristic content—

सर्वतो व्यावृत्तं व्यक्तिमात्रत्वं स्वलक्षणम् ।

to maintain that this "svalakshaṇa" factor contained within a preceding vijñāna produces a subtle subliminal impression on the following vijñāna and so on in an endless succession; to hold that mankind is exposed to the calamity of this Saṁsāra in consequence of men's nescience, which makes them see reality and permanence and externality where these do not exist; to distinguish between a right and a wrong course of conduct, and to proclaim that the latter leads to bondage and the former to

liberation in the form of Nirvāṇa: all these positions taken by the Vijñānavādin—involving as they do the need of some one or some thing, that is beyond and independent of the series of momentary phases of the mind or consciousness, and that could express these and such other judgments—become altogether inconsistent with the hypothesis of a series of mere momentary Vijñānas, not one of which has the power to "look before and after," and which reaches the utmost limit of its life-purpose by producing a transient though self-conscious flicker.

—Sūtra 28, line 70 ff. — When an idea occurs to me, I do not have to take a light and see whereabout in my mind it is: it is self-luminous. Not so an outward physical object. But unto whom can the Vijñāna be self-luminous? Not unto the Ātman, because the Ātman is not admitted; neither unto the "Ālaya-vijñāna" which is itself vijñāna, and which is also momentary. Vijñāna must hence be held to hold the candle unto itself, which is opposed to what is normal. See also below, lines 86ff.

—Sūtra 28, line 75 ff. — "I am reading the book" is the first grade of knowledge, which may be called *receptive* perception. "I am conscious of myself as reading the book" is the second grade of knowledge, which may be called *reflective* perception. "I am conscious of myself as being conscious of myself as reading the book" is the third grade of knowledge, which may be styled *re-reflective* knowledge. Can we carry the process of self-introspection any further; and if so, where are we to stop? Some have argued that, as inhabitants of a world of "three dimensions," we cannot reach beyond the third grade of knowledge above enumerated. But Śaṅkarāchārya gives the correct answer when he says that there is no *conscious* double reflection in any of our acts of cognition. Further, the percipient is always distinct from the object perceived, be that object a mere book, or the perceiver's act of perceiving. And the perceiving subject *qua* subject, and as long as he continues as perceiver or the Sākshin, refuses to be turned into an object for perception. Nobody in fact dreams of making the subject, at the very same time and in the very same act, an object. — The problem has been very ably discussed by Śaṅkarāchārya in his Aitareyopanishadbhāshya (pp. 59–66, Ānandāśrama edition).

—**Sūtra 28, line 83.** — "Apramāṇagamya" is Śaṅkarāchārya's paraphrase for "avabhāsakāntaranirapeksha," and "anavagantrika" for "svayam eva prathate."

—**Sūtra 28, line 84ff.** — Assuming that the vijñāna is a mass of self-luminousness, where there is neither means nor object for illumination and nobody to watch the illumination, the Pūrvapakshin says that the nature of this light of vijñāna is of the nature of anubhava or of self-consciousness; but this is playing with words. When there is none to experience it, what is the use of saying that the light in question is of the nature of experience? —In the same strain one can ask the Vedāntin, what is the fun of your endowing the Brahman with the character of intelligence and joy, when there is nothing else that Brahman can know and take delight in, and when Brahman itself cannot be the source of light and joy to any other percipient? If Brahman or Ātman be the self-subsistent Sākshin, what does he stand witness to, and for whom? Śaṅkarācharaya can reply that, of the kūṭastha Brahman no description is possible in words, and even "Sachchidānandatva" is not truly predicable of it. But short of that *ultima ratio*, the Āchārya merely replies by saying that there is a world of difference between the Vijñānavādin's conception of the Vijñāna and the Vedāntin's conception of the Brahman. As a matter of fact however the two are not so very different from each other. Vijñāna collectively is the "Bodhi" the "Prajñā Pāramitā" or the most perfect intelligence which is the highest reality which embraces the universe (because there can be no universe independently of the Vijñāna), and which is designated as the Tathatā, the real essence (tatha=tathya=tattva), or according to another explanation, the suchness (tathātā) or quiddity, *i. e.*, the supreme substance of the entire universe. The conception can be held to be practically one with the Vedāntic conception of the Brahman, and certain characterisations of his Absolute as given by Asaṅga, *e. g.*, Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra, vi. 1—

न सन्न चासन्न तथा न चान्यथा
न जायते व्येति न चावहीयते ।
न वर्धते नापि विशुध्यते पुन-
र्विशुध्यते तत् परमार्थलक्षणम् ॥

agree word for word with those of the Māyāvādin's Brahman. Compare also Gauḍapādakārikā iii. 35, 46 and *passim*, where Manas or Chitta is eventually identified with Brahman.

—**Sūtra 29, line 10.** — According to the stricter Vedāntic view the dream-experience is to be explained exactly like an ordinary case of error as when one mistakes the rope for the snake, there being the creation of an illusory object by what is called "Anirvachanīya-khyāti." Śaṅkara's speaking of the dream as an act of memory is not therefore according to the orthodox Vedānta as expounded, for example, in the Vedāntaparibhāshā—

ननु स्वप्नस्थले पूर्वानुभूतस्मरणमात्रेणैव व्यवहारोपपत्तौ न रथादिसृष्टिकल्पनं, गौरवादिति चेन्न । रथादेः स्मरणमात्राभ्युपगमे रथं पश्यामि, स्वप्ने रथमद्राक्ष-मित्याद्यनुभवविरोधोपपत्तेः । अथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजते—इति रथादि-प्रतिपादकश्रुतिविरोधापत्तेश्च । तस्माच्छुक्तिरूप्यवत् स्वप्नोपलब्धरथादयोऽपि प्राति-भासिका यावत्प्रतिभासमुपतिष्ठन्ते ॥

Of this correcter view Śaṅkarāchārya is fully aware, as is clear from his Bhāshya on Br. Sūtras III. ii. 1. — Compare also his Bhāshya on II. i. 14, lines 75–86. That nevertheless he puts forth before his Buddhistic opponent the view that dream is an act of (imperfect) memory is because this view would be readily acceptable to him, while the "anirvachanīya-khyāti" view the Buddhist would at once denounce. No apology on behalf of Śaṅkarāchārya is therefore called for. Nevertheless, the Brahmavidyābharaṇa says—

यद्यपि सिद्धान्ते शुक्तिरजतादितुल्यतात्कालिकस्वाप्नपदार्थगोचरं ज्ञानं साक्षि-रूपमनुभवः, नतु तत्कालासतः स्वाप्नस्य पदार्थस्य ज्ञानं स्मृतिः, तथापि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाजन्यत्वे सति संस्कारजन्यत्वं स्मृतेर्वर्तते, एवं स्वाप्नज्ञानस्यापीति स्मृतिपदं तत्रैव गौणं द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

—**Sūtra 29, line 14.** — It is to be noted that Śaṅkarāchārya is here assuming the position of inveterate realism while refuting the idealistic theory of his opponents, forgetting that he had himself drawn upon the analogies of dream and Māyā, time and again, in support of his own position. Bhāskarāchārya and Keśava Kāśmīrin do not miss the opportunity to rate Śaṅkarā-chārya for his inconsistent procedure—

ये तु बौद्धमतावलम्बिनो मायावादिनस्तेऽप्यनेन न्यायेन सूत्रकारेणैव निरस्ता वेदितव्याः । यदि बाह्योऽर्थो नाभिप्रेतः स्यात् , किमर्थमित्थं यतेत सूत्रकारः ।

Śaṅkara's defence probably would be that the Vijñānavādin denies outer world altogether and gives you nothing instead but the transient flux of ideas; whereas the Vedāntin admits the external world as only *epistemologically* real, and when he denies it, it is only to affirm its existence in and through the Absolute Brahman. A similar distinction is made between the position of the Śūnyavāda and the Māyāvāda :

सौगतब्रह्मवादिनोरयं विशेषो यदादिमः ।
सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वं ब्रूते द्वितीयस्तदनन्यताम् ॥

Vijñānabhikshu also agrees in regarding the Māyāvāda as aprāmāṇika, and the fact that even some of the śruti texts have used the analogies of dream and the like he explains by declaring—

यत्र शास्त्रेषु विकाराणां स्वप्नदृष्टान्तप्रदर्शनं तद्वैराग्यार्थक्षणभङ्गुरत्वादिपरं न पुनर्बाह्यविषयाभावपरम् ।

—**Sūtra 29, line 17.** — Compare II. ii. 10, lines 42ff.

—**Sūtra 30, line 5.** — It will be remembered that under sūtras II. i. 35, 36 both the Sūtrakāra and the Bhāshyakāra had not scrupled to seek support of the argument from "anāditva;" but there it was vouchsafed by the Scripture, whereas here it seems to have been reached by mere excogitation. Moreover, under II. i. 35-36, the problem was cosmological, and justified the appeal to the Scriptures. Here the problem is more or less psychological: namely, whether the mind can have an impression in the utter absence of anything outside the mind to produce the impression at some stage or the other. Hence, argues the Siddhāntin, we are justified in accepting the one, but rejecting the other. Compare also the Bhāshya on II. ii. 37, lines 18–22.

—**Sūtra 30, line 6ff.** — The Pūrvapakshin had maintained—

Wherever vāsanās, there diversified knowledge, *e.g.*, dreams;
Wherever no-vāsanās, there no knowledge.

The Siddhāntin now maintains—

> Wherever no-vāsanās, even there diversified knowledge (as in outward perception);
>
> Wherever no-diversified-knowledge, there no vāsanās.

And as mere arguments both ought to fare equally.

—**Sūtra 31, line 1** ff.—Compare above, Note to II. ii. 18, line 18 and II. ii. 28, line 63.

—**Sūtra 31, line 9.**—The Vijñānavādins are also styled the Yogāchāras, just as the Śūnyavādins are often known as the Madhyamaka school of philosophy. The names are variously explained. Thus—

> शिष्यैस्तावद्योगश्चाचारश्चेति द्वयं करणीयम् । तत्र अप्राप्तस्यार्थस्य प्राप्तये पर्यनुयोगो योगः । गुरूक्तस्यार्थस्याङ्गीकरणमाचारः । यैरुभयं संपादितं ते योगाचाराः । यैः पुनर्गुरूक्तमङ्गीकृतं, पर्यनुयोगश्च न कृतस्तेषां मध्यमका माध्यमिका इति वा प्रसिद्धिः ॥

Lévi explains that the Yogāchāra school developed in particular the Yoga point of view which aimed at reaching mystical union with Reality by the method of introspection and meditation. This gave them the idealistic point of view, in the light of which they tried to explain the various stages of illumination called "daśa buddha-bhūmayaḥ" and the courses of conduct known as "adhimuktichāryā" leading up to and following upon each of these stages. The Mādhyamikas often claim to be the most faithful followers of the Buddha, the true doctrine of Śūnyatā, which was beyond the comprehension of the other schools) being revealed to them alone. As the Buddha adopted the "Majjhimā Paṭipadā" or the doctrine of the mean, the Mādhyamikas derive the name also from that circumstance. Śaṅkarāchārya dismisses this latter school, however, with rather scant courtesy.

—**Sūtra 32, line 5** ff.—Śaṅkarāchārya has been ironical (II. ii. 28[73], II. ii. 29[14]) and even abusive (II. ii. 28[37]) before; but that the Buddha, who claimed to have been filled with extreme compassion not only for the whole humanity, but for the whole universe, should have been charged with hatred and ill-will for the world was the most unkindest cut of all.

—It only remains to discuss how far Śaṅkarāchārya has been correct in his interpretation of the Buddhistic sūtras and especially of the last five sūtras directed against the Vijñānavādins. Amongst the Bhāshyakāras, Bhāskara and Vallabha, like Śaṅkara, dismiss the Śūnyavāda by a bare mention. The others assign a separate adhikaraṇa to the school, Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha and Nimbārka bringing it under the last sūtra (sarvathā'nupapatteś cha), while Madhva is peculiar in distributing the sūtras over the three schools as follows: Bāhyārthavāda, sūtras 18-25; Śūnyavāda, sūtras 26–29; and Vijñānavāda, sūtras 30–32. The language of the sūtras is not particularly propitious to Madhva's interpretation except in the sense that as all the schools of Buddhism agreed on several essential points, all arguments would apply to each of them severally and to all collectively, especially where the wording of the sūtras (*e. g.*, 26, 28, 30) was as vague as vague could be. I am inclined to think that as sūtra 32 has all the appearance of the finale of an attack, the Sūtrakāra wished to throw all the Buddhistic sūtras into just one adhikaraṇa. There is probably a sort of an order observed in taking up the successive Buddhistic doctrines for refutation; but this is mostly logical, and it was more or less immaterial what school was to champion the the various doctrines attacked. We should remember in this connection that the Vijñānavādins, also held by the doctrine of the Śūnya or the Void: see Asaṅga XVIII. 101—

सर्वधर्मा अनात्मानः परमार्थेन शून्यता ।
आत्मोपलम्भे दोषश्च देशितो यत एव च ॥

Vijñāna, according to them is the sole reality belonging to the realm of *relative* knowledge. From the point of view of the highest or the most perfect knowledge, they would accept Śūnyatā, which according to them was not absolute vacuity, but rather the void thought, a mere thus-ness (tathatā) devoid of any characteristic and free from the distinction of subject, object, and knowledge. The extreme Śūnyavāda is, logically speaking, a further process of abstraction in the same direction, which has reached its culmination in the "Eight Noes,*" that famous negativistic formula with which Nāgārjuna commences.

* "No anihilation, no production, no destruction, no persistence, no unity, no plurality, no coming-in, no going-out."

his Madhyamaka Śāstra—

अनिरोधमनुत्पादमनुच्छेदमशाश्वतम् ।
अनेकार्थमनानार्थमनागममनिर्गमम् ॥
यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शिवम् ।
देशयामास संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे वदतां वरम् ॥

—However, the problem has acquired special significance by reason of Jacobi's contention (Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1911, Vol. xxxi, pp. 1-29) that the Brahmasūtras refute the Śūnyavāda in II. ii. 28–32 as they did not know of the Vijñānavāda, which was founded only subsequent to the date of the Brahmasūtras. Nāgārjuna, the "founder" of the Śūnyavāda, Jacobi assigns to about the end of the second century after Christ. Jacobi's date for Asaṅga and his younger brother Vasubandhu, the "founders" of the Vijñānavāda, was based upon a paper of Takakusu (B. E. F. E. O., 1904) where cir. 450–550 was given as their time; but later researches have effected a shifting of the date to a period earlier by a least 100 years, which however Takakusu is not prepared to concede. This in any case need not seriously affect Jacobi's conclusion. Jacobi's line of argument is as follows. Refutations of philosophical theories can only be made after they are well established; and although germs of these two theories can be traced in the earlier Buddhist literature, it is improbable that the author of the Brahmasūtras should have spent so many sūtras over them unless the theories had assumed the prominence that they did after the writings of Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu. This may be conceded with some reservations.

—Now, a possible way to escape from the clutches of the above argument would be to assert that the refutatory sūtras in question constitute a later addition to the several Sūtrapāṭhas. Jacobi does not appear to have seriously considered this possibility. In an independent paper contributed a few years ago, I have discussed this problem as far as the Vedāntasūtras are concerned; and with reference to the Yogasūtras it is well-known that Deussen has declared the fourth and the last pāda of the Yogasūtras to be of the nature of an appendix constituted out of four successive additions (1-6, 7-13, 14-23 and 24-33), the sūtras discussing the Buddhistic views (namely, the Vijñānavāda) being

IV. 15-16. Apart, however, from this consideration, which can possibly affect only the date of the philosophical sūtras, has Jacobi succeeded in showing that Nyāyasūtras IV. ii. 26–33 and Brahmasūtras II. ii. 28–32 discuss the Śūnyavāda, and not the Vijñānavāda? This problem deserves to be discussed on its own merits, even though we were to succeed hereafter in discovering some refutation of the Vijñānavada marked out as such in a text indubitably belonging to a time considerably earlier than A. D. 350. — We naturally have to ignore here the Nyāya passage.

—The burden of Jacobi's proof, as far as the Brahmasūtra passage goes, rests upon a long extract quoted as from a "Vṛittikāra" which is given by Śabarasvāmin aneant his bhāshya on Mīmāṅsāsūtra I. i. 5. The passage extends to over ten printed pages (7–18) and is introduced by the remark—

वृत्तिकारस्तु अन्यथेमं ग्रन्थं वर्णयांचकार ।

It introduces, in the course of the proposed alternative explanation, an objector who denies the reality of all perceptions, and his objection is refuted in the passage by arguments which, when put together seriatim, are held to constitute a close commentary on the Vedānta sūtras II. ii., 28 to 32. The Vṛittikāra, we may add, mentions the names of Upavarsha, Pāṇini, Jaimini, and Piṅgala, and also refers to the "Mahāyānika" view, and quotes from the Nirukta and the Ashṭādhyāyī. We subjoin relevant excerpts from the quoted passage, inserting in brackets at their head the Vedāntic sūtras II. ii. 28–32, on which each is believed to be a commentary—

(नाभाव उपलब्धेः ॥ २८ ॥)

ननु सर्व एव निरालम्बनः स्वप्नवत् प्रत्ययः । प्रत्ययस्य हि निरालम्बनतास्वभाव उपलक्षितः स्वप्ने । जाग्रतोपि स्तम्भ इति वा कुड्य इति वा प्रत्यय एव भवति । तस्मात् सोपि निरालम्बनः ॥—

(वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ॥ २९ ॥)

.........यदि प्रत्ययत्वात् स्वप्नप्रत्ययस्य मिथ्याभावः, जाग्रत्प्रत्ययस्यापि तथा भवितुमर्हति ।............। अन्यतस्तु स्वप्नप्रत्ययस्य मिथ्याभावो

विपर्ययादवगतः । कुत इति चेत् । सनिद्रस्य मनसो दौर्बल्यान्निद्रा मिथ्याभावस्य हेतुः । .... । अचेतयन्नेव हि सुषुप्त इत्युच्यते । तस्माज्जाग्रतः प्रत्ययो न मिथ्येति । .... ॥

(न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥ ३० ॥)

शून्यस्तु । कथम् । अर्थज्ञानयोराकारभेदं नोपलभामहे । प्रत्यक्षा च नो बुद्धिः । अतस्तद्भिन्नमर्थरूपं नाम न किंचिदस्तीति पश्यामः ॥ स्यादेत-देवं यद्यर्थाकारा बुद्धिः स्यात् । निराकारा तु नो बुद्धिः, आकारवान् बाह्योऽर्थः । स हि बहिर्देशसंबद्धः प्रत्यक्षमुपलभ्यते । अर्थविषया हि प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः, न बुद्ध्यन्तरविषया ॥ —

(क्षणिकत्वाच्च ॥ ३१ ॥)

क्षणिका हि सा, न बुद्ध्यन्तरकालमवस्थास्यत इति । उत्पद्यमानैवासौ ज्ञायते ज्ञापयति चार्थान्तरं प्रदीपवदिति यदुच्येत तन्न । न ह्यज्ञातेऽर्थे कश्चिद्बुद्धिमुपलभते । ज्ञाते त्वनुमानादवगच्छति । तत्र यौगपद्यमनुपपन्नम् । .... । न चार्थव्यपदेशमन्तरेण बुद्धे रूपोपलम्भनम् । .... तस्मादप्रत्यक्षा बुद्धिः ॥

(सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३२ ॥)

अपिच काममेकरूपत्वे बुद्धेरेवाभावः, नार्थस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य सतः । नचैकरूप्यम् । अनाकारामेव हि बुद्धिमनुमिमीमहे, साकारं चार्थं प्रत्यक्षमेवावगच्छामः । तस्मादर्थालम्बनः प्रत्ययः । अपिच नियतनिमित्तस्तन्तुष्वेवोपादीयमानेषु पट-प्रत्ययः । इतरथा तन्त्वादानेऽपि कदाचिद्घटबुद्धिरविकलेन्द्रियस्य स्यात् । न चैवमस्ति । अतो न निरालम्बनः प्रत्ययः ॥

—According to Jacobi the first two sūtras, on the ground that we actually perceive the objects, refute the view that external objects do not exist, the analogy of the dream-objects being pronounced inapplicable. The next two sūtras refute the view that ideas can be concrete realities, seeing that they are in themselves fleeting and have to be at best inferred only — and inferred, let us add, by an enduring percipient. The last sūtra is a general condemnation. We confess that we fail to see the cogency of this "refutation of the doctrine of the Void." The

first two sūtras, it is true, can be indifferently a refutation of the Vijñāna as well as the Śūnya philosophies, because both alike deny reality of the external world. But to argue that "an idea cannot be a real object" implies that the opponent maintained that the ideas *were* real objects; and surely no Śūnyavādin cared to maintain that thesis. It is on the contrary the Vijñānavādin who did this. The Vijñānavādin asserts that "objects are unreal, but ideas are real." This can be met by the assertion which is its direct contradictory, namely, that "objects are not-unreal (nābhāvaḥ), while ideas are non-entities (na bhāvaḥ)." How Jacobi can make the second passage—interpreted by him as a commentary on the last three sūtras—fit in with the rest of the context we are unable to see.

—Jacobi has assuredly done great service to scholarship by pointing out the importance of the present citation from the unknown Vṛittikāra. The citation extends certainly much beyond what Kumārila understood it to do. Nor have we any objection to regard the passage as a sort of a commentary on Brahmasūtras II. ii. 28-32,—at any rate this can be more truly said about the first part of the passage which seems to explain sūtras 28-29 : although it seems to us not quite impossible to explain the correspondence of the passage and the sūtras on the ground of sameness of topic. The case is certainly much more problematic as to the latter part. Jacobi seems least convincing in his proposed interpretation of Brahmasūtra II. ii. 30. If it is a Śūnyavāda sūtra its proper interpretation might perhaps be—"Śūnyatā does not exist because of the (proof called) Non-perception"; or, in the words of Kumārilabhaṭṭa (Ślokavārttika, page 343)—

तस्मादभावगम्यत्वं शून्यतायाः स्थितं हि नः ।

[Commentary—तदेवमभावगम्यत्वमेव शून्यतायाः पारिशेष्यादापन्नम् ।]

—But even granting that the Brahmasūtras were originally directed against the Śūnyavāda, it is difficult to imagine what possible motive — not only Śaṅkarāchārya — but even Bhāskarāchārya and Vallabhāchārya could have had in not bringing in a refutation of the Śūnyavāda school under some one or more sūtras? It is at times argued that the Śūnyavāda, in its distinguishing between a "saṁvṛiti-satya"

and a " paramārtha-satya," or between the phenomenal and the noumenal points of view, no less than in its conception of the Highest Reality as an aggregate of the "Eight Noes" came so very dangerously near the absolutistic position of the Māyāvāda that Śaṅkarāchārya found it prudent not to raise up a hornet's nest about his ears and create suspicion as to the true parentage of the Vedāntic doctrine of Advaita. But we doubt if this would be at all a fair view of the case. The fact is—as indeed Jacobi himself points out—the " Vṛittikāra " speaks of the followers of the Mahāyāna in quite general terms without distinguishing between the Mādhyamikas and the Yogāchāras. Opponents of Buddhism only knew that Buddhistic philosophers had developed a number of peculiar logical and metaphysical positions, and these they tried to refute, without always caring to go into the finer shades of distinction between schools and schools. This last was effected only in the later age of the Bhāshyakāras and commentators. As in the case of the Sāṁkhya and the Vaiśeshika systems, so also in the case of Buddhism, we accordingly feel inclined to conclude that the Sūtrakāra had before him a presentation of the opponents' system much more primitive than what is preserved in our extant classical exponents of each.

—Sūtra 33, line 1. — It is worth while noting the differences in apparel and equipment that marked out the followers of one school of philosophy from another. Thus we are told, in regard to the Sāṁkhyas—

अथ सांख्यमतं ब्रूमस्ते त्रिदण्डैकदण्डकाः ।
कौपीनं वसनं तेषां धातुरक्ताम्बराश्च ते ॥
क्षुरमुण्डा एणचर्मासना द्विजगृहाशनाः ।
बीटेति भारते ख्याता दारवी मुखवस्त्रिका ॥
दयानिमित्तं भूतानां मुखनिःश्वासरोधिका ।

About the Śaivites we learn—

अथ योगमतं ब्रूमः शैवमित्यपराभिधम् ।
ते दण्डधारिणः प्रौढकौपीनपरिधायिनः ॥
कम्बलिकाप्रावरणा जटापटलशालिनः ।
भस्मोद्धूलनकर्तारो नीरसाहारसेविनः ॥

दोर्मूले तुम्बकभृतः प्रायेण वनवासिनः ।
आतिथ्यकर्मनिरताः कन्दमूलफलाशनाः ॥

The Vaiśeshikas are not differentiated from the Śaivites—

अथ वैशेषिकं ब्रूमः पाशुपतान्यनामकम् ।
लिङ्गादि योगवत् तेषां ते ते तीर्थकरा अपि ॥

The Buddhists are thus described—

अथ बौद्धमतं वक्ष्ये मौण्ड्यं कृत्तिः कमण्डलुः ।
लिङ्गं तेषां रक्तवस्त्रं वेषः शौचक्रिया बहुः ॥

The two Sects of the Jainas are thus characterised—

तत्र जैनमते लिङ्गं रजोहरणमादिमम् ।
मुखवस्त्रं च वेषश्च चोलपट्टादिकः स्मृतः ॥
श्वेताम्बरा वन्द्यमाना धर्मलाभं प्रचक्षते ।
शुद्धां माधुकरीं वृत्तिं सेवन्ते भोजनादिषु ॥
दिगम्बराणां चत्वारो भेदा नाग्न्यव्रतस्पृशः ।
पिच्छिकाधारणपराः प्राहुर्नो निर्वृतिं स्त्रियः ॥
नास्ति चीवरयुक्तस्य निर्वाणं सद्व्रतेऽपि हि ।
शेषं श्वेताम्बरैस्तुल्यमाचारं दैवते गुरौ ॥

Finally, the Bhāgavatas comprise several sub-sects, wearing mudrās, tripuṇḍras, Gopīchandana marks, and the other familiar sectarian devices, which it is perhaps unnecessary to detail here any further.

—Sūtra 33, line 1 ff.— A few general facts concerning the origin and the historical development of Jainism will be useful for an understanding of the discussions that are to follow. While Gotama the Buddha was the founder of Buddhist philosophy, Vardhamāna alias Mahāvīra (for whose death B. C. 467 seems to be the most probable date, although others put it as far back as B. C. 484, and even B. C. 527) was only the most successful *reformer*, belonging to a religious order which was older than Buddhism by at least 200 years, and of which Mahāvīra is regarded as the 24th Tīrthakara. Pārśvanātha the 23rd (or the last but one) Tīrthakara of the Jainas is also a historical figure. The followers of the order founded by him are actually men-

tioned by their earlier name of Nigganthas (Sans. Nirgranthas), not only in the Scriptures of the Jainas (*e. g.* Uttarādhyayana, xxiii), but also, apparently, in the Buddhistic Canon (Dīgha Nikāya, i. p. 57). In the course of time, some laxity seems to have crept into the order; and Mahāvīra expurgated the same by prescribing a strictly rigorous discipline for the monks.

—By way of a corollary from this it follows also that a very large part, if not of the Jain Scriptures themselves, at least of the ideas contained in them, belongs to a date much earlier than that to which the ideas peculiar to Buddhism can be referred. It is also the case that while the Buddhist texts presuppose at each stage, and as their back-ground and source of inspiration, the philosophical ideas developed in the Brahmanical circles, the Jainas seem to have worked out their philosophical conceptions in more primitive and independent circles. The Jain notion of the embodied souls as inhabiting all the four elements; their conception of sin as a subtle matter entering, so to say, into a chemical combination with the substance of the souls and capable of being expelled from it by ascetic practices; their belief in the six colours (leśyas) of the soul in accordance with their ethical purity; as also in what is known as the taijasa-śarīra of the meritorious persons which has the power, for the benefit or injury of others, to emit heat and light: all these notions proclaim their kinship with that circle of thought and practice which gave rise to the Atharvaveda and to literature of that type. Jainism has suffered in estimation as an ethical and metaphysical system by being deemed as more or less contemporaneous in origin with the other more evolved philosophical systems like the Sāṁkhya, Vedānta, and Buddhism. The fact is that Mahāvīra inherited the ontology of his system from a remoter ancestry, and he probably did little more than transmit it unchanged to succeeding generations.

—The Sacred Canon of the Jainas has undergone considerable vicissitudes. There was an earlier—probably, in essentials, a pre-Mahāvīra—part of the Canon which has been irrevocably lost. This was made up of the fourteen "Pūrvas." Next there are the "forty-five (11 + 12 + 10 + 6 + 4 + 2 = 45) Āgamas" in the form in which they were finally redacted by Devarddhigaṇi at the great Council at Valabhi (A. D. 526): but these labour under

the disadvantage of not being recognised at all by the Digambara section of the Jain community. For purposes of reference we give below a list of the Canon. The language of the Canon is known as Ārsha- or Ardha-Māgadhī.

I.—FOURTEEN "PUVVAS" or Pūrvas (*not extant*)—

(i) Uppāya (Utpāda);
(ii) Aggeṇiya (? Aggrāyaṇīya);
(iii) Vīriyappavāya (Vīryapravāda);
(iv) Atthinatthippavāya (Astināstipravāda);
(v) Nāṇappavāya (Jñānapravāda);
(vi) Sachchappavāya (Satyapravāda);
(vii) Āyappavāya (Ātmapravāda);
(viii) Kammappavāya (Karmapravāda);
(ix) Pachchakkānappavāya (Pratyākhyānapravāda);
(x) Vijjāṇuppavāya (Vidyānupravāda);
(xi) Avañjha (Avandhya);
(xii) Pāṇāum (Prāṇāyus);
(xiii) Kiriyāvisāla (Kriyāviśāla);
(xiv) Logavindusāra (Lokabindusārā).

II—TWELVE AṄGAS—

(i) Ayārangasutta (Ācharāṅgasūtra), oldest extant text in prose and verse, giving prescriptions for monks, etc.;
(ii) Suyagaḍaṅga (Sūtrakṛitāṅga), poetic exhortations and philosophic disquisitions, followed by a polemic against Kriyāvāda and Akriyāvāda, Vainayika and Ajñānavāda;
(iii) Thāṇaṅga (Sthānāṅga), enumeration of different principles in rising numerical groups of 1 to 10;
(iv) Samavāyaṅga (Samavāyāṅga), a continuation of the preceding, giving groups of 1 to 100 and more;
(v) [Bhagavatī-]viyāhapaṇṇatti ([Bhagavatī-]vyākhyāprajñapti), exposition of the dogma in the form of dialogues, and containing stories of contemporary philosophers (Jamāli, Gosāla, etc,);
(vi) Ṇāyadhammakahāo (Jñātadharmakathāḥ), a collection of stories, with a moral and religious purpose;

(vii) Uvāsagadasāo (Upāsakadaśa), ten chapters narrating stories of pious monks and laymen ;

(vii) Antagadasāo (Antakṛiddaśa), ten chapters narrating stories of pious ascetics who have attained salvation at death ;

(ix) Aṇutarovavāiyadasāo (Anuttaraupapātikadaśa), ten chapters giving stories of monks who have attained the highest heaven ;

(x) Paṇhāvāgaraṇāiṁ (Praśnavyākaraṇāni) expositions of prescriptions and interdictions ;

(xi) Vivāgasuyam (Vipākasūtram), legends concerning rewards and punishments earned by Karman ;

(xii) Diṭṭhivāya (Dṛishṭivāda), *no longer extant* : probably an abstract of the " Pūrvas, " especially discussing philosophical theories.

III—TWELVE UPĀṄGAS (corresponding to the Twelve Aṅgas)—

(i) Ovavāiya (Aupapātika)—concerning the origin of beings in heaven and hell ;

(ii) Rāyapaseṇaijja (Rājapraśnīya)—Dialogue between king Paësi andthe monk Kesi concerning the soul ;

(iii) Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra—Discussion on biological subjects ;

(iv) Paṇṇāvaṇā (Prajñāpanā)—by an author called Ayya Sāma, and treating of thirty-six categories, etc. ;

(v) Suriyapaṇṇatti (Sūryaprajñapti)—Jain astronomy ;

(vi) Jambuddīyapaṇṇatti (Jambudvīpaprajñapti)—legendary geography of Bhāratavarsha ;

(vii) Chandapaṇṇatti (Chandraprajñapti)—cosmography of the Heavens, and system of time-reckoning ;

(viii) Nirayāvalī,
(ix) Kappāvadaṁsiāo (kalpāvatamsikāḥ),
(x) Pupphiāo (Pushpikāḥ),
(xi) Pupphachūliāo (Pushpa chūlikāḥ),
(xii) Vaṇhidasāo (Vṛishṇidaśa)
} Description of the Hells and lower regions as attained by the ten murderous stepbrothers of Ajātaśatru of Buddhistic fame, or as attainable by others.

IV—TEN " PAIṆṆAS " OR PRAKĪRṆĀNI (Miscellanies)—

(i) Chaüsaraṇa (chatuḥśaraṇa), Four Adorables, by Vīrabhadra ;

(ii) Āürapachchakkhāṇa (Āturapratyākhyāna), how one may die peacefully ;

(iii) Bhattaparinṇā (Bhaktaparijñā), abstenances prior to death ;

(iv) Saṁṭhāra (Saṁstāra), postures at death ;

(v) Taṇḍulaveyāliya (Taṇḍulavaichārika), detailing how the fœtus grows ;

(vi) Chandāvijjhaya, (Chandravedhyaka), proper astrological conjuctions for death ;

(vii) Devindatthava (Devendrastava), praise of Lord Indra ;

(viii) Gaṇiavijjā (Gaṇitavidyā), Jain Mathematics ;

(ix) Mahāpachchakkhāna (Mahāpratyākhyāna), renunciations prior to death ;

(x) Vīratthava (Vīrastava), in praise of Lord Mahāvīra.

V—SIX CHHEDA-SŪTRAS (lists not unanimous)—

(i) Nisīhajjhayana (Niśīthādhyayana)
(ii) Mahānisīha (Mahāniśītha),
(iii) Vavahāra (Vyavahāra),
(iv) Āyāradasāo (Āchāradaśa), alias Dasāsuyakkhandha (Daśāśrutaskandha),
(v) Bṛihatkalpasūtra,
(vi) Pañchakalpa.

} Discussions as to what constitutes prohibited conduct for monks & for nuns, prescribing punishments and expiations for the same.

VI—FOUR MŪLA-SŪTRAS—

(i) Uttarajjhayana (Uttarādhyayana) a compilation of dialogues, parables, ballads, etc. concerning asceticism ;

(ii) Āvassaya (Āvaśyaka), treating of the six daily practices of the monks ;

(iii) Dasaveyāliya (Daśavaikālika), by Sajjambhava and giving rules of conduct, sententious maxims, and the like ;

(iv) Piṇḍa-[or Oha-]nijjutti (Piṇḍa-[or Ogha-]niryukti, being a supplement to the above).

VII—SOLITARY TEXTS—

(i) Nandisutta (Nandīsūtra), (ii) Anuyogadārasutta (Anu-yogadvāra-sūtra).	Encyclopædic treatment of several principles and practices.

—This Canon, as before observed, is disowned by the Digambaras, but on various internal and external grounds an age as early as the commencement of the Christian era has been rightly claimed at any rate for the twelve (eleven) Aṅgas. The Śvetāmbara tradition itself refers the constitution of the canon to about 300 B. C., when a council was held for the purpose at Pāṭaliputra, and the period represented by 300 B. C. to 100 A. D. is probably the period when the Canon was being formed and fixed.

—**Sūtra 33, line 26.** — The Jain philosophy starts with a dualistic division of the universe into Jīva and Ajīva. The Ajīva is further divided into (i) Dharma, (ii) Adharma, (iii) Ākāśa, and (iv) Pudgala, to which some add (v) Kāla. The Jīva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma, and Ākāśa are pradeśātmaka, occupy space, and are therefore often designated as the five "Asti-kāyas," or "Extended-entities," Time being excluded from the category because it has *astitva* or existence, but not *kāyatva* or extension in space. The sentient Jīva comes into contact with the non-sentient Ajīva, and as a result there takes place a pouring in of a subtle material fluid (āsrava) which keeps the soul down in bondage (bandha).* When the inlet for this fluid is closed (saṁvara), and the fluid that has already penetrated into the soul is driven off by penance (nirjara, lit. drying up), the soul is liberated (moksha) and soars upwards to the Highest Realms of the Blessed. This gives us, therefore, the five categories of (i) āsrava, (ii) saṁvara, (iii) nirjara, (iv) bandha, and (v) moksha, to which in some enumerations two more, viz. pāpa and puṇya as the ethical causes of the physical effects of āsrava and saṁvara-nirjara, are added. One thing to be noted here is the peculiar Jain notion of what they call Dharma and Adharma. As Jacobi says, the Jainas have divided the normal functions

* The Jain notion of Āsrava is much more primitive than that of the Buddhists, who therefore may have been indebted to the Jainas for the idea.

of space as we conceive it into the three moments of Ākāśa, Dharma, and Adharma, the three together forming the necessary condition for the subsistence of all things. The Ākāśa affords them room to subsist; Dharma makes it possible for them to move and to be moved; and Adharma makes them rest in one place. If we ignore these three "Asti-kāyas" there remain the two Astikāyas of Jīva and Pudgala or soul and matter, there being an infinite number of the former, while the latter are either aggregates, or atoms torn off from the aggregates and capable of being fused into them from time to time. This is a very simple description of Jain ontology, against which Śaṅkarāchārya does not find it worth his while to raise any objection. His main objection—and of course that of the Sūtrakāra whose intention he faithfully interprets—is against their so-called "Syādvāda," or "Disjunctive Dialectics."

—Sūtra 33, line 7ff. — In the same breath with their ontological dogma as above described, the Jainas maintain another dogma which in some respects corresponds to the Sāṁkhya doctrine of "pariṇāmi-nityatva," but for the true genesis and explanation of which we have to consider the peculiar intellectual atmosphere within which the religious and philosophical activities of the Buddha and of Mahāvīra fell. Everything which is sat(existing) the Jainas tell us—

उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत् ।

चेतनस्याचेतनस्य वा द्रव्यस्य स्वजातिमजहतो निमित्तवशाद्भावान्तरावाप्तिरुत्पादनमुत्पाद इत्युच्यते, मृत्पिण्डस्य घटपर्यायवत् । तथा स्वजात्यपरित्यागेन पूर्वभावविगमो व्यय इति कथ्यते, यथा घटोत्पत्तौ पिण्डाकृतेः । अनादिपारिणामिकस्वभावत्वेन व्ययोदयभावात् ध्रुवं स्थिरीभवतीति ध्रुवः, तद्भावः कर्म वा ध्रौव्यम्, यथा घटपिण्डाद्यवस्थासु मृदाद्यन्वयात् ॥

This theory of the indefiniteness or many-sidedness of existence (anekānta-vāda) is in reality a Jain version of the Sāṁkhya doctrine of the constant mutation of the guṇas of the Prakṛiti, or an application to facts of ordinary life of the Vedāntic simile of—

वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं, मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।

which originally was intended to apply to only the transcendental Being. The distinction, of course, is that while with the Sāṁkhyas the changing factors are the guṇas and there is no Prakṛiti as, so to say, a substance over and above the mere sum of the three guṇas; and while with the Vedāntins the changing is the unreal, the Real or the Brahman being incapable of any change; the Jainas regard mutability as an aspect of the Immutable, the 'utpāda' and 'vyaya' being regarded as the guṇas of the 'dhruva' substance. On these premises it is obvious that concerning a given padārtha we can make *from divergent points of view*, different apparently contradictory statements. Thus we are told—

प्रश्नवशादेकस्मिन् वस्तुनि अविरोधेन विधिप्रतिषेधविकल्पना सप्तभङ्गी । तद्यथा—स्याद्घटः स्वात्मना, स्याद्घटः परात्मना, इत्यादि ।

This seems to mean that (i) if somebody has told you that a ghaṭa has a specific shape, and an object normally called the ghaṭa but not having that particular shape is presented to you, you will declare it to be "aghaṭa," though it really is "ghaṭa." Your assertion will thus depend upon *your conception* of what a ghaṭa is. (ii) Similarly, to you the essence of the ghaṭa might consist in its broad-bottomed shape, and not in its smell or colour, and so you would be justified in asserting that inasmuch as the object before you has that given shape it is ghaṭa, but inasmuch as it has the unwanted smell or colour, it is aghata. (iii) Or, a given ghaṭa may not be large enough to serve your purpose and so you can say it is no ghaṭa *to me*: and so on, from several other points of view that can be enumerated. In a sense this is a truism. It amounts to saying that men's points of view differ. But as a proposition of universal application it can imply that all our judgments are particular or individual judgments which have to be always considered in the given limitations of time, place, circumstance, use, intention, etc. If, therefore, we had to depend *exclusively* upon the judgments of men, it is clear that there could be no concensus of opinion, and therefore no certainty. But, fortunately, the Jainas would argue, the Āgamas, which are the works of the Āpta or reliable and omniscient persons, have declared the existence of the seven Padārthas and

five "Asti-kāyas," and we are saved from the purely sceptical attitude to which the "Syādvāda" by itself would lead us. Śaṅkarāchārya, no less than the Sūtrakāra, ignores this latter safeguard, and succeeds in proving that, as a mere "anaikāntika" theory of predication, the Syādvāda must return upon itself, and end in doubting the doubter himself.

—**Sūtra 33, line 24.** — The Jain texts are not anxious to *prove* their Padārthas, any more than the Vedāntins are to prove their Brahman. That rests on the authority of the Āgama, and reasoning can do it harm only, if applied. There is, however, one essential difference between the two. (i) Unlike the Vedāntin the Jain brings in his dialectics even to explain the facts of ordinary life. (ii) Secondly, the omniscient Tīrthakara of the Jainas can never become the Creator of the Universe, because, in the first place, they do not believe in the creation or the dissolution of the world; secondly, because the Tīrthakara, along with his omniscience, develops an absolute indifference to all mundane concerns whatsoever; and thirdly because, with their dualistic starting point, the only relation that they could think of between spirit and matter was that of repulsion. Thus it happens that God, the Creator, is entirely unavailable to the Jainas, and this in a way knocks off the basic support of their Āgamas. And even if it were otherwise, Śaṅkarāchārya was not expected to lay much stress upon this argument on the ground of the veracity of the Scriptures of his opponent: Compare Sūtra 38, line 8ff.

—**Sūtra 33, line 28.** —Śaṅkarāchārya forgets for the time that his conception of the "Māya" is open to the same charge. The defence probably would be that this Māyā is a trancendent entity that is not introduced in and out of season to explain the facts and phenomena of ordinary life. But even so, Śaṅkarāchārya's own argument in the present passage can be forced down his own throat. As Kumārila says in another context (Ślokavārttika, p. 219)—

तस्माद्यन्नास्ति तन्नास्त्येव यत् त्वस्ति परमार्थतः ।
तत् सत्यमन्यन्मिथ्येति न सत्यद्वयकल्पना ॥

—Sūtra 33, line 37. — It remains to explain how the seven propositions of the Syādvāda came to be formulated. From the data supplied by Buddhist as well as Jain Scriptures, we know that the time during which these prophets and teachers flourished was a period of considerable intellectual upheaval, no less remarkable than the age of the "Sophists" in Greek Philosophy before the advent of Socrates. Agnostic and Sceptical dialectics had run so rampant in the age, and they had such a ruthless logic at their command, that it had become very difficult for any established dogma or institution to hold its own against their attack. The Buddha had accordingly to leave a number of vital metaphysical questions "avyākṛita" or unexplained. Mahāvīra (who might be safely credited with the invention of the Syādvāda dialectics) apparently pursued the bolder method of turning the tables against his Sophist opponents. One typical Sophist of the day was Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta who took an extremely agnostic attitude, answering, in reply to any question put to him,—

'अत्थि' ति पि मे नो, 'नत्थि' ति पि मे नो, 'अत्थि च नत्थि च' ति पि मे नो, 'नेवत्थि न नत्थि' ति पि मे नो।

Mahāvīra probably tempered this agnosticism by lending to it an apparently positive aspect. Whereas Sañjaya had said: "I *cannot* say if it is, and I *cannot* say if it is not," Mahāvīra declared; "I *can* say that the thing in-a-sense *is*, and I *can* say that the thing in-a-sense *is not*." He further added that while mere human judgment could lead only to such uncertainties, Scriptures had taught an indubitable doctrine, which, of course, it behoved all true followers to accept. This would logically involve a distinction between the point of view of the highest truth (niśchaya-naya), and the ordinary (vyavahāra) point of view; and the Jain philosophers are not averse to recognise this. Understood in its historical setting, we are thus enabled to appreciate the Syādvāda in its true aspect and to evaluate it accordingly.

—Sūtra 33, line 38f. — Analogously to the Seven Propositions of the Syādvāda, the Jain texts speak of Seven "Nayas" or Modes, viz.—(1) Naigama, (teleological aspect); (2) Saṁgraha (class aspect); (3) Vyavahāra (empirical aspect); (4) Ṛijusūtra

(immediate or *prima facie* aspect); (5) Śabda (denotative aspect of names); (6) Samabhirūḍha (etymological denotation of names); and (7) Evambhūta (context aspect). For definitions and illustrations of these consult, amongst others, Tattvārtharājavārttika (Pannālāl's edition, pages 65ff.). Regarding the seven propositions of the Syādvāda and their scope, the following quotation will be found useful—

तद्विधानविवक्षायां स्यादस्तीति गतिर्भवेत् ।
स्यान्नास्तीति प्रयोगः स्यात् तन्निषेधे विवक्षिते ॥
क्रमेणोभयवाञ्छायां प्रयोगः समुदायवान् ।
युगपत् तद्विवक्षायां स्यादवाच्यमशक्तितः ॥
आद्यावाच्यविवक्षायां पञ्चमो भङ्ग इष्यते ।
अन्त्यावाच्यविवक्षायां षष्ठभङ्गसमुद्भवः ॥
समुच्चयेन युक्तश्च सप्तमो भङ्ग उच्यते ।

Regarding the definite occasions when the above dialectic can be used, the Brahmavidyābharaṇa notes—

सांख्येन यत् सत्त्वैकान्त्यमुपगतं तन्निवृत्तये आद्यो भङ्गः । शून्यत्ववाद्युपगतासत्त्वैकान्त्यनिवृत्तये द्वितीयो भङ्गः । कालभेदेन सत्त्वासत्त्वे तार्किकोपगते तदनैकान्त्याय तृतीयो भङ्गः । वेदान्तिना आनिर्वचनीयत्वमुपगम्यते तदनैकान्त्याय चतुर्थो भङ्गः । सत्त्ववादिनं प्रति सत्त्वेनानिर्वचनीयत्वं पूर्वपक्षिणोद्भावितम्, असत्त्ववादिनं प्रति असत्त्वेनानिर्वचनीयत्वं पूर्वपक्षवादिनोद्भावितम्, सदसत्त्ववादिनं प्रति ताभ्यामनिर्वचनीयत्वं पूर्वपक्षवादिनोद्भावितम्, तदनैकान्त्यद्योतनायावशिष्टास्त्रयो भङ्गाः ।

This probably is a later refinement within the school. There is, however, some justification in the argument that if the Syādvāda is intended merely to assert that things can be looked at from various points of view, that is a truism which cannot establish the proposition concerning the mutability of the *real nature* of things. As Appaya Dīkshita says in his gloss on the Śrīkaṇṭhabhāshya on the passage—

घटादिः स्वदेशेऽस्ति, अन्यदेशे नास्ति, स्वकालेऽस्ति, अन्यकाले नास्ति, स्वात्मनास्ति, अन्यात्मना नास्तीति देशकालप्रतियोगिरूपोपाधिभेदेन सत्त्वासत्त्वसमावेशे लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां विसंप्रतिपत्त्यभावः । नत्वेतावता पराभिमतं वस्त्वनैकान्त्यमापद्यते । स्वकाले सदेव, अन्यकाले असदेव, इत्यादि-नियमस्य भङ्गाभावात् ।

As we have already said, it is the Āgama that proves the Syādvāda: Syādvāda cannot itself prove Syādvāda.

—Sūtra 33, line 40. —The Jain theory of atoms is thus stated—

एकरसवर्णगन्धं द्विस्पर्शं शब्दकारणमशब्दम् ।
स्कन्धान्तरितं द्रव्यं परमाणुं तं विजानीहि ॥

The Jain atoms are thus infinitesimal, eternal, ultimate, and—unlike the Vaiśeshika atoms, but rather resembling in this the Buddhist atoms—qualitatively alike. They have weight, and are hence capable of downward as well as upward motion. But the whole theory is somewhat crude. Keith observes (Logic and Atomism, page 16), "The fact that the Jain school retained the theory without any substantial development is merely one of the many proofs of the metaphysical barrenness of the school." We have to observe in this connection that the main interest of Jainism was in other domains than in metaphysics.

—Sūtra 34, line 3ff. —The Jīvas are divided by the Jainas into the two main classes of the 'free' and the 'bound,' the latter being further divided into 'sthāvaras' or immobiles, that are endowed with only the sense of touch and inhabit the earth, water, light, wind, and plants of all kinds; and the 'trasas' or mobiles, which are endowed with two, three, four, and five senses and inhabit the bodies of the water-insects, gnats, bees, and animals—and others of the type of each, respectively. The bodies inhabited by these Jīvas are classified into (1) audarika or physical, (2) vaikriya which are the plastic sheaths of the gods and denizens of hell, (3) āhāraka of saints, (4) taijasa or magnetic, and (5) kārmaṇa. The first and the last two are shared by all unliberated souls. The souls are all immortal and have to undergo countless succession of transmigrations following their own karman, until, by means of the

saving doctrine of Jainism, they are transported to the Realm of the Blessed which is situated in the Highest Heaven.

—Sūtra 34, line 9.—As we have seen, Jīva is an "asti-kāya" and so occupies space. With regard to its magnitude, we are told—

असंख्येयाः प्रदेशा धर्माधर्मैकजीवानाम् ।

and in the case of each Jīva we learn—

जीवस्तावत् संहरणविसर्पणस्वभावत्वात् कर्मनिर्वर्तितं शरीरमणु बृहद्वाधितिष्ठंस्तावदवगाह्य वर्तते ।

The usual illustration of the process is that of a lamp which can, according to circumstance, diffuse its light within a small room, a larger hall, or the wide space without. The specific difficulty put forward by Śaṅkarāchārya, the Jainas would probably meet by declaring this description of the soul in terms of space as figurative only; or by the supposition that, out of the infinite parts of the soul, only eight, occupying the very centre of each soul, are the really essential parts; or finally—"Arhadāgamaprāmāṇyāt" (Tattvārtharājavārttika, page 203), adding that there is also "Svapakshadoshaprasaṅga" in the conception of the Ākāśa and the śrotrendriya. The Brahmasūtrakāra (to judge from the defence put forth) thus seems to have laid his unerring finger upon a real vulnerable point in the system.

—Sūtra 34, line 13f.—Śaṅkarāchārya's contention that a small body cannot conceivably comprise an infinite number of parts is rather crude. If the avayava is *sufficiently minute*, the number of them contained in the human body may transcend the calculation-powers of man—and that is all that infinitude can mean. Compare the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika argument that if we do not agree to the proposed size of an atom as $\frac{1}{6}$th part of the tertiary-atom, but go on indefinitely dividing and sub-dividing, mount Meru and a mustard seed would be equal in dimension.

—Sūtra 35, line 6.—It is the Sāṁkhyas who admit the doctrine of "pariṇāmi-nityatva" or fixity of the essence amidst the mutations of the guṇas. To the Vedāntins every *real* modification implies impermanence. Compare our Note to II. ii. 33, line 7ff.

—The simile of the skin of the body which wears out every moment is expressed by the old stanza quoted fully in the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha (ii. 78–79) and referred to by Sureśvara in the Naishkarmyasiddhi, ii. 60—

वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नश्चर्मण्यस्ति तयोः फलम् ।
चर्मोपमश्चेत् सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्फलः ॥

—**Sūtra 35, line 7.** — The Jainas have surpassed most philosophers, in the variety and minuteness of their classifications of Karman. There are eight main types of Karman, distributed into as many as 148 sub-types. The main types are—

Ghāti-karmas:

(i) Jñānāvaraṇīya—which obscures, the souls' inborn right to knowledge ;

(ii) Darśanāvaraṇīya—which obscures right intuition and makes men heretics; it also brings on sleep ;

(iii) Antarāya—which hinders the good tendencies, and so leads the soul on the path of sin.

(iv) Mohanīya—which exposes the soul to passions and temptations ;

Aghāti-karmas:

(v) Āyushka—which determines the type and the duration of the next life ;

(vi) Nāma—which determines the body and the number and nature of the indriyas to be assumed by the soul ;

(vii) Gotra—which determines the nationality, caste, family, and social standing of the next birth, and

(viii) Vedanīya—which brings on us suffering by obscuring the bliss-nature of the soul.

In certain enumerations, number (iii) Antarāya and number (viii) Vedanīya change places. The first four are classed as " Ghāti " because they occasion positive impediments to salvation, which it is possible to get rid of in this life ; the remaining four are not so positively mischievous ; but they are responsible for

determining the nature and circumstance of the next life of the transmigrating self, and these are the basic but indirect causes that determine the quality of one's Karmans. Further, the " Aghāti " Karmans are incapable of being destroyed in the present life.

—**Sūtra 35, line 8.** — The following quotation develops the simile of the gourd to its fullest possibility—

तद्यथा गुणवद्भूमिभागारोपितमृतुकालजातं .... पोषणकर्मपरिणतं कालच्छिन्नं शुष्कमलाब्वप्सु न निमज्जति, तदेव गुरुकृष्णमृत्तिकालेपैर्घनैर्बहुभिरालिप्तं घनमृत्तिकालेपवेष्टनजनितागन्तुकगौरवमप्सु प्रक्षिप्तं तज्जलप्रतिष्ठं भवति, यदा त्वस्याद्भिः क्लिन्नो मृत्तिकालेपो व्यपगतो भवति, तदा मृत्तिकालेपसङ्गविनिर्मुक्तं मोक्षानन्तरमेवोर्ध्वं गच्छति। ....एवमूर्ध्वगौरवगतिधर्मा जीवोप्यष्टकर्ममृत्तिकालेपवेष्टितस्तत्सङ्गात् संसारमहार्णवे भवसलिले निमग्नो भवासक्तोऽधस्तिर्यगूर्ध्वं च गच्छति, सम्यग्दर्शनादिसलिलक्लेदात् प्रहीणाष्टविधकर्ममृत्तिकालेप ऊर्ध्वगौरवादूर्ध्वमेव गच्छत्या लोकान्तात्॥

—**Sūtra 35, line 10.** — Apparently therefore the doctrine of the eight central particles of the soul (see above, Note to Sūtra 34, line 9) is a post-Śaṅkara development.

—**Sūtra 35, line 16.** — Under the cover of the word " ādi " the Bhāmatīkāra introduces a new criticism of the theory by inquiring whether the soul's chaitanya is shared by each constituent particle of the soul, or by a given number of particles in their totality—

तेषां प्रत्येकं चैतन्ये बहूनां चेतनानामेकाभिप्रायत्वनियमाभावात् कदाचिद्विरुद्धदिक्क्रियत्वेन शरीरमुन्मथ्येत। समूहचैतन्ये तु हस्तिशरीरस्य पुत्तिकाशरीरत्वे द्वित्रावयवशेषो जीवो न चेतयेत्।

—**Sūtra 35, line 19.** — In the first interpretation the word " paryāyeṇa " meant " by turn, " " alternately ; " in the second interpretation it denotes unending succession.

—Sūtra 36, line 1ff. — The sūtra is variously interpreted—

शंकर—

(1) अन्त्यस्य (मोक्षावस्थजीवपरिमाणस्य) अवस्थितेः (नित्यत्वात्), उभयोः (तत्पूर्वयोराद्यमध्यमपरिमाणयोः) नित्यत्वात् (आत्मपरिमाणाविशेषत्वेन नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्), अविशेषः (त्रयाणामपि परिमाणानां साम्यं, एकशरीरपरिमाणतैव) [प्रसज्येत];

(2) अन्त्यस्य (मोक्षावस्थजीवपरिमाणस्य) अवस्थितेः (नित्यत्वात्), उभयोः (तत्पूर्वयोराद्यमध्यमकालयोः) नित्यत्वात् (अन्त्यपरिमाणानुवृत्तेरवश्यंभावित्वात्) अविशेषः (त्रिष्वपि कालेष्वेकपरिमाणत्वं) [प्राप्नोति];

रामानुज, श्रीकण्ठ—

अन्त्यस्य (मोक्षावस्थागतजीवपरिमाणस्य) अवस्थितेः (नित्यत्वात्), उभयोः (तस्यात्मनः तत्परिमाणस्य तदा) नित्यत्वात्, अविशेषः (पूर्वावस्थास्वपि तथैव नित्यपरिमाणत्वं) [प्राप्नोति];

वल्लभ—

अन्त्यस्य (मोक्षावस्थजीवपरिमाणस्य) अवस्थितेः (नित्यत्वात्), च (चार्वाकादिवज्जीवानित्यत्वपरिहाराय च) उभयोः (संसारमोक्षावस्थजीवपरिमाणयोः) नित्यत्वात्, अविशेषः (जीवस्य शरीरपरिमाणत्वस्य सर्वथा असिद्धिः);

विज्ञानभिक्षु—

अन्त्यस्य (मोक्षावस्थजीवपरिमाणस्य) अवस्थितेः (नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्), उभयोः (वादिप्रतिवादिनोरावयोः) नित्यत्वादविशेषः (नित्यत्वे संप्रतिपत्तिः);

मध्व—

अन्त्यस्य (मुक्तिगतात्मपरिमाणस्य) अवस्थितेः (अवश्यंभावेन), उभयोः (आत्मनस्तद्देहस्य) च नित्यत्वात्, अविशेषः (अविशेषेण सर्वशरीरनित्यत्वं) [प्राप्नोति];

भास्कर,
निम्बार्क } —Same as Saṅkara (1).

—**Sūtra 36, line 3.**—The process of liberation according to Jain philosophy is as follows. With the destruction of four "ghāti" karmas there results during the life-time of the soul the absolute knowledge 'kevala-jñāna.' When the body falls down at death, there results the destruction of the "aghāti" karmas, and the soul thereupon ascends higher and higher until he gains the top of the universe—

तन्वी मनोज्ञा सुरभिः पुण्या परमभास्वरा ।
प्राग्भारा नाम वसुधा लोकमूर्ध्नि व्यवस्थिता ॥
नृलोकतुल्यविष्कम्भा सितच्छत्रनिभा शुभा ।
ऊर्ध्वं तस्याः क्षितेः सिद्धा लोकान्ते समवस्थिताः ॥

Such liberated souls, although freed from the audarika (terrestrial), taijasa (igneous), and kārmaṇa (transmigratory) bodies, can occasionally assume āhāraka (translocatory) body by means of which they can now and then pay visits to Tīrthakaras who occupy the highest region of the Universe—the use of the āhāraka being also permitted to the Jīvanmuktas even before the falling away of the body at death. The liberated souls constitute a hierarchy in the Highest Heaven with the first Tīrthakara as their supreme head. The Jainas, as before observed, do not need any God to create the world, but the place of a god for devotion and worship is taken by the several Tīrthakaras and their immediate disciples, the Gaṇadharas.

—**Sūtra36, line 6.**—There is lacking in this adhikaraṇa the general condemnatory sūtra, unless we regard the word 'aviśeshaḥ' as implying reference to sūtra II. ii. 32, as Śaṅkarāchārya seems to suggest.—While Śaṅkarāchārya's criticism of Jainism is to be understood with the limitations as above indicated, it seems at the same time necessary to say here finally that Jainism has to be evaluated more as a religion than as philosophy, at least so far as its origins are concerned. Accordingly one cannot help deprecating a judgment like the following (Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 297)—"A religion in which the chief points insisted upon are that one should deny God,

worship man, and nourish vermin, has indeed no right to exist." And yet, like some other things that may also not possess the 'right to exist,' it has existed for over two millenia, and has produced excellent types of men—both monks and house-holders —and has offered real guidance and solace to many a seeking and believing votary.

—**Sūtra 37, lines 3-6.** — The following extracts from the Śāṅkarabhāshya on the sūtras in question will explain the exact point—

ब्रह्म च 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' इति लक्षितम् । तच्च लक्षणं घटरुचकादीनां मृत्सुवर्णादिवत् प्रकृतिकत्वे, कुलालसुवर्णकारादिवन्निमित्तत्त्वे च समानमित्यतो भवति विमर्शः—किमात्मकं पुनर्ब्रह्मणः कारणत्वं स्यादिति । तत्र......... ईक्षापूर्वकं हि ब्रह्मणः कर्तृत्वमवगम्यते । .... । ईक्षापूर्वकं च कर्तृत्वं निमित्तकारणेष्वेव कुलालादिषु दृष्टम् । .... । इत्येवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः— 'प्रकृतिश्च' उपादानकारणं च ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यं निमित्तकारणं च, न केवलं निमित्तकारणमेव । कस्मात् । 'प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्' ॥

The 'pratijñā' refers to the promise concerning the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one thing, which, Śankarāchārya tells us in his Bhāshya on II. iii. 6, is to be understood not "kshīrodaka-nyāyena" but the "prakṛiti-vikāra-nyāya"—

क्षीरोदकन्यायेन च सर्वविज्ञानं कल्प्यमानं न सम्यग्विज्ञानं स्यात् । नहि क्षीरज्ञानगृहीतस्योदकस्य सम्यग्विज्ञानगृहीतत्वमस्ति । .... तस्मादशेषवस्तुविषयमेवेदं सर्वविज्ञानं सर्वस्य ब्रह्मकार्यतापेक्षयोपन्यस्यत इति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

The "drishṭānta" is the famous 'earth and jars' in Chhāndogya vi. 1-2. — The next sūtra adduces in support of the position the "Bahu syām, prajāyeya" passages, where Brahman thinks not only of creating the world, but of *itself being* it.

—**Sūtra 37, lines 10 f.** — The Yogasūtras of Patañjali, which is the Classical exposition of the Yoga doctrine, has only one sūtra where Īśvara is mentioned and defined (i. 24)—

क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ।

In the four other sūtras where the word occurs, it occurs in combination with 'praṇidhāna' and as one of the possible objects

of meditation. It is quite clear that, having once recognised God for the sake of appearances, the Philosophy of Yoga as expounded by Patañjali, is not over-willing to make him a vital part of the system. It is Vāchaspati-miśra who asserts, under iv. 3, that—

प्रकृतिरेव जगत्कारणम् । ....ईश्वरस्तु (प्रकृतेः) साम्यपरिणामादि-
रूपाखिलावरणभङ्गेनोद्बोधकः ।

In the "Sāṁkhya-Yoga" system as presented by the Gītā, and in portions of the Mahābhārata, Īśvara plays a more important rôle. In passages like (Gītā, xv. 16f.; cp. also xiv. 3, vii. 4f.)—

द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च ।
....
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ॥

God has almost become the pantheistic deity of the Vedāntins, though passages are occasionally met with in the Epic where God is the Controller of the Prakṛiti. Śaṅkarāchārya is here thinking probably of a treatment of the Yoga doctrine where Īśvara is of more consequence than in our Yogasūtras, and yet much short of what the Gītā seems to make him. What exactly is the text in the mind of the Bhāshyakāra, and what is the part that such a text played in the genesis and evolution of the Early Sāṁkhya Philosophy is a moot point. Compare Notes, page 69, before.

—**Sūtra 37, line 12 ff.**—The brunt of the attack of this adhikaraṇa is of course against the Māheśvaras or Pāśupatas, so that in explaining how the Sūtrakāra was led to bring in these Śaivite systems in immediate succession to his attack on Jainism the Ratnaprabhā observes—

लुञ्चितकेशमतनिरसनानन्तरं जटाधारिशैवमतं बुद्धिस्थं निराक्रियत इति प्रसङ्गसंगतिमाह—इदानीमिति ।

—The origin of the Māheśvaras is lost in obscurity. Although the terrific Rudra is mentioned about 75 times in the Ṛigveda and has three entire hymns addressed to him, he occupies a very subordinate position in that Veda, and the epithet "Śiva" is used in connection with him only once in the Tenth Maṇḍala. In the Yajurveda he appears in a much more developed form

and is the frequent subject of prayer and worship; and there is even a mention of more than one form of him. These forms, sometimes invoked under the distinctive titles of Bhava, Śarva, Īśāna, etc., and representing possibly so many distinct divinities at first, came in course of time to be fused into the Great God who, in the Atharvaveda, is already elevated to the position of the "Lord of Beings" or Bhūta-pati. The eleven forms of the Rudra are definitely formulated in the Brāhmaṇas and in the subsequent theosophic speculations; and, particularly in the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, the God has already taken his rank as the All-highest, and as the Creator of the World, while the Mahābhārata has several legends to narrate concerning that aspect of the God. The so-called Śaivaite Upanishads belong of course to a much later age. But it seems now to be generally conceded that the deity had its first home somewhere outside the pales of Vedic Aryandom: that he was originally a god of the forests and mountains, whose cult and worship was already well-established and wide-spread amongst a section of the aborigines and of the pre-Aryan inhabitants of India—the Nishādas and the Dravidians. Mr. Narasiṁha Swāmi even suggests that "Rudra" was no more than the title of the head of the ancient tribe of the "Bhūtas," with Rudrāṇī as the title of his consort. That is not improbable in itself. In any case, it is evident that the Aryans borrowed the Rudra cult from their non-Aryan predecessors.* It is uncertain, however, as to whether the phallic worship was a part of this Rudra cult, or whether it originally belonged to another section of the pre-Aryan inhabitants of India. Prof. K. R. Subramanian, in his recent book on the Origin of Śaivism (Madras, 1929) makes the old Nāga tribes of Ancient India responsible for the origin and evolution of the serpent-worship, phallic-cult, and other features peculiar to Śaivism. That the phallic worship belongs to the pre-Vedic period, (cp. the epithet "śiśnadevāḥ" which occurs twice in the Ṛigveda), and that in one form or another it was once prevalent in Assyria and all

* Compare in this connection the story of Daksha, how he was punished for denying Śiva a place amongst the regular Vedic Gods with the words—

सन्ति नो बहवो रुद्राः शूलहस्ताः कपर्दिनः ।
एकादशस्थानगता नाहं वेद्मि महेश्वरम् ॥

around the coast of the Mediterranean is now practically proved. And if, amongst certain sections of the Māheśvaras of Mediæval India, certain aberrations in practice are known to have been current, we can attribute that as much to the original inheritance of the cult, as to the sensuous propensities of a more debased age.

—As a system of philosophy with a literature of its own Śaivism can be definitely traced to the early centuries of the Christian era. Patañjali (to Pāṇini v. 3. 99) refers to the images of Śiva, Skanda, and Viśākha; the Śāntiparvan speaks of the Pāśupata as one of the five established schools of religious doctrine; and references since Kālidāsa's time can be cited without end. There are also the Vāyu, Liṅga, and other Śaiva Purāṇas of a somewhat uncertain date and authenticity. The so-called Śaiva "Āgamas," of which a traditional list of 28 is preserved, belong to a period not later than A. D. 500, whereas for Nakuleśa (rather Lakuleśa, from *lakula*, a club), a native of Gujarāt and the founder of the orthodox Pāśupata Philosophy, dates as early as the beginning of the Christian era, and as late as the 3rd or 4th century after Christ, have been variously claimed, the earlier date being probably the more correct one. What exactly was the innovation introduced by Lakuleśa in the Śaivite Philosophy current before his time, it is not now possible to determine. The philosophical religion as established by Lakuleśa in time branched off into the four schools known as Śaiva, Pāśupata, Kāruka (*v. l.*, Kāruṇika, Kālāmukha), and Kāpālika. The first of these is the most moderate and rational, and it developed ultimately into a philosophical system akin to the Viśishṭādvaita. The Śrīkaṇṭha *alias* Nīlakaṇṭha Bhāshya on the Brahmasūtras belongs to this school, and most of the literature of the Tamil or Dravidian Śaivism follows the same persuasion. The Pāśupatas are more extreme in their ritual, but none too weird and dreadful as the other two schools, whose ritual is characterised by Śāktic practices of a revolting type. The sphere of activity of these four schools (which may have originated in Northern India) was subsequently mostly confined to the Central and Peninsular India, while in Kāśmīr there arose about the 7th or the 8th century after Christ another form of Śaivism passing under the name of "Spanda" and

"Pratyabhijñā" schools,* with extensive literatures of their own that is gradually being brought to light. A yet more modern development of Śaivism is the cult of the Liṅgāyatas founded (?) by Basava about the middle of the twelfth century. In nearly all of these Śaivite schools, Tāntric ritual of a kind, consisting in the repetition of mystic formulæ to the accompaniment of symbolical movements of parts of the body, is generally prescribed amongst the disciplines for the novice, and these Śaivite practices, or their analogues from Vaishṇavism, have, even down to the present times, quite thoroughly permeated the daily religious observances (e. g., the Saṁdhyā) of the average Hindu, "who can be, from the nature of these observances, unmistakably classed as a Śaivite or a Vaishṇavite or a Śākta, even though he personally may not be swayed by any sectarian narrowness, and may carry his cultured indifference in regard to these and the other religious observances to the length of denying all religion as such." Śaivism has thus a long and checkered past, and possesses untold possibilities for the future. Its significance in the pre-historic period of Aryan migrations is being only in the last few years recognised to the full.

—**Sūtra 37, line 13.** — It is obvious that Śaṅkarāchārya's refutation in the present adhikaraṇa can apply only to those schools of Śaivism that do not eventually imply monism. This was the case with the earlier "Āgamas" where Śiva or Maheśvara played only a subordinate rôle, his wife Śakti exercising the cosmic functions in a predominant manner. The Śākta Āgamas (of which a traditional list of 77 has been enumerated) carried the same tendency to its extreme. As a compromise there ensued the later Śaivite systems where Śiva and his consort form but one body. Of such a nature are most of the Dravidian and Kāśmīrian schools of Śaivism, which, accordingly, fall outside

* There are not really two schools, the one founded by Vasugupta (cir. 800) and the other by Somānandanātha (cir. 900), as was imagined by Bühler. "Spanda" is the ultimate principle of spontaneous *vibration* accompanied by consciousness, which creates the world. "Pratyabhijñā" is the discipline consisting in unbroken *recognition* of the identity between Jīva and Śiva, which leads to salvation.

the sphere of Śaṅkarāchārya's present attack. What answers most closely the description of Śaṅkarāchārya is the system of Lakuleśa or Lakulīśa, (as he is more usually called) who is credited with the authorship of a work called "Pañchārtha" or "Pañchārtha-vidyā." Regarding the five categories recognised by the school the following explanations are offered by the Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha (vi. 62ff.)—

अस्वतन्त्रं सर्वं कार्यम् । तत् त्रिविधम्—विद्या, कला, पशुश्चेति । तत्र पशुगुणो विद्या । सापि द्विविधा, बोधाबोधस्वभावभेदात् । चेतनपरतन्त्रत्वे सत्यचेतना कला । सापि द्विविधा, कार्याख्या कारणाख्या चेति । तत्र कार्याख्या दशविधा, पृथिव्यादीनि पञ्च तत्त्वानि रूपादयः पञ्च गुणाश्चेति । कारणाख्या त्रयोदशविधा, ज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकं कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकमन्तःकरणत्रयं च । पशुत्वसंबन्धी पशुः । सोपि द्विविधः, साञ्जनो निरञ्जनश्चेति ॥ समस्तसृष्टिसंहारानुग्रहकारि कारणं महेश्वररूपम् । तस्यैकस्यापि गुणकर्मभेदापेक्षया विभागः ॥ चित्तद्वारेणात्मेश्वरसंबन्धहेतुर्योगः । स च द्विविधः, क्रियालक्षणः क्रियोपरमलक्षणश्चेति ॥ धर्मार्थसाधकव्यापारो विधिः । स च द्विविधः, प्रधानभूतो गुणभूतश्च । तत्राद्यः, भस्मस्नानशयनोपहारजपप्रदक्षिणात्मकं व्रतम्, क्राथनस्पन्दनमन्दनशृङ्गारणावितत्करणावितद्भाषणात्मकानि द्वाराणि च । द्वितीयस्तु अनुस्नानभैक्ष्योच्छिष्टाशननिर्माल्यधारणादिः ॥ दुःखान्तो द्विविधः, समस्तदुःखनिवृत्तिः, पारमैश्वर्यप्राप्तिश्च ॥

Under "upahāra" are included the peculiarly Śaivaite practices such as—

हसितगीतनृत्यहुडुक्कारनमस्कारजपाः ।

while the " dvāras " included certain aberrations in practice in the matter of sex, speech and drink.

—**Sūtra 37, line 14f.** —Regarding the recognition of a God in the Vaiśeshika philosophy, vide our Note to II. ii. 12, line 31 (page 82 before).

—**Sūtra 37, line 19.** —The Lakuleśa-Pāśupata, Śaiva, and Pratyabhijñā schools differ from each other in regard to the extent of the causal efficiency of Śiva. The Pāśupata school maintains that Śiva is a cause independent of the Karman of

the individual soul; the Śaiva or the Siddhānta school regards Śiva as the cause in consonance with and not independent of the world's Karman*; while the Pratyabhijñā school maintains that Maheśvara creates the universe by the mere force of His desire.

—**Sūtra 37, lines 20-22.** — It will be noticed that the "itaretarâśrayatva-dosha" and the "andhaparamparā-dosha" have been already urged against the Vedāntic position in Sūtra II. i. 35, while the "prayojanâbhāva" formed the topic of the 11th Adhikaraṇa (II. i. 32-33) of that same Pāda. The superiority of Śaṅkarāchārya's position as compared with that of his opponent consists, in the first place, in the Scriptural authority which the Āchārya naturally claims exclusively for himself, and, secondly, in his *ultima ratio* of the "ajāti-vāda." — It may be pointed out here in passing that the argument in II. i. 34ff. recurs in Brahmasūtra II. iii. 41f. The wording of the latter sūtra—

कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः ।

as well as the general argument is so similar that one wonders why the author of the Brahmasūtras was led to repeat it in such close proximity. I have elsewhere suggested (Basu Mallik Lectures, Pt. 1, pp. 144ff.) that the discussions about the nature of the individual soul and the Absolute Self in Br. Sū. II. iii, and III. ii, respectively, are later additions.

—**Sūtra 37, line 27f.** — Compare Yogasūtra i. 24, quoted by us on page 190 before. It is clear of course that this part of the refutation is directed against the Seśvara-Sāṁkhya, rather than against any specific Pāśupata school.

—**Sūtra 38, line 1ff.** — The sūtra is not present in the Sūtrapāṭha as preserved by Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha, and Bhāskara: the other Bhāshyakāras give it. As Śaṅkara interprets it, it seems somewhat unconnected with the "Pāśupata" refutation.

—**Sūtra 38, line 3f.** — For Saṁyoga see Note to II. ii. 17, line 32ff. Samavāya was already refuted in II. i, $18^{29\text{-}35}$, and else-

* "His dependence on the Karman does not detract from his independence any more than the King's dependence on the guards to protect the capital detracts from the royal power."

where. The other sambandha, the commentators suggest, might be "yogyatā."

—**Sūtra 38, line 10.** — An "Āgama" is generally divided into four pādas—

विद्याक्रियायोगचर्याख्याश्चत्वारः पादाः। पतिपशुपाशानां स्वरूपनिर्णयो विद्या। अनेकविधसाङ्गदीक्षाविधिः क्रिया । जपध्यानादिर्योगः। विहिताचरणनिषिद्धवर्जनात्मिका चर्या ॥

Compare also Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, vii. 178f.—

शैवागमेषु मुख्यं पतिपशुपाशा इति क्रमात् त्रितयम् ।
तत्र पतिः शिव उक्तः पशवो ह्यणवोऽर्थपञ्चकं पाशः ॥

The Āgamas are highly prized by the Śaivas, and the literature bearing upon them is vast and only partially made available in editions and translations. The Śaivas refuse to accord an inferior rôle to the Āgamas by the side of the Vedas. They assert that the Vedas are general, the Āgamas special treatises. Hence, the Vedas which are often meant for the ordinary layman have to be discarded when they go against the teachings of the Āgamas. Śrīkaṇṭha, in his commentary on the sūtra, in fact says—

वयं वेदशिवागमयोर्भेदं न पश्यामः। वेदोपि शिवागम इति व्यवहारो युक्तः, तस्य तत्कर्तृकत्वात् । अतः शिवागमो द्विविधः, त्रैवर्णिकविषयः सर्वविषयश्चेति। वेदस्त्रैवर्णिकाविषयः, सर्वविषयश्चान्यः, उभयोरेक एव शिवः कर्ता। अतः कर्तृसामान्यादुभयमप्येकार्थपरं प्रमाणमेव ॥

—**Sūtra 38, line 11f.** — Apparently Śaṅkarāchārya here intends to imply that to the Vedāntins the Vedas are eternally self-subsistent, "apaurusheya," and so eternally valid. The Vedas are not valid *because* they are the work of an omniscient person. This last is the Vaiśeshika position, while the former is that of the Pūrvamīmāṅsā, which Śaṅkarāchārya is not averse to accept whenever convenient. Compare the "Mantravarṇa" cited in II. i. 36[16], and contrast II. i. 14[67].

—**Sūtra 39, line 2f.** — Śaṅkarāchārya in his first interpretation of the sūtra takes adhishṭhāna to mean support or substrate; and since the Pradhāna is without the qualities of colour etc. he

argues that it cannot be the proper adhishṭhāna for the Lord. In his alternative explanation he takes adhishṭhāna to mean body and says that in the absence of a body the Lord would be unable to manipulate matter. Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and others combine the two interpretations by declaring that the bodiless Lord cannot have anything as his substrate, whether it be with or without qualities. As regards the line of argument followed, the Bhāmatī says—

यथादर्शनमनुमानं प्रवर्तते, नालौकिकार्थविषयमितीहापि न प्रस्मर्तव्यम् ।

—Sūtra 40, line 1ff. — In the first interpretation the affix *vat* is taken in the sense of *like*: as is the soul with reference to the Indriyas, which, being atomic, have undeveloped or non-manifest qualities, so too is the Lord. In the second interpretation, *vat* is understood as a possessive termination, meaning Indriya-endowed [body.]

—Sūtra 41, line 18. — The arguments urged in this refutation are by no means very profound. They can be even stated to be fallacious; for, when we infer fire from smoke we do not say that because in the kitchen a fan was used to kindle the fire therefore the mountain also must have a fan. This is true; but the very fact that the system is unable to withstand even such arguments shows how very weak it really is, says the Kalpataruparimala—

सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानोपन्यासस्तु ईदृशेनासारतरेणाप्यनुमानजातेन दूषयितुं शक्यत्वादत्यन्तुच्छः पक्ष इति द्योतनार्थम् ।

Śrīkaṇṭha however says that this refutation must not be held to apply to the Pāśupata system as a whole, but only to certain parts of it; or rather, to no part of the Pāśupata system, but to the Seśvara Yoga system propounded by Hiraṇyagarbha—

शिवागमैकदेशे शिवस्य परब्रह्मणः केवलनिमित्तत्वमुपपादितम् । तत्परिहारार्थामिदमधिकरणमिति पूर्वाचार्याणां व्याख्या । ...... । केवलेश्वरनिमित्तत्ववादिहिरण्यगर्भोक्तयोगस्मृतिविषयमिति वयं वदामः । .... । सर्वथा न केवलमीश्वरो निमित्तमित्यस्माकं राद्धान्तः ।

Śaṅkarāchārya himself makes it a rather general refutation, so that anybody may wear the cap whom it fits.

—**Sūtra 42, line 4.** — Compare Sūtra 37, line 3ff.

—**Sūtra 42, line 8.**—On the origin of the "Pāñcharātra" system, which is the topic of the present adhikaraṇa in the opinion of all the Bhāshyakāras save two (Madhava and Nimbārka), important light was shed by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, first in his Report for the Search for Sanskrit Mss, 1883–84, then in the paper submitted by him to the Seventh International Congress of Orientalists at Vienna, and finally in his work on Vaishṇavism Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems, Strassburg, 1913. The main points of his thesis are—(1) The doctrine of Bhakti or devotional worship to a Supreme Divinity was known to Pāṇini (7th century B. C.) and can even be detected not only in the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad where the word first occurs (albeit in a concluding stanza which looks like an addendum), but even in some of the Ṛigvedic hymns, particularly those addressed to Varuṇa. —This has been now generally conceded, and the view propounded by Weber and others as to India's indebtedness to Christianity for this doctrine of Bhakti finds no advocate now-a-days. It has in fact been recognised that it was in the course of the development of the worpship of the Sun-god as Vishṇu-Nārāyaṇa, and of Rudra-Śiva, that we meet with the highest expression of the Indian religious thought in the shape of Bhakti, or rather of Pantheistic-monism. And if in the origins of this faith any influence from outside the pales of orthodox Aryan thought is to be brought in, it should rather be sought for in the pre-Aryan cults of worship of the several local gods and godlings, which were capable of arousing in the mind of the worshipper the requisite mood of awe and submission. The second point made is: (2) The Kshatriya race of the Sātvatas, otherwise known by the name of Vṛishṇi, orginated, some centuries before the time of Pāṇini, a new religion of devotion by raising their eponymous hero Kṛishṇa-Vāsudeva of the Mahābhārata fame, his brother Baladeva (alias Saṁkarshaṇa) and his two descendants, Aniruddha and Pradyumna to divine honours. This religion steadily rose in importance so that at the time of the rise of Buddhism there were in existence, besides Buddhism itself, two other important religions, (Jainism and the Bhāgavata religion of Bhakti, equally opposed to Brāhmaṇism, and alike founded by the Kshatriyas.—This part of Bhan-

darkar's argument is also generally conceded. Thirdly (3), in the course of the prolonged struggle between Brāhmaṇism and Buddhism and the pre-Buddistic "Heretics," the former found it to their interest to make an alliance with the Bhāgavata religion; and in the process of doing so, the Brāhmaṇas identified Vāsudeva with Nārāyaṇa, which was the name given to the Supreme Being in the later Brāhmaṇa period, as also with Vishṇu—originally an aspect of the Sun-god—who, along an independent line of development, was concurrently being raised also to the position of the Supreme Being. — The line of evolution herein postulated is a legitimate working out of a tendency first seen in what Max Müller styles "henotheism," afterwards acentuated in the Brāhmanic doctrine of the mystic correspondences (bhaktisāhacharya or bandhutā)* obtaining between divinities and their varied paraphernalia of worship, and ultimately culminating in the full-fledged doctrine of the "avatāras." And several gods like Khaṇḍobā or Viṭhobā are being identified with Śiva or Vishṇu in more recent times in accordance with the same process of thought. Fourthly (4), when, in the first two centuries of the Christian era, a colony of Ābhīras from central Asia migrated into India, they brought with them certain Christian notions and legends connected with the birth of Christ and the miracles of his childhood, which added to certain subsequent developments made on the luxuriant soil of India, resulted in the well-known stories of Gopāla-Kṛishṇa, the cowherd-boy of Gokula, which are to be met with only in the Harivaṁśa, the Vishṇupurāṇa, the Bhāgavata and other subsequent literary works—the portion of the Grat Epic where allusions to the doings of Kṛishṇa in his boyhood occur being put down by the distinguished Orientalist as later interpolations. We have already a mention of Kṛishṇa-Devakīputra, the ardent pupil of Ghora-Āṅgirasa in the Chhāndogya iii. 17. 6: and this Kṛishṇa is probably the same as the astute politician of the Mahābhārata, and the religious teacher of Arjuna: but his identification with the Gopāla, the child-god of Gokula, was made only after this immigration of the Ābhīras. —This

* For the "Bandhutā" theology of the Brāhmaṇa texts, its presuppostions and ulterior developments, reference may be made to Belvalkar-Ranade's *The Creative Period*, Chapter II, Sections 24–25.

last part of Sir Ramakrishna's theory is frequently called into question. Patañjali mentions the Ābhīras (vol. I, p. 252) and so they must have come into India at least a couple of centuries before Christ. Hence, if the legend of the cow-herd boy is of Christian origin, it could not be the Ābhīras who brought it in. As rivals to the Ābhīras in this respect, the Gurjars who had an early settlement in the north-west of Punjab, and who gave their name not only to the Gujrānwālā district of Punjab, but also to at least four "Gujarāts," are at times put forward. The Gurjars it is believed had acquired some tincture of Christianity from their neighbours in Central Asia, and they naturally propagated their ideas in the course of their advance into the interior of India. The case nevertheless stands so far unproven.

—So much as to the origins of the Bhāgavata or Pāñcharātra religion. The oldest account of its tenets is contained in the Bhagavadgītā, which, according to Garbe, was originally a Krishnaite theism grounded upon Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy, and was subsequently worked over in the interest of Vedāntic pantheism.* Before long not only the later sectarian Upanishads, but likewise independent "Saṁhitās" came to be written inculcating the philosophy and ritual of the sect. Over two hundred such Saṁhitās are known by name, the oldest of them dating from at least the early centuries of the Christian era. The best account of the contents of these texts is given by Schrader in his "Introduction to the Pāñcharātra," Adyar, 1916. A normal Saṁhitā treats of four topics: Jñāna or philosophy, Yoga or disciplinary practices, Kriyā or construction of temples and dedication of images, and Charyā or prescribed religious and social observances. The Pāñcharātra probably originated in the North of India and subsequently spread to the South, where it brought into existence a mass of controversial literature written in Sanskrit by a series of Vaishṇava teachers known as Āchāryas (amongst them Yāmuna and his pupil Rāmānuja), as also an extensive devotional literature, mostly in Tamil, composed by

* Holtzmann considered the pantheistic part of the poem as the earlier. Hopkins' formula is longer and puzzling: He calls the poem as being "at present a Krishṇaite version of an older Vishṇuite poem, and this in turn was at first an unsectarian work, perhaps a late Upanishad."

Dravidian saints known as Āḷvārs, whose collected writings are often spoken of as the "Vaishṇava" or Tamil Veda. As was perhaps inevitable, there arose a number of minor differences in the philosophical, position and the ritualistic practices of the schools, producing in time the Viśisṭādvaita theory of Rāmānuja (1017–1137), the Dvaita theory of Madhva (1197–1276), th Dvaitâdvaita theory of Bhāskara (perhaps cir. 1050) and of Nimbārka (died cir. 1162), and the Śuddhâdvaita theory of Vallabha (1479–1531). Most of these Āchāryas were natives of the South, although their activity in later life was spread over other parts of India. And concurrently with these religious awakenings of the South, there took place similar awakenings in Bengal, Bihar and adjoining Provinces, under the lead of Rāmānand (1299–1410), Vidyāpati (cir. 1400), Kabīr (1440–1518), Chaitanya (1485–1533), Sūradās (1483–1563), Tulsīdās (1532–1623), Dādu (1544–1603) and others; in Gujarāt under the lead of Narasiṁha Mehta (1415–1481), Mirābāī (1403–1470), Bhalaṇ (1434–1514), Akhā (1615-1675), and Premānand (1636–1734); in Karnatak under Narahari Tīrtha (died 1333), Purandara Da s (1491–1564), Vijaya Das (1687–1755), and other representatives of the Dāsakūṭa (=Bhaktipantha); as also in the Mahārāshṭra under our own saints Jñāneśvara (cir. 1290), Nāmadeva (born 1270), Ekanātha (1548–1599), Tukārāma (1607–1649), Rāmadāsa (1608–1681), and the rest. There is thus an extensive record of achievement to the credit of the Pāñcharātra *alias* the Bhāgavata religion, and the chapter of that record cannot by any means be said to be closed yet. Next to the Gīta, the Bhāgavatapurāṇa is the most authoritative work, which is even recognised (along with the Gītā, the Upanishads, and the Brahmasūtras) as their fourth "Prasthāna" by most Vaishṇava philosophers. The Bhaktisūtras attributed to Śāṇḍilya and to Nārada are much later productions.

—**Sūtra 42, line 9ff.** — The "Vyūhas" or Modes have a cosmological as well as a psychological aspect. Cosmologically the Vyūhas mark the four stages of world-emanation as proceeding from the Highest Being. This Highest Being is endowed with "Shāḍguṇya" or the six qualities of jñāna, aiśvarya, śakti, bala, vīrya, and tejas, which in their totality make up the body of the Highest Vāsudeva. In the Vyūhas only two out of the

six qualities are specially emphasised, and by the help of them the Vyūhas initiate the creative process by originating nascent distinctions, putting forth the duality of Purusha and Prakṛiti, and bringing about an all-round growth and movement in the cosmos. From the psychological point of view the Saṁkarshaṇa is the individual soul, the Pradyumna the Manas, and Aniruddha the Ahaṁkāra.—The four Vyūhas give rise to three sub-Vyūhas each, the resulting twelve Vyūhas being the first twelve out of the twenty-four names—Keśava, Nārāyaṇa, etc. with which the orthodox Hindu begins his daily "Saṁdhyā." —The doctrine of the Vyūhas is found in the "Nārāyaṇīya" section of the Mahābhārata (xii. 347. 30–40), but it is altogether unknown to the Gītā. It would also seem that originally only the first two Vyūhas were recognised.

—**Sūtra 42, line 13 f.** — The terms are thus defined—

वाक्कायचेतसामवधानपूर्वकं देवतागृहगमनमभिगमनम् । पूजाद्रव्याणामर्जनमुपादानम् । इज्या पूजा । स्वाध्यायोऽष्टाक्षरादिजपः । योगो ध्यानम् ॥

—**Sūtra 42, line 26.** — It will be remembered that the Bhāgavata conception of Moksha was the soul's *permanent* abode in Vaikuṇṭha, and not a merging of the individual soul into the Supreme Soul without leaving behind any consciousness of individuality.

—**Sūtra 43, line 2 f.**—The attack contained in the first two sūtras of the present adhikaraṇa is interpreted in the same manner by all the Bhāshyakāras except Madhva, Nimbārka and Vijñāna. The two latter Bhāshyakāras (and particularly Madhva) interpret the first sūtra (*i. e.*, 42) as an attack against the view that the Lord's Śakti might be the creator of the world *independently.* A female-being like Śakti cannot by itself create anything. If you join the Śakti with the Lord, who is the active agent in creation, it is clear that before the Lord the Kartṛi can do anything, he must have a karaṇa or body and limbs, which he has not (sūtra 43). And if you endow the Lord with both body and power of seeing (vijñāna), that amounts to accepting (apratishedha) "our own" theory. The last sūtra is a condemnation in general terms.—Rāmānuja is alone in making the last two sūtras a reply to the pūrvapaksha in the first two sūtras, so that the Pāñcharātra

system, being cured in its few vulnerable points, stands uncondemned. Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Vallabha have made the adhikaraṇa condemnatory throughout. Śrīkaṇṭha comes midway. While he makes sūtra 44 a refutation of the attack in sūtras 42 and 43, he nevertheless makes the last or 45th sūtra a general condemnation of the system on other grounds.

—**Sūtra 43, line 4.** — Would not the spider producing threads out of himself have been an adequate dṛishṭānta? Compare the Bhāshya on II. i. 25.

—**Sūtra 44, line 3.** — The Mahābhārata (xii. 347) explicitly declares—

यो वासुदेवो भगवान् क्षेत्रज्ञो निर्गुणात्मकः ।
ज्ञेयः स एव राजेन्द्र जीवः संकर्षणः प्रभुः ॥
संकर्षणाच्च प्रद्युम्नो मनोभूतः स उच्यते ।
प्रद्युम्नाद्योऽनिरुद्धस्तु सोऽहंकारः स ईश्वरः ॥

—**Sūtra 44, line 5.** — The word "tat" in the sūtra refers, according to Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha, to "Pāñcharātraprāmāṇya," according to Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, to the "asambhavadosha" urged in sūtra 42; while Vallabha who, not unlike Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, finds a condemnation of the Pāñcharātra system in all the four sūtras, understands by "tat" the Vyūhas, who, being now regarded as endowed with Vijñāna and the other guṇās of the Supreme Lord, will each of them be an independent Sovereign upon whose sweet will there can be no restriction imposed. The simultaneous existence of more than one Omnipotence can always be proved to be a logical inconsistency. — I think that there is a much more satisfactory way of interpreting the sūtra. Sūtra 43 having urged that from Saṁkarshaṇa, the agent, Pradyumna, the mind cannot originate, sūtra 44 says–if, as an alternative supposition, Pradyumna is not a "Karaṇa" but is identical with Vāsudeva, as being possessed of "vijñāna" and other pre-eminences, then the "Karaṇatva" ought to have been plainly denied; but "tadapratishedhaḥ," the Karaṇatva is not discountenanced in the system.

—**Sūtra 44, line 13.** — Compare II. i. 6, line 18.

—Sūtra 44, line 14. —The name "Pañcharātra" has been variously explained. (1) Rātra signifies a chapter or a topic, as in the familiar Arabian "Nights," the five topics of a Saṁhitā being either Tattva, Muktiprada, Bhaktiprada, Yaugika, and Vaiśeshika; or the five means of Abhigamana etc. detailed in II. ii. 42, line 13, above. (2) A treatise that results in the night-obscuration, *i. e.*, the confounding of five heretical systems. (3) What cooks (verb, *pach*) the night of ignorance, what illumines. (4) a treatise in which the great Purusha offers a sattra for five nights as a means of obtaining pre-eminence in the world and, as a consequence of the sattra, assumes the five-fold manifestations in his Para, Vyūha, Vibhava, Antaryāmin, and Archā forms. This last explanation seems to me to be more legitimate than the others.

—Sūtra 45, line 1ff. — Rāmānuja is alone in turning, what on the face of it is a concluding stroke of the attack against an opposed system, into an actual defence of it. He thus paraphrases the sūtra—

विप्रतिषिद्धा हि जीवोत्पत्तिरस्मिन्नपि शास्त्रे ।

For Rāmānuja's rendering we would expect the sūtra to be "Pratishedhāch cha" and not "Vipratishedhāch cha." Further, if the "pratishedha" were so explicitly made, what are we to think of the earlier objection which ignored the existence of such an explicit denial? Rāmānuja's interpretation of the adhikaraṇa thus lacks conviction, and yet apparently it seems to have convinced Thibaut, who says (S. B. E. 34, lii)—"It, however, appears, to me that the explanations of the 'vā' and of the 'tat', implied in Rāmānuja's comment, are more natural than those resulting from Śaṅkara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unusual proceeding to close the polemical pāda with a defence of that doctrine which—in spite of objections—has to be viewed [—by whom ?—] as the true one." The arguments against Rāmānuja's interpretation are quite on the surface: (1) The tone of the whole pāda is "parapakshanirākaraṇa." (2) The tone of the last sūtra of the adhikaraṇa is decidedly combatative, as of sūtras II. ii. 10, 17, and 32. (3) Rāmānuja's explanation of the last sūtra is anything but satisfactory. (4) If the Sūtrakāra really wanted to defend the Pāñcharātra system

he could have done so in a far less unambiguous manner. And finally, (5) Śaṅkara's explanation of the sūtras falling under the adhikaraṇa is not, after all, so very objectionable.

—**Sūtra 45, line 2 f.** — One expects that Śaṅkarāchārya would pick many more holes into the system under cover of this last sūtra than what he has actually done. His "Veda-vipratishedha" is absolutely untenable. Rāmānuja has correctly pointed to the analogous passage in the Chhāndogya, VII. i. 2–3, where the "Veda-nindā" by Nārada is not really intended, and says that the words of dissatisfaction put in Śāṇḍilya's mouth are merely intended as "vakshyamāṇa-vidyā-praśaṁsārtham." Rāmānuja writes—

यश्चैष केषांचिदुद्घोषः......वेदविरुद्धं तन्त्रमिति, सोप्यनाघ्रातवेदवचसाम-नाकलिततदुपबृंहणन्यायकलापानां श्रद्धामात्रविजृम्भितः ।

—**Sūtra 45, line 5.** — Śrīkaṇṭha finds, from his point of view as a Śaiva philosopher, another contradiction in the Pāñcharātra system—

श्रुतिविरुद्धेश्वरकारणवादमुक्तिहेतुत्वतप्तमुद्राधारणादिधर्मपरत्वादिना विप्रति-षेधात् ।

Probably, the Pāñcharātra philosopher would find the "chitā-bhasmacharchā" of the Pāśupata system equally contrary to "Scriptural" commands ! As to "Purāṇa" passages proclaiming Śiva, Vishṇu, and the worshippers of each in turn, by all kinds of opprobious names, they end by cancelling each other, and can never be taken very seriously.

Addenda et Corrigenda to the Notes

Page	Line	Correct	Incorrect
65	11	and hence necessarily heterogenous;	and heterogeneous;
75	*After line 22 add the following Note—*		
	— **Sūtra 9, line 3** — कार्यवशेन etc., i. e., *a posteriori*, and not *a priori*		
83	11	omitted*.	omitted.
83	*bottom*	*Add the following footnote—*	
	* Not quite. Compare xii. 75 ff.—	संख्यादिभिरमुक्तश्च निर्गुणो न भवत्ययम् । तस्मादसति नैर्गुण्ये नास्य मोक्षोऽभिधीयते ॥ गुणिनो हि गुणानां च व्यतिरेको न विद्यते । . . . . प्राग्देहान्न भवेद्देही प्राग्गुणेभ्यस्तथा गुणी ।	
88	21	World; and the introduction of God into the system is a later accretion.	World.
88	25	3 † Dvyaṇukas	3 Dvyaṇukas
88	*After the first footnote, add the following footnote—*		
	† Śaṅkara (see II. ii. 11[20]—द्वयणुकसहितो परमाणुः) seems to have considered the Tryaṇuka as made up of three atoms.		
89	22	Śaṅkarāchārya, although his words imply that a tryaṇuka consists of just three *atoms*, not three dvyaṇukas),	Śankarāchārya),
92	25	मित्राभावो,	मित्रभावो
95	23	II. ii. 11	II. ii. II
109	7	Samavāya in fact may be said to be the हेतु which has संश्लेष as the फल. Hence there should be	There should be
115	8	Dīpavaṁsa*,	Dīpavaṁsa,
115	*Add at bottom the following footnote—*		
	* द्वे सतानि च वस्सानि अट्ठारस वस्सानि च । संबुद्धे परिनिब्बुत्ते अभिसत्तो पियदस्सनो ॥		
115	9	218	288
115	11	478	477
121	36	*sensible*	*sensibile*

Page	Line	Correct	Incorrect
122	24	*Add at the end of the footnote—*	

चतुष्टये can mean "four-constituted" or "of four-kinds." The Bhāmatīkāra seems to understand the word in the second sense, following the अभिधर्मकोश II. 13—

भूतानि पृथिवीधातुरप्तेजोवायुधातवः ।
धृत्यादिकर्मसंसिद्धाः खरस्नेहोष्णतेरणाः ॥

Page	Line	Correct	Incorrect
123	8	सविषयेन्द्रियाणि	सविषयेद्रियाणि
123	25	in the world, resembling herein the three guṇas of the Sāṁkhyas.	in the world.
125	5	Skandhas, — or we may say that it is just the five Skandhas (i. e., the different functions, vṛittis or faculties) viewed in their togetherness—	Skandhas,
129	*After line 5*	*add the following Note—*	

— **Sūtra 19, line 3** — The अविद्यादि series establishes an unending cyclic chain of causes, e. g., River — Vapour — Cloud — Rain — River, but the chain by itself does not explain adequately the *modus operandi* of each of its causal links. Nor does it explain *why* things lend themselves to be arranged in such a series: why they exhibit such inherent uniformity. In the absence of an adequate answer to this important question, the "निदान" chain is as good as an *ignoratio elenchi.*

Page	Line	Correct	Incorrect
129	22	निर्वर्तयति,	निर्वर्तैयात,
137	17	the aṇus (i. e., body)	the aṇus
137	18	the āśraya (*not* āśrita).	the āśraya
139	7	parts. The use of the word — which is a Jain technicality — in the present context is rather curious.	parts.
153	26	*Add at the end of the Note—*	

The theory in effect asserts that destruction is always the mother of construction. The death-knell of the dying year tolls in the arrival of the New Year.

189 *After line 25 add the following Note—*

— **Sūtra 36, line 4** — The उत्तराध्ययन 36. 65 asserts that the dimension of a perfect soul is $\frac{2}{3}$ rds of the height which the individual had in his last existence.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

—Sutra 3, line 31.— "Darśana", translated by us as Śruti-text, can also mean "intuitive-realisation," on the evidence of the Śvetāśvatara passage 6.13.

—Sūtra 9, line 11 f.— Compare also the Bhāshya on III. ii. 21—
ब्रह्मस्वभावो हि प्रपञ्चो न प्रपञ्चस्वभावं ब्रह्म ।

—Sūtra 8, line 10.— कारणाव्यतिरिक्तं (=कारणाकारं) कार्यं is the hypothesis of the सिद्धान्तिन्, but under the supposition made that becomes impossible.

—Sūtra 23, line 8.— Another possible interpretation of this perplexing sūtra can also be suggested by taking the word अश्मन् to mean "magnet" as in sūtra II. ii. 7. As the magnet, the source of movement in the iron-needle, is not itself agreeably or disagreeably affected by the movement, and so cannot be charged with doing and not-doing what is disagreeable and agreeable respectively, so the soul (and *a fortiori* the God) cannot be liable to any similar contingency, seeing that the so-called हित or अहित belongs to the body only. The body, through ignorance, identifies itself with the soul, and fancies that it can do हित or अहित to itself, just as the iron-needle, being temporarily magnetised, may imagine itself as the source of its own movements and worry about them.

—Sūtra 27, line 24.— The frequent appeals to लौकिक दृष्टान्तs in the Sūtras (even Sūtra 28 is an appeal to "loka") serve to emphasise the fact that even ordinary experience is capable of affording us fleeting glimpses or intimations of the Absolute.

—Sūtra 32, line 1.— The प्रयोजनवत्त्व or purposiveness of actions or प्रवृत्तिs is a rule applicable only to finite (human) beings. To generalise it and to attribute it to the inflnite God or Absslute is unwarranted. Hence the पूर्वपक्ष is sufficiently answered by saying that it does not arise at all.

—Sūtra 34, line 1.— The argument of Sūtras 34-36 of this Pāda recurs also in Sūtras II. iii. 41–42.

Errata to the Notes

Page	line	Correct	Incorrect
4	15	Pūrvapakshin	Pūrvapakhin
4	25	(and in the portions	and in the portions
9	31	तद्विदः ॥	तद्विदाः ॥
13	26	sūtra, such as " tattvānām, "	sūtra
15	11	Ashṭakās	Ashṭakas
17	15	stimulat-	stimula-
18	16	Sāṁkhyas	and Sāṁkhyas
19	9	**वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा**	**वायुर्वै पिष्ठा]**
20	11	Kāśmīrin	Kaśmīrin
23	24	four	five
23	26	*omit* —(v) कार्यस्य कारणवत्प्रसङ्गः ।	
25	*last*	propitiate	propitiat
49	19	the soul (and *a fortiori* God)	God
54	6	—**Sūtra 33,**	—**Sūtra 32,**

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[N. B. Figures refer to pages of English translation, unless they are preceded by n, in which case they refer to the pages of Notes].